Exploring the limits of the concept of legitimate expectations in investment treaty law : a study in comparative law and the development of international law by Nowak, Lucja Magdalena
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nowak, Lucja Magdalena (2015) Exploring the limits of the concept of legitimate expectations in investment 
treaty law : a study in comparative law and the development of international law. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of 
London. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/20373 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this PhD Thesis are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
 
This PhD Thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
When referring to this PhD Thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the PhD Thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of 
submission) "Full PhD Thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD PhD Thesis, 
pagination.
1Exploring the Limits of the Concept of
Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law:
A Study in Comparative Law and the
Development of International Law
Lucja Magdalena Nowak
Supervisors: Peter Muchlinski and Nicholas Foster
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Law
SOAS, University of London
2014
2
3Thesis Abstract
This thesis aims to identify more clearly the rationale, the constituent elements and
the methodology of the concept of legitimate expectations in the field of investment
treaty law. It addresses the problems associated with the concept’s development in
the application of the standards of fair and equitable treatment and indirect
expropriation.
The thesis adopts a comparative perspective. More developed legal regimes have
been referring to legitimate expectations and to a similar concept of investment-
backed expectations. Their experiences can assist in addressing questions about the
concept’s nature in investment treaty law. The enquiry focuses on seven such
regimes, namely those of: the USA, England, Australia, European Union, European
Convention on Human Rights, general international law and World Trade
Organisation.
The analysis shows that the concept of legitimate expectations is equitable. It
safeguards fairness and trust in the actions of public authorities. It demands
balancing of the private interest behind legitimate expectations and the public
interest underlying the measures that frustrate them.
The analysis identifies three common types of legitimate expectations, namely:
legitimate expectations related to the legal and factual situation of an investment,
legitimate expectations arising from specific representations and legitimate
expectations related to invalidation of State acts. It also identifies the limits of the
concept. It should cover neither expectations of immunity from general legislative or
regulatory changes, nor investor’s subjective expectations of treatment, nor
expectations of a proprietary nature.
The comparative analysis clarifies the concept’s limits, the methodology required for
its application and the fundamental questions the tribunals need to address. This
greater clarity will facilitate a comprehensive case-by-case discussion among system
participants. This discussion will contribute to the development of a concept capable
of balancing the private and public interests persuasively and thus of supporting the
long-term sustainability of the investment treaty system as a whole.
4TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables ..........................................................................................................11
A. Table of Abbreviations ..............................................................................11
B. Investment Awards, Separate and Dissenting Opinions, and Expert
Reports                                                   . ............................................................12
1. Awards and Opinions................................................................................12
2. Expert Reports..........................................................................................18
C. National Jurisdictions................................................................................18
1. Australia ...................................................................................................18
2. Canada.....................................................................................................18
3. England and Wales ..................................................................................18
4. Hong Kong ...............................................................................................20
5. United States............................................................................................20
D. International and Supranational Cases .....................................................21
1. Permanent Court of International Justice, International Court of Justice,
Awards (State-to-State Arbitration) ..................................................................21
2. GATT 1947 and WTO Reports of the Working Party, the GATT Panels and
the Appellate Body...........................................................................................21
3. The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and the General Court22
a. The ECJ and Opinions of Advocates General .......................................22
b. The General Court ................................................................................24
4. The European Court of Human Rights......................................................25
E. Treaties, National Legislation and Announcements ..................................26
1. IIAs and Model IIAs ..................................................................................26
2. NAFTA Treaty Statements........................................................................27
3. GATT and WTO........................................................................................27
4. Other Treaties, Conventions, Rules and Statutes .....................................27
5. National Legislation and Legislative Announcements ...............................28
Chapter 1 Introduction: Comparative Law Methodology and Development of
Investment Treaty Law (‘ITL’)..................................................................................29
5A. Introduction...............................................................................................29
B. Thesis, Research Questions and Working Assumptions...........................30
C. Reasons for this Research: Development of International Law through the
Rhetorical Argumentation. ...................................................................................34
D. The Comparative Method: Persuasiveness through Broad Comparative
Approach - General Observations .......................................................................39
E. Methodology of This Thesis: Choice of Comparators, Sources.................46
F. Thesis Outline...........................................................................................51
Chapter 2 Investment Treaty Law (‘ITL’) as a Developing Legal Order: Structural
Context of the Comparative Analysis ......................................................................53
A. Introduction...............................................................................................53
B. Key Characteristics of ITL: A Nascent Legal Regime Developing through
Interpretation of Vague Treaty Standards............................................................53
C. Dealing with Indeterminate Treaty Standards: Methods and Limits...........61
D. Legitimate Expectations in the Process of Development of ITL.................69
E. Conclusions..............................................................................................78
Chapter 3 The Origins and Development of Legitimate Expectations Doctrine in
Anglo-American Municipal Law...............................................................................79
A. Introduction...............................................................................................79
B. The US Regulatory Takings and ‘Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations’ (‘RIBE’)..........................................................................................80
1. The Origins and Rationale of RIBE...........................................................80
a. Origins ..................................................................................................80
b. Rationale...............................................................................................82
2. RIBE Based on Property Rules at the Time Property Is Purchased or
Invested In.......................................................................................................83
3. Reliance on the Law as an Argument in Favour of Protecting RIBE..........86
a. Reasonable Reliance on Law as a Shield against Subsequent
Regulatory Change ......................................................................................86
b. Substantial Reliance: Factors Strengthening the Reliance on Law
Argument .....................................................................................................86
6c. Reasonable Reliance on Law as a Regulatory Freeze ..........................88
4. Foreseeability of Regulatory Change as a Factor in Establishing RIBE ....89
a. Recognition of General Regulatory Powers of the Authorities ...............89
b. Examples of Situations Related to State’s Regulatory Powers That May
Impact on Reasonableness of RIBE.............................................................90
c. The Notice Rule Cannot Mean That All Regulation Is Foreseeable .......92
5. Balancing Reasonable Reliance and Foreseeability of Change: Regulatory
Risk Allocation .................................................................................................94
a. Balancing Between Reasonable Reliance and Foreseeability Is a Matter
of Degree .....................................................................................................94
b. Balancing Directed by ‘Fairness and Justice’ of Regulatory Transitions 95
c. Concept of RIBE Is Unclear and RIBE-Based Claims Rarely Successful97
6. Conclusions..............................................................................................98
C. Legitimate Expectations in English and Australian Law ............................98
1. Origins and Rationale ...............................................................................98
2. Sources of Legitimate Expectations........................................................102
a. Sources of Procedural Expectations ...................................................102
b. Sources of Substantive Expectations ..................................................104
3. Legitimacy of Expectations .....................................................................108
4. Protection of Legitimate Expectations: Procedural or Substantive? ........111
a. Procedural Protection..........................................................................111
b. Substantive Protection ........................................................................112
5. Legitimate Expectations and Balancing ..................................................114
6. Conclusions: English and Australian Law ...............................................116
D. Conclusions............................................................................................117
Chapter 4 The Origins and Development of Legitimate Expectations Doctrine in EU
law and ECtHR Jurisprudence..............................................................................119
A. Introduction.............................................................................................119
B. EU law and the Principle of Protection of Legitimate Expectations..........119
71. Origins and Rationale of the Principle of Protection of Legitimate
Expectations ..................................................................................................119
2. Situations of Protection of Legitimate Expectation ..................................123
a. Legitimate Expectations and Regulatory Change................................123
b. Legitimate Expectations and Revocation of Decisions ........................128
c. Legitimate Expectations Arising from Representations........................130
3. The ‘Prudent Trader’ Standard ...............................................................133
4. Balancing the EU Interest with the Private Interest .................................135
5. Conclusions............................................................................................138
C. Legitimate Expectations and Property Protection under the ECHR.........139
1. The Origins and Context of the Concept of Legitimate Expectations in the
ECtHR Jurisprudence ....................................................................................139
2. Scenarios in which ECtHR Refers to Legitimate Expectations ................141
a. Legitimate Expectations and Ultra Vires..............................................142
b. Legitimate Expectations and Claims ...................................................145
3. Balancing Community Interests with the Interests of the Individual .........148
4. Conclusions............................................................................................152
D. Concluding Remarks ..............................................................................153
Chapter 5 Legitimate Expectations and International Law.....................................155
A. Introduction.............................................................................................155
B. Normativity of Custom and Legitimate Expectations ...............................155
C. Legitimate Expectations and Treaty Interpretation ..................................160
1. Theory ....................................................................................................160
2. Practice: GATT/WTO Concept of Legitimate Expectations .....................163
D. Unilateral Declarations, Estoppel and Pre-Ratification Obligations .........169
1. Unilateral declarations ............................................................................169
2. Estoppel .................................................................................................171
3. Provisional Application of Treaties..........................................................172
E. Conclusions............................................................................................174
Chapter 6 The Origins and Development of Legitimate Expectations in International
8Investment Law: Indirect Expropriation .................................................................176
A. Introduction.............................................................................................176
B. ‘Metalclad Definition’ and the Meaning of ‘Reasonably-to-Be-Expected
Economic Benefit of Property’ ...........................................................................177
C. Critique of Metalclad: ‘Legitimate / Investment-Backed Expectations’ as
Factors Relevant for the Elucidation of Vague IIA Standards ............................183
D. References to ‘Legitimate / Investment-Backed Expectations’ in Connection
with Indirect Expropriation .................................................................................186
E. Conclusions............................................................................................193
Chapter 7 The Origins and Development of Legitimate Expectations in Investment
Treaty Law: Legitimate Expectations and the FET Standard.................................195
A. Introduction.............................................................................................195
B. Theoretical Underpinnings......................................................................195
C. Sources of Legitimate Expectations........................................................197
1. Legitimate Expectations Based on Investor’s Reliance on an IIA: Legitimate
Expectations of FET ......................................................................................197
2. Legitimate Expectations Based on the State of the Law at the Time of
Investment.....................................................................................................201
3. Legitimate Expectations Arising from ‘Commitments’: Argentina’s
Privatisation Programme................................................................................205
4. Legitimate Expectations Arising from Representations ...........................208
D. Legitimacy and Reasonableness of Investor’s Expectations...................212
1. General Considerations: Caveat Investor ...............................................212
2. Objective Assessment of Legitimacy and Reasonableness of Investor’s
Expectations ..................................................................................................216
3. Specific Considerations: Legitimacy of Expectations Arising from
‘Commitments’...............................................................................................217
4. Specific Considerations: Legitimacy of Expectations Arising from
‘Representations’...........................................................................................218
E. Protection of Investor’s Legitimate Expectations.....................................220
1. Expectations Arising from the State of the Law at the Time of Investment220
92. Expectations Arising from ‘Commitments’...............................................224
3. Expectations Arising from ‘Representations’...........................................224
F. Balancing Private and Public Interest .....................................................226
G. Conclusions............................................................................................229
Chapter 8 The Legal Character of the Concept of Legitimate Expectations in
Investment Treaty Law – A Comparative Analysis ................................................231
A. Introduction.............................................................................................231
B. Summary of the Survey ..........................................................................231
C. Concepts Based on Legitimate Expectations: Typology..........................233
1. European and US Approaches ...............................................................233
2. Legitimate Expectations and Representations ........................................236
3. Legitimate Expectations and Legislative Change....................................239
4. Legitimate Expectations and Ultra Vires .................................................242
D. Common Elements .................................................................................245
1. General Observations.............................................................................245
2. Rationale ................................................................................................246
3. Equitable Character................................................................................248
4. Legitimacy of Expectations .....................................................................251
5. Balancing................................................................................................253
E. The Loose Ends: Expropriation, Public International Law and Commitments256
F. Conclusions............................................................................................259
Chapter 9 Conclusions and recommendations......................................................261
A. Introduction.............................................................................................261
B. How to Apply the Concept of Legitimate Expectations in Practice...........261
1. Three Types of Legitimate Expectations.................................................261
2. Considerations Applicable to All Three Types of Expectations................262
3. Type 1: General Expectations Related to Legal and Factual Circumstances262
4. Type 2: Legitimate Expectations Arising from Representations ..............263
5. Type 3: Legitimate Expectations and Ultra Vires.....................................265
10
C. Fundamental Questions Underlying Application of Legitimate Expectations266
1. The Character of Protection Offered by IIAs ...........................................266
2. The Character of the FET Standard........................................................267
3. A Standard of Prudent or Reasonable Investor.......................................268
4. Does the Concept of Legitimate Expectations Apply to Contracts?.........268
D. Considerations for Treaty Drafters ..........................................................270
E. Suggestions for Further Research ..........................................................272
1. The Contractual Dimension of Legitimate Expectations ..........................272
2. The Role of Stabilisation Clauses ...........................................................272
3. The Standards of Review/Balancing .......................................................273
F. Final Remarks ........................................................................................274
Bibliography..........................................................................................................276
A. Books .....................................................................................................276
B. Articles and Chapters in Edited Volumes................................................279
C. Institutional Reports................................................................................295
11
List of Tables
A. Table of Abbreviations
AB Appellate Body
BIT bilateral investment treaty
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada
and the EU
CFI Court of First Instance
CIL customary international law
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECJ Court of Justice of the European Union
ECT Energy Charter Treaty
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
DFATD Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of Canada
FET fair and equitable treatment
FIPA Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
FTA free trade agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HCA High Court of Australia
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IIA international investment agreement
ILC International Law Commission
ITA investment treaty arbitration
ITL investment treaty law
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P 1/1 Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR
12
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
RIBE reasonable investment-backed expectations
USSC U.S. Supreme Court
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
WTO World Trade Organisation
B. Investment Awards, Separate and Dissenting Opinions, and Expert
Reports .
1. Awards and Opinions
ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v The Republic of
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal of 2 October 2006
AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v The Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award of 23 September 2010
Al-Bahloul v Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), Partial Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability of 2 September 2009
Alpha Projektholding GmbH v Ukraine, ICSID Case no. ARB/07/16, Award of 8
November 2010
Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v The
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award of 26 September
2007
Arif v Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award of 8 April 2013
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3,
Final Award of 27 June 1990
Award in the Matter of an Arbitration between Kuwait and the American
Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL), 21 ILM 976 1982
Azinian, Davitian, & Baca v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/2, Award of 1 November 1999
Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of 14
July 2006
13
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award of 27 August 2009
BG Group Plc. v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 24 December 2007
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award of 24
July 2008
Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
Decision on Liability of 14 December 2012
Cargill, Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2,
Award of 18 September 2009
Chemtura Corporation v Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award of 2 August
2010
CME Czech Republic B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 13
September 2001
CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award
of 12 May 2005
CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision
of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003
Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award of 5
September 2008
Corn Products International, Inc. v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility of 15 January 2008
Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/02, Award of 31 October 2012
Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/19, Award of 18 August 2008
EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones
Argentinas S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award of 11 June 2012
EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award and
Dissenting Opinion of 8 October 2009
Electrabel S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision
on Jurisdiction, applicable law and liability of 30 November 2012
14
El Paso Energy International Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award of 31 October 2011
EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN 3481,
Award of 3 February 2006
EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN 3481,
Partial Dissenting Opinion of Horacio A. Grigera Naón of 30 December 2005
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award of 22 May 2007
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 January 2004
Feldman v Mexico (NAFTA), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 16
December 2002
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/02/01, Award of 17 July 2006
Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award of 12
November 2010
Gami Investments, Inc. v The Government of the United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL, Final Award of 15 November 2004
GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award of 31
March 2011
Generation Ukraine, Inc. v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16
September 2003
Glamis Gold, Ltd. v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award of 8 June 2009
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al v United States of America, Award
of 12 January 2011
Gustaw F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/24, Award of 18 June 2010
Impregilo S.p.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award of 21
June 2011
Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa Peru, S.A. v The Republic of
Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Decision on Annulment of 5 September 2007,
Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin Berman
15
International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Arbitral Award of 26 January 2006
International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Arbitral Award of 26 January 2006, Separate Opinion by
Thomas Wälde
Jan de Nul N.V., Dredging International N.V. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/13, Award of 6 November 2008
Kardassopoulos and Fuchs v The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos.
ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, Award of 3 March 2010
Kardassopoulos v Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of
6 July 2007
Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability
of 14 January 2010
Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Dr.
Jürgen Voss of 1 March 2011
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections
to Jurisdiction of 30 April 2004
Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award of 31
March 2010
Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award of 30 August 2000
Methanex Corporation v United States of America (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), Final
Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits of 3 August 2005
Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award
on the Merits of 6 June 2008
Mobil Investments Canada Inc. & Murphy Oil Corporation v Canada, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and on Principles of Quantum of 22 May
2012
16
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v The Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/7, Award of 25 March 2004
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v The Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment of 21 March 2007
National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award of 3 November
2008
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, LCIA Case No.
UN3467, Final Award of 1 July 2004
OKO Pankki Oyj, VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG, Sampo Bank PLC v The Republic
of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/6, Award of 19 November 2007
Oostergetel, Laurentius v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Final award of 23 April
2013
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award of 11
September 2007
Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company, CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v The
Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 28 April
2011
Plama Consortium Limited v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award of 27
August 2008
PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Şikreti v
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award of 19 January 2007
Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (NAFTA), Interim Award of 26
June 2000
Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/23, Award of 29 June 2012
Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v Republic
of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award of 29 July 2008
Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 17
March 2006
Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award of 28 September 2007
17
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 29
January 2004
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/84/3, Award on the Merits of 20 May 1992
Spyridion Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award of 7 December
2011
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAgua Servicios
Integrales del Agua S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on
Liability of 30 July 2010
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAgua Servicios
Integrales del Agua S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Separate
Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group v Argentina, UNCITRAL,
Decision on Liability of 30 July 2010
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group v Argentina, UNCITRAL,
Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003
The Rompetrol Group N.V. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award of 6 May
2013
Total S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability of 27
December 2010
Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Award of 7 June 2012
Ulysseas, Inc. v Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 12 June 2012
Unglaube Marion, Unglaube Reinhart v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case Nos.
ARB/08/1 and ARB/09/20, Award of 16 May 2012
Walter Bau AG (in liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL, Award of 1
July 2009
18
Waste Management, Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3,
Final Award of 30 April 2004
White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India, Final Award of 30
November 2011
2. Expert Reports
El Paso Energy International Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Legal Opinion of M. Sornarajah of 5 March 2007
AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v The Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Expert Report of Professor Piet Eeckhout of 30
October 2008
C. National Jurisdictions
1. Australia
F.A.I. Insurances Ltd v Winneke [1982] HCA 26
Haoucher v Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1990] HCA 22
Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic [1990]
FCA 22
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6
2. Canada
The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664, Reasons for
Judgement of 2 May 2001
3. England and Wales
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374
F & I Services Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2001] EWCA Civ 762
McInness v Onslow Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520
19
R (Association of the British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of
State for Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473
R (on the application of Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ
607
R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2005] EWCA Civ 1363
R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008]
EWCA Civ 755 [2008]
R v Devon County Council ex parte Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73
R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Matrix-Securities Ltd. [1994] 1 WLR
334
R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd. (1990)
1 WLR 1545
R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Unilever plc [1996] STC 681
R v Liverpool Corporation ex parte Liverpool Taxi Drivers Association [1972] 2 QB
299
R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hamble (Offshore)
Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714; [1995] 1 CMLR 533
R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213
R (on the application of Rashid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2005] EWCA Civ 744
R (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex County Council [2003] 1 WLR 348
R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment ex parte Begbie [2000] 1
WLR 1115
R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte U.S. Tobacco International Inc. [1992] QB
353
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR
1482
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Zeqiri [2002] UKHL 3
Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40
20
Rowland v Environment Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885
Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149
4. Hong Kong
A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629
5. United States
Agins et ux. v City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v Allard et al., 444 U.S. 51 (1979)
Armstrong et al. v United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)
Board of Regents of State Colleges et al. v Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust
for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602 (1993)
Connolly et al., Trustees of the Operating Engineers Pension Trust v Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation et al., 475 U.S. 211 (1986)
Kaiser Aetna et al. v United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)
Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al. v Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)
Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency v
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
Nollan et ux. v California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
Palazzolo v Rhode Island et al., 533 U.S. 606 (2001)
Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v New York City et at., 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
Pennsylvania Coal Company v Mahon et al., 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
Banco Nacional De Cuba v Sabbatino 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., et al. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
et al., 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
21
D. International and Supranational Cases
1. Permanent Court of International Justice, International Court of Justice,
Awards (State-to-State Arbitration)
Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits) No.
7, PCIJ Reports, Ser. A – No. 7, 1926
Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Judgement, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów Factory (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits),
No. 13, PCIJ Reports, Series A – No. 17, 13 September 1928
Norwegian Shipowners’ claims (Norway v USA) Decision of 13 October 1922, UN
Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. I (1922), p. 307
Shufeldt claim (Guatemala, USA), Decision of the arbitrator H.K.M. Sisnett of 24
July 1930, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, p. 1079
The Oscar Chinn Case (United Kingdom v Belgium) Judgement of 12 December
1934, PCUJ Series A/B, Judgements, Orders and Advisory Opinions, Fascicule No.
63
Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) Judgement of 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 253
2. GATT 1947 and WTO Reports of the Working Party, the GATT Panels and
the Appellate Body
The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Report of the Working Party of 31
March 1950 Adopted by the Contracting Parties on 3 April 1950 (GATT/CP.4/39)
II/188
European Community – Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain
Countries in the Mediterranean Region, Report of the Panel of 7 February 1985
(unadopted) (L/5776)
European Economic Community — Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors
and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Report of the Panel
of 14 December 1989 adopted on 25 January 1990 (L/6627/ - 37S/86)
22
European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
Report of the Appellate Body of 5 June 1998 (WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R,
WT/DS68/AB/R)
India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
Report of the Appellate Body of 19 December 1997 (WT/DS50/AB/R)
Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, Report of the Panel of 1
May 2000 (WT/DS163/R)
3. The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and the General Court
a. The ECJ and Opinions of Advocates General
7/56 and 3 to 7/57 Algera v Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel
Community [1957] ECR 81
42 and 49/59 Société Nouvelles des Usines de Pontlieue – Acriéries du Temple
(SNUPAT) v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR
101
14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandische Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken N.V. v High
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1962] ECR 485
111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community [1965] ECR 835
21/64 Macchiorlati Dalmas e Figli v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community [1965] ECR 175
81/72 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European
Communities [1973] ECR 573
1/73 Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Zucker [1973] ECR 723
74/74 Comptoir national technique agricole (CNTA) SA v Commission [1975] ECR
533
74/74 Comptoir national technique agricole (CNTA) SA v Commission [1976] ECR
797
78/74 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH B.J. Stolp and Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
für Getreide und Futtermittel [1975] ECR 421
2/75 Einfur- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Firma C. Mackprang
[1975] ECR 607
23
2/75 Einfur- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Firma C. Mackprang
[1975] ECR 607, Opinion of AG Werner
92/77 An Bord Bainne Co-Operative Limited and The Minister for Agriculture [1978]
ECR 497
112/77 August Töpfer & Co. GmbH v Commission [1978] ECR 1019
84/78 Tomadini and Administrazione delle finanze dello Stato [1979] ECR 1801
98/78 Firma A. Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1978] ECR 69
99/78 Weingut Gustav Decker KG v Hauptzollamt Landau [1979] ECR 101
14/81 Alpha Steel Ltd. v Commission [1982] ECR 749
52/81 Offene Handelsgesellschaft in Firma Werner Faust v Commission [1982]
ECR 3745
108/81 G.R. Amylum v Council [1982] ECR 3107
245/81 Edeka Zentrale AG and Federal Republic of Germany [1982] ECR 2745
303 and 312/81 Klöckner-Werke AG v Commission [1983] 1507
188/82 Thyssen AG v Commission [1983] ECR 3721
205 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor v Germany [1983] ECR 2633
224/82 Meiko-Konservenfabrik v Germany [1983] ECR 2539
162/84 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1986] ECR 481
265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgensand Van Dijk FoodProducts v Commission [1987]
ECR 1155
120/86 Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1988] ECR 2321
170/86 von Deetzen v Hautpzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1988] ECR 2355
196/88 to 198/88 Cornée v Coopérative agricole laitière de Loudéac [1989] ECR
2309
C-5/75 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide
und Futtermittel [1975] ECR 759, Opinion of AG Trabucchi
C-15/85 Consorzio Cooperative d’Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 1005
C-152/88 Sofrimport Sàrl v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477
C-331/88 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Fedesa
[1990] ECR I-4023
24
C-96/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2461
C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v Council [1992] ECR I-3061
C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v Council [2000] ECR I-203
C-365/89 Cargill BV v Producktschap voor Margarine, Vetten and Oliën [1991] ECR
I-3045
C-368/89 Crispoltoni and Fattoria autonoma di tabachi di Citta di Castello [1991]
ECR I-3695
C-85/90 Dowling v Ireland [1992] I-5305
C-313/90 Comité International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthétiques (CIRFS) v
Commission [1993] I-1125
C-31/91 to C-44/91 Alois Lageder SpA v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
[1993] I-1761
C-63/93 Duff v Minister of Agriculture and Food, Ireland [1996] ECR I-569
C-63/93 Duff v Minister of Agriculture and Food, Ireland [1996] ECR I-569, Opinion
of AG Cosmas
C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi [1994]
I-4963
C-90/95 P de Compte v European Parliament [1997] ECR I-1999
C-110/97 Netherlands v Commission [2001] ECR I-8763
C-402/98 Agricola Tabacchi Bonavicina Snc di Mercati Federica (ATB) and
Ministerio per le Politiche Agricole [2000] ECR I-5501
C-500/99 P Conserve Italia Soc. Coop. arl v Commission [2002] ECR I-867
C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo Adriano Srl, Dilexport Srl and Ministero del
Commercio con l’Estero [2004] ECR I-6911
C-376/02 Sichting ‘Goed Wonen’ v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2005] ECR I-
3445
b. The General Court
T-123/89 Chomel v Commission [1990] ECR II-131
T-7/93 Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission [1995] II-1533
25
T-458/93 and T-523/93 Empresa Nacional de Urânio SA (ENU) v Commission
[1995] II-2459
T-465/93 Consorzio Gruppo di Azione Locale ‘Murgia Messapica’ v Commission
[1994] II-361
T-472/93 Campo Ebro Industrial SA, Levantina Agrícola Industrial SA and Cerestar
Ibérica SA v Council [1995] ECR II-421
T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas EPE v Commission [1994] ECR II-1201
T-571/93 Lefebvre v Commission [1995] ECR II-2379
T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II-39
T-66/96 and T 221/97 Mellett v Court of Justice of the European Communities
[1998] FP-II-A 1305
T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v European Parliament [1998] II-4239
T-72/99 Meyer v Commission [2000] ECR II-2521
T-273/01 Innova Privat Akademie GmbH v Commission [2003] ECR II 1093
4. The European Court of Human Rights
Anheuser-Busch v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36
Antwi v Norway, App no 26940/10 (ECtHR, 14 February 2012)
Beyeler v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 52
Campbell and Fell v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 165
Centro Europa 7 S.R.L v Italy, App no 38433/09 (ECtHR, 7 June 2012), Concurring
Opinion of Judge Vajic
Colak v Germany, App no 9999/82 (ECtHR, 6 December 1988)
Draon v France (2006) 42 EHRR 40
Draon v France, App no 1513/03 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 21 June 2006)
Fedorenko v Ukraine (2008) 46 EHHR 6
Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403
Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v Czech Republic, App no 39794/98 (ECtHR Grand
Chamber, 10 July 2002)
James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHHR 123
26
Jantner v Slovakia, App no. 39050/97 (ECtHR, 4 March 2003)
Kopecký v Slovakia (2005) 41 EHRR 43
Lithgow v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHHR 329
Malhous v The Czech Republic, App no 33071/96 (ECtHR, 12 July 2001)
Marckx v Belgium (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 330
Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v Ireland (1992) 14 EHHR 319
Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v Belgium (1996) 21 EHRR 301
Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v Belgium (Article 50), App no 17849/91 (ECtHR,
3 July 1997)
Spacek Sro v Czech Republic (2000) 30 EHRR 1010
Sporrong and Lönrroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35
Stretch v The United Kingdom (2004) 38 EHRR 12
Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2) (2012) 55 EHHR 15
Von Maltzan v Germany, App nos 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02 (ECtHR
Grand Chamber, 2 March 2005)
E. Treaties, National Legislation and Announcements
1. IIAs and Model IIAs
2004 US Model BIT: Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment
2004 Model FIPA: Agreement Between Canada and […] for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments
2012 US Model BIT: Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment
Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area
(AANZAFTA) of 27 February 2009
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement of 26 February 2009
Australia – Chile Free Trade Agreement of 30 July 2008
27
Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the
Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China of 22 November 2008
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU,
Draft text of 13 November 2013
Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement of 5 August 2004
North American Free Trade Agreement of 1 January 1994
Pakistan and Federal Republic of Germany Treaty for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments of 25 November 1959
2. NAFTA Treaty Statements
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions of 31 July 2001
3. GATT and WTO
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of 15 April 1994
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994, Annex 1A to the Agreement
Establishing the WTO of 15 April 1994
Dispute Settlement Understanding, Annex 2 to the Agreement Establishing the
WTO of 15 April 1994
4. Other Treaties, Conventions, Rules and Statutes
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States of 14 October 1966
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4
November 1950 North American Free Trade Agreement of 1 January 1994
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Statute of the International Court of Justice
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice of 16 December 1920
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969
28
5. National Legislation and Legislative Announcements
Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy (Bipartisan Trade Deal) of 2007 (US)
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Sec. 2102(3), 111 Stat. 2001-
2002 995
The Constitution of the United States of America 1787
Human Rights Act 1998
29
Chapter 1 Introduction: Comparative Law Methodology and
Development of Investment Treaty Law (‘ITL’)
A. Introduction
The inspiration for this thesis lies in the unprecedented rise of references to
legitimate expectations in investment treaty law (‘ITL’) and investment treaty
arbitration (‘ITA’). They have become ubiquitous since about 2003.1 Despite this
popularity the concept is mired in controversy, inconsistent approaches and lack of
systematic consideration by scholars.2 Nevertheless, it is an important overarching
concept used for clarifying and applying the vague treaty standards. There is a dire
need for its clarification and coherence that could consolidate its role as an effective
tool.
This thesis uses comparative law methodology as a technique of investigating the
concept of legitimate expectations. Its aim is to inform the discussion about the
concept in this nascent area of international law by exploring parallels between its
use in investment treaty law (‘ITL’) and in a broad spectrum of other legal regimes.
This will help in understanding better what the investment tribunals have been doing
so far and in informing clearer, more persuasive and coherent use of the concept in
the future. It is hoped that over time such persuasiveness and coherence will
contribute to the authoritative development of ITL.
1 Andrew Newcombe, Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Tribunals,
Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009) 278.
2 Fietta noted that ‘continuing failure of some of the most pre-eminent arbitral tribunals to
address [the issue], in a clear, consistent, and analytical manner’ (Stephen Fietta,
‘Expropriation and the ‘Fair and Equitable’ Standard: The Developing Role of Investors’
‘Expectations’ in International Investment Arbitration’ (2006) 23 J.Int’l Arb. 375, 375);
Snodgrass observed ‘little systemic consideration of the scope or limits of the protection’
and no ‘discussion on the authority for providing protection for such expectations’
(Elizabeth Snodgrass, ‘Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations: Recognising and
Delimiting a General Principle’ (2006) 21 ICSID Rev. 1, 2, 10-11); Potestà refers to
‘abundant and disordered jurisprudence on the issue’ (Michele Potestà, ‘Legitimate
Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a
Controversial Concept’ (2013) 28 ICSID Rev. 88, 89). See also Newcombe & Paradell (n
1) 279; Chris Yost, ‘A Case Review and Analysis of the Legitimate Expectations Principle
as It Applies Within the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard’ (2009) ANU College of
Law Research Paper No. 09-01
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1364996> accessed 16 April 2014;
Abhijit PG Pandya, Sandy Moody, ‘Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: An Unclear Future?’ (2010)  1
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1631507> accessed 16 April 2014;
Ivar Alvik, Contracting with Sovereignty, State Contracts and International Arbitration
(Hart Publishing 2011) 197.
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B. Thesis, Research Questions and Working Assumptions
The research presented here asks questions about the foundations of the concept of
legitimate expectations as well as its constituent elements. It is based on a working
assumption that the concept of legitimate expectations involves two sets of
elements. First, it requires some conduct of a State and reliance on it by an
individual in a way that creates expectations of that individual about the future
conduct of the State. Secondly, it concerns subsequent conduct of the State that
frustrates those expectations and the legal consequences of such frustration. The
key questions underlying these mechanisms are: when are expectations legitimate
and in what circumstances the State bears the legal consequences of their
frustration.
The main thesis of this research is that
the concept of legitimate expectations is a tool used by investment
tribunals to concretise vague investment treaty standards of fair and
equitable treatment (FET) and indirect expropriation; that a comparative
approach to this practice can inform its more persuasive use in the
future, balancing the interests of foreign investors and host States; and
that such approach can contribute to the development of the nascent
investment treaty regime in a more authoritative way.
The analysis follows the classic comparative structure. 3 First, it presents the
essential relevant elements of the compared legal systems, one by one. It then uses
this material as a basis for critical comparison, taking ITL as its central point. It ends
with conclusions about available options for future investment tribunals and/or treaty
drafters.
As explained in more detail in section E, the comparison involves eight legal
regimes: US law, English law, Australian law, European Union (‘EU’) law,
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), general
international law, the law of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) and ITL. With
regard to each of them, the analysis covers the following issues:
 origins and rationale of the concept of legitimate expectations (or investment-
backed expectations);
3 Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd rev
edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998) 6.
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 situations in which the concept is used and sources of legitimate
expectations;
 reasonableness and/or legitimacy of expectations; and
 balancing of expectations with State regulatory powers.
With the exception of ‘investment-backed expectations’, a term used in US law on
this issue, the analysis focuses exclusively on the legal phenomena labelled
‘legitimate expectations’. It is assumed that the concepts labelled as such answer to
specific needs of a given legal regime.
The general mechanism underlying legitimate expectations is that of reliance: party
A relies on conduct of party B and frustration of expectations arising from that
reliance may bring legal consequences for party B. This mechanism underpins
perhaps every legal relationship.4 As a result, the concept of legitimate expectations
is sometimes associated with other concepts based on reliance. An in-depth analysis
of such concepts is outside the scope of this analysis. This concerns in particular the
concepts of estoppel, venire contra factum proprium and pacta sunt servanda.5
This analysis also does not cover the contractual paradigm of the concept of
legitimate expectations.6 This paradigm focuses on contracts between States and
foreign investors. The concept of legitimate expectations in this context refers to
mutual legitimate expectations of investors and host States, informed by the long-
term equilibrium of their contractual relationship.7 This paradigm calls for a separate
4 See e.g. Maurice Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ (1998)
272 Recueil des Cours 159, 186 and Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of
Rules (Cambridge University Press 1999) 107 with regard to public international law.
5 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Separate Opinion by Thomas Wälde [Thunderbird/Wälde] paras.
25-27; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 279; Yost (n 2) 33-36; Hector A Mairal, ‘Legitimate
Expectations and Informal Administrative Representations’ in: SW Schill (ed),
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press
2010) 422-426; Chester Brown, ‘The Protection of Legitimate Expectations as a “General
Principle of Law”: Some Preliminary Thoughts’ (2009) 6 TDM 1, 9. See also earlier
writings by Dolzer, who associated these concepts with ‘legitimate reliance’ and ‘original
expectations’, ideas which later merged into his conceptualisation of legitimate
expectations (see Rudolf Dolzer, ‘New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien
Property’ (1981) 75 AJIL 553, 579-587. The development of his conceptualisation can be
traced through: ‘Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?’ (2002) 64 N.Y.U.Envtl.L.J.
64, 78-79; ‘The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative
Law’ (2005) 37 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 953, 968-969 and ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment:
A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’ (2005) 39 Int’l Law 87, 100-103 by the same
author).
6 Thunderbird/Wälde, para.  27.
7 Award in the Matter of an Arbitration between Kuwait and the American Independent
Oil Company (AMINOIL), 21 ILM 976 1982 [AMINOIL], paras. 148-149; Rosalyn Higgins,
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comparative research of specific mechanisms used for these types of contracts in
national legal systems, such as the French concept of contract administratif.8 It does
not lend itself to a comparative analysis together with public law and public
international law concepts labelled ‘legitimate expectations’.
The central point of the present analysis is ITL.9 It is assumed that the concept of
legitimate expectations is relevant to two investment treaty standards: fair and
equitable treatment (‘FET’) standard and indirect expropriation. Investment treaties
(‘IIAs’)10 formulate them broadly. The standards cannot be defined in abstracto. Their
application is heavily fact-specific and therefore controversial. The obligation to
accord FET ‘offers a general point of departure in formulating an argument that the
foreign investor has not been well treated by reason of discriminatory or other unfair
measures that have been taken against its interests’.11 Investment tribunals have
interpreted it to include a wide range of State conduct – an approach often criticised
as excessive. 12 Indirect expropriation occurs when legitimate governmental
regulation crosses the point beyond which the burden on the regulated person
should be borne by the society as a whole. Defining this crossing point or the criteria
‘Legal Preconditions of Foreign Investment’ in Pat Rogers (ed), Themes and Theories
(Oxford University Press 2009); State Contracts: UNCTAD Series on Issues in
International Investment Agreements (United Nations 2004) Sales No. E.05.II.D.5, 45.
Traces of this approach can be found in recent investment treaty award, see e.g. Total
S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability of 27 December 2010
[Total], para. 313 and Impregilo S.p.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/17, Award of 21 June 2011 [Impregilo], para. 330.
8 M Sornarajah, International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, Oxford University
Press 2010) 86; UNCTAD (n 7) 4.
9 A more detailed background of the investment treaty regime is presented in Chapter 2.
10 The term ‘IIAs’ (international investment agreements) denotes bilateral investment
treaties as well as investment chapters in free trade agreements and similar treaties.
11 Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd rev edn, Oxford University
Press 2007) 639.
12 See e.g. Stephen Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
International Investment Law and Practice’ (1999) 70 BYIL 99; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key
Standard’ (n 5); Christoph Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’
(2005) 6 JWIT 357; Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore, Matthew Weiniger,
International Investment Arbitration. Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press
2007) Chapter 7; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) Chapter 6; Roland Kläger, ‘Fair and
Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press
2011); Hussein Haeri, ‘A Tale of Two Standards: “Fair and Equitable Treatment” and the
Minimum Standard in International Law – The Gillis Wetter Prize’ (2011) 27 Arb Intl 24;
Alexandra Diehl, The Core Standard of Investment Protection: Fair and Equitable
Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2012); UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment:
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II: A sequel (United
Nations 2012) Sales No. E.11.II.D.15.
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facilitating its identification has proven difficult in practice, as suggested by the
extensive literature on the subject.13
Both standards, the FET and indirect expropriation, address the key risk for foreign
investors - the regulatory risk. As a result, investors often pursue parallel claims
based on both standards in relation to the same facts. Many commentators focus on
the FET standard because most references to legitimate expectations by investment
tribunals are linked to this standard. However, there is a significant cross-fertilisation
between expectations-based concepts used in the context of expropriation and
expectations-based concepts used in the context of FET and procedural fairness.
Investment tribunals and commentators use these concepts in relation to both
standards
One aspect of this cross-fertilisation concerns the US law concept of investment-
backed expectations. This concept is linked with the concept of legitimate
expectations by a number of commentators.14 Moreover, references to ‘investment-
13 See e.g. Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State. Recent Developments
in International Law’ (1982) 176 Recueil des Cours 259; Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect
Expropriation of Alien Property’ (1986) 1 ICSID Review 1; Gaëtan Verhoosel, ‘Foreign
Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking a
“Reasonable” Balance between Stability and Change’ (1998) 29 Law & Pol.Int.Bus. 451;
Thomas Wälde, Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and
“Regulatory Taking” in International Law (2001) 50 ICLQ 811; Rudolf Dolzer, Felix Bloch,
‘Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?’ (2003) 5 International Law FORUM
du droit international 155; Jan Paulsson, Zachary Douglas, ‘Indirect Expropriation in
Investment Treaty Arbitrations’ in Horn N, Kröll SM (eds), Arbitrating Foreign Investment
Disputes. Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law International 2004);
Christoph Schreuer, Rudolf Dolzer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford
University Press 2008) Chapter 6; Brigitte Stern, ‘In Search for the Frontier of Indirect
Expropriation’ in Arthur Rovine (ed), CIAM: The Fordham Papers, vol 1 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2008) 59; Lucy Reed, Daina Bray, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Fairly and
Equitably Applied in Lieu of Unlawful Indirect Expropriation?’ in Rovine A (ed), CIAM:
The Fordham Papers vol 1 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 13; Newcombe & Paradell
(n 1) Chapter 7; Caroline Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate:
Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State
Arbitration’ (2012) 15 J.I.E.L. 223.
14 See e.g. Dolzer (n 13) 62; Wälde & Kolo (n 13) Parts III-IV; Vaughan Lowe,
‘Regulation or Expropriation?’ (2002) 55 C.L.P. 447 461; Dolzer, ‘New Developments’ (n
5) 78-79; Thomas Wälde, ‘Energy Charter Treaty-based Investment Arbitration,
Controversial Issues’ (2004) 5 JWIT 373, 387; Yves L Fortier, Stephen L Drymer,
‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or
Caveat Investor’ (2004) 19 ICSID Rev. 293, 306-308; Jack Coe Jr, Noah Rubins,
‘Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and Contributions’ in Weiler T
(ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID,
NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005) 624-
625; Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International
Law’ (2005) 20 ICSID Rev. 1, 35-38; Fietta (n 2) 378; Snodgrass (n 2) 28;
Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 119.
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backed expectations’ have been introduced into a number of IIAs15 and already
interact with investment tribunals’ approach to the concept of legitimate
expectations.16 Consequently, incorporation of the US law concept of investment-
backed expectations into this comparative analysis is justified.
C. Reasons for this Research: Development of International Law through the
Rhetorical Argumentation.
The reasons for undertaking this particular research project can be divided into
causes and desired effects. They arise from the twin needs for persuasiveness and
balancing.
The persuasiveness-related cause for this research rests in the current state of
conceptualisation of the concept of legitimate expectations in ITL. The need for
comparative approach is a result of dissatisfaction with the development of the
concept so far, characterised by its low explainability and incoherence. This is
explained in more detail in Chapter 2. 17 It shows the insufficiency of staying within
the four corners of the IIAs at this stage of the development of the regime.18 One way
to remedy this situation is to seek explanations in more developed legal systems.
Increased persuasiveness is the major goal of this comparative analysis. 19 A
comparative background creates a level playing field for the various approaches to
legitimate expectations that may have influenced the system participants so far.
Awareness of this diversity will enable them to make better informed and explainable
choices when the concept is used in the future. Over time, the persuasiveness of
such choices will help make the concept of legitimate expectations more coherent. It
15 See Chapter 6, Stection C.
16 Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/23, Award of 29 June 2012 [RDC].
17 See Chapter 2, Section D.
18 The need for comparative approach diminishes once the regime develops tools to deal
with its specific issues. Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies
Shaping the Investment Treaty System’ (2013) 107 AJIL 45 53; Thomas Wälde, ‘The
Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration’ in P Khan, T Wälde (eds), New Aspects of
International Investment Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 118.
19 See also Stephan Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy:
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’ (2011) 52
Va.J.Int'l L. 57 88; Wälde (ibid) 110.
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will also contribute to the development of its uniform interpretative methodology.20 It
may also influence the future wording of IIAs.21
Persuasiveness of arguments used by investment tribunals contributes to the
effective development of international law, understood as a continuing process of
authoritative legal decision-making. 22 The rules of this decentralised and non-
hierarchical legal system are not detailed and precise. International courts and
tribunals applying those rules need to fill the lacunae resulting from this lack of
normative detail. They do so by employing various tools and techniques.23 In case of
IIAs these tools and techniques fall within the realm of treaty interpretation. The
concept of legitimate expectations is one of such tools. Filling the lacunae often
requires creativity and may involve policy-making choices. However, the courts and
tribunals need to avoid perceptions that they abuse their powers as treaty
interpreters. Persuasive explanation of decisions is a powerful technique to change
such perceptions.24
The development of international law understood as a decision-making process is
not based on a neutral ‘discovery’ and application of appropriate rules by investment
tribunals. Rather, the tribunals must decide which of the many possible approaches
to apply. These choices are context-dependent and require ‘harder work in
identifying sources and applying norms’ than when applying established rules.25
Forging of a ‘right’ rule occurs in a process of rhetorical argumentation among
various system-participants. 26 International law is not based on the principle of
binding precedent. Consequently, this discursive process27 and the legal decision-
20 Schill (n 19) 88-89; Snodgrass (n 2) 58.
21 Schill (n 19) 88; Snodgrass (n 2) 3.
22 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It
(Oxford University Press (1994) 2.
23 Higgins (n 22) 10; Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and
Character of Norm Creation Changing’ in Byers M (ed), The Role of Law in International
Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford University Press
2001) 211.
24 Higgins (n 22) 4-7; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in
Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 29-36, 196-197; Dolzer, ‘New
Foundations’ (n 5) 578; Lowe (n 23) 216.
25 Higgins (n 22) 8.
26 Lowe (n 23) 219, 220.
27 Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University
Press 1998) 7.
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making are continuous 28 , and the references to past decisions are usually
insufficient.29 What matters is the persuasiveness of the rhetorical argumentation
used to justify decisions made in an individual case. Persuasiveness influences
repeat use of a rule and its consistency.30 The source of a persuasive argument is
not always important 31 , as long as it involves a ‘rhetorical, topical argument
addressed to the invisible college of international lawyers’. 32 Such rhetorical
argumentation, if adopted by tribunals, contributes to the persuasiveness of their
legal decision-making.
The persuasiveness of the decision-making in applying the concept of legitimate
expectations depends on the systematic and open analysis of the relevant factors.33
This opens the final decision to public scrutiny and prevents perceptions of bias or
subjectivity in the decision-making from forming.34
The second reason for the comparative research into the concept of legitimate
expectations is balancing. Greater coherence of the concept requires analysis of
balancing between investors’ expectations of stability and the host State’s regulatory
interests. The relevance of balancing in this context is based on four sub-reasons,
namely: the systemic importance of balancing in international law in general and in
ITL in particular; limited guidelines on balancing in IIAs; the key role of the concept of
legitimate expectations in the balancing process; and inconsistent approaches to
balancing in practice.
Balancing is important at a systemic level. As argued by Franck, international law
has at its core the managing the tension between stability and change.
Expectations of any investor, domestic or foreign, inevitably clash with the workings
of a political system. The former is interested in stability while the latter needs the
ability to change. These interests often cannot be simultaneously satisfied. It is
accepted that a State will not always respect investor’s expectations.35 The question
28 Higgins (n 22) 2-3.
29 ibid 2.
30 Lowe (n 23) 215.
31 Higgins (n 22) 10; Lowe (n 23) 220.
32 Lowe (n 23) 219.
33 Higgins (n 22) 5.
34 ibid 3; Orakhelashvili (n 24) 196.
35 Franck (n 27) 439; Lowe (n 14) 450.
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is how the two interests should be balanced and when should the frustration of
investor’s expectations be protected.
The question of balancing is a question about regulatory risk allocation. The
allocation may differ depending on whether it occurs under national law, customary
international law (‘CIL’) or ITL. Balancing of the two interests in stability and change
needs to be fair procedurally, i.e. occur through a process perceived as right by
system participants, and substantively, i.e. satisfy the participants’ expectations of
justice.36 The risk allocation will therefore depend on what is perceived as ‘fair’, ‘just’
or ‘right’ in a given legal regime.37 The balancing will therefore touch upon the
fundamental values of that regime.38 In ITL, which is a nascent legal regime, this
balancing mechanism and the fundamental values are at the early stages of
development.
In developing this balancing mechanism investment tribunals are provided with little
guidance. Different values compete here. The need to attract foreign capital requires
an investment climate that is friendly and protective, and guarantees stability and
credibility of host States’ commitments.39 On the other hand, the host State needs to
exercise its powers to regulate its economy in the public interest.40 The scales were
seemingly tipped by the wording of early IIAs which expressly referred to the former
but not the latter set of values. This created a presumption against balancing.  An
argument was advanced that IIAs should be interpreted in favour of investment
protection. 41 This trend was strengthened by the zeitgeist of the ‘retreat of the
State’.42 However, recent approaches are more in line with Franck’s proposition. It is
36 Franck (n 27) 7-8.
37 ibid 7, 440.
38 ibid 7.
39 See e.g. Dolzer, ‘New Foundations’ (n 5) 574; Franck (n 27) 439; Andrew T Guzman,
‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties’ (1997) 38 Va.J.I.L. 639, 659-660.
40 Lowe (n 14) 450, 460; Wälde & Kolo (n 13) 820; Verhoosel (n 13); Peter Muchlinski,
‘“Caveat investor”? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 527, 528.
41 See e.g. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 29
January 2004 [SGS v Philipines], para. 116; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v
The Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award of 25 March 2004 [MTD], para.
104; Wälde (n 18) 107-108; Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 953; Newcombe
& Paradell (n 1) 116.
42 Thomas Wälde, ‘A Requiem for the “New International Economic Order” The Rise and
Fall of Paradigms in International Economic Law’ (1995) 1-2 CEPMLP Journal; Dolzer,
‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 955.
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recognised that balancing is necessary for the system’s future viability.43 This goes
hand-in-hand with three other trends. First, a major recalibration was brought about
by the ‘public law’ approach to ITL. It added the public law paradigm to the private
law approach that dominated the investment regime at the beginning.44 Secondly, a
new generation of IIAs expressly requires tribunals to balance investor’s interests
with other values such as health, safety, labour standards or public welfare.45 Thirdly,
the zeitgeist now animates arguments that the world has ‘reached or perhaps
passed the peak of globalisation and trade liberalisation’.46 The 2008 global financial
crisis also inspired a rethink of the space needed for regulatory flexibility.
The concept of legitimate expectations is strongly associated with stability and
change.47 The need to strike a fair balance between these two interests is at the
concept’s core.48 However, even the more detailed IIAs do not provide guidance as
to how that balance should be struck. Tribunals are called here to make value
judgements.49 These decisions show what is considered to be legitimately expected
and worthy of protection by ITL.
The balancing is influenced by the tribunals’ perceptions about how ITL should
operate. With regard to legitimate expectations these perceptions have a crucial
impact on the way in which the risk will be allocated between the investor and the
State. This is generally reflected in the assessment of legitimacy of investor’s
expectations.50 More specifically, it is visible in the concept of investment conditions
43 Roberts (n 18) 91; Brigitte Stern, ‘The Future International Investment Law: A Balance
Between the Protection of Investors and the States’ Capacity to Regulate’ in Alvarez JE
et al (eds), The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations , Realities,
Options (Oxford University Press 2011) 192; Schill (n 19) 69.
44 Wälde (n 18) 60-61; Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law
(Oxford University Press 2007); Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty
Arbitration. Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart
Publishing 2008); Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative
Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010); Roberts (n 18) 78 et seq.
45 Roberts (n 18) 80; Suzanne A Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New
Generation of International Investment Agreements’ (2010) 13 JIEL 1037.
46 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The
2006 Freshfields Lecture’ (2007) 23 Arb Intl 357, 378.
47 UNCTAD (n 12) 63; Kläger (n 12) 169-186; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 278-279.
48 Yost (n 2) 49; Trevor Zeyl, ‘Charting the Wrong Course: The Doctrine of Legitimate
Expectations in Investment Treaty Law’ (2011) 49 Alta.L.Rev. 203, 235; Potestà (n 2)
122.
49 Spears (n 45) 1071-1072.
50 See Chapter 7, Section D.1-2.
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‘offered’ or ‘represented’ to the investor by the host State51 and in the approaches to
invalidation of State acts tainted by illegality (ultra vires situations).52
The term ‘legitimate expectations’ has three meanings reflecting different
approaches to the issue of balancing. First, it can mean expectations of a foreign
investor that require balancing with the interests of the host States. These are
‘legitimate expectations-weak sense’ that identify one side of the balancing process
but not its outcome.53 Secondly, ‘legitimate expectations’ may indicate investor’s
interests that prevail over the host State’s interest. This approach is based on a
circular logic that State actions frustrating expectations are inherently arbitrary and
therefore in breach of an IIA. These ‘expectations-strong sense’ can be abused to
shift the balance towards foreign investors. 54 In fact, they do not involve any
balancing at all. Lastly, ‘legitimate expectations’ may refer to the outcome of the
balancing between the interests of investors and host States.
The comparative analysis can suggest solutions to the question of balancing and
elucidate the role of the concept of legitimate expectations in this mechanism. It can
suggest more specific factors that could be included in this balancing process to
strengthen the persuasiveness and therefore fairness and justice of the process and
its results.55 To this attention now turns.
D. The Comparative Method: Persuasiveness through Broad Comparative
Approach - General Observations
This section explains the comparative law methodology in international law. The next
section focuses on the details of methodology used in this thesis.
The comparative law method is often used to explore and develop national laws. It is
approached more cautiously in international law.56 The comparative approach helps
to understand new concepts and to address novel problems. It allows for an enquiry
51 See Chapter 7, Section D.3.
52 See Chapter 8, Section D.4.
53 Montt (n 44) 222.
54 ibid 222-223.
55 Schill (n 19) 88.
56 Valentina Vadi, ‘Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment
Treaty Arbitration (2010-2011) 39 Denv.J.Int'l L.& Pol'y 67, 79; William E Butler,
‘Introduction’ in Butler WE (ed), International Law in Comparative Perspective (Sijthoff &
Noordhoff 1980) 1, 1; David Kennedy, ‘The Methods and the Politics’ in Legrand P,
Munday R (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge
University Press 2003) 348-349.
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into the legal systems that have already grappled with similar questions. 57
International law is no stranger to analogies. This is how it developed. Borrowing
from other law regimes has always been practiced by international courts and
tribunals. Over time, as the system matured, guidelines have been introduced to
channel the use of analogies. 58 The two main formal channels for comparative
analogies in international law are the principle of systemic integration59 and the
concept of ‘general principles of law’ 60, which is one of the sources of international
law.61
The principle of systemic integration belongs to the general rule of treaty
interpretation and mandates the interpreter to take into account together with the
context of a treaty ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties’.62 Its goal is to prevent development of international law into
specialist regimes existing as isolated compartments, using conflicting rules and
threatening the quality and coherence of international law as a whole.63 This threat is
connected with the phenomenon of fragmentation.64
The concept of ‘general principles of law recognised by civilized nations’ is one of the
most doctrinally divisive concepts in international law. 65 It aims to introduce an
objective criterion concerning the sources the tribunals can use in resorting to
comparative analogies.66
57 Vadi (n 56) 77; Roberts (n 18) 47.
58 Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Sources and Analogies of International Law (With Special
Reference to International Arbitration) (Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. 1927); Georg
Schwarzenberger, ‘The Inductive Approach to International Law’ (1947) 60 Harv.L.R.
593; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford
University Press 2012) 35; HC Gutterige, ‘Comparative Law and the Law of Nations’ in
Butler WE (ed), International Law in Comparative Perspective (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1980)
13.
59 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’).
60 Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ (the ‘ICJ Statute’).
61 Zweigert & Kötz (n 3) 7-8; Gutterige (n 58) 13, 16.
62 Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
63 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279, 284.
64 See Chapter 2, Section B.
65 Butler (n 56) 7. See generally: Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by
International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens & Sons 1953). For summary of diverse
scholarly positions see: VD Degan, Sources of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1997) 14-19.
66 Gutterige (n 58) 16, 21.
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The principle of systemic integration and the general principles of law do not instruct
tribunals how to use comparative analogies.67 They provide a general guidance. A
tribunal introducing a gap-filling, concept inspired by comparative analogies it can do
so only after careful consideration. The comparative solution needs to satisfy the
demands for justice and equity that underlie the operation of international law.68 The
aim of comparative analogies is also to maintain or increase coherence of
international law as a whole.69
In applying legal comparisons international tribunals use their creative function in a
subtle way:
An international tribunal chooses, edits and adapts elements from
other developed systems. The result is a body of international law
the content of which has been influenced by domestic law but
which is still its own creation.70
The tribunals’ discretion in applying legal comparisons is subject to the general limits
of their powers of adjudication, namely the perceptions of persuasiveness, objectivity
and absence of abuse.71 The process of using comparative analogies is subject to
the general validating mechanism described in Chapter 2.72
The choice of comparators presents a problem for developing an international law
concept by recourse to national legal systems. It affects general principles of law.
Although its reference to the ‘standard of civilisation’ is nowadays discredited73, it is
construed as referring to principles common to ‘advanced’ or ‘principal’ legal systems
of the world.74 The ICJ judges represent ‘the main forms of civilization and of the
principal legal systems of the world’.75 This may enable the ICJ to identify a general
principle of law. However, this mechanism is not available for investment tribunals.
They consist of one or three arbitrators whose selection is unrelated to the legal
system they represent. Commentators argue that the threshold of
67 Lauterpacht (n 58) ix; Gutterige (n 58) 16; Crawford (n 58) 35.
68 Gutterige (n 58) 16, 21; Zweigert & Kötz (n 3) 8; Lauterpacht (n 58) xi; Lowe (n 23)
216, 220; Dolzer, ‘New Foundations’ (n 5) 578.
69 Crawford (n 70) 35; Lowe (n 25) 216.
70 Crawford (n 58) 35.
71 See Chapter 2, Section C; Vadi (n 60) 96.
72 See Chapter 2, Section B.
73 Degan (n 65) 68-69.
74 ibid 70; Schill (n 19) 92; Wälde (n 18) 102.
75 Article 9 of the ICJ Statute.
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representativeness can be reached by comparing common and civil law legal
systems because they constitute the legal traditions that have influenced most
national legal systems.76 However, although the choice of comparators is important,
it is the qualitative rather than quantitative analysis that matters.77
Neither the choice of comparators nor their analysis is neutral. It involves elements
of policy-making.78 The purpose of comparative analysis influences the choice of
comparators 79 and the choice of comparators influences the results of the
comparative exercise.80 Some comparative choices are therefore controversial.81
References to analogies are a common feature in ITL. They are used by investment
tribunals to remedy the limited utility of the VCLT to treaty interpretation. 82
References to a broad variety of legal regimes in search of analogies and
comparisons arise from the hybrid nature of the investment treaty regime. The sui
generis convergence of these analogies by investment tribunals influences the
development of the system and informs its emerging identity.83
This thesis is by no means the first attempt at a comparative approach to the
concept of legitimate expectations. However, past experiences do not create a
coherent whole that could serve as a springboard for further analysis. Three issues
make the choice of the comparative methodology difficult: the comparisons had
different goals; they were based on different understandings of the concept of
legitimate expectations and they concentrated on a variety of aspects of the concept.
As to differences in goals of comparative analysis, the most frequent of these is the
critical assessment of the practice of investment tribunals. They are criticised for
applying the concept of legitimate more broadly and less clearly than other legal
systems84 and that they accord less deference to the States’ sovereign powers than
76 Schill (n 19) 92-93; Snodgrass (n 2) 29-30; Dolzer (n 13) 60-61. Yost ((n 2) 37-38) is
sceptical towards such approach.
77 Schill (n 19) 93.
78 Dolzer, ‘New Foundations’ (n 5) 578.
79 Schill (n 19) 90.
80 Vadi (n 56) 84.
81 One commentator observed that references to national laws with regard to
expropriation of alien property revealed ‘ideological predilections’ (Crawford (n 58) 36).
See e.g. Dolzer, ‘New Foundations’ (n 5) 582; Wälde & Kolo (n 13) 821-824; Wälde (n
18) 102-103.
82 Vadi (n 56) 89-94; Roberts (n 18) 51-52. See Chapter 2, Section C.
83 Roberts (n 18) 92-93.
84 Fietta (n 2) 379; Pandya & Moody (n 2) 1.
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other legal systems. 85 Another goal is to show that protection of legitimate
expectations is a general principle of law.86 Yet another is to differentiate between
references to legitimate expectations under indirect expropriation and the FET
standard.87 Sometimes the comparison does not have a specific goal, concentrating
simply on highlighting differences and similarities.88
The differences in understanding of the concept of legitimate expectations reflect
lack of coherence as to its meaning. Some commentators approach the concept as a
principle of protection of legitimate expectations 89 while others as legitimate
expectations of stable and predictable legal and administrative framework.90 Different
understandings of legitimate expectations may sometimes be confused. Mairal
analyses protection of legitimate expectations arising from informal administrative
representations but concludes by referring to legitimate expectations based on
State’s commitments in IIAs.91
Commentators concentrate on a various aspects of this widespread concept. Some
concentrate on expectations arising from administrative representations92 ; others
research a broader notion of government conduct as a source of expectations93; still
others focus on expectations related to deprivation of property rights.94 A number of
commentators use the comparative perspective to argue that investment tribunals
should be more cautious in balancing investor’s legitimate expectations with host
State’s right to govern and regulate.95
No single comparative methodology emerges from the previous approaches to the
concept of legitimate expectations. This reflects general absence of such set
methodology in international law. The methodology used may be placed on a sliding
scale. On the one hand analogies are introduced without much explanation. 96
85 Zeyl (n 48) 234-235; Potestà (n 2) 122.
86 Snodgrass (n 2); Brown (n 5).
87 Fietta (n 2) 376-378.
88 Mairal (n 5) 449-452.
89 Snodgrass (n 2) 31; Brown (n 5) 9.
90 Zeyl (n 48) 207-208.
91 Mairal (n 5) 415, 418, 451.
92 ibid; Fietta (n 2) 376-377.
93 Snodgrass (n 2).
94 Fietta (n 2) 378.
95 ibid 3; Zeyl (n 48) 235; Potestà (n 2) 122.
96 Pandya & Moody (n 2) 1.
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Commentators may merely acknowledge ‘apparent similarities’ and ‘clear parallels’97
between concepts used by investment tribunals and those found in other legal
systems. Others select legal systems on a functional basis. Here, they are often
guided by recognition that the role of investment tribunals is similar to that of
administrative or constitutional judicial review.98 Many commentators assume that
there is a single concept of legitimate expectations which investment tribunals are
tapping into99, which presumably legitimises borrowing from other legal systems.
At the top of this sliding scale is the argument that the concept of legitimate
expectations is a general principle of law as understood under Article 38(1)(c) of the
ICJ Statute.100 While some commentators attempt to provide evidence that such
general principle exists101 , others assume its existence102 , while yet others are
inconclusive. 103 Some commentators admit that, even if a general principle of
legitimate expectations exists, it may only be an ‘emerging’ one, the precise scope or
content of which is still developing.104
In theory, recognition that ‘protection of legitimate expectations’ is a general principle
of law would have an impact on the development of international investment law.
Such a general principle would be treated as a source of law and therefore be
directly applicable in the process of interpretation. It would validate a more specific
approach to the concept.105 This approach, if successful, would have an advantage
over using simple analogies, which can slow down the development of the law by
introducing many competing analogies.106
Snodgrass argued that the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is a
general principle of law.107 By defining it as a ‘principle of protection’ she narrowed
97 Fietta (n 2) 376-378.
98 Fietta (n 2) 376; Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 27.
99 Dolzer, ‘New Developments’ (n 5) 78; Mairal (n 5) 413; Zeyl (n 48).
100 Snodgrass (n 2); Mairal (n 5) 415.
101 Snodgrass (n 2); Brown (n 5); Potestà (n 2) 98.
102 Mairal (n 5) 415; Zeyl (n 48) 204-205.
103 Yost (n 2) 36-39; André von Walter, ‘The Investor’s Expectations in International
Investment Arbitration’ in Reinisch A, Knahr C (eds), International Investment Law in
Context (Eleven International Publishing 2008) 197-198; Dolzer, ‘New Developments’ (n
5) 78.
104 Brown (n 5) 9; Potestà (n 2) 98.
105 Snodgrass (n 2) 11.
106 Roberts (n 18) 52.
107 Snodgrass (n 2).
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her investigation to specific points of the operation of the concept. Such approach
provides an ‘attractive intellectual framework’ offering a detailed synthesis of a
number of legal systems that could be further refined and developed in practice.108 It
ignores without explanation the other approaches to legitimate expectations used in
ITL/ITA. Moreover, it attempts to prove the existence of a rule of law rather than a
general principle of law. Perhaps for these reasons Snodgrass’ proposition has not
been adopted in practice.
Previous comparative analyses mention a plethora of different legal regimes that use
references to legitimate expectations. They include national laws of Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, England, Germany,
Greece, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Scotland, South Africa, Switzerland,
USA, and Venezuela. 109 They also include public international law110 and in the
practice of international and supra-national courts and tribunals, such as the Court of
Justice of the European Union (‘ECJ’) and the General Court (referred to jointly as
the ‘EU Courts’)111, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’)112, the panels
and the Appellate Body operating under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(‘GATT’) within the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) 113 , the World Bank
Administrative Tribunal114, the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
Organisation.115 These legal regimes are often invoked to show the geographical
scope of the concept of legitimate expectations. Only a number of them have been
researched in more depth. 116 However, they set a direction for constructing
comparative methodology for this thesis, to which we now turn.
108 ibid 3-4.
109 Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ‘Of Contracts and Treaties in the Global Market’ (2004) 8
Max Planck Yrbk UN L 341, 355-356; Fietta (n 2) 376-378; Snodgrass (n 2) 26-28; Yost
(n 2) 36; Mairal (n 5) 417-419; Zeyl (n 48) 211-216; Potestà (n 2) 94-98;
Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 28. See also Total, para. 128.
110 Brown (n 5) 1-2; See also Total, paras. 131-134.
111 Fietta (n 2) 376-377; Snodgrass (n 2) 26; Brown (n 5) 4; Yost (n 2) 36; Mairal (n 5)
417; Zeyl (n 48) 216; Potestà (n 2) 94-95; Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 27. See also Total,
para. 130.
112 Brown (n 5) 6; Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 27; Dolzer, ‘New Developments’ (n 5) 78.
See also Total, para. 124.
113 Brown (n 5) 7; Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 29.
114 Vicuña (n 109) 356.
115 Brown (n 5) 7.
116 Snodgrass (n 2); Mairal (n 5); Potestà (n 2).
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E. Methodology of This Thesis: Choice of Comparators, Sources
As indicated in section B, the goals of this analysis will be achieved by analysing
foundations, constitutive elements and operation of the concept of legitimate
expectations in a comparative light. Consequently, the comparators used in this
analysis should constitute a representative and manageable set of legal regimes.
These must be regimes capable of supporting argumentation that is relevant and
persuasive for ITL.
This requires selection directed not merely at the use of a label of ‘legitimate
expectations’. It needs to take into account similarities among the various regimes as
well as critique that may influence the persuasiveness of arguments in ITL. Apart
from national law regimes it needs to include international law regimes, to ensure
that investment tribunals proceed in harmony with international law as a whole.
This analysis employs concepts from eight legal systems: (1) the US law concept of
investment-backed expectations; the concepts of legitimate expectations used in (2)
English law and in (3) Australian law; the concepts of legitimate expectations used in
(4) EU law and in (5) the jurisprudence of the ECtHR; the concept of legitimate
expectations used in (6) general public international law as well as in (7) the
specialised international law regime concerning trade – WTO law and, finally (8) the
concept of legitimate expectations used in ITL.
These legal perspectives on the concept of legitimate expectations represent diverse
paradigms relevant for the development of ITL. The public law paradigm of national
laws includes administrative judicial review (English law, Australian law, EU law) and
constitutional judicial review (EU law and US law). The public international law
paradigm is represented by general international law, WTO law and the ECHR as
specialised international law regimes, and EU law as a sui generis supra-national
legal regime.117 These paradigms represent various frameworks for understanding of
ITL on a macro level, i.e. as a system.118 They often compete with one another
leading to conceptual disagreements between commentators and arbitrators. The
concept of legitimate expectations is a good example of such clashes. 119 A
117 Roberts describes this paradigm as comprising of international law regimes
concerning State’s right to regulate and act at a national level but does not include the
EU law within it (Roberts (n 18) 46).
118 ibid 46.
119 Splits within tribunals on the use of the concept of legitimate expectations were clearly
articulated in e.g. Thunderbird/Wälde; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona
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comparative analysis reveals the foundations of such clashes. It thus contributes to
the regime’s maturation by allowing for a more informed use of the various
approaches.
An important connecting factor between the European approach to legitimate
expectations, represented by English law, EU law and the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR, is their reference to the German law concept of Vertrauensschutz. 120
Vertrauensschutz is the German language equivalent of the English phrase
‘legitimate expectations’. The exploration of concept of legitimate expectations is
aided by the German language monograph by Müller – a source not explored in this
context so far.121
One criterion informing the selection of comparators for this analysis is frequency
with which a given legal regime is cited by counsel, tribunals and commentators.122
This limits the number of legal systems referring to the concept of legitimate
expectations to those that are most relevant to ITL. Of a large number of legal
systems referred to by commentators, the ones most frequently analysed in greater
detail are English law, EU law and US law. An important counterweight to US law is
provided by the ECtHR jurisprudence, which also concerns property protection but
represents a European perspective, while an important counterweight to English law
is provided by Australian law, where strong arguments were made against
substantive protection of legitimate expectations.
Cultural factors also influence the selection of comparators. The phrases ‘legitimate
expectations’ and ‘investment-backed expectations’ are terms of art undefined in ITL.
The way in which counsel and arbitrator understand and approach these concepts
will be informed by the use of these concepts in the legal systems familiar to a given
S.A. and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/17, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken [Suez/InterAgua/Nikken]; Suez,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion
of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken [Suez/Vivendi/Nikken]; Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/18, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Dr. Jürgen Voss of 1 March 2011 and Merrill
& Ring Forestry L.P. v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award of 31 March
2010 [Merrill], paras. 233, 242.
120 See Chapter 3, Section C.1; Chapter 4, Sections B.1 and C.1. See also
Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 27; Stephan Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of
Law, and Comparative Public Law’ in Schill SW (ed), International Investment Law and
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 165; Dolzer, ‘New Foundations’
(n 5) 579-580.
121 Jorg P Müller, Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag KG 1971).
122 Wälde (n 18) 103, 110.
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practitioner.123 Indirect evidence indicates a strong influence of common law.124 In
ITA counsel and arbitrators most often have a background in US and English law.
US and British nationals are respectively the first and the third most frequently
appointed arbitrators by nationality. 125 Moreover, many arbitrators of different
nationality were trained and practice in England or in a legal system rooted in
common law, such as Australia or Bangladesh. The same applies to counsel. A
survey of investment treaty cases active in 2013 reveals that in almost 80% at least
one party was represented by a US or a London-based law firm or counsel.126
As noted above, no selection of comparators is neutral. The selection for the
purposes of this thesis follows the public law and public international law paradigms.
As a result, it can be viewed as falling within the public law approach conceptualising
ITA as judicial review.127 However, we do not insist that a ‘pure’ public law approach
is the correct approach to ITL. Rather, the focus here is on presenting the concept of
legitimate expectations in a broader perspective to clarify its use by investment
tribunals so far and influence its more persuasive use in the future. This may mean
conscious and open acceptance as well as rejection of certain aspects of the
concept resulting from this comparative analysis.
The analysis that follows is based on qualitative research. Its primary sources are
mainly decisions and awards of relevant courts, tribunals and other dispute
settlement bodies. These are: awards of investment tribunals in ITL/ITA context;
reports of GATT/WTO panels and the Appellate Body; decisions of the EU Courts
and opinions of Advocates-General in the EU context; decisions of the ECtHR in the
ECHR context and decisions of the US Supreme Court and the English and
123 Roberts (n 18) 56.
124 Direct evidence is limited partly due to minimal public access to pleadings. A survey
among arbitrators and counsel would also be of limited utility since the the other legal
systems inspire instinctive understandings rather than express transplants.
125 ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2013-2) July 2013, p. 20
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Ope
nPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=An
nouncement133> accessed 16 April 2014.
126 Survey of data available in the Investment Treaty Arbitration database
(<http://italaw.com/> accessed 16 April 2014) shows that in 38 disputes (35.2%) both
parties were so represented and in 48 disputes (44.4%) at least one party was so
represented. In some cases the parties were represented by more than one law firm
and/or counsel of which some were London- or US-based and some were based in other
countries (e.g. France or Canada). Only in 22 cases (20.4%) none of the party was
represented by a London- or US-based law firm or counsel.
127 van Harten (n 44), Montt (n 44), Schill (n 44).
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Australian courts in the national law contexts. Other primary sources play less
important role. However, references will be made to the US Constitution, the ECHR,
the GATT and to IIAs. Primary sources are less prominent in the context of general
public international law because there legitimate expectations are a doctrine-based
rather than a judge-made concept.
There is no official centralised reporting mechanism for investment awards. The
awards and case materials128 are available from a number of overlapping sources.
Awards issued in ICSID arbitrations 129 are available on the ICSID website 130 ,
although full texts of awards are published only with the parties’ consent. 131 A
consolidated database on NAFTA awards and case materials132 is provided in the
NAFTA Claims database133 and on the websites of individual NAFTA parties.134 A
publicly accessible database of investment treaty awards and case materials is
compiled in the ITA database135, while a parallel Investment Claims subscription-only
database is provided by Oxford University Press.136
English law cases are available in the publicly accessible database provided by
British and Irish Legal Information Institute (‘BAILII’)137 and Australian law cases in
an analogous database provided by Australasian Legal Information Institute
128 With some exceptions (notably NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and
CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement)) case
materials, i.e. submissions, correspondence, hearing transcripts as well as tribunals’
orders and awards, are not publicly available.
129 See Chapter 2, Section B.
130 <https://icsid.worldbank.org/> (all databases mentioned below accessed 16 April
2014).
131 However, absent such consent ICSID is obliged to ‘promptly include in its
publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal’. See the Article 48(5) of the
Washington Convention and Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.
132 In NAFTA arbitration there is generally ‘public access to documents submitted to, or
issued by, Chapter Eleven tribunals’ (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 July 2001, Section 1).
133 <http://www.naftalaw.org/>.
134 For cases filed against Canada: website of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade
and Development <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx>, for cases filed against the USA:
website of the U.S. Department of State <http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm>, for cases
filed against Mexico: website of  <http://www.economia.gob.mx/comunidad-
negocios/comercio-exterior/solucion-controversias/inversionista-estado>.
135 <http://www.italaw.com/>.
136 <http://oxia.ouplaw.com/>.
137 <http://www.bailii.org/>.
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(‘AustLII’).138 US Supreme Court cases are available through the US Supreme Court
Library of the HeinOnline database.139 Judgements of the European Courts and the
ECtHR are available in publicly accessible internet-based databases: the Curia140
and the HUDOC141 respectively. The reports of GATT/WTO panels and the Appellate
Body are available in the WTO-administered database.142 The ICJ website provides
access to the judgements of the PCIJ and ICJ.143
The secondary research sources include scholarly writings (articles, commentaries,
treatises) commenting on and evaluating specific decisions of dispute settlement
bodies as well as writings developing more general doctrinal threads of the concept
of legitimate expectations and investment-backed expectations. These sources were
obtained from various libraries 144 and electronic databases. 145 Another group of
secondary sources are reports prepared by international organisations involved in
the development of international law and international investment law. Such reports,
summaries of existing practice, analyses and policy suggestions are regularly
prepared by the United Nations Commission of Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’)
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) and are
available on their respective websites. 146 Materials relating to the work of the
International Law Commission (‘ILC’) can be found on its website.147
138 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/>.
139 <http://heinonline.org>.
140 <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/>.
141 <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#>.
142 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm#results>.
143 <http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/index.php?p1=9 (PCIJ), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3> (ICJ).
144 In particular the libraries of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London School
of Economics and the British Library.
145 In particular: Cambridge Journals Online <http://journals.cambridge.org/>, Dawsonera
<https://www.dawsonera.com/>, HeinOnline <http://heinonline.org>, JSTOR
<http://www.jstor.org/> and Oxford Journals Online <http://www.oxfordjournals.org/>.
146
<http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/I
nternational-Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx> (UNCTAD);
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/oecdworkoninternationalinvestmentlaw.htm> (OECD).
147 <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/>.
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F. Thesis Outline
This introductory chapter presented a working understanding of the concept of
legitimate expectations, the main thesis of this work and the key research questions.
It also described the goals and explained the methodology of the following
comparative analysis.
Chapter two presents the structural context of ITL/ITA. It explains the mechanism
through which ITL and the concept of legitimate expectations develop. It shows why
the comparative approach to legitimate expectations is necessary for further
authoritative and persuasive development of ITL.
Chapter three is divided into two sections and concerns the origins and development
of the concept of legitimate expectations in Anglo-American legal systems, namely
US constitutional law, English law and Australian law. It focuses on the concept of
‘reasonable investment-backed expectations’ used in the US doctrine of regulatory
takings and on the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ used judicial review in
England and Australia. Each section ends with system-specific conclusions and the
chapter ends with a summary of findings relevant for the concept of protection of
legitimate expectations in ITL.
Chapter four is divided into two sections and concerns international and supra-
national legal regimes. Section one looks into EU law and the concept of legitimate
expectations used by the EU Courts. Section two looks at the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (‘P 1/1’). ECtHR uses the concept
of legitimate expectations here in the area of property protection. Each section ends
with system-specific conclusions and the chapter concludes with a general summary.
Chapter five looks at how the concept of legitimate expectations is understood and
applied in general international law. It is divided into sections exploring different
references to legitimate expectations: in the context of the binding nature of
international law, estoppel, unilateral declarations and treaty interpretation. This
latter topic is explored through the approach taken in WTO law. The chapter looks at
how the GATT/WTO panels and the Appellate Body used the concept of legitimate
expectations to interpret the GATT.
Chapters six and seven focus on the concept of legitimate expectations in
investment treaty law. Chapter six analyses the development of the concept of
protection of investors’ expectations in the context of indirect expropriation while
52
chapter seven looks at the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of the
FET standard.
Chapter eight presents the assessment of the comparative contribution of the legal
systems analysed in chapters three to five have to the development of the concept of
protection of legitimate expectations in ITL. Can they help clarify and consolidate the
concept of protection of legitimate expectations in this latter area of law? Could they
offer solutions or improvements for the balancing of expectations of investors with
the host State’s right to regulate in the public interest?
Chapter nine summarises the findings of this comparative exercise by way of
conclusions. It makes recommendations for future use of the concept of legitimate
expectations by investment tribunals and treaty drafters and suggests areas of
further research.
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Chapter 2 Investment Treaty Law (‘ITL’) as a Developing
Legal Order: Structural Context of the Comparative
Analysis
A. Introduction
ITL is a developing legal regime. Its structure and operation have specific
characteristics and pose novel questions requiring creativity in developing answers.
The concept of legitimate expectations has played a significant role in this creative
process, especially with regard to the FET standard. The ITA practice shows the
need to resort to analogies and comparisons with other legal systems in support of
proposed solutions. Analogies are also needed to understand and discipline
references to legitimate expectations. Investment tribunals are the main engine of
the new regime’s development. Their authority, and the legitimacy of the developing
regime, depends on whether their function is exercised within its inherent limits and
responsibilities.
This chapter commences by presenting the structure of the legal regime of ITL/ITA. It
then sketches the mechanism of its operation and development, in particular the role
played by investment tribunals. Finally, it discusses the problems of this process and
shows how the concept of legitimate expectations fits within this broader picture. It
concludes by discussing the question why comparative evaluation of the concept of
legitimate expectations may contribute to the development of ITL.
B. Key Characteristics of ITL: A Nascent Legal Regime Developing through
Interpretation of Vague Treaty Standards
ITL is a nascent legal regime.148 Its foundations were laid by the mid-1960s’ with the
first bilateral investment treaties (‘BITs’)149 and the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the Washington
Convention). However, for almost three decades thereafter these treaties were of
148 Andrea Bjorklund, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante’
(2008) US Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 158
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319834> (accessed 16 April
2014) 277; Roberts (n 18) 49.
149 The first BIT was the 1959 Pakistan – Germany Treaty for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments. In the 1970s and 1980s they became part of economic policy
of major capital-exporting States (UNCTAD and ICC, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-
1991 (United Nations 1992) Sales No. E.92.II.A.16, p. 2).
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limited practical importance. 150 Nothing akin to an international investment law
regime existed in the minds of courts and commentators. In 1970 the ICJ noted
absence of generally accepted international rules on the consequences of unlawful
acts committed by host States against foreign investors.151 The area was mired in ‘an
intense conflict of systems and interests’152, resulting in profound disagreements
about the content of substantive international law rules. 153 Leading international
relations scholars likened a specialised international regime on foreign investment to
a ‘perpetual motion machine’:
most people would like one for their own purposes; no one has
ever built one; and discussions about their construction often take
on a certain air of unreality.154
Everything changed in the last decade of the 20th century. The end of the Cold War
brought a widespread embrace of the liberal market economy, privatisation,
deregulation and opening to foreign investment.155 Increased volumes of foreign
direct investment (‘FDI’) and competition to attract foreign investors meant that for
many States the regulation of FDI shifted from the national to the international law
level.156 The ‘age of optimism’157 of the 1990s was marked by belief in the power of
globalisation and international law. This resulted in a Cambrian explosion in the
number of signed IIAs. Throughout the 1990’s it quadrupled from 440 in 1991158 to
150 At the end of 1980s, with 265 BITs concluded globally, they were still a ‘limited
phenomenon’ (UNCTC, Bilateral Investment Treaties (United Nations 1988) Sales No.
E.88.II.A.1, p. 72).
151 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Judgement, ICJ Reports 1970 [Barcelona Traction case], p. 88-89.
152 ibid. 89.
153 In 1964 in Sabbatino the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “There are few if any
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the
limitations on state’s power to expropriate the property of aliens.” (Banco Nacional de
Cuba v Sabbatino, Receiver, et al., 376 U.S. 398 428-429)
154 Robert O Keohane, Van Doom Ooms, ‘The Multinational Firm and International
Regulation’ (1975) 29 Int’l Org 169, 169.
155 van Harten (n 44) 39-40.
156 UNCTAD, Trends in International Investment Agreements: An Overview: UNCTAD
Series on International Investment Agreements (United Nations 1999) Sales No.
E.99.II.D.23, p. 10; Wälde (n 18) 78.
157 Gideon Rachman, Zero-Sum World. Politics, Power and Prosperity after the Crash
(Atlantic 2010).
158 UNCTAD & ICC (n 149) 3.
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1,857 in 1999.159 It then almost doubled again, reaching 3,196 IIAs by the end of
2012. 160 Accessions to the Washington Convention also grew from the 1990s
onwards. 161 These treaties created a skeleton of the nascent international legal
regime on foreign investment. They are a good example of the international law
phenomenon of fragmentation, defined as:
the emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or
rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice.162
The number of IIAs, which are predominantly bilateral, determines one feature of the
emerging regime – the atomised character of its main building blocks.163 The wording
of the treaties is standardised but not identical.164 In practice they are approached as
referring to overarching concepts. These atomised treaties, applied by ad hoc
tribunals, are developing into a legal regime, resisting ‘the temptation of extreme
compartmentalization’.165 Another feature of the IIAs is vagueness of their wording.
They are drafted at a considerable level of generality, are often far from clear and
open to a range of interpretations.166 This is also the feature of the substantive treaty
provisions that are of interest to our analysis, namely the FET standard and indirect
expropriation. They represent general treatment standards rather than specific legal
159 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (United Nations 2000) Doc. No.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2, p. 1< http://unctad.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf> (accessed 16 April
2014).
160 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and
Trade for Development (United Nations 2013) Sales No. E.13.II.D.5, p. 101.
161 van Harten (n 44) 27.
162 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission Finalized by Martii Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, A/CN.4/L.682, para. 8.
163 For this reason some commentators treat as ‘overreaching’ a suggestion that the
treaties might form a ‘system’ (Bjorklund (n 148) 270).
164 Peter Muchlinski, ‘The Framework of Investment Protection: The Content of BITs’ in
Sauvant KP, Sachs LE (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment:
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford
University Press 2009) 38; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 1; van Harten (n 44) 27-28;
UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way
Forward: UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development (United
Nations 2008) Sales No. E.08.II.D.1, p. 43; Douglas, Zachary, ‘The Hybrid Foundations
of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2003) 74 B.Y.B.I.L. 151 159.
165 Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaties and General International Law’ (2008) 57
ICLQ 361 378. See also van Harten (n 44) 28; Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Unified Theory
of Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (2010) 43 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 43, 47-48; Roberts (n
18) 52; UNCTAD (ibid) 2, 62; Vadi (n 56) 88; Schill (n 19) 94-96.
166 Bjorklund (n 148) 269; van Harten (n 44) 5.
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rules167, being a result of a political compromise between States.168 The vagueness
of IIAs lies at the heart of the problems with the regime’s development.169
Other key characteristics of ITL concern its enforcement mechanism. Most IIAs
nowadays stipulate that claims relating to compliance by States with their treaty
obligations vis-à-vis foreign investors are subject to arbitration. 170 The ‘epochal’
feature of ITA is the ability of private parties, namely foreign investors, to bring
claims directly against those States. These claims may trigger international law
responsibly of the host State and are brought before international tribunals.171 No
intermediation of the investor’s home State is required, unlike under the older system
of diplomatic protection.172 Another ‘revolutionary’173 element of the regime is that
disputes are decided by arbitral tribunals independent from the States – parties to an
IIA. Investors can bring treaty claims regardless of any contractual relationship
between them and the host States. Here, the mechanism also differs from
international commercial arbitration which requires existence of an arbitration
agreement between the parties to the dispute.174
Most IIAs refer to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(‘ICSID’), based on the Washington Convention, as the arbitration mechanism.175
ICSID arbitration has been tailor-made for the resolution of investor-State disputes,
although originally not for ITA.176 It uses as a template commercial arbitration and is
167 Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual
Role of States’ (2010) 104 AJIL 179, 190; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 91-92; Wälde (n
18) 95.
168 Toby Landau, ‘Reasons for Reasons: The Tribunal’s Duty in Investor-State
Arbitration’ (2009) 14 ICCA Congress Series: 50 Years of the New York Convention:
ICCA International Arbitration Conference (Kluwer Law International 2009) 195.
169 UNCTAD (n 12) (with regard to the FET standard).
170 This became permanent feature of IIAs in the 1990s (van Harten (n 44) 26).
171 Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration without Privity’ (1995) 10 ICSID Rev. 232, 256; van Harten
(n 44) 97; Stephan, W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law
– an Introduction’ in Schill SW (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative
Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 13.
172 van Harten (n 44) 6, 9.
173 ibid 95.
174 Paulsson (n 171) 233; Wälde (n 18) 59-60; van Harten (n 44) 62-66.
175 Sornarajah (n 8) 306.
176 Wälde (n 18) 57 (the Convention was drafted under the presumption that disputes will
be based on arbitration clauses included in contracts or national laws on foreign
investment).
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based on the premise of ‘depoliticisation’.177 The rationale underlying this design was
to limit, by contrast with diplomatic protection, State control over the dispute
settlement process. 178 ICSID emphasises its independence from the political
influences of the host and home States.179 The private adjudication paradigm means
that tribunals consist of ‘privately contracted adjudicators’ and the ability to review
the award once it is rendered is limited.180 The reason for adopting these novel
solutions was to increase confidence in the enforceability of IIAs.181
On a ‘macro’ scale the nascent regime has its own rules and an enforcement
mechanism. It is a new and specialised type of law that seeks to address a particular
issue, namely the phenomenon of foreign investment.182 This does not mean that the
regime appeared on the map of the fragmented international law fully formed.
Rather, it is still ‘new and undertheorised’, subject to rapid changes and mired by
stark divisions concerning its effectiveness and operation.183
The fundamental unresolved questions concern, among others, the precise object
and purpose of the regime, its relationship to the CIL rules on the treatment of aliens,
and the content of its core substantive rules and principles. Because of the early
stage and the intensity of its development, its mechanism, to which we now turn, is
material for our analysis.
International investment law grows from the root of the highly controversial CIL on
protection of aliens.184 The arrival of BITs meant a ‘treatification’ of this area185 that
‘starv[ed] custom of independent progressive development’.186 IIAs are nowadays
the main building blocks of international investment law. They are the main point of
177 Ibrahim F I Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depolitization of Investment Disputes: The
Roles of ICSID and MIGA (1986) 1 ICSID Rev. 1.
178 Schill (n 171) 13.
179 Wälde (n 18) 80.
180 van Harten (n 44) 5; Schill (n 171) 13; Wälde (n 18) 116.
181 Roberts (n 167) 183.
182 ILC, Fragmentation (n 162) para. 15.
183 Roberts (n 18) 46, 48-49.
184 Samuel K B Asante, ‘International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal’
(1988) 37 ICLQ 588.
185 Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘The Treatification of International Investment Law’ (2007)
NAFTA Rev. 155.
186 McLachlan (n 165) 365.
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reference for investment tribunals in adjudicating international law disputes between
investors and host States.187
However, ITL is only ‘in theory primarily based on treaties’.188 The main engine of its
development are decisions of investment tribunals.189 This is a consequence of the
regime’s early stage of development.190 Tribunals operate in a novel environment
where the treaty wording is vague and CIL related to this area is controversial. The
standards set out the stage for a broad range of arguments by the parties to a treaty
dispute. Under the FET standard the key legal issue is whether the facts of a
particular case show fair and equitable or unfair and inequitable treatment of a
foreign investor. With regard to indirect expropriation the question is whether a
particular regulation is a legitimate regulation or an undue interference with an
investment. Characterisation of the facts is crucial and the parties present competing
conceptions of a given standard. The tribunal’s role is to decide which conception
applies to the facts before it.191
The early tribunals were looking into ‘a void, untouched by those who have the
authority to make the law’.192 The ‘first generation’ of IIAs provided little assistance in
approaching the vague treaty standards. There was an acute need for clarity which
the tribunals, as authorised decision-makers, had to satisfy.193 They have a broad
discretion to shape the substantive content of treaty protections and methodology of
its application.194
The tribunals’ discretion is often directed towards ‘disputes concerning the legality of
state conduct in the regulatory sphere’.195 It also gives them great power over how
the host States exercise their sovereign powers. Most investment disputes concern
187 Salacuse (n 211) 157.
188 Wälde (n 18) 44 (emphasis added).
189 ibid 44; Landau (n 168) 198; Roberts (n 18) 62.
190 Kaufmann-Kohler (n 46) 375; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Is Consistency a Myth?’ in
Gaillard E, Banfatemi Y (eds), Precedent in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing
2008) 144; Bjorklund (n 148) 277.
191 ibid 81; Wälde (n 18) 95.
192 Jan Paulsson, ‘International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty
Arbitration and International Law’ (2006) 13 ICCA Congress Series: International
Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? (Kluwer Law International 2007) 886.
193 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press
1990) Chapter 4.
194 Landau (n 168) 195; Wälde (n 18) 46, 48; van Harten (n 44) 123; Schill (n 171) 13;
Bjorklund (n 148) 269.
195 van Harten (n 44) 101.
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regulatory issues, which are a novel subject-matter for an international tribunal. No
such disputes could have been brought before onto such forum before.196 As a
result, by resolving those disputes investment awards influence the limits of host
State’s sovereign regulatory powers.197
This function of investment tribunals inspired the public law approach to ITL.198
According to this approach
Investment arbitration … is essentially a form of international
judicial review of governmental (regulatory, administrative and, at
times, fiscal) action, although it uses the forms of commercial
arbitration.199
The public law paradigm is one of many competing for the primacy in theorising
ITL/ITA.200 The public law and the commercial arbitration approaches are the two
most important ones. The commercial arbitration approach views ITA as based on
equality of arms between the parties to the dispute. 201 The role of investment
tribunals is limited to the resolution of a dispute between the parties.202 The public
law approach, as well as public international law approach, is based on the
deference to the State, treating States as superior to private actors.203 The role of
tribunals reaches beyond resolution of a specific dispute into the development of
ITL.204 This thesis follows the public international law paradigm in describing the
mechanism of development of ITL. Such approach is not seriously contested in
practice. More controversially, the public law paradigm is based on the premise that
host State’s sovereign powers cannot be unduly constrained and the State must
retain some flexibility to regulate in the interest of public welfare.205
196 McLachlan (n 165) 376; van Harten (n 44) 96.
197 ibid 67, 81; Schill (n 171) 14.
198 See van Harten (n 44); David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic
Globalization (Cambridge University Press 2008); Schill (n 44).
199 Emphasis added. Wälde (n 14) 389; Thomas Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under
Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Selected Key Issues based on Recent Litigation
Experience’ in Horn N, Kröll SM (eds), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes.
Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law International 2004) 211.
200 See generally Roberts (n 18).
201 ibid 55; Wälde (n 18) 54.
202 Roberts (n 18) 61-62.
203 ibid 55.
204 ibid 62.
205 ibid 67.
60
The insistence on the public law paradigm was a reaction to the early practice of
investment tribunals. It had a specific goal of influencing the theorisation of
investment treaty regime. 206 It is important not to conflate it with the public
international law paradigm, since they focus on relationships between unequal and
equal parties respectively.207
The development of ITL/ITA engages a number of different actors. 208 They
participate in a broad mechanism of validation of ITA awards, which has been
summarised as follows:
The actual compilation of a generally accepted set of standards will
be an accretive process developed little by little as tribunals make
decisions in individual cases, and as those decisions are tested by
other tribunals, by publicists and international organisations, and by
the states themselves.209
This ‘testing’ legitimises the concretisation of vague treaty standards as well as the
process and methodology through which this is achieved. 210 The actors of this
legitimisation include not only the parties to the dispute, their counsel and arbitral
tribunals. They also include: scholars, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations who compile and comment on the previous cases, and identify ‘lines of
jurisprudence’; and States, as parties to the IIAs rather than respondents in the
disputes, who refine the wording of IIAs, issue interpretative statements and make
their opinions known otherwise, or even withdraw from the regime altogether.211
Legitimisation leads to the ‘natural selection’ of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ awards 212 ,
consolidation of a de facto precedent system and articulation of increasingly specific
principles.213 The broad spectrum of actors also means that the power to develop the
206 ibid 63.
207 ibid 64-64.
208 Peter Muchlinski, Comments in: ‘Transcript from Memorial Symposium for Professor
Thomas Wälde. Roundtable on the Question of Convergence in International Law’ in
Weiler T, Baetens F (eds), New Directions in Interaitonal Economic Law. In Memoriam
Thomas Wälde (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 566; Roberts (n 167) 189.
209 Bjorklund (n 148) 280; see also Franck (n 193) 61; Wälde (n 18) 46.
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211 Bjorklund (n 148) 275; Roberts (n 167) 190-194.
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(ed), Arbitration under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to Key Issues
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legal discourse on these complex issues goes beyond to the tribunals to other
experts at an international level.214
C. Dealing with Indeterminate Treaty Standards: Methods and Limits
The crucial role for investment tribunals is to clarify the of vague treaty provisions. A
legitimate system must consist of rules that ‘communicate what conduct is permitted
and what conduct is out of bounds’.215 Such clarity increases compliance of the
treaty parties who know what is expected of them.216 The process of clarification
progresses on a case-by-case basis217 and is on-going. To be successful it needs to
bring about a legal order that is coherent, consistent, stable and predictable. 218
Although some commentators optimistically state that the ITL is developing in a
predictable and consistent manner219, this development also attracts considerable
criticism.220
The process of clarification of the broad IIAs standards rests on two pillars, treaty
interpretation and references to past awards, to which we now turn.
Treaty interpretation is the primary methodology employed by tribunals.221 Treaties
are creatures of international law and their interpretation and operation is based on
214 Muchlinski (n 208) 562.
215 Franck (n 193) 57.
216 ibid 52.
217 Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 962.
218 Kaufmann-Kohler (n 46) 374; Landau (n 168) 198.
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220 Landau (n 168) 198-199; UNCTAD (n 12) 12 and (n 185) 105-107.
221 See generally on: (a) treaty interpretation: Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation
(Oxford University Press 2008); Orakhelashvili (n 24); Hersch Lauterpacht ‘Restrictive
Interpretation and The Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’ (1949)
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the rules of international law.222 Consequently, a tribunal resolving treaty a claim
must first resort to international law. 223 The VCLT provides that treaties are
‘governed by international law’224 and should be interpreted in accordance with the
general rule of interpretation set out in Articles 31-33 of the VCLT.
The first point of reference for investment tribunals is Article 31(1) of the VCLT225
which provides that
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
Next, Article 31(3)(c) calls the interpreter to take into account ‘any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. The interpreter
should take into account any agreements or other instruments relating to the treaty
made between the treaty parties, their subsequent practice and any special meaning
given by the parties to the terms of the treaty. 226 Preparatory work and the
circumstances in which the treaty was concluded can be considered as
supplementary means of interpretation.227
Despite initial hesitation investment tribunals accepted the role of treaty
interpretation and the VCLT in applying IIAs.228 In practice, Article 31(1) of the VCLT
turned out to be of limited utility.229 Similarly, non-textual and subsidiary means of
interpretation are either unavailable or are also of limited usefulness.230 Tribunals
222 Yas Bonfratemi, ‘The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Yannaca-
Small K (ed), Arbitration under International Investment Law. A Guide to Key Issues
(Oxford University Press 2010) 208; Zachary Douglas, The International Law of
Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press 2009) 81; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1)
77; Wälde (n 18) 95.
223 Wälde (n 18) 94; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 92.
224 Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT.
225 McLachlan (n 165) 371-372; Schreuer (n 221) 1.
226 Article 31(2)-(4) of the VCLT.
227 Article 32 of the VCLT.
228 Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties’ in Gazzini  T, De Brabandere E (eds),
International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2012) 119-120; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 110; Wälde (n 18) 95; McLachlan
(n 165) 371.
229 Roberts (n 18) 50-51; Schreuer (n 221) 1; Wälde (n 18) 95.
230 Kläger (n 12) 46; McLachlan (n 165) 372. Here, the notable exception is NAFTA
which utilises the mechanism of interpretative statements. On ways in which States can
influence interpretation by utilising Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the VCLT see Roberts (n
167).
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struggle to interpret the vague treaty standards and to identify the treaties’ object and
purpose.
The treaty standards, and IIAs in general, are formulated in very vague terms. The
general principle of treaty interpretation can only take the tribunals so far in their
concretisation and application.231 The VCLT assumes that it is possible to find an
interpretation based on literal and contextual considerations by reference to the
object and purpose of a treaty.232 This assumption is problematic for IIAs. Textual
interpretation of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ ends up being ‘a little more than an
exchange of synonyms’.233 The language of IIAs consists largely of terms of art.
Relying on dictionary definitions is not very helpful in decoding them and may even
be counter-productive.234
Text-based approach to interpretation also causes problems in decoding the object
and purpose of IIAs.235 The practice exposes a rift between two major approaches.236
According to one, the main purpose of the IIAs is promotion and protection of foreign
investments as an end in itself.237 It mandates creation of an investment-friendly
climate to encourage capital flows.238 Investment treaties merely redress the balance
between States and investors. Without a treaty the investor would be at the mercy of
the State which has the power to create and abolish rights and thus ‘holds most of
the high cards’.239 This led some tribunals to equate the FET standard with the host
State’s obligation to maintain a stable environment for investment240 and to interpret
231 Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 962; Gazzini (n 228) 121; Newcombe &
Paradell (n 1) 111.
232 Gazzini (n 228) 120; Kläger (n 12) 45-46.
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(n 5) 92.
235 Roberts (n 18) 51; Wälde (n 18) 111.
236 Stern mentions an approach favouring the interest of the host State but such
approach is rare in practice (Stern (n 43) 191).
237 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 115-116 view such approach as ‘defensible’.
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ambiguities in a treaty in favour of foreign investors.241 This approach is criticised for
overly favouring foreign investors.242
The other approach requires close scrutiny of the treaty object and purpose and a
balanced approach to treaty interpretation.243 The application of IIAs should leave
more flexibility to host States than allowed the first proposition. The balanced
approach can be interpreted out of treaty preambles referring to economic
development and cooperation.244 It can also be adopted regardless of the specific
text of a treaty preamble245 because it is indispensable for the long-term survival of
ITL. A regime that overly favours foreign investors may discourage treaty parties
from admitting investments in the first place.246
The second key method of developing ITL are references to past ITA awards. From
the end of the 1990s the number of ITA awards grew steeply. Within two decades
from the first award247, at the end of 2012, the regime saw 514 publicly known ITA
disputes.248 They generated a significant number of awards, decisions and orders
that contributed greatly to the development of ITL. References to previous awards
are found in virtually every investment award and are the tribunals’ preferred method
of supporting their decisions.249 Such method is generally acceptable, even though
there is no doctrine of binding precedent in ITL.250 References to previous awards
241 SGS v Philippines, para. 166; Wälde (n 18) 107-108.
242 Lowe (n 14) 455; Schreuer (n 221) 2; Kläger (n 12) 45; Orakhelashvili (n 24) 564.
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245 Stern (n 43) 192; Roberts (n 18) 50-51.
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247 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
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reflect the inevitability of using analogies in a situation, described above, in which
tribunals as decision-makers find themselves.251 These references contribute to the
creation of a body of rules more coherent than would have otherwise existed given
the atomised and ad hoc nature of the regime.
However, the results of employing these two methods are not free from controversy.
The main complaints address inconsistency and quality of tribunals’ decisions.
Awards of investment tribunals attract considerable criticism for being inconsistent.
This concerns situations when in largely the same factual circumstances various
tribunals arrive at diametrically opposite results with regard to important substantive
or procedural issues.252
Inconsistency is often justified. A decision in every dispute depends on a number of
factors, namely: the facts of the case, the evidence provided, the wording of a given
IIA, the arguments presented by the parties, and the particular constellation of
arbitrators in a tribunal.253 Given the scope for variations, to paraphrase Muchlinski, if
the tribunals were speaking with one voice, they would be doing administration, not
law.254 The key to resolving the problem of inconsistent decisions is a persuasive
justification of a divergent approach based on critical evaluation of previous
decisions.255
The requirements of consistency, coherence and clarity attach predominantly to the
tribunals’ methodology, i.e. the process by which they reach decisions in individual
cases.256 To strengthen their authority and enhance legitimacy of the developing
legal order, the tribunals must ‘function in accordance with ascertainable principles of
Key Standard’ (n 5) 92; Vadi (n 56) 88. Specifically on the issue of precedent in ITL see
e.g. Paulsson (n 77); Kaufmann-Kohler (n 46); Bjorklund (n 148); Weeramantry (n 249);
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Doctrine of Precedent in Investment Arbitration?’ in Muchlinski P, Ortino F, Schreuer C
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press
2008).
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252 van Harten (n 44) 7-8; Wälde (n 18) 115; Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing International Law through Inconsistent
Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521.
253 Paulsson (n 212) 701; Weeramantry (n 249) 120-121.
254 Muchlinski (n 208) 566.
255 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 59-60, 106; Landau (n 168) 198. But see Kaufmann-
Kohler (n 190) 376-377.
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right process’ that are common to all participants of the regime.257 Such legitimate
methodology cannot be ‘discovered’ but develops on a case-by-case basis.
Consistent methodology helps to secure a more predictable operation of the legal
order. This predictability contributes to the order’s credibility and strengthens the
confidence of its users.258 Clarification of investment treaty standards by way of well-
reasoned awards arrived at through consistent and acceptable methodology is most
likely to have a ‘powerful pull to compliance’.259
This takes us to the quality of tribunals’ reasoning, which is the second point of
critique of the regime’s development. The quality of awards is considered insufficient
for the purposes of the regime.260 The role of tribunals as law-developers requires
that their awards create, as well as respect, an ‘authoritative and persuasive
precedent’.261 However, they do not disclose the reasons that led them to decide the
dispute in a particular way.262Tribunals rely on previous awards uncritically263 and
reveal very little of the thinking behind their decisions.264 This is perceived as a
prerequisite for the regime’s evolution in a wrong direction. 265
Tribunals must issue well-reasoned awards to avoid perceptions negatively
impacting on their authority and enhance the convergence of ITL. A four-point
methodology may be of assistance in this respect. First, tribunals need to explain
why they relied on certain awards, distinguished others and found yet others
unconvincing.266 Secondly, they must carefully and fully explain how they took into
account the legal and factual positions presented by the parties and why they arrived
at a particular resolution of their dispute. 267 Thirdly, tribunals should adequately
257 Franck (n 193) 64-65; Muchlinski (n 208) 566.
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67
explain what they were doing in the interpretative process.268 This must include the
whole series of steps in the logical chain that led the tribunal to apply the treaty in the
circumstances of a particular case, showing its diligent and systematic application of
the VCLT.269 Lastly, the tribunals must remember that their reasoning is taken into
account in future disputes and future scholarly critique. The reasoning should thus
be ‘clear and straightforward’ and avoid unnecessary obiter comments.270
How far can the tribunals go in exercising their broad powers? Their discretion is not
delineated by bright lines. However, there are important guideposts the tribunals
must be mindful of.
First, tribunals are not law-makers but decision-makers, even though, when
understood literally, such a division is a fiction.271 The traditional view of international
law is that only States can create international law, while courts and tribunals only
interpret and apply it.272 Investment tribunals’ quasi-legislative function is a functional
necessity.273 ITA awards, even without the system of precedent, are perceived as
evidence of the content of ITL.274 However, tribunals need to operate within the
confines of a given treaty and avoid a perception that they create the law rather than
apply it. They cannot abuse their powers e.g. by deliberately or drastically
misreading the intention of the treaty parties.275 As observed by Lauterpacht:
The law-creating autonomy and independence of judicial activity
may be an unavoidable and beneficent necessity. But they are so
only on condition that the judge does not consciously and
deliberately usurp the function of legislation.276
Secondly, tribunals operate within the rules of treaty interpretation. The VCLT does
not provide a mechanical test that could allow them to arrive at a ‘correct’
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interpretation.277 These are only basic278 or guiding279 rules, leaving considerable
scope for flexibility. 280 Although in interpreting and applying the IIAs investment
tribunals engage in a creative, or even experimental, activity281, their freedom is
checked by the rules of interpretation.
The preferred approach of the tribunals has been labelled as ‘professional’282, that of
‘self-restraint’283 and, perhaps most aptly, as a requirement
to adopt such objectively justifiable and explainable decisions as
would be based on legal rules and principles accepted by all
parties to the legal dispute284
and, one should add, the parties to the IIA.285 Quality of reasoning therefore plays a
key role in explaining what the tribunals are doing and why, and why this stays within
the confines of their function. The requirements with regard to such reasoning also
shape the tribunals’ discretion.
The architecture of the investment treaty regime authorises tribunals to develop this
legal order and gives them a broad discretion to do so. However, it does not endow
them with the authority recognised as legitimate by the participants of the system.286
A well-reasoned award contributes to the persuasive application of vague treaty
standards.287 A line of such awards forms a persuasive jurisprudence constante.288
The validation process influences the tribunals’ authority. 289 This process is
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particularly visible with regard to the concept of legitimate expectations, to which we
now turn.
D. Legitimate Expectations in the Process of Development of ITL
References to legitimate expectations are an ‘arbitral innovation’.290 They developed
as ‘an operational method’ of applying indeterminate treaty standards, in particular
the FET standard. 291 Tribunals developed tools necessary to avoid the
embarrassment of non liquet and the need to declare the FET standard ‘void for
vagueness’.292
Legitimate expectations are not referred to in investment treaties.293 Arbitral tribunals
spun the practice of referring to legitimate expectations from the Tecmed award.
That award is an example of an early practice of operationalizing the vague treaty
standards through abstract ‘definitions’.294 References to expectations were often
used in such ‘definitions’. In AAPL v Sri Lanka, the standard of full protection and
security was found to include ‘what should be legitimately expected to be secured for
foreign investors by a reasonably well organised modern State’.295 In Metalclad,
deprivation of ‘reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of property’ was referred
to as an important element of expropriation. 296 Finally, in Tecmed, the tribunal
pronounced that the FET standard:
requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international
investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations
that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the
investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in
its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know
290 UNCTAD (n 12) 9.
291 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAgua Servicios
Integrales del Agua S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability of
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beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its
investment and comply with such regulations. Any and all State
actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the
guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions
approved thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such
regulations. The foreign investor also expects the host State to act
consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting
decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by
the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and
launch its commercial and business activities. The investor also
expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the
actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the
function usually assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive
the investor of its investment without the required compensation. In
fact, failure by the host State to comply with such pattern of
conduct with respect to the foreign investor or its investments
affects the investor’s ability to measure the treatment and
protection awarded by the host State and to determine whether the
actions of the host State conform to the fair and equitable treatment
principle.297
Some commentators welcomed Tecmed’s ‘lengthy list of desiderata’298 as the
‘most comprehensive definition’ of the standard’. 299 However, other reactions
suggested that the Tecmed tribunal might have overstepped the mark of acceptable
creativity.300 Subsequent tribunals were more wary of using sweeping statements to
define the FET standard, but were not discouraged from referring to legitimate
expectations.301
Despite this criticism, the above passage became the centre of the web of ideas of
what legitimate expectations are or should be. The critique truncated the mantra
of the Tecmed definition to a more general reference that the FET standard
requires ‘treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken
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into account by the foreign investor to make the investment’.302 However, this
means different things to different tribunals.303 Some require a ‘conduct’ that creates
expectations, in particular specific representations304, others find it sufficient that an
investor had some pre-existing set of expectations formed at the time he decided to
invest.305 Some tribunals accept, or even require, the legitimate expectations to be
created by contractual relations between the investor and the host State306, while
others stress that contractual expectations cannot be equated with the concept of
legitimate expectations.307
A number of awards cultivate the broad concept of legitimate expectations from the
‘definitional’ approach of Tecmed.308 They view legitimate expectations as covering
‘such well-established fundamental standards as good faith, due process, and non-
discrimination’. 309 This approach allows tribunals to subsume under the FET
standard a number of different sub-standards such as non-arbitrariness,
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Award of 8 November 2010 [Alpha], para. 420; Spyridion Roussalis v Romania, ICSID
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305 See e.g. OKO, Parkerings, para. 331; Al-Bahloul v Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case
No. V (064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 2 September 2009 [Al-
Bahloul], paras. 200-202; Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability of 14 January 2010 [Lemire], para. 267; Electrabel S.A. v The
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, applicable
law and liability of 30 November 2012 [Electrabel], paras. 7.76-78.
306 Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award on
the Merits of 6 June 2008 [Metalpar], para. 185; Walter Bau AG (in liquidation) v The
Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL, Award of 1 July 2009, para. 12.1.
307 Parkerings, para. 344; Gustaw F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v Republic of Ghana,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award of 18 June 2010, paras. 335, 357.
308 Tecmed, para. 154; Saluka, para.307; Plama, para. 176; Kardassopoulos and Fuchs
v The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, Award of 3
March 2010 [Kardassopoulos], para. 438; Lemire, para. 267; Electrabel, para. 7.77;
Oostergetel, Laurentius v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Final award of 23 April 2013
[Oostergetel], para. 222.
309 Saluka, para. 303.
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transparency, consistency, non-discrimination or stability, regardless whether they
are expressly referred to in a given IIA.310
Similar collection of divergent ideas emerges from scholarly writings. Many
commentators are descriptive rather than critical in their writings. Legitimate
expectations are viewed as closely related to the requirement of transparency of
the host State’s legal framework311, its stability and predictability312, and to due
process in administrative decision-making.313 Some commentators argue that
expectations may be derived from ‘any form of state conduct’314, or from broadly
understood ‘legal framework’, representing the whole legal universe relevant to
the investment. 315 Others argue that expectations only arise from specific
representations made by the State to the investor.316 Yet others suggest that
legitimate expectations arise directly from investor’s reliance on an IIA.317 Some
commentators state that legitimate expectations cannot be equated with vested
property rights 318 , while others make the opposite argument. 319 Some
commentators pair legitimate expectations with the need of balancing investors’
interests with the host State’s regulatory flexibility320, while others exclude such
balancing from the concept.321
Two observations immediately spring to mind here. First, legitimate expectations are
a central element of the FET standard and are habitually referred to by parties and
tribunals.322 Secondly, the concept is incoherent. Despite the fact that legitimate
310 Landau (n 168).
311 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 133-134.
312 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 279-280.
313 McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 239, 261; McLachlan (n 165) 377.
314 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 280.
315 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 133.
316 McLachlan (n 165) 377.
317 Todd J Grierson-Weiler, Ian A Laird, ‘Standards of Treatment’ in Muchlinski P, Ortino,
Schreuer C (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford
University Press 2008) 275-283
318 McLachlan, Shore, Weiniger (n 12) 239, 261; McLachlan (n 165) 377.
319 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 255, 278, 280, 283.
320 McLachlan, Shore, Weiniger (n 12) 239; UNCTAD (n 12) 77.
321 Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 106.
322 Kaufmann-Kohler (n 46) 372-373; Fietta (n 2) 378, 385; Electrabel, para. 7.75; von
Walter (n 103) 173 (frequency of references suggests that it is treated as a ‘panacea for
the resolution of all unresolved questions’).
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expectations have been invoked in virtually every FET claim after Tecmed,
references to expectations did not reach satisfactory coherence. Reference to
legitimate expectations as a ‘concept’, let alone a ‘doctrine’ or ‘principle’, may
therefore be a misnomer.
References to legitimate expectations are not free from criticism. Three points of
critique are highlighted below: low quality of reasoning, string citations323 as the main
engine of perpetuation and an unrealistic and all-encompassing nature of the
concept.
Quality of reasoning is a perpetual problem. Tecmed and subsequent tribunals did
not invoke any authority to support their concept of legitimate expectations.324 Even
when relying on previous awards tribunals often do not explain how and why they
approached the concept of legitimate expectations. As a result, although certain
more specific elements are recurring in practice, there is little explanation why they
are being used and little critical evaluation of such practice. A good example is the
rule that legitimate expectations must exist at the time when investment is made. It is
commonly repeated by tribunals and traced back to Tecmed.325 Some tribunals reject
claims based on legitimate expectations based on this time element326, and only a
few were not comfortable with the rule’s strictness.327 The explanation offered for this
rule is that the time of making the investment marks the point at which the investor
assesses the legal and factual background for investment. 328 This argument is
insufficient to explain why upsetting such expectations should be regarded as unfair
and inequitable.
Similar criticism applies to many scholarly writings. As shown above, the bundle of
ideas emerging from commentaries is often contradictory. It is often also
323 Landau (n 168) 204.
324 Douglas (n 289) 28; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 96; El Paso Energy
International Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Legal Opinion of M.
Sornarajah [El Paso/Sornarajah], para. 80.
325 See e.g. Jan de Nul, para. 265; Plama, para. 176; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve
Sanayi A.S. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award of 27
August 2009 [Bayindir], para. 190; AES Summit, para. 9.3.8; Frontier Petroleum Services
Ltd. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award of 12 November 2010 [Frontier
Petroleum], paras. 287-288; Lemire, para. 285; Electrabel, para. 7.76; Oostergetel, para.
209.
326 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Arbitral Award of 26 January 2006 [Thunderbird], para. 165.
327 AES Summit, paras. 9.3.12-13; Kardassopoulos, paras. 439-441.
328 Frontier Petroleum, para. 287; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134-135.
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unsupported by detailed arguments and references to authorities. Rather, it
represents a collection of arguments, competing for persuasiveness and
authority.329
Low quality of reasoning is also related to the tribunals’ use of the general rule of
interpretation. The approach taken by the Tecmed tribunal was criticised as an
abuse of this rule. The tribunal invented the intention of the treaty parties rather than
read it out of the treaty. 330 That intention was effectively derived from the
expectations of the foreign investor.331 The tribunal’s reference to Article 31(1) of the
VCLT was therefore a fiction. 332
Tribunals often skip this part of the interpretative process, relying instead on what
has been pronounced by earlier tribunals. 333 This may suggest that by
operationalizing the FET standard though legitimate expectations investment
tribunals mentally eject themselves from the process of treaty interpretation and
simply declare the standard in one guise or another.334 This would remove the
important barrier separating the use of creativity from its abuse. Since previous
tribunals often did not base their interpretation on anything other than dictionary
definitions or previous awards, this may lead to nothing more than a mechanical
string citation, which is the next point we will discuss.
Investment tribunals referring to legitimate expectations have been harshly criticised
for their reference to past awards. Such awards are often the only ‘authority’ for
referring to legitimate expectations. The past awards, however, also provide no
explanation of their approach. These references are therefore often little more than
mechanical.335 This practice of string citations has been criticised as an abuse of
329 The process of drawing out of interstitial tools has been described by Lowe ((n 23)
219).
330 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 570.
331 MTD Annulment, para. 67.
332 Wälde (n 18) 107.
333 See e.g. The Rompetrol Group N.V. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award of
6 May 2013 [Rompetrol], para. 197; Oostergetel, para. 221; GEA Group
Aktiengesellschaft v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award of 31 March 2011
[GEA], paras. 268, 272-305; Arif v Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23,
Award of 8 April 2013 [Arif], paras. 531-539; Parkerings, paras. 330-333.
334 Vandevelde (n 165) 68; Snodgrass (n 2) 58; von Walter (n 103) 199.
335 Douglas (n 289) 28; El Paso/Sornarajah, para. 80; Orakhelashvili (n 24) 265.
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precedent336, ‘a thoughtless application’337, ‘the magic incantation of the formula’338
and a building of a ‘house of cards’.339
Tribunals do not clarify the different approaches to legitimate expectations, their
normative scope, character or weight. 340 They neither explain the analysis that
underpins their application of the concept of legitimate expectations341, nor provide
any authority for the approach taken.342 Tribunals often refer to previous awards
representing diametrically different views of legitimate expectations, without
explaining which one in particular they are relying on in their own approach.343 Some
tribunals take even more minimalist approach, supporting their pronouncements on
legitimate expectations with no references at all344 or providing no reasoning for their
finding that the host State ‘did not respect investor’s reasonable and legitimate
expectations’.345
The third point of criticism is that references to legitimate expectations expand
the intended scope of an IIA and support an all-encompassing standard that
favours interests of investors. The Tecmed ‘definition’ was criticised for providing
no outer limit to the obligation of FET.346 Such standard would require perfection
‘to which all states should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain’.347 As such,
it is unrealistic and obviously beyond the scope of what could have been
336 Douglas (n 289) 28.
337 UNCTAD (n 12) 9.
338 El Paso/Sornarajah, para. 80.
339 Potestà (n 2) 90; Zeyl (n 48) 224; Christopher Campbell, ‘House of Cards: The
Relevance of Legitimate Expectations under Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions in
Investment Treaty Law’ (2013) 30 Journal of Int’l Arb’n 361, 366-367, all referring to
Roberts’ (n 193) use of the phrase to generally describe the methodology use of
investment tribunals.
340 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 282; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 106; Snodgrass (n 2)
10, 58; Potesta (n 2) 98-90.
341 Fietta (n 2) 375.
342 Snodgrass (n 2) 10.
343 See e.g. Jan de Nul, para. 186; Al Bahloul, paras. 201-202.
344 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award of 29 July 2008 [Rumeli], para. 609.
See also Electrabel, paras. 7.75-7.76.
345 Rumeli, para. 615.
346 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 570; Suez/InterAgua/Nikken and Suez/Vivendi/Nikken, paras. 2-
3 (referring generally to the practice of investment tribunals since Tecmed).
347 Douglas (n 289) 28; see also UNCTAD (n 12) 64-65.
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intended by the treaty parties. Subsequent tribunals has been criticised for
unduly favouring investors’ concerns in applying the vague treaty standards.348
The problems troubling the development of ITL through the concept of legitimate
expectations show that there are no firm guiding principles as to how references to
expectations should be used in an investment treaty claim.349 Tribunals appear to
pick and choose from the uncoordinated mass of ideas in a way that most suits the
case before them.350 The choice of a convenient articulation of the concept is often
made by the parties and tribunals usually uncritically follow these conceptual
‘tunnels’.351
On a ‘macro’ level the aspects of awards concerning legitimate expectations often
display ‘a marked lack of consistency of legal analysis’.352 Tribunals do not try to
bring those ideas into a consistent and coherent whole.353 The variety of inconsistent
approaches is not converging into a specific principle, rule or doctrine. The concept
is applied in a way that suggests is limitless character and applicability to any
situation that the investor considers disadvantageous.354
The origins and operation of the various approaches to legitimate expectations are
left unexplained and way in which they are used lacks consistency. As a result,
decisions based on references to legitimate expectations are not convincing355 and
seen as an overstepping of the bounds of accepted creativity. This undermines the
authority of investment tribunals as well as legitimacy of the developing regime as a
whole.356 The persuasiveness of what the tribunals are doing is weakened.
Tribunals are obviously not required to lay out a complete theory or doctrine of
legitimate expectations. Yet the interest of the regime as a whole demands their
responsibility for the precedential value of their awards and for the systemic
348 UNCTAD (n 12) 9, 11.
349 Fietta (n 2) 375.
350 See e.g. Ulysseas, Inc. v Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 12 June 2012
[Ulysseas], para. 249.
351 Wälde (n 18) 52-53; see e.g. Al Bahloul, para. 203, Roussalis, paras. 316-317; GEA,
paras. 268, 271-305.
352 Fietta (n 2) 390.
353 ibid 375; Snodgrass (n 2) 2, 17; Pandya & Moody (n 2) 1; Potesta (n 2) 89.
354 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 282; Snodgrass (n 20) 10; UNCTAD (n 12) 67.
355 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 282.
356 French ((n 278) 283) observed that improper exercise of the judicial function may
‘undermin[e] the confidence of States in international justice itself.’
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consistency of their methodology. 357 Application of the concept of legitimate
expectations needs to provide commentators with sufficient material to analyse the
tribunals’ approach and develop a more coherent and complete conceptualisation of
the concept. 358 The awards and scholarly writings so far do not support its
consistency and predictability.
This is not to say that the disorganised patchwork of ideas on legitimate
expectations is happily perpetuated. Some tribunals realise their authority is at
stake when faced with claims suggesting that the claimant hoped his reference to
legitimate expectations could convert a weak, or even frivolous, claim into a
success.359 They realise that if the concept is not tackled, it may allow for endless
reconceptualisation of the claim, creating ‘a “moving target” for a respondent’ and
undermine due process.360 Tribunals are becoming more assertive in setting
boundaries of what is a reflection of the concept.361
Resort to analogies is justified to help to address the problems that limit the
development of legitimate expectations as a consistent, predictable and legitimate
tool operationalizing the vague treaty standards. These analogies may be
inductive362, turning to the general international law or other branches of international
law, or deductive, turning to national legal systems. Comparisons and analogies are
a normal way of searching for answers to novel problems. In case of nascent legal
regimes such ITL, the recourse to more established legal systems dealing with
similar issues is a logical approach to problem-solving and clarification.363 They are
357 Wälde (n 18) 53.
358 Lowe (n 213) 73.
359 See e.g. Oostergetel, paras. 174-177; Unglaube Marion, Unglaube Reinhart v
Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/08/1 and ARB/09/20, Award of 16 May
2012 [Unglaube], para. 250.
360 Arif, para. 543.
361 In a series of awards tribunals rejected an argument that legitimate expectations are
expectations of stability: Mobil Investments Canada Inc. & Murphy Oil Corporation v
Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and on Principles of
Quantum of 22 May 2012 [Mobil], para. 153; Continental Casualty Company v Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award of 5 September 2008 [Continental], para. 258; El Paso
Energy International Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award of 31
October 2011 [El Paso], paras. 350-352; Metalpar, para. 187; Impregilo, paras. 290-291;
Total, paras. 115-117.
362 On inductive and deductive reasoning in international law see: Schwarzenberger (n
58).
363 Roberts (n 18) 46; Lowe (n 23) 214; Wälde (n 18) 109; Vadi (n 56) 77.
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also an established method of developing international law.364 Use of analogies is
subject to the usual limits of the function of courts and tribunals in international law.
Investment tribunals have been referring to other legal regimes to develop ITL365
although they are wary of using analogies openly in relation to legitimate
expectations.366 However, comparative arguments are an important element of the
scholarly critique of the concept. 367 Perceptions of legitimacy depend on ‘the
plausibility of analogical reasoning and the persuasiveness of topical, rhetorical
argument’. 368 Yet, analogical references to legitimate expectations are often
insufficiently detailed or too narrow to strengthen such perceptions. As explained in
chapter 1, an in-depth exploration of selected legal systems, a task undertaken in
this thesis, has a greater chance of succeeding in this respect.
E. Conclusions
ITL, as a nascent legal regime, develops mainly through investment awards. Yet, the
quality of awards, in particular with regard to the concept of legitimate expectations,
has been criticised. Approaches suggested by investment tribunals are only to some
extent converging into a coherent practice. They are viewed as not authoritative by
commentators, treated as a broad and varied catalogue of available approaches by
claimants, and are not followed pursuant to a predictable pattern by tribunals. A
comparative approach in addressing these issues has been either shallow or limited.
A more in-depth analysis may support more persuasive approaches and create solid
points of reference that could propel the concept towards greater coherence.
364 Snodgrass (n 2) 18; Silia Vöneky, ‘Analogy in International Law’ in Wolfrum R (ed),
Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law (internet ed).
365 Vadi (n 56) 89-94; Roberts (n 18) 51-52.
366 But see Thunderbird/Wälde, paras. 27-29; Total, paras. 128-134; Sempra Energy
International v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award of 28 September
2007 [Sempra], para. 298.
367 See Chapter 1, Section D.
368 Lowe (n 23) 221.
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Chapter 3 The Origins and Development of Legitimate
Expectations Doctrine in Anglo-American Municipal Law
A. Introduction
This chapter looks into references to expectations in Anglo-American national legal
systems. It focuses on two concepts used in the laws of the United States of America
(‘USA’), England and Australia that are of particular relevance to ITL. Section B looks
at the US law concept of ‘reasonable investment-backed expectations’ (‘RIBE’). This
concept is used to analyse whether an impact of a regulation on private property
constitutes expropriation (regulatory taking). Section C focuses on the concept of
‘legitimate expectations’ used in England and Australia. The concept is used there in
a judicial review inquiry into whether an individual should be granted a fair hearing
before his interests (‘legitimate expectations’) are affected by exercise of State
discretion. English law extends this concept to substantive fairness, allowing the
courts to find that administrative bodies should fulfil an individual’s legitimate
expectations in substance.
The English law concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ attracts greater attention than
the US law concept of ‘RIBE’ in ITL discussions on legitimate expectations. This
lesser attention is undeserved and this chapter attempts to fill this gap. Facial
references to the US concept have been present in ITA/ITL from its early stages369
and continue to this day.370 IIAs expressly refer to RIBE and to the Penn Central test
of which RIBE are one of the factors. 371 This chapter will also show that the
relevance of RIBE for elucidation of the concept of legitimate expectations goes
beyond such labelling.
369 See e.g. Jan Paulsson, ‘Investment Protection Provisions in Treaties’ (2000) 19 ICC
Investment Protection: La protection de l’investissement 1, 7 (suggesting that
assessment of State actions under the FET standard may include ‘the impact of the
measure on the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the investor’).
370 See Chapter 1, Section B.
371 See Chapter 6, Section C.
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B. The US Regulatory Takings and ‘Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations’ (‘RIBE’)
1. The Origins and Rationale of RIBE
a. Origins
The concept of RIBE is used in US federal constitutional law in the context of
regulatory expropriation. According to the US Constitution:
private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just
compensation.372
This phrase, known as the ‘Takings Clause’, was initially applied only to physical
takings of property.373 This changed with the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal case in which
the US Supreme Court (‘USSC’) recognised that:
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognised as a taking.374
Since then courts and commentators have been struggling to make clear when
regulation ‘goes too far’ and constitutes a taking.375 The initial approach focused on
372 Part of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America (the
US Constitution).
373 Thomas Ruppert, ‘Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations: Should Notice of
Rising Seas Lead to Falling Expectations for Coastal Property Purchases?’ (2011) 26
J.Land Use & Envtl.L. 239, 244-245; Pamela O’Connor, ‘The Changing Paradigm of
Property and the Framing of Regulation as a “Taking”’ (2010) 36 Mon LR 50, 56; Lucas v
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
374 Pennsylvania Coal Company v Mahon et al., 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Jeffrey M
Gaba, ‘Taking ‘Justice and Fairness’ Seriously: Distributive Justice and the Takings
Clause’ (2007) 40 Creighton L.Rev. 569, 571, 573-574.
375 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., et al. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et
al., 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002); Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v New York City et
at., 438 U.S. 104 (1978) at 123; Palazzolo v Rhode Island et al., 533 U.S. 606, 617
(2001); Gaba (n 374) 569; Lynda J Oswald, ‘Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed
Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis’ (1995) 70 Wash.L.Rev.
91, 96-97; David Crump, ‘Takings by Regulation: How Should Courts Weigh the
Balancing Factors?’ (2012) 52 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1, 3; John A Kupiec, ‘Returning to
Principles of “Fairness and Justice”: The Role of Investment-Backed Expectations in
Total Regulatory Taking Claims’ (2008) 49 B.C.L.Rev. 865, 870; David J Breemer, RS
Radford, ‘Great Expectations: Will Pallazzolo v Rhode Island Clairfy Doctrine of
Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?’ (2001) 9 N.Y.U.Envtl.L.J.
449, 477.
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the diminution of value.376 Another approach, suggested by Michelman377, was to ask
not ‘how much’ property had been taken but:
whether or not the measure in question can easily be seen to have
practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived,
sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectations.378
Michelman argued that those ‘distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-
backed expectations’ represent ‘mentally circumscribed things’ which the property
owner thinks he controls. Frustration of expectations by regulation inflicts on him a
‘pain of acute or demoralizing kind’.379 This, in turn, brings about ‘demoralization
costs’.380
The USSC adopted Michelman’s idea of investment-backed expectations in its 1978
Penn Central case.381 The USSC’s takings practice is based on an ad hoc case-by-
case approach involving various factors but lacking a coherent unifying theory.382
The USSC eschews mechanical tests. Its approach depends on the circumstances
of a particular case383 and requires their ‘careful examination and weighing’.384 As
stated in one recent case:
we still resist the temptation to adopt per se rules in our cases
involving partial regulatory takings, preferring to examine a ‘number
of factors’ rather than a simple ‘mathematically precise’ formula.385
376 Leif Wenar, ‘The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause’ (1997) 97
Colum.L.Rev. 1923, 1929.
377 Frank I Michelman, ‘Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law’ (1967) 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1165-1258.
Michelman’s article is regarded as a ‘single most significant article on the subject’ of
RIBE (Joshua P Borden, ‘Derailing Penn Central: A Post-Lingle, Cost-Basis Approach to
Regulatory Takings’ (2010) 78 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 870, 894) and ‘the cornerstone of
investment-backed expectations as a legal concept’ (Kupiec (n 375) 870, 878-879).
378 Michelman (n 377) 1233.
379 ibid 1233-1234.
380 ibid 1214.
381 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Kupiec (n 375)Radford (n 375)
382 Gaba (n 374) 574; Crump (n 375) 21; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
383 Penn Central 438 U.S. at 124; Pennsylvania Coal (260 U.S. at 416.
384 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor J, concurring).
385 Tahoe-Sierra 535 U.S. at 326. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (Brennan J)
(‘this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula”’ and engaged in
‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’) or Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (‘we have
generally eschewed and “set formula” for determining how far is too far’).
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The USSC uses a ‘polestar’386 of three factors of ‘particular significance’387 which it
set out in the Penn Central case. This ‘Penn Central test’388 consists of: first, the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; secondly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, i.e. RIBE,
inspired by Michelman’s idea of expectations; and, thirdly, the character of the
government action.389
b. Rationale
RIBE are derived from the utilitarian concept of property.390 According to Bentham,
utilitarianism’s most influential contributor, property is ‘nothing but a basis of
expectation’.391 An individual expects future enjoyment of the fruit of his property
resulting from his investment in it. The State’s role is to provide security of these
expectations because absence of security discourages property owners from using
their property productively.392 This role of the State reflects the ultimate goal of
utilitarianism, namely the maximisation of aggregate welfare.393 However, the classic
utilitarian theory opposed redistribution affecting security of expectations. 394
Michelman, however, accepts that redistributions are acceptable, even if they
frustrate expectations. He argues that regulatory impact on property owner’s
expectations should be compensated only when disappointment of expectations
would be ‘critically demoralizing’.395
The above reflects the on-going US constitutional debate that informs the Takings
Clause and RIBE, and concerns relations between private property and the State396.
386 Palazzollo, 533 U.S. at 633.
387 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
388 Mark W Cordes, ‘The Fairness Dimension in Takings Jurisprudence’ (2010) 20
Kan.J.L.& Pub.Pol’y 1, 2. Similar names are used that suggest its ‘polestar’ character:
‘Penn Central factors’ (Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al. v Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 539 (2005)), ‘Penn Central analysis’ (Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334; Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 633 (O’Connor J, concurring)) or ‘Penn Central approach’ (Crump (n 375) 3).
389 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
390 Michelman (n 377) 1211-1212.
391 Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1950) 111-112.
392 Michelman (n 377) 1212.
393 ibid 1182.
394 ibid 1212-1213.
395 ibid 1213 (arguing that ‘[s]ecurity of expectations is cherished not for its own sake but
only as a shield for morale.’)
396 Ruppert (n 373) 244-245.
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The federalist-natural law tradition argues that ‘property rights generate firm
expectations entitled to judicial protection from excessive government regulation’.397
It assumes that the main purpose of the Takings Clause is protection of property.398
On the other hand, the republican-positivist tradition argues that property rights are
inherently limited by public interest.399 Following the former, RIBE reflect a view that
the State will not interfere with proprietary expectations and will protect property
rights from interference. Alternatively, RIBE may be seen as reflecting a dynamic
understanding of property rights, changing over time and reflecting social concerns
and values allowing for certain uses of property but prohibiting others.400
2. RIBE Based on Property Rules at the Time Property Is Purchased or
Invested In
The concept of RIBE focuses on ‘investment’ as a basis of ‘reasonable’ expectations
of a property owner. 401 Expectation has to be ‘investment-backed’, meaning a
‘financial venture with a view of specific future use’.402 However, the fact that an
expectation is investment-backed is not sufficient to establish RIBE.403 This requires
establishing objectively what ‘bundle of rights’ constitutes the property in question
and what expectations are linked with that property.404 This enquiry into the relevant
circumstances resembles the investigation of the ‘sources’ of legitimate expectations
in the other legal systems analysed here. The main difference is that RIBE are
expectations of property while in the other systems they usually focus on State
conduct.
The ‘sources’ of RIBE are rooted in the law shaping the property owner’s
expectations concerning his property.405 That law consists of various rules in force
397 Daniel R Mandelker, ‘Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law’ (1995) 27
Urb.Law. 215, 227.
398 ibid 227-228.
399 ibid 227.
400 Gaba (n 374) 569.
401 Cordes (n 388) 34; Breemer & Radford (n 375) 451.
402 Robert M Washburn, ‘“Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations” as a Factor in
Defining Property Interest’ (1996) 49 Wash.U.J.Urb.& Contemp.L. 63, 67.
403 Oswald (n 375) 115.
404 Washburn (n 402) 68; Kupiec (n 375) 883-884; Daniel R Mandelker, ‘Investment-
Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?’ (1987) 31 Wash.U.J.Urb.& Contemp.L. 3, 6-7.
405 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor J (concurring).
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when the owner purchases his property or invests in it.406 It shapes the content of
property rights, the permissible and protected uses of the property, as well as
restrictions of those uses. It informs expectations about future benefits of the owner’s
investment.407
The USSC’s description of ‘property interests’ in Roth408 is often referred to409 in
discussions about the ‘sources’ of RIBE:
Property interests … are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law – rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.410
However, RIBE represent a concept broader than ‘property interests’. 411 They
include the property owners’ understandings of the State powers over his property.412
The ‘background principles’413 shaping reasonable property expectations are rooted
in statutory and common law414, but also in other ‘objective rules and customs that
can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved’.415 Equating RIBE and
property interests would create circularity: an expectation would be reasonable only
conforming to what the law says property is. This would enable the authorities or the
courts to create or extinguish expectations at their will.416
The sources of RIBE thus go beyond a property interests and ‘black letter’ rules.
RIBE are determined ‘in light of the whole of our legal tradition’ and set within a
406 Washburn (n 402) 69; Cordes (n 388) 34; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
407 Cordes (n 388) 34; Washburn (n 402) 70; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; Breemer &
Radford (n 375) 480.
408 Board of Regents of State Colleges et al. v Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) [Roth].
409 John J Delaney, Emily J Vaias, ‘Recognizing Vested Development Rights as
Protected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims’ (1996) 49
Wash.U.J.Urb.& Contemp.L. 27, 29; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
410 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (such approach is common even though Roth concerned 14th
Amendment).
411 Mandelker (n 397) 226.
412 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
413 ibid at 1029.
414 ibid at 1017.
415 ibid at 1030 (Scalia J) and 1035 (Kennedy J, concurring); Washburn (n 402) 70
(referring generally to laws, rules and regulations); Breemer & Radford (n 375) 454, 480-
482 (criticising).
416 Oswald (n 375) 108-109; Kupiec (n 375) 884; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy J,
concurring).
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dynamic concept of property that balances private expectations to secure private
investment with the State’s entitlement to enact new regulation in response to
changing conditions.417 Such approach takes account of the market conditions at the
time of investment and social preferences as to desirability of protection or restriction
of certain uses of property.418
RIBE may reflect situations traditionally allowing for more State interference419 or
‘unique concerns’ justifying expansion of traditional limits of State power. The
specific content of proprietary expectations depends on the purpose of the relevant
regulation and the subject-matter of the expectations.420 Limitations in the use of
property based on existing regulations are not regulatory takings.421 The property
owner cannot complain that existing rules are applied to him.
RIBE reflect the tension between protection of expectations of private property
owners and the State’s right to regulate.422 This tension arises from uncertainty about
future government regulations.423 This is the problem of ‘legal transitions’, namely
situations when new regulation changes the existing regulatory framework in a way
negatively affecting the value of certain property. 424 Such regulatory uncertainty
cannot be entirely eliminated and regulatory takings aim at allocating the risk of such
uncertainty between property owners and the rest of society.425 RIBE hold a key role
in this allocation. Their mechanism rests on two opposing arguments. First, that the
property owner relies on the state of the law at the time he makes his investment
and, secondly, that he has the ability to foresee the regulation negatively impacting
on his expectations.426 To these arguments we now turn.
417 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy J, concurring).
418 Mandelker (n 397) 235-236, 230-231.
419 Kaiser Aetna et al. v United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (federal navigational
servitude over interstate waters is traditionally viewed as not requiring compensation);
Mandelker (n 397) 226 (historical governmental powers over common resources).
420 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy J, concurring) (e.g. protection of coastal areas
from erosion).
421 ibid at 1030; Washburn (n 402) 69-70.
422 See Breemer & Radford (n 375) 519-520 (and references) for criticism of such
approach.
423 Louis Kaplow, ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions’ (1986) 99 Harv.L.Rev.
509, 512.
424 Kaplow (n 423) 511-512; Mandelker (n 397) 228.
425 Kaplow (n 423) 513.
426 ibid 513, 520, 522; Cordes (n 388) 35; Mandelker (n 397) 232.
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3. Reliance on the Law as an Argument in Favour of Protecting RIBE
a. Reasonable Reliance on Law as a Shield against Subsequent Regulatory
Change
RIBE represent expectations that are more than the property owner’s unilateral
hope, his abstract need or belief.427 It is argued that such expectations should be
protected from subsequent regulatory changes because, when the owner invested in
his property, he reasonably relied on the norms and rules shaping the allowed uses
of property at that time.428 Consequently, it would be unfair to ‘change the rules of
the game mid-stream’429 in a way negatively affecting the value of his property.430
Certain circumstances may strengthen the above argument beyond simple reliance
and increase the weight of the property owner’s interests in the Penn Central
balancing exercise. This happens when the property owner ‘substantially proceeds in
good faith after governmental approval of his development’.431 In such case the
subsequent regulation affects an established use of property rather than its future or
potential use.432 The next section illustrates this point with four examples.
b. Substantial Reliance: Factors Strengthening the Reliance on Law Argument
First, acquisition of property may be based on governmental assurances that the
land will be available for certain development. Subsequent government conduct
disregarding such assurances may constitute a taking if it is coupled with substantial
economic loss for the property owner.433
Secondly, the property owner may have relied on specific statutory provisions
allowing for certain use of property or establishing its protection. Here, expectation
follows from the explicit text of the relevant law in force at the time of the property’s
purchase. The law may indicate that certain uses of property are approved and that it
is reasonable for the property owner to rely on them to pursue his investment.434 In
427 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130; Oswald (n 375) 115-116.
428 Cordes (n 388) 34; Gaba (n 374) 589; Kaplow (n 423) 522; Mandelker (n 397) 232.
429 Cordes (n 388) 34.
430 ibid 34, 35; Washburn (n 402) 81.
431 Mandelker (n 397) 237-238.
432 ibid 232-233; Cordes (n 388) 35-36; Michelman (n 377) 1233.
433 Cordes (n 388) 39.
434 Washburn (n 402) 76-79.
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Monsanto the relevant statute concerning submission of trade secrets in the process
of registration of toxic products provided that such trade secrets will be kept
confidential. Subsequent disclosure of those secrets by the authorities violated these
provisions and frustrated claimant’s RIBE. Given importance of the right to exclude
others in protecting trade secrets, the Court found that the impact on the property
required just compensation.435
Thirdly, the property owner might have ‘sunk a lot of irretrievable investment in the
project’ 436 after purchasing the property and before the regulatory change.
Michelman recognised such situation as a ‘distinctly crystallized expectation’.437 If a
property owner already developed his land and put it to use, it means that he
substantially relied on the previously existing rules. He should be protected from
subsequent interference, unless his activity constitutes a nuisance.438
Fourthly, such substantial expenditures may be based on the property owner’s good
faith reliance on a formal approval of certain land development, such as a building
permit. 439 In such situations the owner obtains a vested right protected from
subsequent regulatory changes. Mandelker argues that the mechanism of vested
rights or estoppel should be available in takings cases.440 The law of vested rights
clearly protects from subsequent regulatory changes those owners who already
applied for a building permit or started a construction.441 However, others point out
that RIBE represent a broader concept than vested rights because they do not
require financial investment for a finding of a regulatory taking.442
435 Ruckelshaus, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency v
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011-1013 (1984) [Monsanto]; Washburn (n 402) 78-79.
436 William A Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Harvard
University Press 1995) 50. See also Cordes (n 388) 35; Washburn (n 402) 91.
437 Michelman (n 377) 1233; Cordes (n 388) 35.
438 Cordes (n 388) 35.
439 Mandelker (n 397) 236 and (n 442) 5.
440 Mandelker (n 397) 236-237. See also Delaney & Vaias (n 409); Washburn (n 402) 90-
91. The Penn Central test would involve a greater number of factors, including balancing
with public interest.
441 Washburn (n 402) 90-91; Mandelker (n 404) 5.
442 Washburn (n 402) 91; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor J, concurring).
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A less formal government approval may also trigger relevant substantial reliance.443
Such expectations arose in Kaiser Aetna, where a developer invested to build a
private marina. He was advised by relevant authorities that he did not require any
permits for its development and operations. His expectations were dashed in breach
of the Takings Clause when the authorities later required free public access to the
marina.444
c. Reasonable Reliance on Law as a Regulatory Freeze
Commentators often categorically state that property owners should be protected
from changes of the law on which they reasonably relied.445 Such argument favours
interests of property owners and ‘proves too much’.446 Taken literally, it is circular by
implying that the laws, once relied upon, should never change.447 This resonates with
the classic utilitarian concept of property demanding perfect security for
expectations.448 Such suggestion of immunity from regulatory change is ‘particularly
perverse’ because laws change frequently and such changes are often
predictable.449
The approach attaching too much weight to the reliance argument has not been
endorsed by the USSC.450 Anyone has to accept that regulations will change, as they
change all the time.451 The question is when such change is unfair.452 State of the
law at the time the property was acquired is only one side of the risk allocation
exercise. The other one, foreseeability of regulatory change, will be analysed now.
443 Michael M Berger, ‘Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes
New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning’ (1988) 20 Urb.Law. 735, 766-767; Mandelker
(n 397) 218.
444 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167, 179-180; Mandelker (n 397) 218; Crump (n 375) 31.
445 ibid 81.
446 Cordes (n 388) 34, 35.
447 Kaplow (n 423) 522, 524; Mandelker (n 397) 228.
448 See Section B.1.a.
449 Kaplow (n 423) 522.
450 Ruppert (n 373) 255.
451 Cordes (n 388) 35.
452 ibid 35.
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4. Foreseeability of Regulatory Change as a Factor in Establishing RIBE
a. Recognition of General Regulatory Powers of the Authorities
Reliance on the rules shaping property owner’s expectations does not make him
completely immune from a negative impact of future regulation.453 Proper functioning
of the State requires for such regulation.454 If governments were required to pay for
every diminution of property value caused by regulation they could hardly go on455
and would be compelled to ‘regulate by purchase.’ 456 Every regulation involves
‘adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’457
and usually burdens some persons more than others. 458 This does not mean,
however, that those burdened more are to be automatically compensated.
The assessment whether regulation ‘goes too far’ needs to consider regulatory risk
implied in property ownership.459 Legal rules change all the time and it is a normal
element of an economic life. 460 Property owner necessarily expects regulatory
restrictions on his property.461 This implied risk differs between ownership of real
property and personal property. In US constitutional law land ownership has a
special status. The Takings Clause reflects the ‘historical compact’ prohibiting the
State from eliminating all economically valuable use of land. On the other hand, no
such implied limitation exists with regard to personal property. 462 As a result,
regulatory interference, especially with business activities, is allowed to a much
greater extent with regard to personal property than with regard to land ownership.463
Economic loss caused by regulatory changes is part of the business risk464 and is a
453 ibid at 627; Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-125; Cordes (n
388) 38.
454 Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v Allard et al., 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
455 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
456 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65. See also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324; Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 131; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
457 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
458 ibid at 133-134; Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
459 Cordes (n 388) 38.
460 ibid 34.
461 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
462 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
463 Ruppert (n 373) 257-258.
464 Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust
for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993); Connolly et al., Trustees of the
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cost of ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community’.465 The
State has a ‘traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings’ and a
business person ‘ought to be aware that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless’.466
The above does not mean that a regulatory change can never constitute a taking.
Immunity from future regulatory change is linked with its foreseeability by the
property owner. Foreseeability will depend on the circumstances of a particular case,
as they reflect a level of implied regulatory risk. Next sub-section discusses factors
relevant for assessing foreseeability. However, none of them is generally dispositive
of the Penn Central enquiry.
b. Examples of Situations Related to State’s Regulatory Powers That May
Impact on Reasonableness of RIBE
First, such implied regulatory risk may be linked with legitimate exercise of State’s
police powers.467 Traditionally, police powers include regulation to protect ‘health,
safety, morals or general welfare’.468 This may cover zoning laws, defining what type
of development is allowed on certain land469, or rules on preventing ‘harmful or
noxious uses’ of property.470 Expectations that such regulatory powers will not be
used are unreasonable.471
Secondly, regulatory powers foreseeable by the property owner may be rooted in the
‘background principles’ which are the source of RIBE. Rules and regulations set out
discretionary powers of the State, reaching beyond police powers or nuisance.
Expectation that those discretionary powers will not be exercised, or will be
exercised only in a way favourable to the property owner, is often unsupported by
those background principles and therefore unreasonable.472
Operating Engineers Pension Trust v Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation et al., 475
U.S. 211, 227 (1986).
465 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis J dissenting); Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67.
466 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-1028.
467 ibid at 1027; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413; Oswald (n 375) 114; but see Berger
(n 443) 745.
468 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
469 ibid at 125.
470 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022; Crump (n 375) 14-15.
471 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
472 Washburn (n 402) 85; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006.
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Thirdly, a statute in force at the time when the property was acquired may put the
property owner on notice that new regulation may be passed in the future to further
legislative ends of that statute.473
Fourthly, since regulation is introduced to advance common good, in certain
circumstances the society makes known its disapproval of continuing enjoyment of
certain expectations. 474 Here, circumstances of a particular case may reveal
impending restrictions on property use, such as: conversions of farmland into a
residential area 475 ; regulation preserving buildings of historical importance 476 ;
restrictions on residential development in coastal area in light of rising sea levels477
or due to increased environmental impact of the existing human settlements.478 A
sudden discovery of a product’s harmfulness may trigger preventive regulation that
will not be linked with expectations of compensation.479
Fifthly, it may be relevant whether the activity in which the property owner is
engaged is already highly regulated.480 If it is, new regulation may hardly come as a
surprise and can usually be easily anticipated. 481
Lastly, subsequent change of regulation may not constitute a taking if restrictions on
property rights are imposed in return for the benefit of participating in a regulated
market.482 This factor is limited to personal property. Use of one’s real property, e.g.
a right to build on one’s land, is not viewed as a government benefit.483 A landowner
cannot be required to give up a property interest in return for a right to build on his
property.484
473 Washburn (n 402) 80; Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227.
474 Michelman (n 426) 1241.
475 Cordes (n 388) 39.
476 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
477 Ruppert (n 373).
478 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307-312.
479 Kaplow (n 423) 524.
480 Cordes (n 388) 39; Berger (n 443) 765-767; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 257.
481 Cordes (n 388) 39.
482 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007.
483 Nollan et ux. v California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 833 (1987); Berger (n
443) 746-747.
484 Mandelker (n 397) 222. Despite this limitation in Nollan federal courts applied the
Monsanto notice rule to land ownership cases (Breemer & Radford (n 375) 469-470,
485-486).
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All, or some, of the above factors may be relevant in the assessment of
reasonableness of investment-backed expectations.485 These factors may trigger the
so-called ‘notice rule’, i.e. a situation when the property owner’s expectations are
unreasonable because he could have predicted the regulation and its impact on his
investment-backed expectations.486
The notice rule was introduced in Monsanto487, a case concerning registration of
pesticides. In the process of registration producers submitted data about their
products, including trade secrets. A new regulation gave the regulator discretion to
publish such data prospectively. The data was confidential before. The court found
that the producer did not have RIBE that his data will not be publicised in the future.
He could have foreseen the regulatory change because he operated on a market
that has already been regulated for a long time and pesticides have been subject of
public concern for a long time.488 It was important that: the regulation addressed
legitimate government interest; the participation in the regulatory scheme was
voluntary; and that the risk of having the data published was balanced with the
producer’s ability to market his products and gain economic advantages from its
sales.489 The fact that data disclosure was not regulated previously did not support,
absent any express promise to the contrary, RIBE that such disclosure will not be
allowed in the future. In the circumstances of the case it was part of the producers’
risk that, once the government focuses on the issue to regulate it, that regulation will
not be to their advantage.490
c. The Notice Rule Cannot Mean That All Regulation Is Foreseeable
The US federal courts extended the Monsanto notice rule and the concept of
‘background principles’ to untenable proportions.491 They were finding that a mere
existence of a general regulation excludes any reasonable expectation that a
subsequent regulation will not be enacted.492 The courts were also finding that the
485 Cordes (n 388) 39-40.
486 ibid 34.
487 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
488 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007-1008.
489 ibid at 1007.
490 ibid at 1008-1009.
491 Breemer & Radford (n 375) 463; Mandelker (n 397) 219; Cordes (n 388) 41;
Washburn (n 402) 80; Palazzolo, U.S. 533 at 626 and 629.
492 Kupiec (n 375) 877, 886.
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‘regulatory climate’ of a given area of activity automatically puts the property owner
on notice of further more restrictive regulation. Some courts concluded that existence
of a regulation eliminates completely expectations of potential future uses of
property. This led to routine rejections of regulatory takings claims493 and even to
findings that lack of RIBE precluded the property owners from bringing regulatory
takings claims altogether.494
Such an extreme approach has been criticised. Commentators observe that it views
all regulation as reasonably foreseeable and thus exempts even the harshest one
from inflicting a taking.495 Regulatory changes should be anticipated by property
owners.496 However, such implied foreseeability cannot be converted into a rule that
regulatory changes should always be anticipated.497 In such case the concept of
RIBE would not serve fairness and justice in relations between the State and
property owners498 but would turn into a defence against regulatory takings claims.499
Such a position is untenable, just as the assumption that reliance on existing rules
and regulations immunises the property owner from all future regulation. 500 The
federal courts’ approach illustrates the tendency of RIBE to move towards
circularities.501 It may be used to show that every regulatory change constitutes a
taking because an expropriatory interference is what the court said it is. On the other
hand, it may be used to show that no regulatory change may ever constitute a taking
because there is usually some information allowing for a conclusion that the property
owner could have anticipated the regulatory change.
493 Breemer & Radford (n 375) 484.
494 Cordes (n 388) 40; Washburn (n 402) 86; Breemer & Radford (n 375) 518; Palazzolo,
533 U.S. at 626.
495 Oswald (n 375) 114; Richard A Epstein, ‘Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: A
Tangled Web of Expectations’ (1993) 45 Stan.L.Rev. 1369, 1371; Cordes (n 388) 38;
Kaplow (n 423) 524; Mandelker (n 397) 228.
496 Cordes (n 388) 34.
497 Kaplow (n 423) 524; Mandelker (n 397) 228.
498 Cordes (n 388) 38; Kupiec (n 375) 886; Breemer & Radford (n 375) 517.
499 Breemer & Radford (n 375) 517; Epstein (n 495) 1372.
500 Oswald (n 375) 114; Kaplow (n 423) 525.
501 Epstein (n 495) 1371.
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The USSC criticised and rejected the latter ‘sweeping rule’ in Palazzolo. 502 It
observed that in balancing between the private right to use one’s property and the
State’s right to regulate the court may take into account whether the exercise of
State authority was reasonable. Regulation may be ’so unreasonable or onerous’
that it will call for compensation. The notice rule cannot preclude the court from
analysing the regulation from this perspective. 503 It analyses the purposes and
effects of a particular regulation.504 The assessment whether a regulation unjustly
burdened private property must turn on objective factors.505
5. Balancing Reasonable Reliance and Foreseeability of Change: Regulatory
Risk Allocation
a. Balancing Between Reasonable Reliance and Foreseeability Is a Matter of
Degree
Neither reliance on the law at the time of the property acquisition, nor the
foreseeability of future regulation can unlock the concept of RIBE on their own. The
former favours property owners and implies regulatory freeze.506 The latter favours
the State and implies that no compensation should be paid for a regulatory impact on
property.507 Insisting on either the one or the other represents an ‘all-or-nothing
approach’508 which provides no satisfactory answer to the question when regulation
‘goes too far’ in affecting property owner’s RIBE.
The answer to what constitutes RIBE lies between these two extremes. It is a matter
of degree 509 and of striking a balance between them. 510 These two opposing
positions cannot be reconciled by way of general propositions511 as ‘there is no
502 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626 (Kennedy J, for the Court) and 632 (O’Connor J,
concurring).
503 ibid at 625-627.
504 ibid at 634 (O’Connor J, concurring).
505 ibid at 630.
506 Cordes (n 388) 34.
507 ibid 34.
508 Kaplow (n 423) 525.
509 ibid 525; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
510 Washburn (n 402) 87.
511 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
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abstract or fixed point’ beyond which regulation becomes expropriatory.512 Thus, the
assessment of RIBE takes into account the elements discussed in the previous
sections. This assessment is not clinically isolated from the other elements of the
Penn Central test and interacts with the other factors the USSC takes into account
on a case-by-case basis.513
b. Balancing Directed by ‘Fairness and Justice’ of Regulatory Transitions
How should the two interests, i.e. protection of proprietary expectations and
regulation in the public interest, be reconciled? There are no mechanical tests here
that could guarantee predictable results.514 No set formula exists to assess when the
property owner’s expectations are reasonable.515
This exercise is informed by the general direction underlying the Takings Clause,
namely that of the requirement of ‘just compensation’ for a taking. The constitutional
requirement of just compensation for a taking
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.516
The USSC therefore links protection under the Takings Clause with distributive
justice.517 The Penn Central test (including, but not limited to, the three ‘polestar’
factors) is informed by the search for fairness and justice. Its application is
instrumental to the Court’s finding, based on its judgement and logic518, what is
required by justice and fairness in the circumstances of a particular case. 519
However, the Court gives no indication how to apply the test other than that it is
512 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
513 Ruppert (n 373) 253; Breemer & Radford (n 375) 527-528; Mandelker (n 404) 14;
Washburn (n 402) 67.
514 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor J, concurring).
515 Washburn (n 402) 86.
516 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. See also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
517 Gaba (n 374) 570.
518 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
519 ibid at 65.
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applied on an ad hoc case-by-case basis. 520 Introduction of RIBE or the Penn
Central factors did not provide it with a golden bullet to resolve this conundrum.521
Scholars propose many economic, social and political theories as standards to be
applied to this balancing.522 However, none of these propositions had much influence
over the USSC jurisprudence.523 As a result, very little can be said about how the
Penn Central test, and particularly RIBE, is in fact applied. It is even suggested that
due to the multiplicity of competing values and the ideological tensions, the USSC
deliberately avoids a fixed solution and rotates between alternative interpretations.524
USSC’s practice has been criticised for lack of neutrality and exposure to ‘biases and
prejudices of judges’, who apply their own values to the constitutional
interpretation.525
One of the factors used by the USSC directly addressing the question of balancing
private and public interests is the ‘average reciprocity of advantage’.526 It is used to
weigh burdens and benefits brought about by regulation and enquire whether the
benefits outweigh the burdens.527 At a ‘micro’ level reciprocity of advantage looks
into the relationship between specific property and surrounding properties, while at a
‘macro’ level it evaluates the benefits of regulation for the society and for the
property owner as a member of that society. The assessment is not limited to the
impact of a particular regulation but may consider benefits stemming from related
regulations. It is not a search for perfect reciprocity but rather a general offsetting of
regulatory burdens with the benefits of regulation. Generally, broad-based
520 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor J, concurring); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 336;
Gaba (n 374) 570, 575.
521 Mandelker (n 397) 231.
522 E.g. Cordes (n 388) 34 (‘sharp and unanticipated change’); Mandelker (n 397) 228-
229 (mentions proposition focusing on ‘abrupt and arbitrary change’, ‘efficiency values’);
Kaplow (n 423) (‘economic approach’); Kupiec (n 375) (‘public choice theory’); Gaba (n
374) (‘principle of distributive justice’).
523 Gaba (n 374) 590; Borden (n 377) 870-871. The federal courts are less confused here
and pay particular attention to the foreseeability of regulation. (Ruppert (n 373) 254)
524 Mandelker (n 397) 231, referring to Richard H Plides and Elizabeth S Anderson,
‘Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic
Politics’ (1990) 90 Colum.L.Rev. 2121, 2171-2172.
525 Gaba (n 374) 592.
526 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123; Agins et ux. v
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-1018; Tahoe-Sierra,
535 U.S. at 341.
527 ibid 586.
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regulations are more likely to create reciprocal benefits and spread the burdens over
a large number of parties.528
c. Concept of RIBE Is Unclear and RIBE-Based Claims Rarely Successful
The Penn Central test and the USSC’s ad hoc approach do not operate in a
predictable and mechanical way. The US regulatory takings law is universally
criticised for its lack of clarity.529 Just like the other concepts analysed here, RIBE are
not a beacon of clarity. The courts have never explained its meaning530 and they
struggle to apply it.531 It is not supported by any ‘monolithic unitary theory’.532 Some
commentators see it as suspicious533 or even ‘dysfunctional’534 and its effectiveness
as questionable.535
RIBE require a factual enquiry into the scope of proprietary protection against
regulation. 536 At the minimum, they may be treated as an analytical tool for
‘evidentiary description of the property interest alleged to have been taken’.537 To
avoid veering into circularities, RIBE call for a balance between the need for stability
of proprietary expectations and the need for the concept of property to evolve
according to social needs.538 Thus, facially, RIBE represent an evidentiary factual
enquiry. The USSC practice, however, shows that it reflects the dynamic concept of
property that
reflects a pragmatic judgement about the property interests that
courts decide are worth protecting under the Taking Clause.
Nothing else is possible.539
RIBE appear to focus attention on the private interest in security against regulatory
changes.540 However, the USSC rarely finds that a regulatory change is a taking.541
528 Cordes (n 388) 20-21, 50.
529 Crump (n 375) 2.
530 Mandelker (n 397) 249; Oswald (n 375) 106; Gaba (n 374) 588-589; Breemer &
Radford (n 375) 449-450 (and references).
531 Mandelker (n 397) 249; Berger (n 443) 758.
532 Mandelker (n 397) 249; Kupiec (n 375) 867, 911.
533 Epstein (n 495) 1370.
534 Breemer & Radford (n 375) 517.
535 Oswald (n 375) 107, 151; Borden (n 377) 873.
536 Berger (n 443) 759; Breemer & Radford (n 375) 517, 527-528.
537 Breemer & Radford (n 375) 517.
538 Ruppert (n 373) 255; Cordes (n 388) 26.
539 Mandelker (n 397) 249.
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Despite initial fears, introduction of RIBE did not tilt the takings analysis in favour of
the property owner.542 Alleged expectations are usually found to be unreasonable in
the circumstances543 and commentators observed that even in the land ownership
cases, RIBE ‘generally support a balance in which the vast majority of costs [of
regulation] must be borne by landowners’.544
6. Conclusions
RIBE are a flexible and amorphous concept. They refer to property interests affected
by regulation. US courts use RIBE among multiple factors to establish whether
regulation went too far and constituted expropriation. In the narrow sense RIBE
focus on the state of the law and other circumstances at the time when the owner
acquires his property. They ask what crystallised expectations about the future use
of that property arise from those circumstances and influenced his understanding of
his property rights. In a broader sense RIBE embody the balancing between the
owner’s need for stability of his property expectations and the State’s need for
flexibility to regulate in the public interest. However, they provide little general
guidance as to how this balancing should occur. RIBE also reflect the dynamic
understanding of property, reflecting changing social attitudes to property. They are
an important tool of regulatory risk allocation between the property owners and
society. It reflects special protection of land ownership in US law and shows that
regulatory risk is higher for business entities. Like in English law, to which we now
turn, RIBE-based claims are rarely successful.
C. Legitimate Expectations in English and Australian Law
1. Origins and Rationale
In England and Australia courts developed545 the concept of protection of legitimate
expectations to extend procedural fairness to situations falling short of rights.546 The
540 Mandelker (n 404) 6; Washburn (n 402) 67, 71.
541 Washburn (n 402) 67, 71.
542 ibid 71.
543 Washburn (n 402) 71; Mandelker (n 397) 244.
544 Cordes (n 388) 18.
545 The phrase was first used in 1969 by Lord Denning in in Schmidt v Secretary of State
for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149, 170.
546 Philip Sales, Karen Steyn, ‘Legitimate Expectations in English Public Law: An
Analysis’ (2004) PL 564, 567; Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell, Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s
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concept of an ‘expectation’ refers to a legally relevant situation that would not be
protected by law but for the intervention of the court.547 The need to develop this
special category arose during the progressive development of judicial review in the
1960’s. The courts were erasing the historically rigid conceptual divisions, including a
distinction between ‘rights’ (a protected category of legal situations) and ‘privileges’
(situations arising from State discretion that were unprotected). 548 The courts’
targeted the growing administrative ‘largesse’, i.e. beneficial legal situations created
by administrative discretion. Its growth required strengthening of protections against
the capricious exercise of administrative discretion.549
Legitimate expectations arise when a decision-maker creates an expectation on the
part of an individual about the way in which its administrative discretion will be
exercised. Expectation may be later negatively affected by the unexpected exercise
of such powers and may require protection.550 The concept of legitimate expectations
elevates certain expectations to legal protection.551 The protection arises when it
would be unfair to leave the expectations-holder without legal protection, if the
administration were to exercise its discretion in a way negatively affecting his
position.
Despite its frequent use before English courts552 and in many scholarly writings, the
concept of legitimate expectations is far for settled, specifically with regard to
substantive protection. In fact, it creates ‘so much uncertainty that there is a real
danger that [it] will collapse into an inchoate justification for judicial intervention’.553
Judicial Review (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 609; Jack Watson, ‘Clarity and Ambiguity: A
New Approach to the Test of Legitimacy in the Law of Legitimate Expectations’ (2010) 30
LS 633, 633; Reynolds, Paul, ‘Legitimate Expectations and the Protection of Trust in
Public Officials’ (2011) 2 P.L. 330, 333-334; A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2
AC 629, 636 (Ng Yuen Shiu) (Lord Fraser).
547 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 358.
548 This is associated with Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40.
549 This new development was referred to as ‘new property’ (see: Charles A Reich, ‘The
New Property’ (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733; Robert Baldwin, David Horne, ‘Expectations in a
Joyless Landscape’ (1986) 49 MLR. 685).
550 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 565.
551 Reynolds (n 546) 330; Watson (n 546) 634.
552 A BAILII search on 8 April 2014 returned over 1600 cases.
553 Christopher Forsyth, ‘Legitimate Expectations Revisited’ (2011) JR 429, 429. See
also Watson (n 546) 651; Reynolds (n 546) 331.
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Moreover, similarly to the US concept of RIBE, cases based on substantive
protection of expectations are rarely successful.554
The concept of legitimate expectations developed from a single phrase used by Lord
Denning555, who famously said that it ‘came out of my own head and not from any
continental or other source’.556 However, it is accepted that its development has
been influenced by, if not borrowed from, continental Europe.557 As it originally arose
from the requirements of natural justice, the main rationale for its protection is
fairness.558 In this sense, protection of legitimate expectations is a matter of fairness
in public administration.559 This justification is related mainly to procedural protection
of legitimate expectations560 and it does not explain in what circumstances protection
of expectations is fair.561
Much greater controversy surrounds substantive protection of legitimate
expectations.562 The rationales of this protection were proposed ex post facto, as the
concept developed ‘without any real attempt to explain its purpose and to sufficiently
554 Christopher Forsyth, William Wade, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press
2009) 446; Forsyth (n 553) 436. Both, procedural and substantive, expectations ‘are
concerned with exceptional situations’ (R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755 [41] (Laws LJ) (Niazi)).
555 He found that an administrative body ‘may give a person who is affected by their
decision an opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he has
some right or interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not
be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.’ (Schmidt (n 545) 170,
emphasis added).
556 Christopher F Forsyth, ‘The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations’
(1988) 47 CLJ 238, 241.
557 ibid 241-245.
558 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 447; R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners Ex parte MFK
Underwriting Agents Ltd. (1990) 1 W.L.R. 1545, 1569-1570 (Bingham LJ) (MFK
Underwriting); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 569.
559 R. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Ex p. Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd
[1995] 2 All ER 714; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 544 (Sedley J) (Hamble Fisheries); Council
of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 415 (Lord Roskill)
(GCHQ); Ng Yuen Shiu (n 546) 638 (Lord Fraser); Paul Craig, Administrative Law
(Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 650-651; Reynolds (n 546) 331.
560 Forsyth (n 556) 240; Reynolds (n 546) 344-345.
561 Craig (n 559) 651; Reynolds (n 546) 333.
562 Forsyth (n 556) 240; Mark Elliott, ‘Legitimate Expectations: Procedure, Substance,
Policy and Proportionality’ (2006) 65 CLJ 254, 255-256.
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identify principles which underpin this purpose.’”563 The three main rationales are as
follows.
First, the substantive protection of legitimate expectations is a protection against
abuse of power.564 However, abuse of power is insufficient to serve as a standard of
review.565
Secondly, substantive protection of legitimate expectations is a protection of trust
that the individual has reposed in decision-maker’s representations. 566 This is
modelled on the German law concept of Vertrauensschutz, meaning protection of
trust or confidence.567 Trust between the governing and the governed underpins
good administration. Without it ‘government becomes a choice between chaos and
coercion’.568 It is argued that, because existence of trust is a question of fact, this
rationale facilitates the finding of expectations deserving protection. 569 A related
rationale for protection refers to the requirements of good government.570
Lastly, protection of legitimate expectations is linked with the rule of law, requiring
‘regularity, predictability, and certainty in government’s dealings with the public’.571
This broad concept is linked with another rationale, namely legal certainty.572 Legal
563 Reynolds (n 546) 331.
564 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213, 251
(Lord Woolf MR) (Coughlan); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 580; Craig (n 559) 620; Forsyth &
Wade (n 554) 447.
565 R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2005] EWCA Civ 1363 [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [67] (Laws LJ) (Nadarajah); Paul
Craig, Soren Schønberg, ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations After Coughlan’ (2000) 4
P.L. 684, 698; Sales & Steyn (n 546) 590; Craig (n 559) 620-621, 665; Reynolds (n 546)
334. See Section C.5.
566 Forsyth (n 556) 244 and (n 640) 431; Reynolds (n 546) 340-341; Watson (n 546) 641.
567 Forsyth (n 556) 244. See Chapter 1, Section E.
568 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 447. See also Forsyth (n 553) 431; Reynolds (n 546) 343,
349-351.
569 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 447. However, Craig ((n 631) 651) associates trust/good
government rationale with the requirement of detrimental reliance.
570 Nadarajah (n 565) at [68] (Laws LJ). See also Soren Schønberg, Legitimate
Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2000) 25.
571 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 609. See also Sales & Steyn (n 546) 569-570; Craig
(n 559) 652; Schønberg (n 570) 12-23.
572 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 609-610; Craig (n 559) 652; Forsyth & Wade (n
554) 447. This is linked with an analogous approach in EU law. See Chapter 4, Section
B.1.
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certainty promotes certainty and consistent administration573 and allows those who
harbour legitimate expectations to plan their actions on that basis. 574 Recently,
however, some commentators suggested that legitimate expectations and legal
certainty are conceptually separate and play different functions.575 The courts also
criticised broad rationales such as rule of law for being too abstract to ‘tell you, case
by case, what is lawful and what is not’ 576 and thus unhelpful in the doctrine’s
practical application.
2. Sources of Legitimate Expectations
a. Sources of Procedural Expectations
Procedural expectations are expectations that a certain procedure will be followed by
the authorities in their exercise of administrative discretion.577 They arise from four
types of sources: the very nature of the benefit in question, an established practice,
representations and published policies.
Procedural expectations arising from the very nature of the benefit that a person
enjoys or hopes to enjoy578 arises in situations when a person already enjoys some
benefit as a result of administrative discretion. Legitimate expectation arises if such
benefit is sufficiently important to be allowed to continue until some rational ground
for withdrawal. Its continuation should not be refused without offering the beneficiary
some procedural rights, such as a reasonable opportunity to comment. 579 This
typically applies to renewals of licenses and permits.
In F.A.I. Insurances580 the court found that a grant of a license for conducting an
insurance business gave rise to a legitimate expectation that the license will be
renewed unless there was a good reason not to. The ‘natural expectation’ in the
properly conducted insurance business was that it will continue indefinitely. The
573 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 610.
574 Craig (n 559) 649.
575 Reynolds (n 546) 338-340; Forsyth (n 553) 432.
576 Nadarajah (n 565) at [67] (Laws LJ); similar criticism by: Watson (n 546) 633; Forsyth
(n 553) 431; Reynolds (n 546) 330, 349-351.
577 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 565; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 453; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n
546) 371; Craig (n 559) 647.
578 Various terms are used to refer to this situation (e.g. privilege or advantage) to reflect
that the situation is less than a right.
579 Craig (n 559) 382; GCHQ (n 559) 408 (Lord Diplock).
580 F.A.I. Insurances Ltd v Winneke [1982] HCA 26 at [2] (Gibbs CJ).
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procedural protection may also be granted if the refusal of the benefit may limit one’s
liberty581 or cast a shadow on his reputation.582
This type of interest is protected only by way of procedural fairness. However, this
situation is also regarded as being outside of the concept of legitimate expectations.
It is argued that procedural protection is based on common law fairness, not on
representations or practice.583 Something more is required, e.g. a past practice or
representations, to create legitimate expectations enhancing the inherent duty of the
authorities to act fairly.584 Moreover, this category of benefits is shrinking. It is now
widely recognised that revocation, variation, suspension and refusal of licenses or
similar benefits attract procedural protection without any court intervention. 585 In
Australia, it’s the High Court (‘HCA’) noted that the concept of legitimate
expectations may be superfluous, since ‘the rules of procedural fairness are
presumptively applicable to administrative and similar decisions’, and thus the
question is not whether procedural fairness is required but ‘what does fairness
require in the circumstances’.586
An established consistent practice may constitute an implied representation.587 Long
established practice of consultations creates legitimate expectations that the process
will be followed in the future. If changes in employment conditions of civil servants
have been subject to an established and invariable practice of consultations,
changes introduced without it are unfair. Requirements of national security may,
581 E.g. a refusal to grant a passport.
582 E.g. a reputation of a professional, whose license is not renewed without reason or a
reputation of anybody if a decision of his deportation is made public (F.A.I. Insurances (n
580) [14] (Brennan J); Haoucher v Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1990] HCA
22 at [5] (Deane J)); Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 368).
583 ibid 566-567, 588; Reynolds (n 546) 334; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 623-624;
Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 447-448.
584 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 453-454; R. v Devon County Council ex parte Baker [1995] 1
All ER 73, 90-91 (Simon Brown LJ).
585 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 366.
586 Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20 at [24]
(McHugh J) (Teoh) (emphasis added). See also Haoucher (n 582) at [2] (Deane J); Kioa
v West [1985] HCA 81 at [34] (Mason J); Alison Duxbury, ‘The Impact and Significance
of Teoh and Lam’ in: Groves M, Lee HP (eds), Australian Administrative Law,
Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press 2007) 311-312.
587 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 566; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 617.
104
however, override the requirements of fairness and no consultation will be
required.588
As to representations, expectations may arise from individual promises of the
administration that a certain procedure will be followed. A foreigner whom the
authorities promise the ability to present his case before deportation can legitimately
expect this promise to be fulfilled.589 A taxi association has a legitimate expectation
of being consulted on a specific issue when the city council assured it that such
consultation will take place.590
Representations to follow certain procedure raise the question of their ‘value added’,
if the law already guarantees some procedural protection.591 The dominant view is
that such promise adds to the individual’s situation only when it strengthens an
already existing protection or offers protection that would otherwise not have
existed.592
Published policies, viewed by some commentators as a type of representation593,
can also give rise to procedural legitimate expectations.594 If the authorities give an
individual a published circular detailing criteria for adopting a child, they cannot later
depart from those criteria without affording the interested person a hearing, unless
there is some overriding public interest for such departure.595
b. Sources of Substantive Expectations
Substantive expectations are expectations that the authorities will exercise their
discretionary powers in a particular way, conferring a benefit on the person
harbouring such expectation.596 ‘Procedural’ and ‘substantive’ expectations cannot
588 GCHQ (n 559) 403 (Lord Fraser), 404 (Lord Scarman), 412 (Lord Diplock), 419 (Lord
Roskill), 423 (Lord Brightman).
589 Ng Yuen Shiu (n 546).
590 R v Liverpool Corporation ex parte Liverpool Taxi Drivers Association [1972] 2 QB
299, 306-307.
591 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 365.
592 Craig (n 559) 383; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 612.
593 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 618.
594 Craig (n 559) 384.
595 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337,
1334, 1347 (Parker LJ).
596 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 565; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 453; Craig (n 559) 647.
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be neatly separated.597 The same policy or assurance may be interpreted either as a
promise about the procedure to be followed, or as referring to the outcome of that
procedure. 598 Substantive legitimate expectations may arise from three sources,
namely: representations, past practice and policies.
Representations are the main source of legitimate expectations. Some
commentators argue that legitimate expectations can only be engendered by clear
and unambiguous representations, especially when the protection sought is
substantive. 599 Past practice and general policies as sources of substantive
expectations are subject to doctrinal controversy.600
Finding whether an administrative conduct is a representation giving rise to
legitimate expectations involves a detailed examination of its precise terms.601 There
are no strict and clearly defined requirements and ‘no artificial restriction on the
material’ as to what could constitute a ‘representation’. 602 Depending on the
circumstances of a given case and their interpretation by courts, representations
may arise from conduct, policy or other behaviour. 603 This may include words,
conduct or combination of the two604 and involve individual statements, circulars,
reports or agreements.605 Thus,
the form of the express representation is unimportant as long as it
appears to be a considered assurance, undertaking or promise of a
benefit, advantage or course of action which the authority will
follow.606
However, certain characteristics have been identified as necessary for the decision-
maker’s conduct to give rise to substantive legitimate expectations.
597 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 317-318.
598 E.g. an assurance specifying a procedure to be followed may be interpreted as an
assurance that once the specified conditions are fulfilled, the outcome of the procedure
will be positive (Sales & Steyn (n 546) 578).
599 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 577.
600 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 617 (on past practice).
601 Coughlan (n 564) 241.
602 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 450.
603 Watson (n 546) 639.
604 Craig (n 559) 659.
605 ibid 659.
606 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 615.
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First, the promise or a statement by the authorities must be clear, unequivocal and
unambiguous.607 It also cannot be subject to any relevant qualification.608 Claims
based on legitimate expectation often fail because the alleged representations were
insufficiently unambiguous and clear.609
The more specific the representation, the easier it is to establish a legitimate
expectation.610 Representations should therefore be directed at an individual or a
small group of recipients.611 They have to be specific, or ‘pressing and focussed’, in
nature. 612 Some commentators observe that it is relevant if the statement or
representation was based on a specific consideration of the particular case. If it was
not, granting protection in such situation could interfere will the discretionary powers
of the authorities.613
The second potential source of substantive expectations, past practice, is more
controversial. It does not involve clear and unambiguous statements. Commentators
and courts are divided whether it falls outside the concept of substantive legitimate
expectations or whether it is an exception from the general requirement of clear and
unambiguous representations as a source of expectations.614 The controversial case
here is Unilever, where the tax authorities, after accepting for 20 years tax filings
made out of time, enforced the time limit without any advance warning. The court
found that this reversal of past practice was unfair.615
Policy statements constitute another controversial category of sources of substantive
expectations. Critics point out that because general policy statements are not clear
607 MFK Unterwriting (n 645) 1570 (Bingham LCJ); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 574; Forsyth &
Wade (n 554) 450; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 622; Watson (n 546) 636.
608 MFK Unterwriting (n 645) 1570 (Bingham LJ); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 577; Woolf,
Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 622.
609 Watson (n 546) 638; Forsyth (n 553) 429.
610 Craig (n 559) 659.
611 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 456; Coughlan (n 564) 243. But see Woolf, Jowell & Le
Sueur (n 546) 616) (referring to ‘individual, a number of individuals, or a class’ in a
catalogue which covers procedural as well as substantive expectations).
612 Niazi (n 554) at [46] (Laws LJ).
613 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 575-576.
614 R. (Association of the British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State
for Defence [2003] QB 1397, 1423 (Dyson LJ) (‘an exceptional case’); Sales & Steyn (n
546) 574-575; Craig (n 559) 659; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 617; Watson (n 546)
637.
615 R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever plc [1996] STC 681, 697
(Simon Brown LJ).
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and unequivocal, they do not constrain the ability of the authorities to exercise their
discretion to change their policy.616 Since the authorities did not have knowledge
about an individual’s case when issuing a policy, and the policy was not directed at
that individual or a narrow group of addressees, the policy statements cannot be
clear and unequivocal vis-à-vis that individual.617
Application of an existing policy is ambivalent as to whether its addressee knows
about it. The critics argue that it is inappropriate to subsume ‘expectations that an
existing policy will apply’ under the concept of legitimate expectations, either
regardless of618 or on condition of the addressee’s knowledge about such policy.619
Such approach deprives the concept of legitimate expectations of its clear meaning
and adds nothing to the general requirements of fairness.620 Protection based on a
policy should not refer to legitimate expectations but to ‘a general expectation of
fairness, good governance, or consistency of public administration’. 621 Some
commentators argue that expectations based on general policy statements should
only be protected procedurally 622 because substantive protection would be an
“unacceptable fetter” of the discretionary powers.623 However, substantive protection
of expectations related to policies may be considered if the authorities made specific
representations that the existing policy will not apply or that an old policy will apply to
an individual in spite of its subsequent change.624
616 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 575-576; to that effect Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 450.
617 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 575; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 456; Watson (n 546) 643-644.
618 R. (on the application of Rashid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005]
EWCA Civ 744 at [25] (Pill LJ) (expectation that the authorities will apply their non-
deportation policy of which the claimant had no knowledge); Teoh (n 586) at [29]
(Toohey J) (legitimate expectations arising from a signed but not ratified treaty do not
require the applicant to have knowledge of that treaty); Haoucher (n 582) at [16] (Toohey
J).
619 Teoh (n 586) at [31] (McHugh J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6 at [152] (Callinan J) (Lam).
620 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 451-452; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 626; Forsyth (n
553) 433-435; Mark Elliott, ‘Legitimate Expectations and the Search for Principle:
Reflections on Abdi & Nadarajah’ (2006) 11 JR 281, 282-283.
621 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 626; See also Forsyth (n 553) 433.
622 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 588; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 457.
623 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 588.
624 Forsyth (n 553) 434; Craig (n 559) 667; Reynolds (n 546) 348.
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3. Legitimacy of Expectations
Legitimacy of expectations is assessed in the circumstances of a particular case. It
depends on the manner in which expectations were engendered and on the
reasonableness of reliance on them.625
Assessment of legitimacy of expectations involves an objective interpretation of the
alleged sources of expectations in light of the surrounding circumstances.626 There is
no general test underlying such assessment, which depends on the circumstances of
a particular case. 627 The context in which the representation was made is
important. 628 The intention of the decision-maker and the understanding of the
conduct by the representee may be relevant, but are not determinative.629 The level
of sophistication required from the addressee may be relevant for assessing how he
could have understood the representation.630 It may also be relevant that he could
have foreseen that the official position is likely to change631, or was aware that the
authorities either did not intend to create an expectation632 or made a mistake.633 The
individual’s position may be strengthened if he was reassured by the authorities that
the expectation will not be dashed. Legitimacy of expectations may be diminished
when the addressee could have sought reassurance but failed to do so.634
The beneficiary of the statement or representation must deal fairly with the
authorities. 635 In particular, he must make full disclosure of all relevant and
625 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 576.
626 Hamble Fisheries (n 559) 549 (Seldey J); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 566.
627 R. (on the application of Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ
607 at [22] (Bibi) (Schiemann LJ, observing that the court will have ‘to find one or more
measuring rods’ to construct a case-specific test).
628 Coughlan (n 564) 241; Sales & Steyn (n 546) 576.
629 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 622.
630 R. v Secretary of State of State for the Home Department ex parte Zeqiri [2002] UKHL
3 at [44] (Lord Hoffmann, observing that ‘Kosovar refugees cannot be expected to check
the small print.’); MFK Underwriting (n 558) 1569 (Bingham LJ, applying a standard of
‘every ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer’ to dealings with the revenue); R. v Secretary of
State for Education and Employment ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1129 (Laws
LJ) (Begbie) 1126-1127 (Gibson LJ); Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 622.
631 Craig (n 559) 659.
632 Craig (n 559) 659.
633 Begbie (n 630) 1127 (Gibson LJ).
634 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 634.
635 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 450.
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necessary information.636 The authorities need to have full and informed opportunity
to make relevant representations637 and the applicant must put ‘all his cards face up
on the table’.638
Detrimental reliance strengthens the claim for protection of legitimate expectations. It
proves existence of an expectation 639 and may add weight in the balancing of
legitimate expectations with any overriding public interest. 640 Reliance is not an
essential component of the concept of legitimate expectations641, although in practice
its absence is rare.642 In some circumstances the requirement of detrimental reliance
should not be imposed643 or is impossible to fulfil.644 Some commentators argue that
substantive protection of legitimate expectations should be granted only in cases of
significant detrimental reliance.645
It is also observed that pairing the concept of legitimate expectations with detrimental
reliance assimilates it with the private law concept of estoppel. 646 However, in
England and Australia representations about the way in which administrative
discretion will be exercised cannot estop the decision-maker.647 Analogies between
636 Craig (n 559) 660; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 626; Watson (n 546) 644.
637 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 574, 576, 580; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 450; Woolf, Jowell & Le
Sueur (n 546) 626.
638 MFK Underwriting (n 558) 1569 (Bingham LJ).
639 Bibi (n 627) at [31] (Schiemann LJ, observing that significance of reliance is factual,
not legal); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 572; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 453; Woolf, Jowell & Le
Sueur (n 546) 628.
640 Bibi (n 627) at [31] (Schiemann LJ); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 580; Woolf, Jowell & Le
Sueur (n 546) 628.
641 Hamble Fisheries (n 559) 546 (Sedley J); Bibi (n 627) at [31] (Schiemann LJ); Begbie
(n 630) 1124 (Gibson LJ); Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 627-628.
642 Begbie (n 630) 1124 (Gibson LJ).
643 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 627-628; Bibi (n 627) at [55] (Schiemann LJ,
observing that requirement of detrimental reliance would ‘place the weakest in the
society at a particular disadvantage’).
644 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 453 (there is no detrimental reliance in prisoner’s
expectations based on the promise of home leave); Craig, (n 631) 660 (‘moral’ rather
than economic detriment).
645 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 580-581.
646 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 452. But see Michael Supperstone, James Goudie, Paul
Walker, Judicial Review (Lexis Nexis 2010) 172-176 (arguing that Coughlan represents
public law estoppel by representation).
647 Lam (n 619) at [69] (McHugh and Gummow JJ).
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estoppel and legitimate expectations are undesirable and are rejected by courts648
because the authorities, unlike a private party, must ‘weigh up the public interest
against that of the individual’ when making decisions.649
Representations must be made by a properly authorised person.650 This raises a
question whether expectations can arise from ultra vires representations. The rule of
law requires that the authorities always act within their powers. As a result, they are
prohibited from acting ultra vires. The scope of their duties cannot be extended or
varied through their own conduct or conduct of other persons. Expectations are
therefore not legitimate when the action they pertain to would be ultra vires.651
Upholding an unlawful representation by allowing it to give rise to legitimate
expectations would legitimise arbitrarily extensions of administrative powers in
disregard of statutory limitations.652
After England implemented the ECHR, the English law doctrine of ultra vires clashed
with the ECtHR’s approach to legitimate expectations. The latter does not treat the
doctrine of ultra vires as automatically disqualifying expectations from protection.653
After Stretch and Pine Valley 654 the English courts accepted this position. 655 In
certain circumstances fairness will require protection of such ‘unlawful legitimate
expectations’ under English law. 656 Commentators argue that although unlawful
expectations cannot bind the authorities, fairness657 or protection of trust658 may
require taking them into account in the decision-making. The basis of such
protection, however, should be based on fairness and not – as under the ECHR – on
648 R. (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex County Council [2003] 1 WLR 348, 358
(Lord Hoffmann).
649 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 570. See also Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 627; Craig (n
559) 680 (observing that the difference between estoppel and legitimate expectations
lies in the court having to take into account the broader public interest).
650 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 577; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 449; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n
546) 623.
651 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 565-566; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 450-451; Woolf, Jowell & Le
Sueur (n 546) 625.
652 Hamble Fisheries (n 559) 553 (Sedley J); Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 451.
653 Chapter 4, Section C.2.a.
654 Ibid.
655 Rowland v Environment Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885 at [152] (Mance LJ).
656 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 643, 637. See also Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 451
(who support protection in case of ‘innocent representees’).
657 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 641-643.
658 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 451.
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the balancing of legality and legal certainty. The latter approach would weaken the
rule of law. 659 The protection would not be substantive but could involve a
discretionary relief, such as compensation.660
4. Protection of Legitimate Expectations: Procedural or Substantive?
Procedural expectations can be protected only through procedural fairness.
Substantive expectations may be protected either procedurally or substantively.661 In
case of substantive expectations the court will decide what, if any, protection to
afford on the basis of the circumstances of a particular case. To be substantively
protected legitimate expectations must comply with stricter requirements than for
procedural protection.662 The substantive protection extends the original mechanism
of protection from procedural fairness to substantive fairness. This extension
developed in English law but was rejected in Australia. Substantive protection,
although generating the bulk of scholarly commentary on legitimate expectations, is
only exceptionally granted by courts.663
a. Procedural Protection
Both procedural and substantive expectations can be protected procedurally. If a
legitimate expectation is based on an established practice, on a promise to follow a
specific procedure, or on a policy detailing such a procedure, the procedural
protection will follow that practice or promises. Procedural protection will not be
required only in exceptional cases, e.g. due to national security concerns.664 If a
legitimate expectation is substantive, the court will determine procedural protection
by asking what is required by procedural fairness in the circumstances. Procedural
fairness usually requires that the individual is given an opportunity to make
representations before his expectation is dashed, unless there is an overriding
interest not to follow such course. However, the court may merely require that the
659 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 643; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 452.
660 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 641-643; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 451.
661 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 583-584. As to procedural protection of legitimate expectations
see e.g.: McInness v Onslow Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520, 1529 (Megharry V.-C.); Woolf,
Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 371.
662 E.g. representations must be clear and unambiguous any may require detrimental
reliance.
663 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 446; Sales & Steyn (n 546) 570.
664 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 454.
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legitimate expectation is taken into account before a decision is made that affects
it.665
b. Substantive Protection
The major difference between English law and Australian law lies in their approach
to substantive protection of legitimate expectations. English courts allow for their
substantive protection, i.e. require that the benefit promised by the administration is
actually provided, unless there is an overriding public interest not do to so.666 This
approach – which may be an influence of EU law667 – has not been adopted in
Australia.
Coughlan668 is the leading case in which English courts recognised that protection of
a legitimate expectation can be substantive. The court found that in certain
circumstances reversal of a promise to provide an individual with certain benefit can
be so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power rather than to a ‘simple’ procedural
unfairness. Miss Coughlan was severely disabled and required permanent care. She
accepted to be moved from a hospital to a purpose-built nursing home on the basis
of an uncontested promise from the authorities that the new place will be her ‘home
for life’. A few years later the authorities decided to close the nursing home without
providing her with an alternative. She was found to have a legitimate expectation of a
home for life, as promised. Reneging on this promise, in the absence of a
reasonable equivalent alternative and in the absence of an overriding public interest,
constituted an ‘unfairness amounting to an abuse of power’. The court acknowledged
a previous line of cases which suggested that the concept of legitimate expectations
could be extended to substantive protection. 669 It thus resolved scholarly
665 Coughlan (n 564) 243; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 454-455.
666 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 455.
667 ibid 317-318, 456.
668 Coughlan (n 564).
669 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR
1482, 1497 (Taylor J); Hamble Fisheries (n 559) at 731 (Sedley J). For the discussion of
jurisprudence leading to Coughlan see e.g. Supperstone, Goudie & Walker (n 646) 362-
366. Cameron Stewart, ‘The Doctrine of Substantive Unfairness and the Review of
Substantive Legitimate Expectations’, in: Groves Matthew and Lee, H.P. (eds),
Australian Administrative Law, Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge
University Press 2007) 280.
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discussions670 on whether English courts should grant such protection and recognise
‘the free standing principle of substantive legitimate expectation’.671
This development was resisted in Australia on the basis that such extension allows
the courts to interfere with the exercise of governmental powers. The predominant
view was that adopting the course chartered in Coughlan would offend the basic
notion of the separation of powers. It would ask judges to engage in the assessment
of substantive fairness of employed policies and thus to perform the functions of the
executive. 672 For these reasons the Australian courts were never favourably
predisposed towards the idea of substantive protection of legitimate expectations.673
Although some decisions were not entirely dismissive of it, all cases based on
substantive legitimate expectations have failed before Australian courts. 674 The
recent decisions of the HCA firmly reject the English doctrine expressed in
Coughlan.675
Two more arguments against substantive protection are added to the above. First,
that judges are not in a position to make decisions concerning substantial fairness.
The judicial review is not as detailed and individualised as the administrative
decision-making. The Coughlan court was not equipped to find, as it did, that the
implications of its decision were ‘financial only’.676 Secondly, there is no clarity as to
what balancing test should be used. In fact, an objective test for balancing the
670 E.g. Paul Craig, ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and Community
Law’ (1996) 55 C.L.J. 289; TRS Allan, ‘Procedure and Substance in Judicial Review’
(1997) 56 C.L.J. 246.
671 Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 317. Stewart (n 669) 280.
672 Stewart (n 669) 281, 298; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 644; Anthony Mason,
‘Procedural Fairness: Its Development and Continuing Role of Legitimate Expectations’
(2005) 12 AJ Admin L 103, 108-110.
673 See e.g. Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21 at [34], [37] (Mason CJ);
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic [1990] FCA 22
at [26] (Neaves J), [77] (Gummow J); Lam (n 619) at [67] (McHugh and Gummow JJ);
Teoh (n 586) at [3], [28], [32] (McHugh J) as well as federal courts decisions cited by
Stewart (n 669) 296). See also Duxbury (n 586) 310.
674 Stewart (n 669) 297. The Teoh case, which concerned legitimate expectations that a
signed but not ratified international convention will be applied in administrative
proceedings, was close to interfering with the separation of powers. However, the judges
were careful to stress that the protection they granted was strictly procedural (Teoh (n
586) at [36] (Mason CJ and Deane J), [3], [28], [32] (McHugh J)).
675 Stewart (n 669) 297. See also Duxbury (n 586) 311; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546)
644.
676 Stewart (n 669) 297; Forsyth (n 553) 437; Sales & Steyn (n 546) 591.
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private interest with the public interest may not exist at all, making the substantive
protection of legitimate expectations an ‘arbitrary and unpredictable rule’.677
The English courts recognise this criticism. They observe that they cannot interfere
with administrative discretion when the alleged legitimate expectations arise from
general policies. The more general the source of legitimate expectations, the less
intrusive the court should be. 678 For example, the court should not scrutinise a
decision on financing for schools involving ‘wide-ranging issues of social policy’
because the court’s decision could concern interests that were not represented
before it.679
5. Legitimate Expectations and Balancing
The question of balancing arises in relation to both procedural and substantive
protection of expectations. 680 The expectation of procedural fairness may be
overridden by a public interest justifying departure from the expected procedure.681
Substantive protection may not be accorded if the public interest justifying the
change of position by the authorities overrides the interest represented by legitimate
expectations.
The balancing between the public and private interests is particularly significant in
case of substantive protection of substantive legitimate expectations.682 While the
substantive protection of expectations limits the decision-maker’s discretion, its
exercise needs to retain flexibility for constitutional reasons. The authorities need to
respond to new circumstances and protect public interest. Their discretionary powers
are conferred by the legislator in situations when regulation by legislation is either
impossible or not advisable. The administration uses these powers to judge when
and how to apply the general law to particular circumstances. When doing so, it is
obliged to act in the public interest. It also cannot fetter its discretion.683 A decision
677 Stewart (n 669) 297-298. See also Sales & Steyn (n 546) 588-591; Woolf, Jowell & Le
Sueur (n 546) 614, 633.
678 Begbie (n 630) 1130 (Laws LJ); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 586-587.
679 Begbie (n 630) 1130 (Laws LJ).
680 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 592; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 628-629; Coughlan (n
564) 239.
681 GCHQ (n 559) (national security – see Section C.4.a); Sales & Steyn (n 546) 592.
682 Coughlan (n 564) 242; Sales & Steyn (n 546) 589, 592.
683 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 568; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 317; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n
546) 628, 636-637.
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whether the private legitimate expectations should outweigh the public interest in
discretionary flexibility defines the limits of the discretionary powers in that particular
case. Doing so requires striking a fair balance between the two interests.684
Commentators enquire whether a determinate balancing test can be identified for
this purpose.685 One of the criticisms of Coughlan was that no such test exists.686 It is
agreed, however, that any the standard applicable here should be higher than the
Wednesbury reasonableness. 687 One such standard could be the proportionality
test.688 It could provide a more structured conceptual framework for the balancing
analysis but it also has its critics.689
In practice, English courts do not apply any mechanical standard and balance the
private and public interests on a case-by-case basis, depending on the
circumstances of a particular case.690 The assessment whether the authority can
depart from its earlier conduct is first made by the decision-maker when it departs
from its earlier representations. This assessment is then subject to judicial review.691
The court must take into account all relevant factors concerning the existence of
expectations, their legitimacy and the exercise of discretion in the public interest.
Legitimate expectations are not protected if there is an overriding public interest
justifying the decision-maker’s departure from earlier representations. 692 Such
684 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 564; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 629; Watson (n 546)
650; Coughlan (n 564) 239.
685 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 573.
686 See Section C.4.b (comments by Australian commentators). Coughlan is viewed as a
proposition of abuse of powers as a standard of review (Craig (n 559) 662). However,
abuse of powers is viewed as insufficient in practice (see Section C.1)
687 Coughlan (n 564) 242; Sales & Steyn (n 546) 590; Craig (n 559) 620-621. According
to this rule a discretionary power may be abused when it is exercised to do something
‘so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the
authority’ (Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 293)
688 Laws LJ is a particular proponent of this test. See Nadarajah (n 565) at [68]) and Niazi
(n 554) at [51]). See also Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 456; Craig (n 559) 665-666.
689 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 590; Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 457; Elliott (n 562) 256.
690 Begbie (n 630) 1130 (Laws LJ); Bibi (n 627) at [22] (Schiemann LJ). Sales & Steyn (n
546) 590-591; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 632-636; Elliott (n 562) 256; Craig &
Schønberg ((n 565) 698-700) proposed four possible approaches.
691 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 572, 590; Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 629.
692 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 580; Coughlan (n 564) 242.
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overriding public interest may concern national security693 or other matters of public
policy, e.g. public health.694
Balancing may be affected by the fact that the authorities, short of fulfilling the
expectations, took steps to mitigate the effects of their frustration, satisfying the
requirements of fairness.695 Such mitigation may, but does not have to, consist of
compensation of out-of-pocket expenses. 696 The authorities should smooth the
position as far as possible, consistently with their other duties. 697 Its mitigating
actions should represent ‘practical means of eliminating unfairness’.698
The key issue in devising an ad hoc standard of review is not to assign courts a role
that crosses the dividing line between judicial and executive powers. The degree of
court’s scrutiny must respect this constitutional principle.699 The court is ‘not the
primary body for identifying what the countervailing public interest might be’ and
what importance that public interest has vis-à-vis the interest represented by
legitimate expectations.700 The court thus needs to give weight to the views of the
administration about such countervailing public interest. 701 In this context the
standard followed by the Coughlan court has been criticised for being dismissive of
the effects its decision would have on the public body and the other recipients of
public services.702
6. Conclusions: English and Australian Law
References to legitimate expectations in English law and Australian law are linked
with the exercise of discretionary powers by public administration. Legitimate
expectations concern the way in which State authorities will exercise their discretion
693 GCHQ (n 559).
694 R. Secretary of State for Health ex parte U.S. Tobacco International Inc. [1992] QB
353, 369.
695 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 635-636.
696 R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Matrix-Securities Ltd. [1994] 1 WLR
334, 347 (Lord Griffiths).
697 Rowland (n 655) at [153] (Mance LJ).
698 F & I Services Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2001] EWCA Civ 762 at
[72] (Sedley LJ).
699 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur (n 546) 613-614. Forsyth & Wade (n 554) 456.
700 Sales & Steyn (n 546) 590.
701 ibid 590.
702 See section C.4.b. (Australian comments).
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and are engendered by the conduct of these authorities. Both England and Australia
accept that such expectations should be protected through procedural fairness.
However, only English courts accept that expectations may be protected
substantively by requiring the authorities to fulfil the individual’s expectations.
Substantive protection of legitimate expectations is controversial and rare in practice.
A decision whether an individual has expectations worthy of substantive protection is
based a case-by-case objective factual assessment. It involves analysis whether the
conduct of the authorities was capable of creating such expectations and whether
the individual’s reliance on such a conduct was justified. If an individual is found to
have had such expectations, the courts assess whether the subsequent conduct of
the authorities frustrating those expectations was justified by an overriding public
interest. No single standard is used for this balancing of the public and private
interests.
The path taken by Australia shows that substantive protection of legitimate
expectations is controversial. When a court requires fulfilment of an expectation or
compensation of their frustration, it may encroach into the domain reserved for the
executive powers. English courts agree that they are not equipped to second-guess
the public administration. They cannot take account of all considerations and
interests informing the administrative decision-making.
D. Conclusions
How can the experiences of US, English and Australian law support the development
of the concept of legitimate expectations in ITL?
All these systems acknowledge that State authorities are not liable for simply
frustrating RIBE or legitimate expectations and respect their right to regulate and
exercise administrative discretion. RIBE assume that laws will change and that the
State will regulate in the public interest thus frustrating expectations. English law
respects the rule of non-fettering of discretion and requires absence of an overriding
public interest for legitimate expectations to be honoured. Courts attach legal
consequences to frustration of expectations when not to do so would have grave
consequences to the operation of the society as a whole, undermining the trust the
authorities need to govern. Neither US law nor English law offer a clear single rule
for the balancing of the private and public interests involved. However, Australian law
offers a valuable critique of the potential balancing mechanism. These experiences
are an important background for addressing the concept of legitimate expectations in
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ITL. They may guide the possible future development of references to legitimate
expectations in ITL. They may be a source of methodology and experience related to
assessment of expectations.
The experiences of the Anglo-Saxon legal systems may also elucidate the ITL
developments so far. English law and Australian law explain at least three
phenomena, namely: the insistence that legitimate expectations should only be
based on specific representations703 ; the resistance to linking expectations with
general laws and property rights704; and to suggestions that legitimate expectations
are a general principle of law.705
RIBE can explain two other phenomena, namely: the arguments that investor’s
legitimate expectations are engendered by the state of the law at the time of
investment706 and the arguments that the law at the time of investment should not
change to the investor’s detriment.707 Moreover, it will be a useful tool of assessment
of ITA practice with regard to IIAs which include RIBE and the Penn Central test.
This chapter showed that English law concept of legitimate expectations was
influenced by EU law and ECtHR jurisprudence, the legal regimes to which we now
turn.
703 Fietta (n 2) 388; Pandya & Moody (n 2) 3.
704 El Paso/Sornarajah, paras. 55-58.
705 Snodgrass (n 2) (in favour); Roberts (n 167) 214 (against).
706 Dolzer, ‘New Developments?’ (n 5) 78-79; Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n
5) 968-969; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 100-104; Newcombe (n 14) 45-46;
Franck (n 193) 441. See Chapter 7, Section C.2.
707 See Chapter 7, Section C.2.
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Chapter 4 The Origins and Development of Legitimate
Expectations Doctrine in EU law and ECtHR Jurisprudence
A. Introduction
This chapter investigates references to legitimate expectations in two European
international legal systems: the EU and the ECHR. Section B looks at typical
scenarios in which the EU Courts apply references to legitimate expectations.
Section C explores how references to legitimate expectations are made by the
ECtHR.
In both systems the concept of legitimate expectations is judge-made. The EU
Courts ensure that EU law, made by the EU institutions in a broad range of areas, is
applied and interpreted in a uniform way. Through its judgements and decisions
ECtHR ensures that the States – members of the ECHR comply with their
conventional obligations. In both systems references to legitimate expectations were
inspired by the legal systems of their member States.
B. EU law and the Principle of Protection of Legitimate Expectations
1. Origins and Rationale of the Principle of Protection of Legitimate
Expectations
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations is part of the EU legal order.708
It is usually paired with709, and viewed as arising from, the EU law principle of legal
certainty.710 It is also as an emanation of the broader constitutional principle of the
rule of law (Rechstaatsprinzip) and the principles of fairness or justice
708 Joined Cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor v Germany [1983] ECR 2633,
2669 (repeated later in e.g. Case C-63/93 Duff v Minister of Agriculture and Food, Ireland
[1996] ECR I-569, 607-608).
709 AG Cosmas viewed both as ‘a corollary to the principle of legality’ which requires the
law to be clear so that institutions know the limits of their powers and individuals know
the extent of their rights and obligations. (Case C-63/93 Duff v Minister of Agriculture and
Food, Ireland [1996] ECR I-569, Opinion AG Cosmas, p. I-581). See also Paul Craig, EU
Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 549; Herwig CH Hofman, Gerard C
Rowe, Alexander H Türk, Administrative Law and Policy in the European Union (Oxford
University Press 2011) 174; Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford
University Press 2007) 242.
710 Case 1/73 Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Zucker [1973] ECR 723,
731. (Note: rules developed by the EU Courts operate as uniform formulas and are often
repeated in multiple decisions).
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(Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien). 711 Together with the principles of proportionality, non-
discrimination, equal treatment and protection of fundamental rights, the principles of
legitimate expectations and legal certainty constitute the general principles of EU
law. 712 All these principles are judge-made. They developed through the ECJ’s
‘spontaneous judicial incorporation’ 713 which saw the principle of legitimate
expectations adopted early in the operation of the Communities.714
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of legal
certainty are not always clearly distinguished by the ECJ.715 Some commentators
view them as equivalent but it is better to treat them as separate, albeit parallel,
concepts.716 These two principles play different functions.717 The principle of legal
certainty applies universally and protects accuracy of the rules of law on which
everyone is entitled to rely. The principle of protection of legitimate expectations
protects specific individuals in concrete situations of trust which are recognised as
worthy of protection. Moreover, legal certainty is a static concept, requiring the
applicable rules to be clear and precise at a particular point of time. Conversely,
protection of legitimate expectations is enjoyed for the future and concerns exercise
of administrative powers over a period of time so that ‘situations and relationships
lawfully created under Community law are not affected in a manner which could not
have been foreseen by a diligent person.’718
711 Dominik Hanf, ‘Der Vertrauensschutz bei der Rücknahme rechtswidriger
Verwaltungsakte als neuer Prüfstein für das “Kooperationsverhältnis” zwischen EuGH
und BVerfG’ (1999) 59 HJIL 51, 55. With regard to rule of law see: Schønberg (n 570)
12-24 (exhaustive explanation of the rule of law as the rationale of protection of
legitimate expectation)
712 Craig (n 709) 253.
713 Gian Antonio Benacchio, Barbara Pasa, A Common Law of Europe (CEU Press
2005) 78.
714 Hanf (n 711) 58.
715 Duff/AG Cosmas (n 709) I-581; Westzucker (n 710) 731 (‘principle of legal certainty
by which the confidence of persons concerned deserves to be protected
(Vertrauensschutz)’); Tridimas (n 709) 242. John A Usher, ‘The Influence of National
Concepts on Decisions of the European Court’ (1976) 1 E.L.Rev. 359, 363-364; Damian
Chalmers, Adam Tomkins, European Union Public Law: Texts and Materials (Cambridge
University Press 2007) 455.
716 E.g. Jürgen Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1992) 867-
868.
717 Duff/AG Cosmas (n 709) I-581-582; Hanf (n 711) 55; Tridimas (n 709) 252.
718 Duff/AG Cosmas (n 709) I-582; Tridimas (n 709) 252.
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In developing the general principles the ECJ drew upon administrative law of EU
Member States, particularly German administrative law. This is highlighted with
regard to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations719, although German
law’s ‘reputation for being influential’ in this respect cannot be really proven.720 The
origins of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations are associated with the
concept of Vertrauensschutz.721 This cross-fertilisation is recognised, but limited. The
adoption shares the rationale and the general mechanism of protection based on
balancing722, but it does not follow the German concept slavishly. The scope of
adoption reflects the different structures and needs of the respective legal
systems.723 In German law the principle protects of ‘well-established’ rights while in
the EU the protection covers situations where there are no clearly established
‘rights’. 724 Legitimate expectations may be parallel to individual rights or vested
rights, but the concept of legitimate expectations is separate from an individual
right.725
The concept of protection of legitimate expectations is abstract and context-specific
and thus not easy to define.726 It addresses situations beneficial to an individual or a
719 Craig (n 709) 253.
720 Georg Nolte, ‘General Principles of German and European Administrative Law – A
Comparison in Historical Perspective’ (1994) 57 MLR 191, 191.
721 e.g. Case 74/74 Comptoir national technique agricole (CNTA) SA v Commission
[1975] ECR 533, 540 (CNTA); Westzucker (n 710) 731; Usher (n 715) 363; Nolte (n 720).
Kuusikko links legitimate expectations with good faith and the German contractual
principle of Treu und Glauben (Kirsi Kuusikko, ‘Advice, Good Administration and
Legitimate Expectations: Some Comparative Aspects’ (2001) 7 EPL 455, 469-470). See
Chapter 1, Section E and Ch 3, Section C.1.
722 In German law the mechanism requires balancing of legitimate expectations with the
duty of the administration to adhere to the law. (Nolte (n 720) 203) The mechanism of
balancing between legitimate expectations and public interests is inherent in the concept
of protection of legitimate expectations.
723 Developing the general principles the ECJ did not look for ‘arithmetical common
denominators’ among the Member States but rather for the best solutions for adaptation
to the needs of the Communities (Craig (n 709) 253, 589; Nolte (n 720) 211; Giacinto
della Cananea, ‘Legitimate Expectations in European and Italian Law’ (2009) 1 Italian J.
Pub. L. 110, 112.
724 Usher (n 715) 364, referring to Case 81/72 Commission of the European
Communities v Council of the European Communities [1973] ECR 573 (Staff Case).
725 Case C-5/75 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel [1975] ECR 759, Opinion of AG Trabucchi, p. 777; Schwarze (n
716) 1117; Craig (n 709) 557. The EU Courts sometimes expressly distinguish between
‘legitimate expectations’ and ‘vested rights’. See e.g. Case 92/77 An Bord Bainne Co-
Operative Limited and The Minister for Agriculture [1978] ECR 497, 514.
726 Hofman, Rowe & Türk (n 709) 179; Schwarze (n 716) 954.
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group of individuals which are worthy of protection and based on their trust in EU
institutions. The legitimate expectations of traders727 concern future conduct of the
EU institutions and arise from these institutions’ earlier conduct. Protection of
expectations is sought when the future conduct turns out to be different than
expected.728 Protection is directed not at rights stricto sensu but at certain favourable
situations created by a decision, representation or other conduct, discussed in the
next section. Protection of expectations is not used to enforce rights or bargains, to
secure against business risks or to guarantee profits. It does not protect the traders
from legislative, administrative or policy changes. Rather, it targets a sudden,
unexpected detrimental change in a situation when a prudent trader could have
objectively and reasonably trusted the EU authorities to behave in a certain way,
when such change was not justified by an overriding public interest.729
Although what expectations are ‘legitimate’ and worthy of protection depends on the
circumstances of a particular case, the rationale for their protection is instructive in
this respect. Translated literally, the phrase ‘Vertrauensschutz’ means ‘protection of
trust’ or ‘protection of confidence’. 730 This reveals that protection of legitimate
expectations is about the protection of trust or confidence placed by persons in the
EU institutions. The principle ‘provides that those subject to the law may rely on
Union measures or the conduct of its officials’.731 The need to protect trust in or
reliability of the EU institutions stems from the very nature of the EU. It is ‘a unique
economic and political partnership between 28 European countries’732 and a highly
regulated environment. Sharpston observes that:
legitimate expectations can only be generated in a regulated
environment and arise, indeed, out of the presence of such
727 EU courts commonly refer to economic operators as ‘traders’. The principle of
protection of legitimate expectations also applies in staff cases and in these two areas is
not clinically isolated. Our focus, however, is on the traders.
728 Eleanor Sharpston, ‘Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality’ (1990) 15
E.L.Rev. 103, 107.
729 Case 84/78 Tomadini and Administrazione delle finanze dello Stato [1979] ECR 1801,
1814-1815; ibid 147.
730 Usher ((n 817) 363) explains that the term was originally translated as ‘protection of
legitimate confidence’ but the term ‘confidence’ was thought misleading and changed to
‘expectation’. (Case 2/75 Einfur- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Firma C.
Mackprang [1975] ECR 607, Opinion of AG Werner at 622 (referring to ‘the principle of
the protection of legitimate confidence or expectation’).
731 Hofman, Rowe & Türk (n 709) 179.
732 The official website of the EU. <http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm> (accessed
16 April 2014).
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regulation. In a completely non-regulated economic environment,
there would be no administrative authorities to raise producers’ and
traders’ hopes for the continuance of a particular pattern of
regulation.733
Protection of confidence supports the system’s proper operation. The traders who
cooperate with the EU should not suffer an additional and unexpected detriment as a
result of their cooperation. Otherwise, they would be discouraged from cooperating,
an effect undesirable for any attempt to regulate the market in the future.734
2. Situations of Protection of Legitimate Expectation
The EU law principle of protection of legitimate expectations operates on three major
planes: when general administrative or legislative measures change; with regard to
revocation of decisions; and in connection with binding representations by the EU
institutions vis-à-vis individuals.735 To them our analysis now turns.
a. Legitimate Expectations and Regulatory Change
The rule underlying the operation of the principle of legitimate expectations in the
context of regulatory change is that individuals do not have a legitimate expectation
that an existing regulatory regime will be maintained.736 This has two important
implications. First, any EU law changes apply prospectively to situations which arose
under the previous state of the law.737 Secondly, a trader cannot bring a successful
claim merely arguing that the legislative change has disadvantaged him, if such
change was within the discretionary powers of the EU institutions.738
733 Sharpston (n 728) 104.
734 Sharpston (n 728) 111-112, 147 (referring to Tomadini (n 729); Tridimas (n 709) 278
(‘those who repose faith in the authorities must not suffer as a result’). See Mulder in
Section B.2.a.
735There is no dominant uniform way of classifying legitimate expectations under EU law
among those commentators who attempt an exhaustive discussion. Schønberg’s classic
monograph (Schønberg (n 570)) concentrates on revocation of decisions and situations
when administration binds itself, not discussing retroactivity as a separate category. On
the other hand, retroactivity plays the main role in Tridimas’ analysis (Tridimas (n 709)).
736 Joined Cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo Adriano Srl, Dilexport Srl and
Ministero del Commercio con l’Estero [2004] ECR I-6911, I-6977; Tridimas (n 709) 270.
737 Westzucker (n 710) 729.
738 Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale AG and Federal Republic of Germany [1982] ECR 2745,
2758; Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma
Tabacchi [1994] I-4963, I-4909 (possible reduction in earnings as a result of new
regulation is not contrary to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations); Craig
(n 709) 573; Schwarze (n 716) 1131.
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These two rules are particularly prominent for the organisation of the EU common
market. Its functioning requires ‘constant adjustments to meet changes in the
economic situation’.739 This justifies broad discretionary powers of the EU institutions
and diminished expectations of regulatory stability. Traders are expected to be
aware of this context.740
As a result, protection of legitimate expectations related to a regulatory change is
reserved to exceptional situations. The EU case-law identifies four types of situations
where the principle of protection of legitimate expectations was successfully applied,
namely: in case of retroactivity; when there were special arrangements between
traders and Community institutions741; when the law expressly provided that certain
interests must be respected in case of a regulatory change; and if such protection
arose from past practice or from the very nature of a given market area. These four
scenarios will be examined now.
Retroactive measures are generally prohibited in EU law as contrary to the principle
of legal certainty. 742 Retroactive application of laws is allowed in exceptional
circumstances.743 The relevant test, formulated in Racke744, requires satisfaction of
two conditions. First, the retroactive effect must be necessary for achieving the
purpose of the exceptional measure and, secondly, legitimate expectations of those
concerned have to be duly respected.745 Retroactivity is therefore generally premised
on respect for legitimate expectations. This, however, does not mean immunity from
change.
EU law distinguishes between two types of retroactivity. The first type, ‘true’ or
‘actual’746 reciprocity, encompasses situations where the change of administrative or
legislative measures concerns past events. Here, the new regulations’ date of entry
739 Case C-402/98 Agricola Tabacchi Bonavicina Snc di Mercati Federica (ATB) and
Ministerio per le Politiche Agricole [2000] ECR I-5501, I-5531; Craig (n 709) 574.
740 See Section B.3.
741 Craig (n 709) 575 (a ‘bargain of some sort’).
742 See e.g. Case C-331/88 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex
parte Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023, I-4069. Craig ((n 709) 550) links it with the rule of law.
743 Such retroactive application is entirely prohibited in relation to criminal matters.
Tridimas (n 709) 252-253; Craig (n 709) 552; Schwarze (n 716) 1123-1124. These
matters are outside the scope of our analysis.
744 Case 98/78 Firma A Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1978] ECR 69, 86.
745 See also Case 99/78 Weingut Gustav Decker KG v Hauptzollamt Landau [1979] ECR
101, 111; Case 224/82 Meiko-Konservenfabrik v Germany [1983] ECR 2539, 2548.
746 Schwarze (n 716) 949, 1120; Sharpston (n 728) 134 (retroactivity stricto sensu).
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into force predates its publication. 747 The second type, ‘false’ or ‘apparent’ 748
reciprocity, covers situations where regulatory changes have immediate application
to pre-existing on-going situations.749 These two types of retroactivity are not always
easily distinguishable and the Racke test applies to both.750
The General Court explained in Campo Ebro that:
there is a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate
expectations if, in the absence of an overriding matter of public
interest, a Community institution abolishes with immediate effect
and without warning a specific advantage, worthy of protection, for
the undertakings concerned without adopting appropriate
transitional measures.751
EU law therefore protects expectations that a retroactive regulation will be
accompanied by appropriate transitional measures. 752 Stronger protection from
change may arise only in case of special arrangements or specific protective
provisions, as discussed in the following paragraphs. Otherwise, the requirement of
‘appropriate transitional measures’ is satisfied by way of an appropriate procedure,
e.g. a notification about the impending measures 753 , a transitional period, or a
gradual introduction of changes. 754 However, the requirement of transitional
measures may still be outweighed by the overriding public interest, e.g. when
notifying the traders of the change would nullify the goals of the measures or allow
speculators to make profits.755
747 Schwarze (n 716) 1120.
748 ibid 949, 1121; Tridimas (n 709) 266 (‘material’ or ‘quasi-retroactivity’).
749 Sharpston (n 728) 134; Schwarze (n 716) 1121.
750 Sharpston (n 728) 134; Schwarze (n 716) 1128. Tridimas (n 709) 266; Case C-152/88
Sofrimport Sàrl v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477; CNTA (n 721).
751 Case T-472/93 Campo Ebro Industrial SA, Levantina Agrícola Industrial SA and
Cerestar Ibérica SA v Council [1995] ECR II-421, 441; See also CNTA (n 721) 550.
752 Sharpston (n 728) 159 (‘legitimate expectation in transitional measures’).
753 Case C-376/02 Sichting ‘Goed Wonen’ v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2005] ECR
I-3445, 3479. This may also be the case when the notice is published on the day when
the retroactive measures are published. The expectation is not an expectation of holding
onto the status quo but ‘of being told what was happening’. (Sharpston (n 728) 136,
discussing Racke (n 744))
754 Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Commission [2001] ECR I-8763, 8846 (restriction on
rice import licensing introduced by a progressive scheme).
755 The EU Courts treat speculative risk as risk voluntarily assumed, which is a similar
approach to that applied in the US law. Sharpston (n 728) 119, 159; Case 2/75 Einfur-
und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Firma C. Mackprang [1975] ECR 607,
616.
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In the second situation legitimate expectations arise when special arrangements
have been made between the trader and the EU institution. Such arrangements may
limit the discretion of the latter and shield the trader from sudden and unexpected
changes as well as the general mutability of regulations.756 The character of such
‘bargain’ has been summarised as follows:
in order to deal with individual situations the Community institutions
have laid down specific rules enabling traders[,] in return for
entering into certain obligations with the public authorities[,] to
protect themselves – as regards transactions definitely undertaken
– from the effects of the necessarily frequent variations in the
detailed rules [regulating a given aspect of the common market].757
What is required is an individualised arrangement based on specific rules involving
advance commitments by the trader in return for protection from change by the
institutions. If such arrangement has been made then:
the principle of respect for legitimate expectations prohibits these
institutions from amending those rules without laying down
transitional measures, unless the adoption of a measure is contrary
to an overriding public interest.758
The protection is not absolute and is unavailable if an overriding public interest
requires the change and lifts the requirement of transitional measures.759
Two cases illustrate operation of this rule. In CNTA, a trader obtained an export
license and arranged for refunds of monetary compensation amounts760 to be fixed in
advance. In return he paid a deposit and made an irrevocable obligation to export a
specific amount of goods. However, before the exports took place the legislation
changed and the refunds were abolished at short notice. The ECJ found that the
abolition of refunds was unforeseeable. The arrangement between the trader and the
EU created a de facto guarantee against exchange rate fluctuations which would
have induced even a prudent trader not to seek an alternative protection against
such risk. The arrangement engendered legitimate expectation that no change will
occur, affecting what was arranged.761 The trader’s legitimate confidence in the EU
756 Tomadini (n 729) 1815.
757 ibid 1814-1815.
758 ibid 1815.
759 On transitional measures see discussion about retroactivity above.
760 These were payments designed to compensate for fluctuations in exchange rates.
761 The trader has also entered into transactions from which he could not withdraw
without losing the deposit (Schwarze (n 716) 1133).
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rules was worthy of protection in those circumstances.762 There was no overriding
matter of public interest justifying the impact of the change on that particular trader.
As a result, he should have been compensated for the loss suffered. However, his
protection was limited to the unforeseeable, immediate and unjustified change and
did not extend to any change.763
In Mulder764, our second illustration, the Council sought to limit the overproduction of
milk. It passed a law allowing milk producers to undertake not to produce milk for five
years in exchange for a premium. Mulder participated in that scheme. After the
period of non-marketing he decided to resume production and applied for a milk
quota. His application was refused because the reference year to calculate the quota
fell during the time when he did not produce milk under the non-marketing
arrangement. Mulder was found to have a legitimate expectation not to be subject to
the general quota conditions. Four elements were relevant for this finding. First, he
was incentivised by the EU to enter into the non-marketing arrangement by the
premium; secondly, his undertaking to suspend production was made for the general
interest; thirdly, at the time the non-marketing arrangement was made it was not
foreseeable that it will prevent the producer from re-entering the market and, fourthly,
the milk quotas targeted him precisely because he earlier cooperated with the
authorities. No such legitimate expectations would have existed had he ceased the
production voluntarily, without the encouragement from the EU institutions.765 Mulder
supplies the rationale for protecting legitimate expectations in order to sustain
conditions encouraging the traders to cooperate with the EU.766
In the third type of situation, the existing law mandates that in case of a regulatory
change specific interests of market participants should be taken into account. This
was the situation in Sofrimport767, a case concerning licences for import of apples.
Issuing of such licenses was suspended with immediate effect. This affected a trader
762 CNTA (n 721) 549-550. Sharpston ((n 728) 128) observes that protection was
triggered by the irrevocable nature of the undertaking and inevitability of the loss in case
expectations were not protected.
763 See Section B.4 in fine.
764 Case 120/86 Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1988] ECR 2321. See also
Case 170/86 von Deetzen v Hautpzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1988] ECR 2355 and a
series of subsequent ‘milk quota cases’, discussed e.g. by: Sharpston (n 728) 110- 112;
Schwarze (n 716) 1136-1137; Tridimas (n 709) 275-280; Craig (n 709) 575-576.
765 Mulder (n 764) 2352-2353.
766 See Section D.1 in fine.
767 Sofrimport (n 750).
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whose apples were in transit but who had not yet applied for the license.768 His
application was refused under the new law. The trader had a legitimate expectation
that his apples will not be affected by the suspension. The expectation was based on
an express provision of the relevant law, requiring that any suspensory measures
should take into account special position of the goods in transit. The goods in transit
were immune from such measures, absent an overriding public interest.769 No such
interest was shown in Sofrimport and the Commission was found to have
disregarded legitimate expectations of the trader.770
The last type of situation, when protection from regulatory changes may be inherent,
concerns the agricultural sector. Here, the changes may need to take into account
the yearly rhythm of the particular market either because of the past regulatory
practice771, or because of the cyclical nature of a given production activity.772
b. Legitimate Expectations and Revocation of Decisions
The second general area utilising the principle of legitimate expectations concerns
revocation of decisions. Favourable decisions conferring individual rights on their
addressees are binding and cannot be revoked. 773 Protection of legitimate
expectations concerns here the addressee’s legitimate expectations of legality and
stability of the situation created by the binding decision.774 The situation created by
the decision cannot be changed unless such change is justified by public policy
interests.775
768 This was a standard practice not a result of trader’s negligence.
769 The requirement of absence of overriding public interest arises from the ECJ
jurisprudence not from the provisions of the relevant law.
770 Sofrimport (n 750) 2509-2511.
771 Case 78/74 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH B.J. Stolp and Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1975] ECR 421 (previous changes which took
into account the cereal marketing year created legitimate expectations of stability of the
yearly rhythm of the market based on such past practice). Schwarze (n 716) 1137-1138.
772 See e.g. C-368/89 Crispoltoni and Fattoria autonoma di tabachi di Citta di Castello
[1991] ECR I-3695, I-3720-3721 (tobacco growers and producers can legitimately expect
to be informed about restrictions of production in good time).
773 Joined Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 Algera v Common Assembly of the European Coal
and Steel Community [1957] ECR 81; Craig (n 709) 557-558; Schønberg (n 570) 73-75;
Schwarze (n 716)  1024. Unfavourable decisions can be revoked.
774 Algera (n 773) 55; Case C-90/95 P Henri de Compte v European Parliament [1997]
ECR I-1999, 2021; Craig (n 709) 557; Schønberg (n 570) 72; Schwarze (n 716) 1024.
775 de Compte (n 774) I-2022; Craig (n 709) 557.
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The legitimate expectations of legality and stability are linked with the addressee’s
knowledge about the decision, requiring it to be properly communicated. 776 A
decision may be revoked when there is a legal provision allowing for such
revocation777; when the parties explicitly consented to such possibility778; and when
the decision was conditional and the conditions were not met.779 In the latter case the
expectation of legality and stability may depend on how strictly a given institution
usually enforces conditions imposed on beneficiaries.780 Moreover, a decision can be
revoked if it was obtained by fraud or deception.781
Special rules apply to revocation of unlawful decisions. Such decisions create a
tension between fairness due to the individual and the requirement of legality of
administrative conduct.782 On the one hand, the individual’s legitimate expectations
of legality and stability should be protected if he relied in good faith on the illegal
decision and because individuals are generally not best placed to detect illegality of
administrative decisions.783 On the other hand, upholding an illegal decision may be
against public interest because its existence militates against the rule of law and may
legitimise situations where the authorities, ‘deliberately or inadvertently, extend their
powers beyond their limits set by law’.784
Unlawful decisions are always prospectively revocable. 785 They can be revoked
retrospectively subject to certain conditions. These require that the revocation is
carried out within a reasonable period time and that the public interest in revocation
776 Craig (n 709) 557; Schønberg (n 570) 77.
777 Schønberg (n 570) 73.
778 Craig (n 709) 558; Schønberg (n 570) 79.
779 Craig (n 709) 558-559; Schønberg (n 570) 76. Until the conditions are met the
decision is revocable.
780 Craig (n 709) 559.
781 Case C-96/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2461, 2495; de Compte (n
774) I-2021. Craig ((n 709) 558) and Schønberg ((n 570) 79) criticise this broad
approach as too strict, penalising innocent misinformation. Understanding of fraud and
deception is broad. See Section B.3 in fine.
782 Craig (n 709) 562; Schønberg (n 570) 89.
783 Schønberg (n 570) 89, 98-99; Joined Cases 42 and 49/59 Société Nouvelles des
Usines de Pontlieue – Acriéries du Temple (SNUPAT) v High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 101, 87 (SNUPAT); de Compte (n 774) 2021.
784 Schønberg (n 570) 89 (footnotes omitted).
785 ibid 97 (suggesting that the Campo Ebro principle would apply here, requiring for a
transitional period in case of immediate application and lack of overriding public interest).
Similarly, Craig (n 709) 566-567.
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outweighs the private interest in upholding it. Balancing of the principles of legality
and legal certainty786 is first undertaken by the EU institution purporting to revoke the
decision. It is then assessed by the EU Courts in the process of judicial review.787
No legitimate expectations exist if the addressee did not treat the decision as final,
e.g. because his sophistication allowed him to notice that the decision was
unlawful788 or because he did not have an expectation in fact.789 No expectations
exist when the addressee contributed to the decision’s illegality790 or when the EU
institutions did not exceed reasonable time in noticing and correcting the illegality.791
The broader implications of revocation should also be assessed, namely whether the
addressee can adapt to the changed circumstances in case of revocation792 and
whether non-revocation would affect any third party interests. Financial reliance on
the decision is important, but not decisive, for affording protection.793
c. Legitimate Expectations Arising from Representations
The third general area utilising the principle of protection of legitimate expectations
concerns representations pursuant to which:
786 SNUPAT (n 783) 87 and Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandische Hoogovens en
Staalfabrieken N.V. v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1962]
ECR 485, 273-274.
787 Schønberg (n 570) 97, 98; Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community [1965] ECR 835, 690.
788 Schønberg (n 570) 99; Case C-365/89 Cargill BV v Producktschap voor Margarine,
Vetten and Oliën [1991] ECR I-3045, 3065-3066 (mistake so obvious that other traders
contacted the Commission about it; the ECJ found that a ‘prudent trader could not have
been led to rely on the lawfulness of a measures containing error of that kind’); Case C-
15/85 Consorzio Cooperative d’Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 1005, 1036 (the
trader had no way of detecting a mistake which was easy to discover by the Commission
because irregularities were not manifest and could not be detected by reading the
decision and rules on the basis of which it was made have not been published.)
789 Case 14/81 Alpha Steel Ltd. v Commission [1982] ECR 749, 764 (the decision
challenged as unlawful).
790 Case C-500/99 P Conserve Italia Soc. Coop. arl v Commission [2002] ECR I-867,
948; Craig (n 709) 565.
791 Case 112/77 August Töpfer & Co. GmbH v Commission [1978] ECR 1019, 1033;
Schønberg (n 570) 100-101; Craig (n 709) 563. There are no hard and fast rules here,
the EU courts apply the criterion of ‘reasonable delay’ here, which is heavily case-
specific.
792 E.g. in Alpha Steel ((n 789) 770) adjustment of a decision to grant a quota was
allowed as by the time of revocation the trader has used only small percent of his quota
and refusal to allow larger quota did not affect him adversely. Schønberg (n 570) 99;
Craig (n 709) 563.
793 Schønberg (n 570) 99 (observes that no claim regarding revocation of an illegal
decision was successful in the absence of reliance); Craig (n 709) 565.
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[an] individual … is in a situation in which it is clear that the
Community administration has, by giving him precise assurances,
led him to entertain reasonable expectations.794
In this context795 legitimate expectations are engendered by a ‘self-binding action’ of
the authorities796 that ‘cannot be categorised as final decisions or determinations’.797
Like in English law, there are no hard and fast rules as to what conduct of EU
institutions constitutes representations giving rise to legitimate expectations.798 The
relevant conduct is analysed on a case-by-case basis. Representations constitute
‘explicit or implicit administrative pronouncements of facts, law or intent’. 799 To
engender legitimate expectations they need to be precise and specific 800, as well as
made by responsible authorities.801
Virtually all forms of explicit representations could conceivably become an
expectations-creating representation. 802 Oral statements carry less weight than
written statements either for evidentiary reasons or because they are often made
without proper delegation.803 However, if uncontested, ‘precise, unconditional and
consistent’ representations that ‘came from authorised and reliable sources’ can
794 Joined Cases T 66/96 and T 221/97 Mellett v Court of Justice of the European
Communities [1998] FP-II-A 1305, 1335-1336; Craig (n 709) 567.
795 The EU Courts also use broader statements covering the general areas described in
the preceding two sections. See e.g. Case T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas EPE v Commission
[1994] ECR II-1201, 1222, Case T-72/99 Meyer v Commission [2000] ECR II-2521,
2540;  Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v European Parliament [1998] II-
4239, 4265.
796 Schwarze (n 716) 1079.
797 Schønberg (n 570) 105; Schwarze (n 716) 1079.
798 Schønberg (n 570) 120; Craig (n 709) 568.
799 Schønberg (n 570) 105.
800 ibid 120; Craig (n 709) 568; Case T-465/93 Consorzio Gruppo di Azione Locale
‘Murgia Messapica’ v Commission [1994] II-361, 386; Case T-123/89 Chomel v
Commission [1990] ECR II-131, 139-140 (silence following request for confirmation not a
precise assurance); Case T-571/93 Lefebvre and others v Commission [1995] ECR II-
2379, 2407-2408.
801 Meyer (n 795) 2541 (assurances not received from EU officials).
802 Schønberg (n 570) 120; Craig (n 709) 567. They refer to letters, faxes, reports,
communications, codes of conduct, consistent practice. In an early commentary
Schwarze ((n 716) 1080-1093).
803 Schønberg (n 570) 121; Schwarze (n 716) 1090-1091. See e.g. Case 21/64
Macchiorlati Dalmas e Figli v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1965] ECR 175, 189 (official approval needed for assurances resulting in abandonment
of a cause of action by the authorities).
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engender legitimate expectations. 804 Only very precisely worded written
representations could have such effect.805 Legitimate expectations cannot arise from
general statements, either oral 806 or written 807 , or from representations that are
conditional or qualified.808
Unlike unlawful decisions, unlawful representations cannot give rise to legitimate
expectations.809 The principle of protection of legitimate expectations cannot justify
repetition of an incorrect interpretation of an EU measure810 or force an EU institution
to apply EU law contra legem.811 Similarly, it cannot apply to an undertaking that
ignores the applicable law812, to the conduct of a Member State that is in breach of
EU law813 or to undertakings by an institution which does not have the power to
make them.814
Legitimacy of an expectation arising from representations is assessed objectively in
the circumstances of the case. This involves an analysis of the regulatory context of
the representation, the nature of the representation and the knowledge of the
addressee. 815 The inquiry into the regulatory context may cover the rules and
804 Mellett (n 794) 1337; Case T 273/01 Innova Privat Akademie GmbH v Commission
[2003] ECR II 1093, 1104.
805 Schønberg (n 570) 123.
806 Joined Cases 303 and 312/81 Klöckner-Werke AG v Commission [1983] 1507, 1529
(a declaration in a phone conversation that the authorities will ‘solve the problem’
insufficient); Schwarze (n 716) 1090.
807 Joined Cases T-458/93 and T-523/93 Empresa Nacional de Urânio SA (ENU) v
Commission [1995] II-2459, 2496 (a letter from the Commissioner of a political character
meant only to open negotiations); Lefebvre (n 800) 2408 (letters worded in ‘very general
terms’); Schønberg (n 570) 124.
808 Innova (n 803) 1104-1105 (a fax communicating a provisional decision explicitly
stating that it is subject to a final decision); Case T-7/93 Langnese-Iglo GmbH v
Commission [1995] II-1533, 1553-1554 (a comfort letter reserving rights to reopen the
matter).
809 Craig ((n 709) 588, 589-590) criticises this approach as too strict, arguing that the EU
Courts should treat unlawful representations in the same way as unlawful decisions.
810 Case C-313/90 Comité International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthétiques
(CIRFS) v Commission [1993] I-1125, 1188 (CIRFS).
811 CIRFS (ibid) 1188; Joined Cases C-31/91 to C-44/91 Alois Lageder SpA and others v
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1993] I-1761, 1790.
812 Case 162/84 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1986] ECR 481, 492; Case 188/82 Thyssen
AG v Commission [1983] ECR 3721, 3734 (‘no official can give a valid undertaking not to
apply Community law’), Sharpston (n 728) 159.
813 Alois Lageder (n 811) 1790-1791.
814 ibid 1791.
815 Schønberg (n 570) 118; Schwarze (n 716) 1134-1135.
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procedures applicable to the situation in question and any general assumptions
inherent in a given practice area.816 The wording and the form of the representations
will also be relevant.817 The analysis enquires whether, in the circumstances of a
particular case, the alleged representations could have led the claimant to ‘a well-
founded belief’ 818 of the sort claimed by him. The standard of the addressee’s
knowledge overlaps with the ‘prudent trader’ standard, discussed in Section B.3.
Embassy Limousines is one of the few successful cases of legitimate expectations
engendered by representations. 819 It concerned public procurement of transport
services for the European Parliament. Before the results of the bid were announced
the claimant, a participant in the bid, was informed by the authorities in an
uncontested telephone conversation that an official opinion had been issued in
favour of awarding the contract to him. The telephone contact was not part of the
bidding procedure. However, it was clear to both parties that such contact was
necessary because the future contract required the bidder to increase its capacity.
Relying on the telephone conversation the claimant made certain pre-contractual
investments, of which he informed the future employer. Those investments were
reasonable and realistic in the circumstances. This was because the European
Parliament ‘induced in its intended co-contracting party the certainty of winning a
contract and, in addition, encouraged that party to make irreversible investments’.820
It thereby encouraged the claimant to ‘take risk which went beyond that normally run
by tenderers in a tendering procedure’. 821 Similarly to the CNTA case, the EU
institutions induced a reasonable and prudent trader to take greater risk than he
would have taken otherwise.
3. The ‘Prudent Trader’ Standard
Assessing whether the EU institutions engendered legitimate expectations worthy of
protection requires analysis: of the conduct allegedly giving rise to such
expectations; of the measures that allegedly frustrated them; and of the conduct and
816 E.g. in state aid cases the aid is legal only when it is officially found to be legal. See
also general assumptions related to organisation of the common market in Sections
B.2.a. and B.4.
817 Schønberg (n 570) 120.
818 Meyer (n 795) 2544.
819 Embassy Limousines (n 795).
820 ibid 4267.
821 ibid 4269. Such normal risk includes costs connected with the preparation of the bid.
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attitude of the trader who claims to have enjoyed the expectations which were later
frustrated. The latter encompasses three major points, namely: whether in light of the
circumstances the trader could have reasonably enjoyed the expectations he claims
to have enjoyed; whether he could have foreseen the measures that frustrated his
expectations and, lastly, whether he acted in good faith.
The EU Courts developed the concept of a ‘prudent trader’ which sets an objective
standard of assessment of the circumstances related to legitimate expectations.822 It
assumes that the trader has some level of knowledge about the market sector in
which he operates. The required level of knowledge and sophistication is high
because most litigants are professionals and ‘may be expected to show considerable
diligence in their dealings with the administration’.823 Sharpston observes that:
the behaviour expected of the prudent trader is based upon what
the well-informed, experienced trader ought to have anticipated
(even if he was not in a position to predict every detail of the
change), and not what the neophyte, the non-specialist or the small
trader might have guessed.824
The prudent trader is required to be ‘discriminating and well-informed’ and thus
aware of the highly regulated policy areas.825 The measure does not have to be
foreseeable in every detail, it is sufficient to be foreseeable in some form.826 A trader
is expected to be very well informed and, if relevant information was publicly
available, the measure would most probably also be foreseeable. The required
knowledge covers political and legal information827 as well as general economic
developments and market trends. 828 The required level of knowledge is very
demanding.829 It implies a detailed enquiry into the relevant information by the court.
The trader is protected only against sudden and unforeseeable occurrences.830
822 Schønberg (n 570) 119; Sharpston (n 728) 158.
823 Schønberg (n 570) 127. The high standard applies also to staff cases as civil servants
are also professionals.
824 Sharpston (n 728) 150.
825 Schønberg (n 570) 127.
826 ibid 127.
827 Schønberg (n 570) 127 (information about law, proposals for legislation, official
communications, policy, general and specialised papers); Sharpston (n 728) 158-159.
828 Schønberg (n 570) 127.
829 Craig (n 709) 571. Schønberg ((n 570) 127) and Sharpston ((n 728) 158-159) criticise
this approach as disadvantaging smaller traders.
830 Sharpston (n 728) 107.
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In the context of regulatory change, the ‘prudent trader’ standard means that the
trader, aware of the inherent fluctuations of the relevant market area, cannot expect
immunity from regulations. He can expect that the law will not apply in an
unforeseeable manner, although non-foreseeability is measured against the high
standard of knowledge. 831 Assessment of the special arrangements to mitigate
regulatory changes will be measured against whether the trader, as a prudent trader,
could have foreseen that the arrangement will not protect him from specific
change.832 With regard to revocation of decisions, it is important whether the trader
was or could have been aware of the circumstances prompting the revocation,
including the decision’s unlawfulness. The ‘prudent trader’ standard is particularly
relevant to expectations engendered by representations. The trader’s knowledge is
crucial for the assessment of his understanding of the expectations-engendering
conduct of the authorities in a given context and of the foreseeability of their later
inconsistent conduct. There is, however, no test that could be mechanically applied
to all these circumstances. Rather, the EU Courts analyse the context of each case
assessing the position of the claimant though the lens of the ‘prudent and
discriminating trader’ and in the light of the circumstances of a specific case.
The principle of legitimate expectations is unavailable if the trader had not acted in
good faith. Legitimate expectations cannot arise if the relevant decision or
representations were based on fraud or deception caused by the addressee. This
includes situations when the trader provided the authorities with inaccurate,
incomplete, misleading or false information.833
4. Balancing the EU Interest with the Private Interest
Legitimate expectations arising from representations need to be balanced against
the policy reasons underlying the measures which frustrated these expectations.
This balancing process is based on the premise that the EU institutions enjoy broad
discretion. The EU is a dynamic and highly regulated environment, where the EU
Council and Commission enjoy broad discretion in complex economic matters. This
discretion covers general assessment of a given situation, choice of appropriate
measures and their implementation. The rule of law obliges the institutions to act on
831 Case 108/81 G.R. Amylum v Council and others [1982] ECR 3107, 3132-3133 ; Case
265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgensand Van Dijk FoodProducts and others v Commission
[1987] ECR 1155, 1181.
832 CNTA (n 721); Mulder (n 764) 2353.
833 See Section B.2.b.
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the basis and in accordance with the appropriate laws and in pursuance of EU
policies.834 As a result:
traders are unable to claim that they have a legitimate expectation
that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by
decisions taken by those institutions within the limits of their
discretionary powers will be maintained.835
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations imposes limitations on these
broad discretionary powers. 836 The overriding public interest represented by the
discretion and the private interest embodied in legitimate expectations are opposing
values that need to be balanced to decide whether the trader’s expectations should
be protected from discretionary powers.837 Thus, even if a claimant can show that he
enjoyed legitimate expectations, their protection still depends on the absence of an
overriding public interest justifying their frustration.838 The EU institutions must show
such justifying public interest behind the measures they adopted, for the EU Courts
to balance it with the trader’s legitimate expectations.
Like English and US courts, the EU Courts have not developed any specific test
applicable to this balancing exercise.839 Schønberg observed that in practice the
Courts apply the test of a ‘significant, serious, or even extreme imbalance’.840 Craig
suggested that the EU Courts should apply the proportionality test.841 Given its
equitable and ad hoc nature, the balancing reflects the EU Courts’ ‘essentially
pragmatic attitude’ and is tailored to the circumstances of a particular case.842 As a
result, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations cannot be distilled into a
specific mechanical test, lowering the predictability of the principle of protection of
834 Deuka (n 74) 432; Racke (n 744); Sharpston (n 728) 103.
835 Case 52/81 Offene Handelsgesellschaft in Firma Werner Faust v Commission [1982]
ECR 3745, 3762-3763; Edeka (n 738) 2758.
836 Sharpston (n 728) 110. Tridimas (n 709) 279) observes that this limitation is more
severe than that arising from the principle of equal treatment. This limitation is self-
imposed as conduct giving rise to legitimate expectations is also a result of exercise of
discretion (see e.g. Staff Case (n 724) 584).
837 Hanf (n 711) 55-56.
838 Craig (n 709) 584; Hanf (n 711) 57.
839 Craig (n 709) 585 (courts ‘reluctant to assign a discrete legal label to this exercise’).
840 Schønberg (n 570) 119.
841 Craig (n 709) 586.
842 Sharpston (n 728) 160.
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legitimate expectations. This encourages claims which are, however, rarely
successful.843
The judicial review of the conduct frustrating expectations is limited to examining
‘whether it contains manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the
authority did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion’.844 The EU Courts do not
substitute their own evaluation of the matter for that of the competent authority845 and
they usually support a wide margin of manoeuvre for the EU institutions, even if the
adopted schemes are subject to criticism.846
In case of a rare finding that claimant’s legitimate expectations were frustrated and
deserve protection, the EU Courts order the EU institutions to make good the
damage suffered if the institution was at fault. 847 Such damages are narrowly
circumscribed. In CNTA the trader could have been compensated only for the loss
caused by the withdrawal of the fixed compensatory amount and the re-exposure to
the foreign exchange risk. The arrangement did not protect him from the loss of profit
and there was no guarantee that the arrangement will be maintained. 848 The
compensation claim ultimately failed for lack of evidence of any relevant loss.849 In
Mulder the EU institutions were ordered to compensate the damage caused by the
refusal of the milk production quotas.850 In Embassy Limousines the claimant was
awarded compensation for the investments made in reliance on the representations
that engendered his legitimate expectations.851
843 Tridimas (n 709) 251; Schønberg (n 570) 119. Craig ((n 709) 269) argues that low
success rate is due to inability to establish that assurances were specific and precise
enough rather than broad margin of discretion. Not in all cases the balancing is express
(see e.g. Embassy Limousines (n 795)).
844 Racke (n 744) 81. See also e.g. Deuka (n 771) 432 (courts ‘must restrict themselves
to examining whether the evaluation of the competent authority contains a patent error or
constitutes a misuse of power’).
845 Deuka (n 771) 432; Schønberg (n 570) 118-119.
846 Sharpston (n 728) 108-109, 128.
847 For detailed analysis of the question of liability and legitimate expectations see:
Schønberg (n 570) 167-236.
848 CNTA (n 721) 550. See Secton B.2.a.
849 Case 74/74 Comptoir national technique agricole (CNTA) SA v Commission [1976]
ECR 797, 806.
850 Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v Council [1992] ECR I-3061. The
detailed analysis of damage suffered can be found in C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v
Council [2000] ECR I-203. See Section B.2.a.
851 Embassy Limousines (n 795) 4275 and 4277. The ECJ also added equitable
compensation for non-material damage caused by keeping the claimant in uncertainty
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5. Conclusions
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations in EU law is ‘rather intangible’
and cannot be easily defined or described by pointing to some distinguishing
features.852 As a result, it does not lend itself to mechanical applications and any
generalisations in its cursory descriptions open doors for misunderstandings.853 The
principle is equitable in character, focusing on equitable and common sense
economic considerations that underlie the EU Courts’ case-law in this area.854
Even though the EU Courts formulate general rules applying to the concept, their
application in practice is heavily case-specific and requires careful inquiry into the
circumstances of each particular case, often leading to strict distinguishing of claims
attempting to rely on similarities with previous cases.855 As a result, claims based on
protection of legitimate expectations rarely succeed. 856 Such claims cannot be
successful on the general premise of an unfavourable change of regulations.
Something more is required to create specific confidence of a prudent, discriminating
and informed participant of the heavily regulated market that could override the
public interest in regulating this market and in ‘a responsible administration to control
speculation and evasion of Community regulations’. 857 Expectations should be
protected to prevent systemic distrust between traders and the administration. The
next section explores the approach taken to the concept of legitimate expectations
by another pan-European legal regime, namely the ECHR.
and forcing him to make ‘useless efforts with a view to responding to the urgency of the
situation’.
852 Eleanor Sharpston, ‘European Community Law and the Doctrine of Legitimate
Expectations: How Legitimate, and for Whom’ (1999) 11 Nw.J.Int'l L.& Bus. 87, 103.
853 Deuka/AG Trabucchi (n 725) 777.
854 Sharpston (n 853) 103 and (n 728); Tridimas (n 709) 281; Deuka/AG Trabucchi (n
725) 777.
855 See e.g. CNTA (n 721) v Tomadini (n 729) (claimant’s situation outside the
transitional regulation); Mulder (n 764) v Case C-85/90 Dowling v Ireland [1992] I-5305
(the non-marketing was due to the milk producer’s ill health and not a result of an
individual bargain with the authorities) and Joined Cases 196/88 to 198/88 Cornée v
Coopérative agricole laitière de Loudéac [1989] ECR 2309 (development plans approved
by national authorities distinguished from arrangements in Mulder (n 764)); Sofrimport (n
750) v Unifruit Hellas (n 795) 1223-1225 (the new measures were of different character
than the ones in Sofrimport and protection of goods in transit did not extend to them).
856 Schwarze (n 716) 1113-1114; Sharpston (n 728) 159; Craig (n 709) 563, 568, 569;
Tridimas (n 709) 251.
857 Sharpston (n 728) 158.
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C. Legitimate Expectations and Property Protection under the ECHR
1. The Origins and Context of the Concept of Legitimate Expectations in the
ECtHR Jurisprudence
The ECtHR uses the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of protection
of property 858 , which is the second most frequently invoked guarantee of the
ECHR.859 Although the use of the concept by the ECtHR is not as widespread and
established as in English law and EU law860, it is still relevant to our analysis.861
The ECtHR was a late adopter of the concept, which arrived before it through
arguments made under national legal systems. The first cases invoking the concept
of legitimate expectations concerned the right to fair trial under Article 6 ECHR.862
They arose in the English and German legal systems respectively and were
influenced by the English law concept of legitimate expectations863 and the German
law concept of Vertrauensschutz.864
The ECtHR did not indicate the origins of the concept of legitimate expectations in its
practice. There is no systematic approach to the ECtHR practice and its case-law
858 It has also been invoked in relation to the right to private life (e.g. Von Hannover v
Germany (No. 2) (2012) 55 EHHR 15) and the right to family life (e.g. Antwi v Norway,
App no 26940/10 (ECtHR, 14 February 2012))
859 Luzius Wildhaber, Isabelle Wildhaber, ‘Recent Case Law on the Protection of
Property in the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Binder C et al (eds),
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph
Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009) 657.
860 Luzius Wildhaber, ‘The Protection of Legitimate Expectations in European Human
Rights Law’ in Mario Monti and others (eds), Economic Law and Justice in Times of
Globalisation, Festschrift für Carl Baudenbacher (Nomos 2007) 256.
861 ibid 253.
862 It guarantees, among others, the right to fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal and adequate time and facilities for the preparation of criminal
defence.
863 Campbell and Fell v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 165, para. 72. A prisoner
could legitimately expectat to be released before the end of his prison term based on a
practice of granting remission. Remission was discretionary but in practice applied to
every prisoner. The Court’s reference to ‘legitimate expectations’ resembles that of Lord
Denning’s in Schmidt (n 545).
864 Colak v Germany, App no 9999/82 (ECtHR, 6 December 1988), para. 26. The
applicant argued that he was promised that his case will be treated as a lesser crime.
The conduct of State authorities did not create legitimate expectation
(Vertrauenstatbestand). The ‘promise’ was informal, it was not foreseen in criminal
procedure and not formally confirmed by the court.
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needs intellectual clarification and doctrinal coherence.865 Commentators link the
origins of the concept in the ECtHR jurisprudence with the EU law’s principle of
legitimate expectations as ‘invoked and adapted to the distinctive context of the
[ECHR]’866 or, more broadly, to a pan-European concept of legitimate expectation
influenced by German constitutional law and applied by the EU Courts and national
courts.867
The concept of legitimate expectations discussed here is used in the context of
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (‘P 1/1’) which states that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest
or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.
By expressly referring to the State’s right to regulate and eschewing a reference to
‘property right’ or compensation, P 1/1 is textually at the opposing pole from the
minimalist US Takings Clause. The ECtHR practice elucidated that P 1/1 guarantees
the right to property868 and consists of three interrelated869 rules: the principle of
peaceful enjoyment of property; the rule that deprivation of possessions is prohibited
unless certain conditions are met; and the rule that the State can limit property rights
pursuant to a general interest by introducing laws which the State deems necessary
for such purpose.870
865 Christian Tomuschat, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Investment
Protection’ in Binder C et al (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century.
Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009) 647; Steven R
Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented
International Law’ (2008) 102 AJIL 475, 497.
866 Wildhaber (n 860) 253.
867 Patricia Popelier, ‘Legitimate Expectations and the Law Maker in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 10, 10.
868 Marckx v Belgium (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 330, para. 63.
869 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHHR 123, para. 37 (Note: rules developed by the
ECtHR operate as uniform formulas and are often repeated in multiple decisions). See
also Wildhaber (n 860) 255.
870 Sporrong and Lönrroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35, para. 61.
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P 1/1 does not define ‘possessions’. The ECtHR interprets this concept as
autonomous and independent from classifications applicable in the national laws.871
This allows the Court it to adopt a broad concept of ‘possessions’, extending beyond
the commonly understood meaning of property.872 ‘Possessions’ therefore include
existing possessions or assets, including claims, with respect to which the applicant
can argue that he has at least a legitimate expectation of obtaining effective
enjoyment of a property right.873 The concept of legitimate expectations extends the
ECHR’s protection beyond the conventional notions of property.874 However, it is
difficult to define in detail. The intellectual rigour of the first two ECtHR cases
referring to legitimate expectations, where the concept was based on reliance on
specific representations or established practice of the State authorities, was not
followed in subsequent case-law. Legitimate expectations have been described in
broad terms as ‘a legitimate expectation that a certain state of affairs will apply’875 or
a situation ‘where the state has given grounds for an individual to think that he or she
has some degree of protection in relation to a property-type interest’. 876 These
arguable definitions do little to explain the concept. It is therefore more instructive to
enquire into the relevant scenarios in which legitimate expectations are invoked.
2. Scenarios in which ECtHR Refers to Legitimate Expectations
Two references to legitimate expectations by the ECtHR are particularly relevant to
our analysis. They are used at the applicability stage of analysis and concern
situations where the applicant’s legal status was found to be based on ultra vires
administrative acts or situations where the ‘possession’ in question is a well-founded
871 Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403, para.
53.
872 Tom Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hart Publishing 2005) 40;
Wildhaber & Wildhaber (n 859) 659-660; Wildhaber (n 860) 255, 258; Ursula Kriebaum,
Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International
Investment Law’ in Breitenmoser S et al (eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule
of Law, Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Dike Werlag 2007) 2; Monica Carss-Frisk,
The Right to Property. A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Handbooks, No. 4 (Council of
Europe 2001) 6.
873 Malhous v The Czech Republic, App no 33071/96 (ECtHR, 12 July 2001), p. 16.
874 Philip Sales, ‘Property and Human Rights: Protection Expansion and Disruption’
(2006) 11 JR 141, 144.
875 Carss-Frisk (n 872) 6.
876 Sales (n 874) 144.
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legal claim that could have been pursued before national courts. These two
scenarios will be discussed below.
a. Legitimate Expectations and Ultra Vires
Situations where the applicant’s legitimate expectations are related to some ultra
vires administrative actions are the least controversial in the practice of the
ECtHR.877 These cases belong to a broader category where the applicant’s situation
is tainted by nullity, voidness or illegality.878 In these cases the applicant does not
have a recognised right under national law but it may have a ‘possession’ under P
1/1.879 As a rule, the ECtHR refers to legitimate expectations when it finds that,
despite being ultra vires, the conduct of authorities created a protected legal situation
for the property owner.
The leading cases here are Pine Valley 880 and Stretch. 881 In Pine Valley the
‘possession’ in question concerned the right to develop a plot of land. The applicants
purchased the land for the purpose of development, relying on a provisional planning
permission registered in an official register which designated the site for industrial
warehouse and office development. The site was located in an area zoned for
agricultural development preserving a green belt. The applicants were denied a
detailed planning permission and, on appeal, the national courts found that the
provisional permission was a nullity. Subsequent legislation remedying this this
situation did not apply to the applicants. As a result, they could not develop the land
and its value dropped substantially. The ECtHR found that at the time when the land
was purchased the applicants were ‘perfectly entitled to assume’ that the planning
permission was valid. The permission was equivalent to a favourable decision as to
the principle with regard to the proposed development and it could not be reopened
by the authorities. The subsequent declaration of nullity constituted an interference
877 It is argued that ECtHR’s references to legitimate expectations should be limited to
this scenario. See Centro Europa 7 S.R.L v Italy, App no 38433/09 (ECtHR, 7 June
2012), Concurring Opinion of Judge Vajic; Wildhaber (n 860) 260, 263; Allen (n 872) 57.
See Section C.2.b. below.
878 E.g. in Beyeler a transaction between two private parties was invalid but its effects
were de facto recognised by the authorities. The ECtHR did not refer to ‘legitimate
expectations’ in this case observing that ‘[t]he complexity of the factual position prevents
its being classified in a precise category.’ (Beyeler v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 52, paras.
104-106)
879 Allen (n 872) 64.
880 Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v Ireland (1992) 14 EHHR 319.
881 Stretch v The United Kingdom (2004) 38 EHRR 12.
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with the applicant’s ‘possession’. As a result, the applicants ‘had at least a legitimate
expectation of being able to carry out their proposed development’ which was a
component part of the property.
A similar situation arose in Stretch, where the ‘possession’ was a right to extend a
long-term lease contract with the local authorities.882 The contract was originally
signed for 22 years and its terms provided that the lessee will build light industrial
buildings and sub-let them for rent. The contract included an option to renew the
lease for a further 21 years, provided that the lessee complied with its covenants.
When the lessee applied for renewal, the authorities negotiated the draft of the new
lease, which the lessee signed. Subsequently, the authorities notified the applicant
that they did not have the authority to sign the lease with the renewal option in the
first place and thus the option was ultra vires and could not be exercised. The
English courts agreed, albeit reluctantly.883 The ECtHR found that when entering into
the lease both the applicant and the authorities have not been aware of any legal
obstacle to the renewal option and that the option constituted an important part of the
lessee’s consideration. He built the required buildings, was sub-letting them and paid
ground rent, and thus was clearly expecting the renewal of the lease. The renewal
negotiations had reached an advanced stage and the ultra vires problem was raised
very late. The ECtHR found that the applicant had at least a legitimate expectation to
exercise his option to renew the rent.
In both cases, the legitimate expectations of certain enjoyment of the applicants’
possessions were attached to the existing property rights. In Pine Valley the
expectation of development was attached to the land. In Stretch the expectation of
contract renewal was attached to the lease. The applicants detrimentally relied on
certain legal acts bearing on their property rights.884 At the time it was justifiable to
treat those acts as having a sound legal basis885, as they could not be unilaterally
changed by the authorities and their illegality was not foreseeable at the time they
were issued. It is unclear, however, whether the P 1/1 protection concerned
882 See also Fedorenko v Ukraine (2008) 46 EHHR 6 (a currency clause in a sale
contract later found to be ultra vires which was an important part of the applicant’s
consideration).
883 The Court of Appeal observed that it was unjust for the authorities ‘to take advantage
of their own errors to escape from the unlawful bargains’. (Stretch (n 881) 22)
884 Purchase of property for a certain price based on information in the public register in
Pine Valley (n 880) and construction of buildings based on the option to renew in Stretch
(n 881).
885 Kopecký v Slovakia (2005) 41 EHRR 43, para. 47.
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expectations of the lease renewal and development of property respectively or
expectations that the legal acts on which the applicants’ relied will not be
retrospectively invalidated. This is particularly relevant in Pine Valley, where ignoring
the nullity of the provisional development plans was not equivalent to a guarantee
that the applicant will be granted the detailed planning permission.
This potential double meaning of legitimate expectations is also visible in Anheuser-
Busch.886 A company filed an application to register a trademark. The application was
subsequently invalidated based on a retrospective international agreement. The
ECtHR found that, since the application gave the applicant certain conditional
proprietary rights887 , he had a ‘possession’ under P 1/1. However, it refused to
pronounce that the applicant had ‘legitimate expectations’.888 The question whether
the trademark application would have been ultimately successful, an outcome
meaning that the registration did not infringe third party rights, was at the heart of the
underlying dispute between the applicant and another private party, both of whom
claimed rights to that trademark.889 The Court did not want to suggest that the
applicant had a legitimate expectation that the trademark will be registered or an
expectation that the application will not be invalidated.890 It appears therefore that in
situations such as Pine Valley and Anheuser-Busch, where expectations of non-
retroactivity are not equivalent to expectations of obtaining an asset, it will be up to
the ECtHR’s discretion to use the concept of legitimate expectations.891
The ECtHR’s understanding of ‘possessions’ in the form of ‘at least a legitimate
expectation’ refers to a justified belief of an applicant that his legal position has a
sound legal basis, i.e. it is not invalid or illegal. That sound legal basis is
unexpectedly removed when it is declared ultra vires. Alternatively, legitimate
expectations may be substantive and refer to the rights arising from that sound legal
basis.
886 Anheuser-Busch v Portugal (2007) 45 EHRR 36.
887 They were conditional on non-infringement of third party rights.
888 Anheuser-Busch (n 886) 78.
889 The underlying dispute, between Anheuser-Busch Inc. and Budĕjovický Budvar,
concerned registration of the ‘Budweiser’ trademark in Portugal.
890 The Court treated references to legitimate expectations as ‘a “legitimate expectation”
of obtaining an “asset”’ (Anheuser-Busch (n 886) 65).
891 In Anheuser-Busch (n 886) the dissenting judges argued that the applicant’s situation
is a ‘legitimate expectation’.
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b. Legitimate Expectations and Claims
The concept of legitimate expectations is also referred to in situations where the
applicant has no ‘existing possession’ but his proprietary interest is ‘in the nature of a
claim’.892 These interests are grounded in a well-founded legal claim.893 To be a
‘possession’ under P 1/1, a claim it needs to be ‘sufficiently established to be
enforceable’894 and the applicant must have ‘at least a “legitimate expectation” that
[it] will be realised’.895
The proprietary interest of an applicant who has ‘an interest in the nature of a claim’
cannot arise from the existing national legislation without an intervention of a
court.896 While the ECtHR practice in this context is not entirely clear897, it applies the
concept of legitimate expectations to two distinguishable situations.
In the first type of cases the existence of the applicant’s claim is not in question. It is
either already recognised by the authorities or established under the relevant law
and pursued before national courts. A subsequent legislation makes continuation
and/or enforcement of such claim impossible. In Pressos 898 the applicants had
claims arising from shipping accidents. They arose automatically pursuant to the
relevant national law from the very fact of the accident. The accidents were caused
by port pilots, who were external service providers and agents of the State. The
established national case-law provided that in such case compensation may be
claimed directly from the State. The applicants filed their claims before appropriate
national courts. As the cases were pending, the State introduced legislation
retrospectively excluding its own liability for the pilots’ negligence. The ECtHR found
that the state of the law at the time of the accident gave rise to the applicants’
legitimate expectations. The claimants could expect that their claims will be
determined in accordance with that established law.
892 Kopecký (n 885) 41.
893 Wildhaber ((n 860) 258) refers to them as ‘legitimate expectations as an incidence of
a property right’.
894 Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v Czech Republic, App no 39794/98 (ECtHR Grand
Chamber, 10 July 2002), para. 74.
895 ibid 69.
896 Kopecký (n 885) 41.
897 Tomuschat (n 865) 647 (in need of ‘intellectual clarification’); Allen (n 872) 50, 56
(‘cannot be described as either clear or coherent’).
898 Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v Belgium (1996) 21 EHRR 301 was the first case in
which the ECtHR found that ‘possessions’ may also encompass legal claims
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In a similar case of Draon the applicants brought a claim against a State hospital for
wrong pre-natal diagnosis which resulted in grave disability of their child. The
hospital did not deny its liability and the claimants applied to the courts for the
assessment of damages and an interim award. Two interim awards on damages
were made and the case was progressing. Before the hearing the State passed a
law limiting the amount of recoverable damages by comparison with an earlier,
established, law. The ECtHR found that the applicants had legitimate expectations of
compensation based on the law and court practice in place before the legislative
change.899
The second type of cases where legitimate expectations can be ‘in the nature of a
claim’ concerns claims for a restitution of property confiscated by the communist
regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. Here, the applicants sought protection of P
1/1 after failing to obtain restitution before their national courts.
The ECtHR treated such cases as not involving claims that were sufficiently
established to be enforceable.900 The restitution cases did not involve legitimate
expectations that a current and enforceable claim would be determined in favour of
the applicants.901 Unlike in Pressos, the applicants could not show that the national
laws or judicial decisions gave rise to some enforceable claims of restitution.902
They ECtHR did not interfere with the application of the relevant laws by the national
courts. The applicants could not succeed if they did not satisfy the legal conditions
for restitution.903 In Kopecký904, the lower court found that the statutory requirements
for restitution were impossible to fulfil in practice. This decision was subsequently
overturned by the higher court, who found that the statutory condition was applicable
and the applicant failed to fulfil it. The ECtHR refused to engage with the higher
court’s decision. It argued that its mandate was limited only to the question of
arbitrariness before the national courts and, in the absence of such arbitrariness,
899 Draon v France (2006) 42 EHRR 40, paras. 12-28, 70-71.
900 The ECtHR adopted a generally unsupportive attitude towards the restitution cases.
See e.g. Tom Allen, ‘Restitution and Transnational Justice in the European Court of
Human Rights’ (2006) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1, 3.
901 Gratzinger (n 984) 72-73; Kopecký (n 885) 49; Von Maltzan v Germany, App nos
71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 2 March 2005), para. 84.
902 Gratzinger (n 894) 72-73; Kopecký (n 885) 49.
903 Gratzinger (n 894) 3, 72-74 (claimants did not have the required citizenship).
904 Kopecký (n 885).
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accepted the finding of the higher court. The claim was therefore not ‘sufficiently
established’ to fall under P 1/1.905
In both cases of the claim-related expectations the ECtHR establishes them on the
basis of the national law and court practice.906 However, if the legal basis of a claim
is problematic, the Court may refuse to pronounce on the question of legitimate
expectations even if it finds existence of ‘possessions’ on another ground. In
Anheuser-Busch the ECtHR found that application for a trademark registration put
the applicant in a legal situation constituting ‘possessions’ protected under P 1/1 but
refused to decide whether it had a ‘legitimate expectation’.907
‘Possessions’ in the form of a claim cannot be based on subjective perceptions. A
‘hope that a long-extinguished property right might be revived’ is not sufficient.908
Existence of legitimate expectations ‘in the nature of a claim’ is determined by the
Court on an objective basis, by reference to the relevant national laws and other
legal acts such as judicial decisions.909 Legitimate expectations cannot arise ‘where
there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation or application of domestic law and
the applicant’s submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts’.910
Where the applicant’s claim is defeated by way of subsequent retroactive change of
law, his expectations are based on reliance on the law and legal practice at the time
when his claim arose.911 Pressos and Draon and the Pine Valley are similar in this
respect. The infringement of ‘possessions’ in all of them occurred by way of
retroactive extinguishing of favourable situations which the claimants could
legitimately have expected to enjoy otherwise.
The reference to legitimate expectations in the context of claims has been criticised
as adding nothing to the statement that a claim can constitute a ‘possession’ where
there is a ‘sufficient basis’ (rather than a ‘legitimate expectation’) for it ‘in national
905 ibid 54-56. See also Malhous (n 873).
906 Draon (n 899) 68 (‘where the proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim it may be
regarded as an ‘asset’ only where it has a sufficient basis in national law’).
907 In the context ‘legitimate expectation’ referred to an expectation of obtaining the
trademark registration, which was a matter of national courts.
908 Gratzinger (n 894) 69; Malhous (n 873) 17.
909 Gratzinger (n 894) 73.
910 Kopecký (n 885) 50; Jantner v Slovakia, App no. 39050/97 (ECtHR, 4 March 2003)
29-33.
911 Kopecký (n 885) 48.
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law, for example where there is settled case-law of the national courts confirming
it’.912 It is argued that such ‘legitimate expectations’ refer to the strength of the claim
rather than its existence. As a result, the mere vesting of a claim is sufficient to
establish the existence of ‘possession’.913 Moreover, a finding that a legal claim is
sufficiently established to be treated as a ‘possession’ for the purpose of P 1/1 is
based on its ‘well-foundedness in domestic law’. It does not depend on references to
legitimate expectations:
To say that the claimant may legitimately expect his claim to be
respected or enforced adds nothing of substance; it must, after all,
be presumed that well-founded legal claims will be protected in a
State that subscribes to the rule of law. Conversely, a claim that
lacks a sound basis in domestic law will lie beyond the reach of
Article 1, and no expectation, however legitimate or reasonable it
may be, will change that.914
This critique is in line with the argument that the ECtHR should apply the concept of
legitimate expectations to a ‘far more limited set of circumstances’, namely those
represented by Stretch and Pine Valley cases.915
3. Balancing Community Interests with the Interests of the Individual
In the ECtHR practice, the enquiry whether P 1/1 applies to the situation before the
Court (and thus whether there is a ‘possession’ as understood by ECHR) is separate
from the inquiry into whether the host State’s conduct constituted an interference
with that ‘possession’. The latter is informed by the two of the three rules expressed
in P 1/1. At this stage the ECtHR takes into account whether the State interference
with ‘possessions’ was in the public interest and in accordance with the relevant law
and general principles of international law. It needs to respect the State’s right to limit
property rights in general interest in a way the State considers necessary.916 These
requirements point to the legality917 of adopted measures and require the State to
justify the necessity and the legitimate aim of its measures.
912 ibid 52.
913 Allen (n 872) 49.
914 Wildhaber (n 860) 260, 263. See also Tomuschat (n 865) 647 (the reference to
expectations ‘rather masks the real situation’) and Centro Europa/Vajic (n 877) (such
reference is ‘unnecessary’).
915 Centro Europa/Vajic (n 877); Allen (n 872) 57.
916 Sporrong and Lönrroth (n 870) 61.
917 Which, akin to the EU law’s principle of legal certainty, includes the requirement that
the law is adequately accessible, sufficiently precise and foreseeable. (Lithgow and
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The central test for assessing State conduct under the ECHR is proportionality. It is
reflected in the ECHR’s reference to instruments ‘necessary in a democratic
society’918 and it also applies to P 1/1. Proportionality requires the ECtHR to:
determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of
the protection of individual’s fundamental rights.919
As is evident from the wording of P 1/1, the ECHR leaves the State considerable
latitude in formulating and implementing its economic and social policies.920 As a
result, the margin of appreciation left to the State is wide and the ECtHR’s intensity
of review is low921, lower than for other substantive provisions of ECHR.922 This
means that the Court ‘would neither scrutinise the details of the merits nor refute the
presumption of good faith of the interfering measures employed by the [State].’923
In using the above tests of legality, legitimacy and proportionality the ECtHR does
not follow any mechanistic formulas and reveals little as to the way in which they are
applied.924 Generally, proportionality requires existence of a legitimate aim of the
measure and a reasonable connection between the measure and that aim. 925
Although the broad understanding of ‘possessions’ subsumes many State measures
under the ECtHR’s scrutiny, the evaluation of their legality, justification and
proportionality leaves the States a broad margin of appreciation. 926 The ECtHR
leaves the States with broad discretion in framing social and economic policies and
in the choice of instruments of their implementation. 927 As a result, although
Others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHHR 329, para. 110; Spacek Sro v Czech Republic
(2000) 30 EHRR 1010, para. 60) See e.g. Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the
ECHR (Intersentia 2002) 152.
918 See ECHR Articles 8.2, 9.2, 10.2, 11.2, Protocol 4, Article 2.3; Allen (n 872) 123.
919 Sporrong and Lönrroth (n 870) 69; Stretch (n 881) 37; Pressos (n 898) 38.
920 Wildhaber (n 860) 255; Allen (n 872) 126.
921 Allen (n 872) 125.
922 Wildhaber (n 860) 255.
923 Arai-Takahashi (n 917) 151.
924 ibid 152 (‘markedly reticent policy of review’); Allen (n 872) 140 (‘very little discussion’
and application in an ‘impressionistic manner’).
925 Stretch (n 881) 37; Allen (n 872) 125.
926 Allen (n 872) 39-40; Arai-Takahashi (n 917) 154 (arguing that this deprives the
proportionality test of its essence in some cases).
927 Pressos (n 898) 37, adding that it will interfere only if the State’s judgement as to what
is ‘in the public interests’ is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’; Draon (n 899) 75.
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proportionality requires that the State does not impose on an individual an ‘individual
and excessive burden’, the ECtHR does not require the States to use the least
restrictive methods, leaving to their discretion the choice of the most effective
means.928 Also in assessing proportionality the ECtHR leaves broad discretion to the
State.929 The standard of proportionality applied by the ECtHR to P 1/1 is therefore
lax.930
How does this general approach impact on the protection of legitimate expectations?
In Pine Valley the ECtHR found that the retrospective invalidation of the planning
permission was an interference with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions which included a legitimate expectation of carrying out their planned
development.931 The Court found that the interference was in conformity with the
planning legislation designed to protect the environment, which was ‘clearly a
legitimate aim “in accordance with the general interest”’.932 Moreover, the national
court’s decision to nullify the provisional permission was a measure of general
application aimed at ensuring that the planning legislation is correctly applied ‘across
the board’ to prevent building in an area preserved as a green belt. Nullification of
the provisional permission was ‘a proper way – if not the only way – of achieving that
aim.’933 Moreover, since the venture of the applicants was commercial, it, ‘by its very
nature, involved an element of risk’. The applicants were therefore aware of the
zoning plan and the opposition of the local council to any departures from it. As a
result, the annulment of the permission was not disproportionate and did not
constitute a deprivation.934
In Stretch the interference with the right to renew the lease by invoking the ultra vires
doctrine was disproportionate.935 Neither the applicant nor the State authority were
aware of the illegality at the relevant time, the local authorities received rent for the
lease and even negotiated its increase at the time of renewal. The renewal option,
even ultra vires, was not against the public interest, did not affect any third party
928 Arai-Takahashi (n 917) 154-155; Allen (n 872) 130-141.
929 Arai-Takahashi (n 917) 156-157, criticising it as ‘excessively restrained approach’).
930 ibid 151-152.
931 Pine Valley (n 880) 51, 54.
932 ibid 57.
933 ibid 59.
934 ibid 59.
935 Stretch (n 881) 36.
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interests and did not affect the exercise of any statutory functions. Moreover, the law
changed in the meantime and this type of option was no longer ultra vires. Thus,
‘there was nothing per se objectionable or inappropriate’ in the renewal option.936
Compensation awarded for the interference with legitimate expectations was limited.
In Stretch the ECtHR observed that the interference with the expectations of a lease
renewal was not equivalent to finding that the applicant ‘was deprived of the property
right which would have been bestowed by a further 21 years lease’.937 Given the
great lapse of time (21 years), the sums necessary for complete reparation were
uncertain and a just satisfaction was established on an equitable basis. 938 The
ECtHR reasoned that a proportionate response to the invalidity of the renewal option
would not have to be its enforcement in the original form. It could have taken the
form of an alternative benefit, compensation or a return of consideration. The Court
followed the latter option, taking as the basis the ground rent paid by the applicant
during the rent period. The applicant did not specify his expenses for erecting the
buildings on the land. He argued neither that he was unable to recoup his investment
through the rent already received nor that he was unable to make a significant profit.
As a result, the Court awarded the applicant the sum equal to the ground rent paid
during the lease and non-pecuniary damages for ‘frustration and not inconsiderable
inconvenience’.939
In Pressos the legislation changing the rules of State liability with regard to pending
claims was a deprivation of property by which the State ‘quite simply extinguished …
without compensation, claims for very high damages’.940 Explanations presented by
the State as to the grounds for adopting the legislation did not justify such
fundamental interference and did not preserve a fair balance between the interests
at stake.941 Although the damages for the accidents were established by national
courts, the apportionment of liability was not and, consequently, the ECtHR sent the
936 ibid 39-40.
937 ibid 50.
938 ibid 48.
939 ibid 50-51.
940 Pressos (n 898) 34, 39.
941 ibid 40-43. Similar conclusion was reached in Draon, where the ECtHR found that the
legislation extinguishing one of essential heads of damage put disproportionate burden
on the applicants. The compensation introduced by the new legislation was not
reasonably related to their loss and was not justified on the grounds given by the State.
The parties settled on the amount of compensation. (Draon (n 899) 82-85; Draon v
France, App no 1513/03 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 21 June 2006), para. 32).
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issue back to the national courts.942 In a single case dismissed by the national courts
on the basis of the new law943 the ECtHR made an equitable apportionment of
liability, awarding to the applicant 50% of the total amount of damages awarded by
the national court, including interest and non-pecuniary damages.944
4. Conclusions
Although the ECtHR’s approach to legitimate expectations is unsettled and lacks
coherence, it is clearly related to the question of invalidation of existing rights and
established claims. The ECtHR associates legitimate expectations with a situation in
which a claimant can have at least a legitimate expectation of effective enjoyment of
a property right and this expectation is eliminated by subsequent State conduct. The
ECtHR recognises two categories of such situations. First, when a person expects to
exercise an existing right but the legal basis of such expectation is retrospectively
invalidated. Secondly, when a person has a well-established pending court claim
against the State and the State extinguishes it through subsequent retrospective
legislation. Both situations are based on the claimant’s reasonable reliance on
relevant laws, case-law or State conduct existing at the time when the expectations
are formed.
The ECtHR refrains from referring to legitimate expectations when doing so could
suggest that the Court is creating a right that the applicant does not have, or that it is
allocating a right and stepping into the shoes of a competent national court.945 It
shows similar restraint when assessing the impact of State measures on legitimate
expectations, leaving them a broad margin of appreciation. It is the only legal system
of those analysed here that applies a specific standard of review, proportionality, to
balance the relevant private and public interests. However, it applies it in a lax
manner and reveals little detail of its methodology. The intensity of its review of the
State actions is low and the protection granted is equitable in character.
942 Pressos (n 898) 51; Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v Belgium (Article
50), App no 17849/91 (ECtHR, 3 July 1997), para. 10.
943 The damage arising from the accident was quantified in a national court’s judgment
but the courts dismissed the case concerning their apportionment after the new ECHR-
offending law came into force.
944 Pressos (n 1066) 20-21.
945 See Anheuser-Busch (n 886) and the restitution cases referred to in Sections C.2.a
and b.
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D. Concluding Remarks
Both EU law and ECtHR jurisprudence use references to legitimate expectations
originating in the European national legal systems. The EU Courts apply it to
interactions between traders and the EU institutions, i.e. to a dynamic supranational
legal order. The ECtHR uses it to monitor interpretation and application of a
particular international convention in multiple national legal orders. Nevertheless,
they both leave the respective institutions a broad margin of discretion in introducing
measures that impact on an individual’s legitimate expectations. They apply a low
level of review to the merits of the measures introduced by those institutions. As a
result, although the threshold of bringing a claim referring to legitimate expectations
is low, the threshold to succeed with such a claim is high. The EU Courts’ approach
is motivated by securing flexibility of reaction of the complex EU institutional
machinery to the dynamically changing economic realities, while the ECtHR is
motivated by non-interference with the policy decisions of its member States.946
How can the legal systems explored in this chapter contribute to the development of
the concept of legitimate expectations in ITL? EU law explains the argument that
legitimate expectations are related to transparency of the law at the time of
investment 947 by linking legitimate expectations with legal certainty. Recent ITA
awards taking a strong position that investors are not immune from regulatory
changes show that ITL develops along the lines similar to EU law. EU law may also
contribute to future developments by supplying methodology for dealing with legal
transitions. Moreover, like English law, it will be helpful in developing the concept of
legitimate expectations engendered by representations. Moreover, it may contribute
to the issue of ultra vires as well as to the balancing of private interests and the host
States’ discretionary powers.
The ECtHR jurisprudence also provides valuable explanations and suggestions for
ITL. It elucidates the question of interactions between ultra vires and legitimate
expectations, suggesting relevant factors and methodology. It elucidates the issues
concerning deference to State authority, both for the assessment whether the
claimant had expectations based on the state of the law at the time of investment
and for the assessment whether legitimate expectations are worthy of protection.
Also here it provides suggestions of relevant factors and methodologies for
946 This is particularly visible with regard to property restitution claims.
947 Schreuer (n 12) 374; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 133-134; Frontier Petroleum, para.
285.
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balancing between private and public interests. These themes will be explored in
Chapter 8. The next chapter, to which we now turn, discusses the concept of
legitimate expectations in general international law.
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Chapter 5 Legitimate Expectations and International Law
A. Introduction
International law did not develop a general and universally accepted theory or
doctrine of legitimate expectations and uses the concept in a number of contexts.
Müller’s 1971 monograph on the protection of legitimate expectations as an
organising principle of international law is an exception.948 He treated legitimate
expectations as legally relevant expectations arising from conclusive conduct of one
State as a result of reliance on that conduct by another State or States. Their legal
relevance is justified by the need for reliability and consistency in international
relations. 949 The theoretical underpinnings of the have also been addressed in
doctrinal discussions on the formation of CIL.
Brown argued that the concept of legitimate expectations has no equivalent in
international law. He understood legitimate expectations as pertaining to a legal
protection of an individual against the harm caused by a State resiling from its
previously stated position.950 This limitation of the concept of legitimate expectations
to relations between individuals and States essentially negates any role of the
concept in public international law. To the contrary, this chapter aims to show that
the concept of legitimate expectations is used in international law and can provide
lessons for ITL.
B. Normativity of Custom and Legitimate Expectations
In doctrinal discussions about CIL the concept of legitimate expectations provides an
alternative way of approaching the question of the normativity of international
custom.951 International custom consists of two elements: material and so-called
psychological, or subjective. The former comprises a State practice of specific
duration, consistency and generality. The latter reflects the State’s consent or intent
to be bound by such a practice or its articulation of such a practice as binding (opinio
juris). 952 International law theory seeks to identify a mechanism transforming
948 Müller (n 121) 1.
949 ibid 1.
950 Brown (n 5) 9. See also Zeyl (n 48) 208.
951 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute refers to ‘international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law’.
952 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument (Cambridge University Press 2006) 410; Crawford (n 58) 24-26.
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international usage into a binding custom. The articulation of such a mechanism is a
major theoretical issue.953
The concept of legitimate expectations is used as an objective element in an attempt
to answer the question ‘why does custom bind?’954 It reflects a rejection, or at least a
critique, of the subjective explanations of the binding nature of custom based on the
State’s will, belief or consent.955 The argument based on legitimate expectations is
that a State is bound by custom because other States have a legitimate expectation
that that State will continue in the conduct it has chosen and the other States can
rely on such continuation. The reliance and legitimate expectations of other States
therefore convert the State practice into a binding obligation. 956 The alternative
wording of Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute should therefore refer to international
custom as ‘[t]he practice of states as evidence of general consensus or expectations
accepted as law.’957
Different justifications are put forward to explain the basis on which the expectations
of other States should be taken into account in assessing the binding character of a
State practice.
Byers links legitimate expectations with an idea of shared understandings – a
collective knowledge of States represented by individuals acting on their behalf –
about what is legally relevant.958 Those shared understandings arise from States’
expectations as to the process of formation of CIL. If conditions are met for such
expectations to reflect a position that certain conduct gives rise to customary rules,
953 Thirlway HWA, International Customary Law and Codification: An Examination of the
Continuing Role of Custom in the Present Period of Codification of International Law (A
W Sijthoff 1972) 47. For an analysis of various approaches see e.g. Koskenniemi (n 952)
Chapter 6 and Mendelson (n 4) Chapter III.
954 Müller (n 121) 88; Brian D Lepard, Customary International Law: A New Theory with
Practical Applications (Cambridge University Press 2010) 119-120.
955 Koskenniemi (n 952) 398; Byers (n 4) 18-19, 108, 148; Müller (n 121) 78; Mendelson
(n 4) 189, 247, 285-292; International Law Association (ILA), Final Report of the
Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, London
Conference (2000), 9-10 <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/30)>
(accessed 16 April 2014). The analyses by Mendelson and ILA are related, since the
former was the Rapporteur in the work undertaken by the latter.
956 Koskenniemi (n 952) 413; Byers (n 4) 106-107; Mendelson (n 4) 185; Müller (n 121)
78, 81, 85; ILA (n 955) 8-10.
957 Oliver James Lissitzyn, International Law Today and Tomorrow (Oceana Publications
1965) 36 (emphasis added). Mendelson (n 4) 183-184.
958 Byers (n 4) 148.
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such expectations converge into legitimate expectations that in the future States will
behave consistently with their past conduct.959
Mendelson, on the other hand, views the concept of legitimate expectations as a
grundnorm, i.e. a basic meta-norm to which all norms of international law are
traceable.960 He proposes the basic norm of international law to be: ‘States should
comply with the legitimate expectations of the international community’.961 Along
similar lines Lepard argues that a State is compelled to fulfil the legitimate
expectations of other States created by its own conduct because it perceives doing
so as a moral or ethical imperative.962
For Müller, the normative relevance of expectations arises from the normative
stability of international law which ensures the ability of States to rely on the conduct
of other States. This stability is the defining element of the international community
as a community based on law.963
Expectations are linked to the social dimension of the international legal process that
gives rise to a binding custom. A major intellectual inspiration here was the work of
McDougal and his collaborators (the New Haven School). They viewed international
law as a ‘global process of authoritative decision’ in which legal process and social
process interact.964 It is a process of a continuous response and demand, of claims
that are made, accepted, rejected or countered by decision-makers on behalf of
States.965 Expectations reflect the questions of authority, namely who is competent to
959 ibid 106-107, 147-151.
960 The concept of grundnorm was developed by Hans Kelsen (see e.g. Principles of
International Law (Reinhart & Company Inc 2006) 314).
961 Mendelson (n 4) 183-184.
962 Lepard (n 954) 58, 75.
963 Müller (n 121) 78.
964 Oscar Schachter, ‘Towards a theory of international obligation’ in Schwebel SM (ed),
The effectiveness of international decisions: papers of a conference of the American
Society of International Law and the proceedings of the conference (Oceana Publications
1971) 15; Michael W Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, Andrew R Willard ‘The New Haven
School: A Brief Introduction’ (2007) 32 Yale J.Int’l L. 575.
965 Myres S McDougal, ‘Editorial Comment: The Hydrogen Bomb Test and the
International Law of the Sea’ (1995) 49 AJIL 356, 356-357; Venkata K Raman, ‘The Rȏle
of the International Court of Justice in the Development of International Customary Law’
(1965) 59 ASIL PROC. 169. Higgins’ conceptualisation of international law as a process
(see Chapter 1, Section C) is viewed as an application of the New Haven School’s
approach. (Byers (n 4) 207)
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make decisions and how. 966 They also reflect the international community’s
expectations about the requirements of future behaviour.967
Proponents of the concept of legitimate expectations conceptualise the process of
international law and the role of expectations in a similar way 968 and often
acknowledge similarities with the New Haven School.969 However, the latter was
criticised for imposing normative outcomes on the States by using pre-determined
higher values to override the choices made by the States. 970 By contrast, the
proponents of the concept of legitimate expectations emphasise their focus on the
process of international law and argue that the universal values and policies can be
determined by observation and interpretation of that process.971
The concept of legitimate expectations emphasises the social context of the
normative character of custom. It focuses on the reactions of the States who are
expectations-holders, their ability to rely on the conduct which engenders
expectations, and their ability to adjust their conduct respectively.972 The respect for
legitimate expectations of other States reflects the value attached by the State bound
by custom to its membership in the international community.973 The ability to rely on
the conduct of others to continue is essential for the normative stability of
international law.974
Legitimate expectations support an empirical or practical analysis of State
conduct.975 The situations in which the legitimate expectations are relevant for the
assessment of international custom cannot be defined in abstracto. They are too
varied to be distilled into a rule or a test.976 Only a case-by-case analysis of the
966 Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell, ‘The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order’, in: McDougal MS and associates (eds) Studies in world public
order (New Haven Press Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) 13-14.
967 Raman (n 965) 172; Lepard (n 954) 119-120.
968 ILA (n 955) 10; Lissitzyn (n 957) 35; Mendelson (n 4) 189-190; Byers (n 4) 8-9, 24-34,
147 (his approach stems from the international relations’ methodology).
969 Byers (n 4) 206-210; Mendelson (n 4) 179, 188, 189; Müller (n 121) 100-103; ILA (n
955) 10.
970 Raman (n 965) 170, 177; Byers (n 4) 208.
971 Byers (n 4) 209; Mendelson (n 4) 185; Müller (n 121) 86.
972 Byers (n 4) 106.
973 Lepard (n 954) 58.
974 Müller (n 121) 78.
975 ibid 77; Mendelson (n 4) 181, 185; Byers (n 4) Chapter 9.
976 Mendelson (n 4) 188, 189; ILA (n 955) 4, 9-10.
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interactions between States can address the question of what expectations are
legitimate and what legitimate expectations are worthy of protection. Such protection
can only be granted in those areas of international interactions that are legally
relevant.977 Claims that a given interest is worthy of protection must be weighed
against the interests of other subjects of international law and the interests of the
international community as a whole.978 Alternatively, an expectation that is worthy of
protection must represent a common interest of at least most States.979
This vagueness is the weakest point of the concept of legitimate expectations. It has
been criticised for providing no real answer to the question of normativity of
custom.980 It fails to answer the question about the circumstances in which legitimate
expectations would signal the existence of a binding customary rule. In search of an
answer it turns to an empirical analysis of what the States regard as law.981 In theory,
it offers the lens of legitimate expectations for this interpretative process. In practice,
the interpreter is advised to establish the parameters of that lens him or herself by
way of empirical case-by-case observations.982 In effect, the concept of legitimate
expectations gives no predictable guidance and is superfluous.983
Breadth is another weak point of the concept of legitimate expectations. They are
said to be the underlying idea behind all rules or broadly understood sources of
international law.984 This includes treaties, resolutions of the UN General Assembly
and unilateral acts of States such as estoppel or unilateral declarations.985 This
expands the vague and indeterminate concept of legitimate expectations onto
international law as a whole and risks diluting the concept even further. More
importantly, given its flexibility and lack of defined rules, the concept of legitimate
977 This distinguishes custom from mere comity. (Müller (n 121) 88; Byers (n 4) 149)
978 Müller (n 121) 89.
979 Byers (n 4) 163-165.
980 Koskenniemi (n 952) 330-333, 413-414; Lepard (n 954) 120.
981 Mendelson (n 4) 181; Byers (n 4) 107.
982 Müller (n 121) 86; Mendelson (n 4) 185.
983 Mendelson recognises this point and observes that the identification of an
independent normative element of custom is usually not necessary in practice.
(Mendelson (n 4) 186, 258-290) Byers tries to solve this problem by referring to ‘shared
understandings’ but they can also only be established on an empirical case-by-case
basis. (Byers (n 4) 147-151)
984 Mendelson (n 4) 186, 394; Byers (n 4) 107, Müller (n 121).
985 Mendelson (n 4) 185, 265-368; Byers (n 4) 107; Müller (n 121) Chapters A.1.I and 3,
B and C.
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expectations may allow treaty interpreters to abuse their mandate. We move now to
discussing this issue.
C. Legitimate Expectations and Treaty Interpretation
1. Theory
The concept of legitimate expectations is referred to in the context of treaty
interpretation. Here, it is used as a reaction to the shortcomings of the ‘objective’
approach to treaty interpretation, viewed as focusing too much on the treaty text. It is
also an alternative to the ‘subjective’ approach, criticised for its unrealistic search for
an empirically verifiable intention of the treaty party.986 The New Haven School also
employed its methodology in this context, pointing to the ‘genuine shared
expectations’ of the treaty parties’ as one of the goals of treaty interpretation.987
Müller argued that the principle of legitimate expectations supports treaty
interpretation that ‘balances in an optimal way the interests of specific treaty
parties’.988 It is not a set formula or an alternative to the general rule of interpretation
of Articles 31-33 of the VCLT. Rather, it is a lens through which this rule should be
applied.989
The principle of legitimate expectations is rooted in good faith which underlies the
interpretative process as a whole.990 It is a touchstone of honesty, or bona fides, in
international relations and is given effect through an interpretation which weighs the
interests of the parties to that treaty.991 The normative understanding of the treaty
provisions is aided by the basic standards applying to the conduct between States
and the diligence required from them in international relations.992 What matters here
986 Müller (n 121) 145-146; Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the
WTO: The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith, Interpretation and Fair
Dispute Settlement (Hart Publishing 2006) 43.
987 Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell, James C Miller, The Interpretation of
Arrangements and World Public Order. Principles of Content and Procedure (Yale
University Press 1967).
988 Müller (n 121) 146.
989 ibid 148, 153.
990 ibid 145-146, 151; Gardiner (n 221) 148.
991 Müller (n 121) 148.
992 ibid 152.
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is the trust, or confidence (Vertrauen), reasonably placed by the treaty parties in the
treaty text in light of this essentially ethical background.993
Interpretation guided by the principle of legitimate expectations emphasises the
context of the treaty. The interpreter is asked to look at the circumstances in which
the words were used by the parties and seek to achieve contextual justice.994 It is
relevant in what form the treaty was concluded, how diligently the treaty text was
prepared and how solemnly the treaty obligation was undertaken.995
The principle of legitimate expectations emphasises confidence in the States’ fidelity
to and responsibility for the word given.996 The party making the treaty stipulation
trusts in the expected effect of its undertaking and the other party reasonably trusts
in the meaning of the treaty stipulation. Attention to and protection of the confidence
of both treaty parties guides the interpreter towards the objective meaning of the
treaty stipulations.997
This manifests itself in the approach to the question of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the
words used.998 Protection of trust means that the ordinary meaning is not to be
understood as some ‘natural’ or ‘literal’ sense of these words. Rather, the interpreter
needs to investigate the meaning of the words to the parties of that treaty in light of
all the relevant circumstances.999 He is required to investigate the relative meaning of
the words used, i.e. their meaning in relation to the persons who used them and the
circumstances of their use.1000
Müller noted that application of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations
requires weighing of the State’s conduct against the ‘minimum requirements of the
orderly inter-State co-existence’. This is an aspirational standard for the non-
hierarchical and not highly integrated international community of States. However,
993 ibid 146.
994 Koskenniemi (n 952) 177 (criticising)
995 Müller (n 121) 147.
996 ibid 147, 149.
997 ibid 146, 148.
998 Article 31(1) of the VCLT reads: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ (emphasis added)
999 Müller (n 121) 146.
1000 ibid 149-150.
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assumption of the existence of certain socio-ethical principles of international
dealings legitimises the use of the principle of legitimate expectations.1001
The New Haven School also used the concept of legitimate expectations in treaty
interpretation. McDougal and his team constructed an elaborate interpretative
methodology. 1002 They viewed ‘a disciplined, responsible effort to ascertain the
genuine shared expectations of the particular parties to an agreement’ as one of the
goals of treaty interpretation.1003 This effort to ascertain expectations is subordinated
to the policy-oriented approach. This means that if the genuine shared expectations
are inconsistent with the ‘fundamental community policy’, they need to be overridden
by such policy.1004 Similarly to their general conceptualisation of international law
discussed in the previous section, this outcome-imposing approach was subject to
critique.1005
Both Müller’s and McDougal’s approaches were formulated at the time when the
general rule of interpretation in the VCLT was still in the course of development. To a
certain extent they were rooted in concerns that the VCLT would promote an overly
textual approach to treaty interpretation.1006 As a result, interpretation guided by the
concept of legitimate expectations sought support in a broader contextual analysis of
a treaty. This involved emphasising that the interpreter should not omit to look to the
broad scope of circumstances and to State conduct before and after the treaty was
concluded, since these elements might be important for the interpretation of the
parties’ expectations.1007
Expectations-based approaches to treaty interpretation are not expressly recognised
in the VCLT. However, one leading commentator observes that an account of the
expectations of treaty parties is axiomatic in the general rule of interpretation of the
1001 ibid 153.
1002 McDougal, Lasswell and Miller (n 987).
1003 ibid 40.
1004 ibid 41.
1005 The critics pointed out that this method of interpretation prescribes specific policy
goals (Orakhelashvili (n 24) 309), that it fails to resolve the problem of acute
indeterminacy of treaty provisions (Falk (n 221) 347), introduces redundant elements to
treaty interpretation (Orakhelashvili (ibid) 313); refers to impossibly vague values
(Koskenniemi (n 952) 206-207) and is impractical to apply in real life (Gardiner (n 221)
68).
1006 Gardiner (n 221) 303; Müller (n 121) 124.
1007 Gardiner (n 221) 302-303; Müller (n 121) 132.
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VCLT.1008 Moreover, practical application of this rule has shown sufficient flexibility in
incorporating material relevant for the determination of the shared expectations of
the parties1009, even though the more detailed theoretical approaches have generally
not been followed. Despite this fact, the concept of legitimate expectations has
created problems in the process of treaty interpretation in international economic
law. This occurred in the context of GATT and the WTO, an area of relevance for the
practice of ITL, to which we now turn.
2. Practice: GATT/WTO Concept of Legitimate Expectations
In the practice of interpretation of GATT and the WTO Agreements1010 the concept of
legitimate expectations is a judge-made principle.1011 It first arose in the context of
the so-called non-violation cases under GATT 1947. Its dispute settlement bodies
accorded protection against breaches of agreed tariff concessions, occurring through
measures nominally consistent with the GATT 1947 but neutralising the effects of the
agreed tariffs.1012 The method to circumvent the agreement in such a way was
usually through subsidies.1013 Because of the low density of the international trade
rules at the time, such undermining of an international agreement was theoretically
possible. The panels dealt with this problem in an essentially equitable way, by
developing the concept of ‘reasonable expectations’1014 or a ‘principle of protecting
legitimate expectations’.1015 It was to ensure that
the level of negotiated reductions of tariff barriers is not offset by
actions consistent with positive rights and obligations, but
1008 Gardiner (n 221) 67.
1009 ibid 302-303.
1010 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of 15 April 1994 with
Annexes.
1011 Panizzon (n 986) 129; Orakhelashvili (n 24) 280; Adrian TL Chua, ‘Reasonable
Expectations and Non-Violation Complaints in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (1998) 32
J.W.T. 27, 28.
1012 PJ Kuyper, ‘The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law’ (1994) 25
NYIL 227, 245-246.
1013 European Economic Community — Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Report of the Panel of 14
December 1989 adopted on 25 January 1990 (L/6627/ - 37S/86) (EEC — Oilseeds),
paras 144-148; The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Report of the Working
Party of 31 March 1950 Adopted by the Contracting Parties on 3 April 1950
(GATT/CP.4/39) II/188 (Australian Subsidy).
1014 Kuyper (n 1012) 246.
1015 Panizzon (n 986) 128.
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inconsistent with the overall level of multilaterally negotiated
liberalization commitments.1016
Despite the significant thickening of the web of international regulation under the
WTO umbrella, the principle of legitimate expectations did not lose its relevance to
Article XXIII (Nullification of Impairment) of the GATT 1994.1017 However, its use
created controversies in practice.
The rationale for the protection of expectations was to protect the reciprocity of tariff
concessions. It was assumed that a GATT participant agrees a tariff concession with
another participant in the expectation that the latter will not systematically offset the
price effects of such concessions. If such expectations had not been protected,
States would have been reluctant to make any tariff concessions.1018 The concept of
legitimate expectations does not protect any specific trade flows. It targets the
competitive relationship between imported and domestic goods arising from
negotiated tariff concessions. 1019 This mechanism assumes that the source of
expectations lies in tariff concessions1020, that the offsetting measure could not have
been reasonably foreseen at the time the concessions were negotiated1021, and that
the non-violation measures do not systematically offset 1022 , reduce or nullify its
value.1023
The mechanism of non-violation complaints and the related concept of legitimate
expectations have been criticised as a ‘legal phantasy’ which could lead to
1016 ibid.
1017 Panizzon (n 986) 129; Kuyper (n 1012) 249. A similar principle was introduced in
Article VI:5(a)(ii) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Panizzon (ibid)
138-141, 157).
1018 EEC – Oilseeds (n 1013) para. 148. The concept of protection of legitimate
expectations is similar here to that applicable to signed but not ratified treaties, discussed
in Section C below.
1019 ibid paras. 147-148. The principle of protection of legitimate expectations also
applies to Article III of GATT 1994 (Panizzon (n 986) 133-135).
1020 Sung-joon Cho, ‘GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the
Achilles’ Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process?’ (1998) 39 Harv.Int'l L.J. 311, 317;
Panizzon (n 986) 150.
1021 Australian Subsidy (n 1013) para. 12; EEC – Oilseeds (n 1013) para. 148; Chua (n
1011) 41; Thomas Cottier, Krista N Schefer, ‘Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate
Expectations in the WTO’ in Bronckers M, Quick R (eds), New Directions in International
Economic Law. Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (Kluwer Law International 2000)
60.
1022 EEC – Oilseeds (n 1013) para. 148.
1023 Kuyper (n 1012) 247; Cho (n 1020) 317; Panizzon (n 986) 142; Chua (n 1011) 47-48.
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abuses.1024 Its original rationale should have led to its diminishing importance as
international trade regulations became denser. 1025 However, the concept was
‘hijacked’ by the WTO members.1026 In EC – Citrus the traditional approach was
extended when the panel decoupled the expectations from tariff concessions. It
introduced an open-ended concept of the ‘balance of rights and obligations’ that
could be upset by measures which did not violate the GATT.1027 Although the panel
report was blocked, the case showed the potential for extension of the non-violation
mechanism. 1028 In Korea – Procurement the panel dangerously extended the
concept to the benefits arising from the process of treaty negotiations.1029 The case
encouraged claims involving ‘legally unreasonable but politically important
expectations’ which did not refer to any specific treaty concessions under the WTO
Agreements but to general policy obligations.1030 This approach resembled the trend
in ITA to treat policy goals of IIAs concerning e.g. stability or cooperation as a source
of treaty obligations.1031
The proponents of these developments argued that non-violation complaints could
reach beyond tariff concessions. The concept protects benefits accruing under the
GATT from being nullified or impaired and these benefits are not limited to tariff
concessions. Nullification or impairment of such broadly understood benefits also
frustrates reasonable expectations of the complainant. 1032 This allows for the
recognition of a multitude of ‘benefits’ that are ‘reasonably expected’ from the GATT
and thus should be protected. Chua suggested that such extended reasonable
1024 Pierre Pescatore, ‘The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism – Its Present Situation
and Its Prospects’ (1993) 27 J.W.T. 5, 19.
1025 Kuyper (n 1012) 247; Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, ‘“Good faith” in the WTO
Jurisprudence: Necessary Balancing Element or an Open Door to Judicial Activism?’
(2005) 8 J Intl Econ L 721, 752.
1026 Cho (n 1020) 319; Panizzon (n 986) 142.
1027 European Community – Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain
Countries in the Mediterranean Region, Report of the Panel of 7 February 1985
(unadopted) (L/5776), para. 4.37.
1028 Kuyper (n 1012) 249.
1029 Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, Report of the Panel of 1 May
2000 (WT/DS163/R), paras. 7.84-8.2; Panizzon (n 986) 142, 151. The report was not
appealed but it raised ‘serious concerns’. The approach was ‘overbroad from all points of
view’ and, if followed, ‘would be an enormous broadening of the non-violation concept’
(Zeitler (n 1025) 740, 751, 752).
1030 Panizzon (n 986) 152-153.
1031 Douglas (n 192) 83-84.
1032 Chua (n 1011) 39-40.
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expectations can follow from: the GATT provisions which ‘protect different types of
expectations’1033; its preambular pronouncements1034 ; and the representations of the
treaty party not reflected in any binding instrument, such as assurances and
statements made in negotiations, conduct of the parties (including silence or
omissions) and government policies.1035
Under this understanding the concept of legitimate expectations ‘protects the validity
of assumptions on which governments act’.1036 Going even further, Cottier & Schafer
argued that the concept of legitimate expectations protects:
subjective beliefs of others, so long as those subjective beliefs, or
expectations, can be logically deduced from the state’s prior
actions or inactions.1037
Like Chua, they recognised that a State’s reliance on actions or words of the other
party as a crucial element of the concept. They expanded it by insisting that the
expectation that the other party will behave in a certain way is based on ‘the
receiver’s view of the agreement’.1038 They argued that the concept applies also to
violation complaints and requires ‘looking at rights and obligations from the point of
view of the entitled party’.1039
This approach dovetailed with the jurisprudence of WTO panels. They have
attempted to expand the concept of protection of legitimate expectations to very
broad and general values such as ‘predictability to plan future trade’ or ‘security and
predictability in the multilateral trading system’.1040 These broad formulations are
similar to the tendency to protect ‘legitimate expectations of stable and predictable
investment environment’ in investment treaty disputes, concentrating on the needs of
investors as beneficiaries of IIAs.1041
1033 ibid 30.
1034 Chua (n 1011) 28, 31-32; Zeitler (n 1025) 728.
1035 Chua (n 1011) 32-34.
1036 ibid 31 (emphasis added).
1037 Cottier & Schefer (n 1021) 30 (emphasis added).
1038 ibid 53. Despite referring to Müller (n 121), Cottier & Schefer’s approach is different,
as it looks subjectively at the claimant’s beliefs. They were inspired by the civil law rules
of contract interpretation. However, Müller, who also referred to these rules, was careful
to formulate the principle of legitimate expectations as an objective one.
1039 Cottier & Schefer (n 1021) 58 (emphasis added).
1040 Panizzon (n 986) 195.
1041 See Chapter 7, Section C.1.
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This expansionary trend culminated in the EC – Computer Equipment1042 and India –
Patents cases.1043 The panels in those cases attempted to extend the concept of
protection of legitimate expectations to violation complaints.1044 They found that the
expectations of the treaty party must be taken into account in the process of
interpreting the relevant WTO Agreement. In India-Patents the panel found that in
the process of interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement1045 it must take into account
the legitimate expectations of WTO members concerning that agreement.1046 The EC
– Computer Equipment panel similarly stated that good faith treaty interpretation
requires interpretation in light of the ‘legitimate expectations’ of an exporting member
state.1047
This trend was halted by the WTO Appellate Body (‘AB’). It criticised the panels for
misusing the VCLT rule of interpretation, 1048 and specifically for their use of
expectations in treaty interpretation.1049 The AB observed that taking into account the
subjective expectations of only one party to the treaty is not consistent with the
general rule of good faith interpretation of treaties.1050 Article 31 of the VCLT aims at
ascertaining common intentions of the parties1051 and any legitimate expectations of
the treaty parties have to be reflected in the language of the treaty itself.1052 The AB
opposed the resort to legitimate expectations as an escape from the process of
treaty interpretation, finding that the EC – Computer Equipment panel failed to
examine the context and the object and purpose of the relevant treaty provisions in
accordance with the VCLT.1053
1042 European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
Report of the Appellate Body of 5 June 1998 (WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R,
WT/DS68/AB/R) (EC – Computer Equipment).
1043 India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
Report of the Appellate Body of 19 December 1997 (WT/DS50/AB/R) (India – Patents).
1044 Panizzon (n 986) 159.
1045 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C to
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of 15 April 1994.
1046 India – Patents, para. 7.22.
1047 EC – Computer Equipment, para. 79.
1048 Panizzon (n 986) 176.
1049 India – Patents (n 1043) para. 48; EC – Computer Equipment (n 1042) para. 83.
1050 EC – Computer Equipment, para. 83; see also India – Patents, para. 48.
1051 EC – Computer Equipment, paras. 81, 83; Cottier & Schefer (n 1021) 61-62.
1052 EC – Computer Equipment, para. 83; India – Patents (n 1043) para. 45
1053 EC – Computer Equipment, para. 89.
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The AB rejected the approach to treaty interpretation based on ‘subjectivism and
autointepretation’ by one treaty party.1054 It observed that taking into account the
subjective views of one treaty party about the content of the agreement reached
during treaty negotiations would seriously undermine the security and predictability
of the treaty arrangements.1055 It would limit the ability of a treaty party to rely on an
objectively identifiable content of its treaty obligations.1056
The trend the AB reacted to pursued a concept of legitimate expectations which had
little or nothing to do with treaty interpretation. It gave extra-textual elements more
weight than the treaty text. It used preambular pronouncements to create new
obligations informed by general policy objectives of the WTO Agreements. It relied
on the perspective of the claimant rather than the perspective of the treaty parties.
This may have been either an overenthusiastic embrace of Müller’s interpretative
technique or evidence that his approach to treaty interpretation, especially the
reliance on extra-textual contextual circumstances, is not manageable in practice
because it is too prone to abuse. The above AB’s decisions were systemic policy
decisions1057, aiming to avoid perceptions that WTO dispute settlement bodies are
stepping ‘into the legislator’s realm’. 1058 Although such an excess is expressly
prohibited under the DSU1059, such a limitation is also implied in the role of all
international courts and tribunals and is thus relevant for investment tribunals.1060
One lesson from the WTO experience is that expectations considered in treaty
interpretation are only expectations of both treaty parties.1061 Secondly, the WTO
experience shows that absent a body with functions comparable to the AB, ITL relies
on investment tribunals to self-monitor against potential perceptions of an abusive
use of the concept of legitimate expectations. If investment tribunals show less
1054 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 316.
1055 EC – Computer Equipment, para. 82.
1056 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 316.
1057 Zeitler (n 1025) 744, 754-755, 756.
1058 Panizzon (n 986) 179; Zeitler (n 1025) 752.
1059 The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) expressly provides in Article 3.2 that
the WTO dispute settlement bodies cannot ‘add or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.’
1060 See Chapter 1, Section D and Chapter 2, Section C.
1061 See also AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v The Republic of
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Expert Report of Professor Piet Eeckhout of 30
October 2008 (quoted in AES Summit, para. 28): ‘[t]he intentions of a single contracting
party to a treaty, not expressed in the text of that treaty, are not relevant to its
interpretation.’
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restraint than the AB, the debate about the limits of their mandates will move into the
broader process-legitimacy.1062
D. Unilateral Declarations, Estoppel and Pre-Ratification Obligations
The concept of legitimate expectations provides a normative justification for the
legally binding character of all rules or institutions of international law.1063 These
include the sources listed in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute as well as other forms of
State conduct producing legal consequences.1064 This section concerns three types
of such conduct: unilateral acts of States (estoppel and unilateral declarations) and
the provisional application of treaties. They concern situations when an objectively
analysed conduct of a State brings about some legally relevant consequences. State
conduct in these situations may be viewed as having a ‘self-binding’ effect. 1065
However, these situations do not provide mechanical tests of ‘application’ of the
concept of legitimate expectations leading to some predictable outcomes. They all
require careful analysis of all relevant circumstances and are rooted in good faith.
The rationale for using legitimate expectations as an explanation of the legally
binding character of the State conduct described below is parallel to the one
regarding custom. States expect other States to behave in certain ways as a result of
their earlier behaviour. They are justified, in the context of a particular type of
conduct, to rely that such conduct will indeed take place in the future.1066 As a result,
a conduct that is different from expected may bring legal consequences for the State
frustrating such expectations.
1. Unilateral declarations
Unilateral declarations provide the first example of a unilateral State act that can
produce legal consequences in international law. They concern ‘declarations publicly
made and manifesting the will to be bound’.1067 In the Nuclear Tests cases1068, the
1062 See Chapter 2, Section B.
1063 See section A.
1064 Mendelson (n 4) 365-366.
1065 Müller (n 121) 81; Lepard (n 954) 58, 75.
1066 Byers (n 4) 107; Mendelson (n 4) 184-185.
1067 International Law Commission (ILC), Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral
Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, with Commentaries
Thereto (2006), para. 1
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_9_2006.pdf> (accessed
16 April 2014).
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ICJ found that a series of official public statements by various State representatives
expressed the French Government’s unqualified intention to cease all atmospheric
nuclear testing in the future.1069 The form, content, chronology, timing and context of
these statements were crucial for this finding. The case gave rise to the ILC’s work
on unilateral declarations.1070
To have legal consequences a unilateral declaration has to be specific and may
concern legal and factual situations.1071 It expresses the State’s clear and unqualified
intention to be bound1072, has to be made publicly1073 and does not require any
reaction or a quid pro quo from another State or States.1074 If such a declaration is
found to exist, the State who has made it may be legally required to follow the course
of conduct consistent with its declaration and not to revoke its declaration
arbitrarily.1075
Unilateral declarations have no pre-determined ‘form’ and their finding is based on a
case-by-case assessment of the text of the State’s declarations, their context and all
other relevant circumstances.1076 Not all unilateral acts are unilateral declarations
and in case of doubt a restrictive interpretation is called for.1077
The general rationale for ascribing legal consequences to unilateral declarations
arises from good faith. 1078 However, the normative cause for such legal
consequences may be rooted in the State’s intention to be bound as well as in the
1068 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) Judgement of 20 December 1974, I.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 253.
1069 Nuclear Tests Case (ibid) paras. 20, 31-41, 49-52.
1070 See the analytical guide to the work of the ILC <http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_9.htm>
(accessed 16 April 2014), culminating in the Guiding Principles (n 1067).
1071 Nuclear Tests Case (n 1068) para. 50; Guiding Principles (n 1067) para. 7.
1072 Guiding Principles (n 1067) para. 9.
1073 In the Nuclear Tests Case ((n 1068) para 50) these were official communiques,
statements as well as media interviews and press conferences made ‘publicly and erga
omnes’.
1074 One of the differences between estoppel and unilateral declaration is that the latter
does not require detrimental reliance. (Byers (n 4) 107) However, reactions to a unilateral
act may be relevant for the assessment of their legal significance. (Guiding Principles (n
1067) para. 3) The main characteristic of a unilateral declaration appears to be intent to
be bound. (Guiding Principles (n 1067) Preamble)
1075 Guiding Principles (n 1067) para 9.
1076 Nuclear Tests Case (n 1068) para. 46; Mendelson (n 4) 367; Guiding Principles (n
1067) para. 7.
1077 Nuclear Tests Case (ibid) paras. 43-44; Guiding Principles (n 1067) para. 7.
1078 Nuclear Tests Case (ibid) para. 46; Guiding Principles (n 1067) para 1.
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expectations of other States engendered by the declaration. Their relevance will
depend on the circumstances of a particular case.1079 In the Nuclear Tests case the
ICJ pointed to the ‘trust and confidence ... inherent in international co-operation’ and
to the increasing essential importance of such co-operation to international relations.
Respect for good faith allows States to ‘take cognizance of unilateral declarations
and place confidence in them’ and entitles them to ‘require that the obligation thus
created is respected’.1080
2. Estoppel
Estoppel provides another example of a situation where a unilateral conduct of a
State can create legal consequences. Here, too legitimate expectations are identified
as a rationale for attaching legal consequences to the State conduct.1081
Estoppel originates from common law. Its scope is broader than that of unilateral
declarations 1082 and its characteristics have been authoritatively elucidated by
Bowett.1083 Like unilateral declarations, estoppel involves a voluntary, unconditional,
clear and unambiguous statement by an authorised State representative. It differs
from unilateral declarations in two important ways. First it concerns only facts and
not law.1084 Secondly, the addressee of the State conduct must have relied on it in
good faith either to its detriment or to the advantage of the party making the
representation.
As in the case of unilateral declarations, ascertaining the existence of an estoppel
requires interpretation of State conduct in its context, in consideration of all the
circumstances of the case.1085 However, intention to be bound is not a prominent
1079 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Second
Session (2000), Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly During its Fifty-Fifth Session Prepared by the Secretariat (2000)
U.N.Y.B.I.L.C. Vol. II(2), para. 258; Guiding Principles (n 1067) preamble (‘it is often
difficult to establish’ which of the two should be the reason for protection).
1080 Nuclear Tests Case (n 1068) para. 46. See also Robert Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources
of International Law (With Special Reference to Good Faith)’ (2006) 53 NILR 1, 10.
1081 Byers (n 4) 11, 107; James Cameron, Kevin R Gray, ‘Principles of international law
in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 248,260; Müller (n 121) 9-10.
1082 Crawford (n 58) 421.
1083 DW Bowett, ‘Estoppel before International Tribunals and Its Relation to
Acquiescence’ (1957) 33 B.Y.B.I.L. 176, 188-194.
1084 Mendelson (n 4) 366 (but observes that this requirement is ‘not entirely clear’).
1085 Bowett (n 1083) 189-190.
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feature of estoppel.1086 As a result, reliance and the related expectations play a more
prominent role in assessing the consequences of the State conduct than with regard
to unilateral declarations.1087
The legal consequence of estoppel is binding preclusion. The State whose conduct
was found to constitute an estoppel is estopped (prohibited) from denying the ‘truth’
of its representation.1088 Although estoppel does not create a ‘right’, it is nevertheless
of great practical or evidentiary importance.1089 Its legal consequences are rooted in
good faith. Estoppel is identified when an inconsistent conduct of a State causes
determent or prejudice to another State who has relied on that conduct. 1090
Detrimental reliance may prove that the other State have relied on, or acted in
confidence in, the conduct of the State and its future consequences.1091 In other
words, it may identify legitimate expectations that need to be protected.
However, undue focus on detrimental reliance may be misleading. It may
overshadow the assessment of the State conduct capable of giving rise to estoppel.
The form, context and circumstances of that conduct are equally important for the
finding of estoppel and its legal consequences. Commentators point out that in the
common law estoppel is resorted to ‘with great caution’ and treated as a principle of
‘equity and justice’.1092
3. Provisional Application of Treaties
A more specific example of the operation of the concept of legitimate expectations is
provided by so-called provisional application of treaties. Article 18 of the VLCT
provides that a State should refrain from acts defeating the object and purpose of a
treaty with regard to which that State took specific steps leading to its ratification,
acceptance, approval or entry into force.1093
1086 Crawford (n 58) 421.
1087 Müller (n 121) 22.
1088 Crawford (n 58) 420; Bowett (n 1083) 188.
1089 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 518.
1090 Bowett (n 1083) 186; Crawford (n 58) 420; Müller (n 121) 10.
1091 Byers (n 4) 107; Müller (n 121) 10-11.
1092 Crawford (n 58) 421; Shaw (n 1089) 515.
1093 Signed the treaty, exchanged instruments constituting a treaty subject to ratification
or expressed consent to be bound by a treaty and its entry into force is pending.
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In other words, a State that is in the process of acceding to a treaty may not act in a
way defeating the treaty’s object and purpose, even though it is not yet formally
bound by its terms. This obligation is rooted in good faith.1094 Its rationale is linked
with the concept of legitimate expectations. 1095 Article 18 protects ‘legitimate
expectations of other participants in the treaty-making process that a State which
has expressed its acceptance of the treaty, albeit not in binding form, would not work
against the object of its acceptance.’1096 These expectations arise from the fact that
the State has entered into a multi-step process which has not yet been completed or
aborted. 1097 Such expectations should be protected because, as observed by
Lauterpacht, a treaty is a result of ‘a painfully achieved compromise’ and States may
be compelled to agree to it because other States did. If no legal obligation is
attached to the signature
the concessions made by other signatories will have been made in
vain seeing that the consideration which they could legitimetely [sic]
expect will not be forthcoming.1098
These expectations reflect general expectations of all States-signatories to a given
treaty, not specific expectations of a particular State.1099
This situation resembles the reciprocity-based rationale supporting the concept of
legitimate expectations in the context of GATT/WTO. Moreover, it refers to a
formalised context of treaty-making. This makes it easier to assess the predictable
internationally acceptable conduct of a State that has taken concrete steps on its
path to be bound by a treaty. Finally, the legal consequences attached to the taking
of those steps are not inflexible. A State is not bound if it makes it clear that it does
1094 Harvard Law School Research in International Law Codification of International Law,
Part III: Law of Treaties, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1939) 29 AJILS 657,
Article 9; Paul V McDade, ‘The Interim Obligation Between Signature and Ratification of
the Treaty’ (1985) 32 NYIL 5, 21.
1095 Mendelson (n 4) 394; McDade (n 1094) 21; T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council
of the European Union [1997] ECR II-39, paras. 78, 84-85.
1096 Oliver Dörr, Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
a commentary (Springer 2012) 220.
1097 ibid 227. See also: Mark E Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 247.
1098 International Law Commission, Law of Treaties, Report by Mr. H. Lauterpacht,
Special Rapporteur, 24 March 1953, Doc. A/CN.4/63. in Documents of the fifth session
including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly (1953) U.N.Y.B.I.L.C.
Vol. II (A/CN. 4/8ER. A/1953/Add. 1) 109-110 (emphasis added). See also Harvard Law
School Research in International Law Codification of International Law, Part III: Law of
Treaties, Text with Comment (1939) 29 AJILS 666, 780-781.
1099 McDade (n 1094) 27.
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not intend to be bound by the treaty1100 or when the treaty did not enter into force
without ‘undue delay’.1101
E. Conclusions
Although the concept of legitimate expectations is not universally applied in
international law, it constitutes an important undercurrent of the theory of
international law. It arises from the understanding of the process of international law
as a social interaction, where a conduct of a State causes reaction of another State
or States. It attaches value to the ability of States to co-operate with other States and
their ability to rely on their actions expecting certain conduct, or legal consequences,
to follow. It sees trust or confidence in international legal relations as value to be
considered in the assessment of the legal consequences of State actions. In effect,
this represents the very idea of law and may be viewed as too broad to contribute to
the persuasiveness of any arguments based on legitimate expectations.
However, the concept has certain lessons for ITL. The concept of legitimate
expectations is a very flexible instrument. It needs to be handled with caution to
prevent its abuse to favour the party who claims to have some legitimate
expectations. The concept is prone to circularity. Stating that a State is able to
expect certain conduct of another State because it is accepted that such conduct will
be forthcoming does not answer the question why such acceptance exists, how it
can be identified and why it should be considered legally relevant. Similarly, an
enquiry following only legitimate expectations of one party and ignoring the conduct
on which it relied, its context and all the relevant circumstances, allows the concept
of legitimate expectations to overwhelm the analytical process. As a result, it risks
skewing the analysis in favour of one party.
To be free from suspicion of abuse, the concept of legitimate expectations needs
clear formulation of what is expected, as shown by the original idea behind the
concept of reasonable expectations under GATT or Article 18 of the VCLT. Absent
such clear indication the decision-makers risk converting general policy goals into
expectations. References to expectations then become speculative and start serving
the political interest of one party. To avoid this situation references to expectations
need to be based on a thorough analysis of the conduct of the State whose actions
give rise to the expectations, its context and circumstances. The expectations of
1100 Article 18(a) of the VCLT.
1101 Article 18(b) of the VCLT.
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another State need to be balanced with the interest of the State whose conduct is
the alleged source of expectations and the interests of international community. The
concept of legitimate expectations can only be used as one of the many factors in
the analysis of the legal consequences of State actions, representing the social and
equitable dimension of that assessment. Most of all, the decision-makers need to
exercise self-restraint in order to apply the concept in an acceptable way.
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Chapter 6 The Origins and Development of Legitimate
Expectations in International Investment Law: Indirect
Expropriation
A. Introduction
References to legitimate expectations in ITA/ITL are predominantly associated with
the FET standard. Some tribunals and commentators view legitimate expectations as
the core element of this standard1102 or even perceive protection, or effectuation, of
legitimate expectations as its main goal. 1103 However, references to legitimate
expectations are made also in relation to indirect expropriation. These are less
frequent but no less important. Early references to ‘investment-backed expectations’
and ‘legitimate expectations’ in ITA/ITL practice and scholarly writings were linked
with concerns about the way in which first investment tribunals applied the indirect
expropriation standard. Exploration of these references allows for a better
understanding of the more recent uses of the concept of legitimate expectations. It
also clarifies why it is incorrect to associate ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit of property’ with the concept of legitimate expectations. Compared with
current practice, this historical background highlights that the use of the concept of
legitimate expectations under the indirect expropriation standard is essentially the
same as under the FET standard. This suggests existence of an overarching notion
of legitimate expectations spanning both treatment standards that deal with
regulatory risk. As a result, any conclusions from the present comparative analysis
will be applicable to both standards. This is all the more important because, as
shown below, a growing number of IIAs refer to ‘investment-backed expectations’ as
one of the factors relevant for the assessment of indirect expropriation.
1102 Saluka, para. 302 (‘dominant element’ of the FET standard); El Paso, paras. 339,
348 (‘basic touchstone’ of FET); Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award of 18 August 2008 [Duke], para. 340
(‘important element’); EDF v Romania, para. 216; Alvik (n 2) 193-197.
1103 Arif H Ali, Kassi Tallent, ‘The Effects of BITs on the International Body of Investment
Law: The Significance of Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions’ in Rogers CA and
Alford RP (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009)
202, 214, 215, 221; Electrabel, para. 7.75; Generation Ukraine, Inc. v Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16 September 2003 [Generation Ukraine], para. 20.37;
Impregilo, para. 285; Rumeli, para. 609; Alpha, para. 420.
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B. ‘Metalclad Definition’ and the Meaning of ‘Reasonably-to-Be-Expected
Economic Benefit of Property’
The first reference to expectations in the context of investment treaty protection
against regulatory risk was made by a NAFTA tribunal in Metalclad in an attempt to
define indirect expropriation. The case concerned a US investment in a landfill in
Mexico. Its operation was ‘barred forever’ by administrative actions of local
authorities and a legislation declaring the landfill’s site an ecological reserve.1104
Applying NAFTA Article 1110 which mentions indirect expropriation but does not
define it, the Metalclad tribunal described expropriation as including
not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property (…)
but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of
the host State.1105
The Metalclad tribunal was the first investment treaty tribunal to find expropriation
and the first whose award was later partially annulled.1106 The annulment decision
described the above definition as ‘extremely broad’ and capable of including as
expropriatory legitimate rezoning of property by State authorities.1107 The ‘Metalclad
definition’ found itself at the centre of the debate criticising the early ITA awards for
approaching the vague IIA standards too broadly.1108
The ‘Metalclad definition’ and the reaction it provoked have two implications for our
analysis. First, the meaning of ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property’ provides an important context to subsequent references to ‘legitimate
expectations’. This issue is addressed in this section. Secondly, the critical response
to Metalclad brought about references to expectations by ITA tribunals,
commentators and IIAs that are at the core of our analysis. In search for ways to
1104 Metalclad, paras. 106, 109.
1105 ibid, para. 103.
1106 The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664, Reasons for
Judgement of 2 May 2001.
1107 ibid, para. 99.
1108 Gonzalo Guzman-Carrasco, ‘“Indirect Expropriation” in US Free Trade Agreements:
The US Trade Act of 2002 and Beyond’ (2004) 4 International Law: Revista Colombiana
de Derecho Internacional 273, 284; Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ‘Carlos Calvo, Honorary
NAFTA Citizen’ (2002) 11 N.Y.U.Envtl.L.J. 19, 28; Vicky Been, Joel C Beauvais, ‘The
Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for
an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine’ (2003) 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30.
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constrain the broad approach taken by investment tribunals, the critics looked into
other legal systems. This brought about references to concepts referring to
expectations. These issues are addressed in the following two sections.
Let us turn first to the meaning of ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property’. The Metalclad award does not explain how the tribunal arrived at its
definition of indirect expropriation and how it should be applied. Because the tribunal
found that the landfill investment was ‘completely lost’1109 it did not need to apply its
own definition and verify whether less than a total loss of investment could amount to
an expropriation. The ‘Metalclad definition’ suggests that a reduction of profits or
returns expected from a foreign investment is sufficient for a finding of indirect
expropriation. This would mean that indirect expropriation requires lesser
interference with an investment than direct expropriation.1110 This lowering of the
threshold for indirect expropriation was, unsurprisingly, embraced by investors, who
argued in subsequent disputes that host State’s measures merely diminishing
expected economic benefits of their investments constituted compensable indirect
expropriation.1111
The ‘reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of property’ can be understood in
two ways. First, as a property protected against expropriation and, secondly, as an
economic benefit, e.g. an income stream, expected from that property. In the latter
case the ‘Metalclad definition’ would be redirecting the expropriation enquiry from
1109 Metalclad, para. 113.
1110 Stern (n 13) 39; Michael W Reisman, Rocío Digón, ‘Eclipse of Expropriation?’ in
Arthur Rovine (ed), CIAM: The Fordham Papers, Vol. 2 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2009) 31; Matthew C Porterfield, ‘International Expropriation Rules and Federalism’
(2004) 23 Stan. Envtl. L.J 3, 58-59; Matthew C Porterfield, ‘State Practice and the
(Purported) Obligation under Customary International Law to Provide Compensation for
Regulatory Expropriations’ (2011) 37 N.C.J.Int'l L.& Com.Reg. 159,168, 171.
1111 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v The
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award of 26 September 2007
[ADM], paras. 230-232, 246; Corn Products International, Inc. v The United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility of 15 January 2008,
para. 83; EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN
3481, Award of 3 February 2006 [EnCana], para. 177; Paushok S, CJSC Golden East
Company, CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL,
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 28 April 2011 [Paushok], para. 332; Waste
Management, Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Final Award
of 30 April 2004, paras. 141, 159; Methanex Corporation v United States of America
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits of 3 August
2005 [Methanex], Part IV Chapter D, paras. 4-5; Merrill, paras. 140, 148-149; Generation
Ukraine, para. 20.27; Ulysseas, para. 180; LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp.,
LG&E International Inc. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on
Liability of 3 October 2006 [LG&E], para. 198; Metalpar, paras. 166-171.
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interference with property rights to an economic impact on their exercise.
Consequently, a diminution of expected economic benefits (e.g. streams of income)
from the investment could be expropriatory. How did subsequent tribunals react to
arguments based on these alternatives?
Faced with the first alternative, the tribunals rejected arguments that expectations of
economic benefit from an investment are a property right per se protected from
expropriation. They found that the profit-generating capacity of an investment does
not constitute an investment. It may, however, be its accessory element relevant at
the valuation stage. 1112 This position is in line with the tribunals’ approach that
expropriation must affect investment as a whole and therefore does not allow for
‘conceptual severance’ of an investment for the purpose of finding of an
expropriation. 1113 No case of partial expropriation has ever been found by ITA
tribunals. As a result, economic benefit cannot be isolated as a separate investment
capable of expropriation.
The above position is in line with CIL. Although CIL does not define property, it
recognises that expropriation encompasses tangible as well as intangible property,
including contractual rights.1114 Proprietary situations protected from expropriation
are identified case-by-case, by reference to relevant municipal law, international law
and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.1115 This creates grey
areas when no rights are ‘vested’1116 under municipal law and there is no relevant
1112 Chemtura Corporation v Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award of 2 August
2010 [Chemtura], para. 243; Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 17; Merrill, paras. 140-
141; Cargill, Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2,
Award of 18 September 2009 [Cargill], para. 356.
1113 Feldman M v Mexico (NAFTA), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 16
December 2002 [Feldman], para. 152; Cargill, para. 367; Merrill, para. 144; Grand River
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al v United States of America, Award of 12 January 2011
[Grand River], para. 155; Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case
No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability of 14 December 2012 [Burlington], para. 257.
1114 John H Herz, ‘Expropriation of Foreign Property’ (1941) 35 AJIL 243, 244-245; Gillian
White, Nationalisation of Foreign Property (Stevens & Sohns 1961) 48. For the protection
of contractual rights see: Norwegian Shipowners’ claims (Norway v USA, Decision of 13
October 1922, UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. I (1922), pp. 307-346)
and Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits) No.
7, Collection of Judgements, Publications of the PCIJ, Ser. A – No. 7, 1926, pp. 43-45.
1115 Herz (n 1114) 244.
1116 On the doctrine of ‘vested rights’ see: G Kaeckenbeck, ‘The Protection of Vested
Rights in Inernational Law’ (1936) 17 B.Y.I.L. 1; M Sornarajah, The Pursuit of
Nationalized Property (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986) 212-213; ILC, International
Responsibility, Fourth Report by F.V. Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur, Responsibility
of the State for Injuries Caused in Its Territory to the Person of Property of Aliens –
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‘precedent’ in international law or jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals,
but the alien’s situation could nevertheless be seen as deserving protection.1117 The
alien is inevitably interested in continuation of such favourable proprietary
situations.1118 However, these may change to his detriment as a result of a legitimate
exercise of administrative or legislative powers. It is recognised that international law
cannot protect against every such change. No clear-cut answer exists in CIL as to
how to demarcate between protected rights and ‘mere interests, expectancies,
favourable situations etc.’1119
Despite this uncertainly CIL generally does not recognise expectations of economic
benefit of property as qualifying for protection against expropriation.1120 In Oscar
Chinn1121 the PCIJ denied protection when the host State’s measures deprived a
British investor of the ability to carry out profitably his shipping business in the
Belgian Congo.1122 The Court refused to recognise ‘possession of customers and the
possibility of making a profit’ as representing ‘anything in the nature of a genuine
vested right’. 1123 It noted that ‘favourable business conditions and goodwill are
transient circumstances, subject to inevitable changes.’1124
On the other hand, international law commonly recognises relevance of expectations
of future benefit of property at the valuation stage. Here, expectations reflect a
functional concept of property acknowledging that the key importance of business-
related property rests not in the value of individual assets but in their ability to
Measures Affecting Acquired Rights, 29 February 1959 (1959) U.N.Y.B.I.L.C. Vol. II, 9-
10.
1117 ILC, International Responsibility (ibid) 9.
1118 Herz (n 1114) 245.
1119 ibid 245. Commentators were also not unanimous on the issue. See Herz (ibid) 246
(with references).
1120 Herz (n 1114) 245; White (n 1114) 48.
1121 The Oscar Chinn Case (United Kingdom v Belgium), Judgement of 12 December
1934, PCIJ Series A/B Fascicule No. 63, pp. 63-90 (Oscar Chinn case).
1122 Chinn’s business became unprofitable when the host State (Belgium) started
subsidising his competitor, a host State-supervised company. (ibid, p. 26).
1123 ibid, p. 88. Therefore, ‘the notion of goodwill is too vague to be regarded as a
separate property right apart from the enterprise to which it is attached’. (White (n 1114)
49)
1124 Oscar Chinn case (n 1121) p. 88. State practice also supports such conclusion.
(White (n 1114) 49).
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generate economic benefits.1125 For the purpose of such ‘going concern’ valuation
economic enterprise is treated ‘as an organic totality’, including ‘legitimate
expectations of the owners’ with regard to expected returns.1126 Those legitimate
expectations represent a ‘premium’ added to the value of the assets reflecting ‘the
enterprise’s ability to attract customers and generate revenues.’1127 This functional
understanding of property, represented under IIAs by the notion of ‘investment’, is
shared by ITA tribunals.1128
The second alternative understanding of ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit of property’ is that it reflects an economic impact sufficient for the finding of
expropriation. This understanding has also been rejected by ITA tribunals. The
Waste Management tribunal agreed that non-payment of fees under a concession
agreement deprived the investor of reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
his investment but such
loss of benefits or expectations is not a sufficient criterion for an
expropriation, even if it is a necessary one.1129
This expresses the dominant view.1130
ITA tribunals usually apply a ‘substantial deprivation’ test1131, requiring neutralisation
of an investment for a finding of indirect expropriation.1132 This neutralizing effect is
1125 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów Factory (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), No.
13, Collection of Judgements, Publications of the PCIJ, Series A – No. 17, 13 September
1928, p. 49; Wälde & Kolo (n 13) 835.
1126 AMINOIL, 21 ILM 976 1982, para. 178.
1127 Allahyar Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff Publishing 1994) 429 (describing IUSCT
jurisprudence).
1128 See e.g. Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 17.
1129 Waste Management, para. 159.
1130 ADM, para. 248; Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (NAFTA), Interim
Award of 26 June 2000 [Pope & Talbot], paras. 101-102; LG&E, paras. 191, 198;
Suez/InterAgua, para. 126; Suez/Vivendi, para. 137; El Paso, paras. 249-256;
Burlington, para. 399. In direct response to Metalclad the new generation of US IIAs
provide that ‘an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone,
does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred.’ (Annex B, Section 4(a)(i)
of the 2012 US Model BIT: Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf> (accessed 16 April 2014).
1131 UNCTAD, Expropriation: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment
Agreements II: A sequel (United Nations 2012) Sales No. E.12.II.D.7, p. 64; Katia
Yannaca-Small, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: How to Draw the
Line?’ in Yannaca-Small K (ed), Arbitration under International Investment Agreements.
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linked with a ‘significant degree of deprivation of fundamental rights of ownership’.1133
Such deprivation can manifest itself in a number of ways, e.g. when the host State
conducts the investment’s day-to-day operations, detains its employees, appoints
directors or interferes with its management or with exercise of shareholders’
rights. 1134 ITA tribunals routinely apply these criteria 1135 , adding sometimes that
economic loss is not a decisive factor for the finding of expropriation. 1136 An
alternative approach1137 views ‘substantial deprivation’ as a reflection of an economic
impact on the investment.1138 Regardless of the approach taken, both accept that a
mere deprivation of expected benefits of investment is insufficient for a finding of
expropriation.
The ‘Metalclad definition’ of indirect expropriation turned out to be ‘the outlier’ that
was in fact never applied by any ITA tribunal. 1139 Subsequent tribunals either
distinguished it on the facts 1140 , observed that the ‘Metalclad definition’ did not
A Guide to Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010) 460-467; Stern (n 13) 40-43;
Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 344; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 298.
1132 Tribunals use various expressions to illustrate that effect, e.g. ‘virtual taking or
sterilising of an enterprise’ (Waste Management, para. 160); ‘substantially complete
deprivation’ (Plama, para. 193); ‘effective neutralisation’ (CME Czech Republic B.V. v
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 13 September 2001 [CME], para. 604);
deprivation that ‘approaches total impairment’ (Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v
The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01, Award of 17 July 2006
[Fireman’s Fund], para. 176).
1133 Pope & Talbot, para. 99.
1134 ibid, para. 100.
1135 See e.g. Chemtura, paras. 245, 247; PSEG, para. 278; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd.
v Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award of 24 July 2008 [Biwater], para. 452;
CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of 12
May 2005 [CMS], paras. 263-264; LG&E, para. 199; BG Group Plc. v Argentina,
UNCITRAL, Final Award of 24 December 2007 [BG Group], para. 271; Enron
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award
of 22 May 2007 [Enron], para. 245; Sempra, para. 284.
1136 Biwater, para. 465; Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, Award of 31 October 2012, paras. 504-505.
1137 Total, para. 196.
1138 E.g. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award of 8 June
2009 [Glamis Gold], paras. 355-356; Plama, para. 193; Bayindir, para. 459; Burlington,
para. 397; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 302; Fietta (n 2), 398.
1139 Ratner (n 865) 512.
1140 E.g. by observing that: the test was based not only on ‘reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit’ but also on transparency and investor’s reliance on the host State’s
representations (Feldman, para. 146)
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correspond with the Metalclad tribunals’ actual findings 1141, or even reinterpreted it
as an example of the ‘substantial deprivation’ standard. 1142 The concept of
‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit’ refers to investor’s economic
expectations and such expectations do not play a decisive role in the finding of
expropriation. Such expectations are not included in the references to ‘legitimate
expectations’ in the context of indirect expropriation. As a result, the term
‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property’ has a different underlying
meaning than ‘legitimate expectations’ and conflating the two is incorrect.1143
C. Critique of Metalclad: ‘Legitimate / Investment-Backed Expectations’ as
Factors Relevant for the Elucidation of Vague IIA Standards
As mentioned above, the Metalclad award provoked strong criticism1144, adding to an
already growing critique of IIAs and the ITA practice.1145 The main point of criticism
was that the ‘Metalclad definition’ left no space for the host State’s sovereign right to
regulate in the public interest.1146 This exceeded the US law standards of regulatory
expropriation on which NAFTA Article 1110 was supposed to be modelled.1147 More
1141 Observing that the Metalclad tribunal found a complete frustration of investment’s
operation (ADM, para. 247) or complete loss of ability to generate a commercial return
(Burlington, para. 398); that the ‘Metalclad test’ stands only in isolation from the facts of
that case (Waste Management, para. 159); that the test ‘must be read in the context of
the facts’ of that particular case (EnCana, para. 177) or that careful reading of the case
does not support a conclusion that substantial deprivation of value can be viewed as
expropriation (El Paso, paras. 249, 252).
1142 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, LCIA Case No.
UN3467, Final Award of 1 July 2004 [Occidental], paras. 88-89; El Paso, para. 252. See
also Vicuña (n 1108) 28; Paulsson & Douglas (n 13).
1143 Yannaca-Small (n 1131) 475; Anne K Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in Reinisch
A (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008) 162-163;
Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of
Foreign Investment (Oxford University Press 2008) 164; Federico Ortino, ‘Legal
Reasoning of International Investment Tribunals: A Typology of Egregious Failures’
(2012) 3 JIDS 31, 46.
1144 See Been & Beauvais (n 1108) for a summary of the criticism and immediate
reactions to Metalclad.
1145 Peter Muchlinski, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
Where Now?’ (2000) 34 Int’l Law 1033, 1046; International Institute for Sustainable
Development, ‘NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment. Addressing the Impacts of the
Investor-State Process on the Environment’ (prepared by Howard Mann, Konrad von
Moltke) (1999); M Sornarajah, ‘Protection and Guarantees of Investment’ (2000) 26 CLB
1290, 1294.
1146 Dolzer, ‘New Developments’ (n 5) 72.
1147 Been & Beauvais (n 1108) 35-36; Porterfield, ‘International Expropriation’ (n 1110);
Guzman-Carrasco (n 1108) 282-283; Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Regulating Multinational
Corportations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized
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specifically, the Metalclad award was criticised for finding environmental and land
use regulation expropriatory, potentially opening the floodgates to similar
challenges. 1148 This raised concerns that the way in which tribunals began to
interpret and apply the IIAs provisions on expropriation could significantly limit the
host State’s right to regulate and require it to compensate foreign investors for
detrimental impact of a broad range of regulatory measures.1149
One reaction came from the US Congress. It sought to ensure that in substantive
protections for foreign investors the USA are not greater than those enjoyed by
domestic ones and that those rights are comparable to those ‘available under United
States legal principles and practices.’1150 It mandated the US President to seek
standards of expropriation and compensation consistent with such principles and
practice.1151 Consequently, from the early 2000’s US IIAs include an elucidation of
indirect expropriation rooted in the US Constitutional law ‘Penn Central test’.1152 It
states that indirect expropriation is determined based on ‘a case-by-case, fact-based
enquiry’ and on a consideration of relevant factors. It lists three such factors,
including ‘the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations’.1153 This elucidation, used in the Model
World Balancing Rights and Responsibilities’ (2008) 23 Am.U.Int'l L.Rev. 452, 460-461;
M Sornarajah, ‘The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in
Catherine A Rogers and Roger P Alford (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration
(Oxford University Press 2009) 287.
1148 Been & Beauvais (n 1108) 33.
1149 ibid 34; Lowe (n 14) 452-453; OECD, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ and the ‘Right to
Regulate’ in International Investment Law (prepared by Yannaca-Small C) (2004) No.
2004/4 Working Papers on International Investment, p. 2; Muchlinski (n 11) 590-591.
1150 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Sec. 2102(3), 111 Stat. 2001-2002
995; Mark Kantor, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Echoes of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan in
the International Law Approach Towards Regulatory Expropriation’ (2006) 4 L.P.I.C.T.
231, 236; Porterfield, ‘International Expropriation’ (n 1110) 41-43; Porterfield, ‘State
Practice’ (n 1110) 177.
1151 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Sec. 2102(3)(D), 111 Stat. 2001-
2002 995.
1152 Kantor (n 1150) 236-237; Coe & Rubins (n 14) 625; Porterfield, ‘International
Expropriation’ (n 1150) 7. This was a part of broader ‘recrafting of the substance and
procedure in investment treaties’ in response to this wave of discontent with the ITA. See
Schill (n 19) 64-65.
1153 The other factors are: the economic impact and the character of the government
action. (Annex B of 2004 US Model BIT
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf> (accessed 16 April 2014)
and 2012 US Model BIT.
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BIT and the US Free Trade Agreements (‘FTAs’)1154, has also been adopted by
Canada in its IIAs and the 2004 Model FIPA.1155 Similar changes were introduced by
other States.1156
The above reactions illustrate three important developments relevant for the
references to ‘legitimate expectations’ or ‘investment-backed expectations’ by
investment tribunals. First, they show that indirect expropriation cannot be defined
and needs to be established case-by-case with help of relevant factors.1157 Secondly,
‘investment-backed expectations’ is one of such factors. Thirdly, clarifying tests and
factors are derived from relevant national and other established legal systems.
These three developments are also visible in the ITA practice and scholarship.
Commentators and tribunals increasingly referred to multi-factor case-by-case
analysis as a basis for expropriation analysis.1158 They began referring to ‘legitimate
expectations’ 1159 or ‘investment-backed expectations’ 1160 as one of such factors.
1154 This text is replicated in FTA’s between the USA and Australia, Chile, Colombia,
Korea, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru and Singapore. See the US Trade
Representative information:  <http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements> (accessed 16 April 2014).
1155 Annex B.13(1)(b) of the 2004 Model FIPA: Agreement Between Canada and […] for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments
<http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf> (accessed 16 April
2014). Canada followed this model in all its IIAs in recent years. See DFATD information:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-
apie/index.aspx?lang=eng> (accessed 16 April 2014). It is also replicated in Australia –
Chile FTA of 30 July 2008 (Annex 10-B).
1156 Article 4.2.b of the Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government
of the People’s Republic of China of 22 November 2008); Agreement Establishing the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZAFTA) of 27 February 2009
(Annex Chapter 11) and ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (Annex 2). See
UNCTAD (n 1131) 74.
1157 Reed & Bray (n 13) 14; Verhoosel (n 13) 473; CG Christie, ‘What Constitutes a
Taking of Property Under International Law’ (1962) 38 B.Y.B.I.L. 307, 338; Paulsson &
Douglas (n 13) 149; Yannaca-Small (n 1131) 455.
1158 Coe & Rubins (n 14) 625; Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 149; OECD (n 1149) 10; Wälde
(n 14) 402 and (n 199) 224; Newcombe (n 14) 40; Yannaca-Small (n 1131) 460; Fortier &
Drymer (n 14) 306; Tecmed, para. 122; Fireman’s Fund, para. 176; ADM, paras. 249-
250; Cargill, para. 322; Glamis Gold, para. 356; LG&E, para. 190; Impregilo, para. 269.
1159 Dolzer, ‘New Developments’ (n 5) 78-79; Fortier & Drymer (n 14) 306-308; Wälde (n
14) 402 and (n 127) 224; Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 157; Tecmed, para. 122; ADM,
para. 250; LG&E, para. 190 (‘reasonable expectations’); Impregilo, para. 269 (referring to
conduct contrary to ‘commitments undertaken’).
1160 OECD (n 1149) 10, 19, 22 (‘reasonable and investment-backed expectations’); Coe
& Rubins (n 14) 624; Newcombe (n 14) 45; Fireman’s Fund, para. 176 (‘reasonable
‘investment-backed expectations’); Cargill, para. 322; Glamis Gold, para. 356.
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These references were often associated with specific legal systems, in particular US
constitutional law, EU law and ECtHR jurisprudence.1161 These more developed legal
systems were regarded as a useful inspiration.1162 Even in cases when expectations
were not expressly referred to in a relevant IIA, references to expectations became a
standard factor in the indirect expropriation test. However, terminology used was not
consistent and the terms ‘investment-backed expectations’ and ‘legitimate
expectations’ were used interchangeably.1163
D. References to ‘Legitimate / Investment-Backed Expectations’ in Connection
with Indirect Expropriation
As shown above, ITA tribunals and commentators acknowledge that legitimate
expectations or investment-backed expectations play a role in indirect expropriation
claims. In more detailed observations they frequently refer to ‘legitimate
expectations’. The variety of situations associated with legitimate expectations
mirrors both the breadth and the subject-matter covered by references to legitimate
expectations under the FET standard, discussed in the next chapter. As under the
latter standard, also with regard to indirect expropriation it is noted that legitimate
expectations may arise from the state of the law at the time of investment1164 or from
‘fundamental features or assumptions of a claimant’s realistic economic projections
when entering into the investment.’ 1165 They may arise from the host State’s
representations vis-à-vis an investor and on investor’s reliance on those
representations. 1166 Expectations are associated with the time of making the
investment. 1167 It is argued that investor expectations, especially when his
1161 Lowe (n 14) 461-462; Dolzer, ‘New Developments’ (n 5) 73, 78-79; Fietta (n 2) 378;
Yannaca-Small (n 1131) 455-459; Wälde & Kolo (n 13) 824 et seq.; Tecmed, p. 122;
Glamis Gold, para. 356.
1162 Lowe (n 14) 460.
1163 This trend continues in more recent references, see e.g. Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13)
104-106; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 350-351; UNCTAD (n 1131) 73-76.
1164 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 104; Coe & Rubins (n 14) 624 (also referring to
expectations associated with investor’s chosen business model and the nature of his
enterprise).
1165 Fietta (n 2) 384-385. See Chapter 7, Section C.2.
1166 Merrill, para. 150; National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award of
3 November 2008 [National Grid], paras. 151-154; Azurix Corp. v The Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of 14 July 2006, paras. 316, 318; Feldman,
paras. 148-149; see also Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 104; Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 154,
157; Muchlinski (n 11) 592; UNCTAD (n 1131) 75. See Chapter 7. Section C.4.
1167 ADM, para. 250; Merrill, para. 150. See Chapter 7, Sections C.2-4.
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investment was induced by the host State and based on formal government
permissions under local law, should be protected in a way that balances investor’s
requirement for stability and host State’s need to regulate in the public interest.1168
Legitimacy of expectations concerning future regulatory changes depends on their
predictability by the investor1169 and on any stabilising commitments he might have
received from the host State. 1170 Moreover, tribunals also refer to assumed
expectations, noting that investors have ‘legitimate and reasonable expectation that
they would receive fair treatment and just compensation’.1171
Because of their similarity to the references to legitimate expectations under the FET
standard, the above suggests that legitimate expectations refer to expectations of
treatment or use of investment.1172 However, some commentators argued that these
expectations represent proprietary rights because they ‘will primarily be manifested
in the investor’s concrete investment’ and consist of interests acquired under the
host State’s law.1173 Legitimate expectations were similarly linked with host State’s
commitments by investors who claimed that their legitimate expectations arose from
the host State’s ‘legal commitments, assurances and guarantees expressly offered
to the investor’ that gave rise to their acquired rights. 1174 It was consequently
suggested that those acquired rights, or legitimate expectations, were expropriated
when the host State reneged on its commitments.1175 Similar argumentation was
used under the FET standard. This approach, although endorsed by some
commentators1176, had not been accepted by tribunals. Confronted with such claims,
the tribunals found that claimants had certain ‘acquired rights’ under host State
1168 Newcombe (n 14) 45.
1169 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 105; Muchlinski (n 11) 592; Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D,
para. 9.
1170 Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7; Muchlinski (n 11) 592. See Chapter 7,
Sections C.2 and 4, Section D.1 and Section E.1.
1171 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v The Republic of
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal of 2 October 2006 [ADC],
para. 424. See Chapter 7, Section C.1.
1172 Lowe (n 14) 461-462; UNCTAD (n 1131) 73.
1173 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 350. See also Dolzer (n 13) 30; Fortier & Drymer (n 14)
306.
1174 CMS, paras. 255-256; Enron, para. 88.
1175 CMS, para. 256; Enron, paras. 87, 234-235; Sempra, para. 274. For a critique of this
approach see El Paso/Sornarajah.
1176 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 350-351. This approach may be an extension of
arguments made by Paradell on behalf of the investor, whom he represented in CMS.
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law.1177 However, these ‘acquired rights’ were not referred to in the tribunals’ final
findings.1178 The tribunals rejected the expropriation claims. Under the FET standard
they treated the host State’s commitments as undertakings of treatment and not as
investor’s ‘acquired rights’ protected under the standard.
Some tribunals and commentators observe that interference with investor’s rights
and reasonable expectations reflects the economic impact of the expropriatory
measure.1179 This is close to the ‘Metalclad test’. It suggests that impact on investor’s
economic expectations can constitute expropriation.1180 However, tribunals are quick
to add that expropriation will not be found if the economic impact is not
substantial.1181 As a result, given that the threshold of substantial deprivation is high
and ITA tribunals do not recognise partial expropriation, references to economic
expectations are not relevant for the indirect expropriation test unless they represent
total annihilation of the investment.1182 Therefore, the term ‘legitimate expectations’
does not include economic expectations at the present stage of development if ITL.
As a result, the references to legitimate expectations that resemble the FET
approach are usually made in abstracto. ITA tribunals rarely investigate investor’s
legitimate expectations under the indirect expropriation standard. Both, the abstract
statements and the ITA practice show that ‘legitimate expectations’ and ‘investment-
backed expectations’ reflect the same ideas as under the FET standard. The
following examples illustrate this point.
In Metalclad representations on which the investor relied to proceed with his
investment contributed to indirect expropriation. He could reasonably believe in the
host State’s representations that he had all necessary permits to proceed with the
1177 CMS, paras. 133, 144; 151; Enron, para. 102, 127.
1178 CMS, paras. 260-264, 273-284; Enron, paras. 240-250, 256-268; Sempra, paras.
278-288, 296-304.
1179 LG&E, para. 190; Tecmed, para. 122; Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 152; Coe & Rubins
(n 14) 624; Fietta (n 2) 384-385.
1180 An extreme version of this argument suggests that investor’s legitimate expectations
of return on his investment are guaranteed by an IIA and constitute property interest
protected against expropriation. See: EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador,
UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN 3481, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Horacio A. Grigera
Naón of 30 December 2005, paras. 17-26. For a critique see: EnCana, fn 138 and
Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 357.
1181 LG&E, para. 191.
1182 ADC, para. 304.
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landfill’s construction. Subsequent conduct of the host State was inconsistent with
those representations and prevented operation of the investment.1183
In RDC the actions of the host State created investor’s legitimate expectation that he
had a valid contract with the host State. This case was based on the treaty text
expressly referring to ‘investment-backed expectations’. 1184 The investment
concerned railroad infrastructure and services in Guatemala. It was based on three
contracts between investor and the host State. One of the contracts was signed but
never approved and the host State could not explain the absence of such approval.
The tribunal found that the contract was de facto performed by both parties. The host
State benefited from this performance and accepted payments under the contract. In
these circumstances the tribunal found that the investor had a legitimate expectation
that the contract was legally valid and its operation was not harmful to State
interests. These expectations were affected when the host State subsequently
declared the contract invalid due to its harmfulness to State interests. The invalidity,
however, did not create substantial enough effect on the investment to constitute
expropriation.1185
In Ulysseas the issue was whether the host Sate gave investor assurances, and thus
created his expectations, about conclusion of power purchase agreements. The
evidence showed that a responsible minister indicated during meetings with the
investor that such agreement could be signed. He created an expectation in the
investor on which the latter acted by submitting proposed contract terms. However,
the assurances were not firm and specific enough to create a legitimate expectation.
The minister refereed the investor to another State body and it quickly became clear
that no such contract could be signed. The prejudice towards investor was limited.
Moreover, the investor did not use another opportunity to sign such contracts at a
later time.1186 This analysis was an incidental factual matter. It is unlikely that, even if
the tribunal found that such assurances have been made, they would have
contributed to the finding of indirect expropriation.
In Fireman’s Fund the investor, a financial institution that had invested in a Mexican
bank, based its expropriation claim on an argument that the host State breached its
1183 Metalclad, paras. 106-107. See also CME (paras. 611-612) and Tecmed (para. 150),
where reliance on representations was relevant for the finding of expropriation when the
expropriaton was caused by the reversal of those representations.
1184 CAFTA-DR, Chapter 10, Annex 10-C, Section 4(a)(ii).
1185 RDC, paras. 116-123, 150-152.
1186 Ulysseas, paras. 191-197.
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undertaking to recapitalise the failing bank. The tribunal analysed existence of the
alleged undertaking using investment-backed expectation as a relevant factor.1187 It
found that discussions during the relevant meeting led only to ‘an agreement to
agree, subject to further negotiations’. The agreement was not binding, was subject
to respective approvals, required formalisation, further negotiations and regulatory
changes.1188 In its assessment of legitimacy of investor’s expectations the tribunal
took into account the level of risk voluntarily undertaken by the investor, who
invested in a ‘troubled bank’ during a financial crisis, thus taking high commercial
risk. 1189 Again, the analysis was incidental and, even a finding of legitimate
expectations would not have supported a finding of expropriation.1190
In Feldman the investor could not reasonably rely on various oral and written
communications between him and the Mexican tax authorities. These
communications were ‘at best ambiguous and misleading’ and would have been in
direct conflict with applicable law. In those circumstances the investor, as a
reasonable person, should have obtained professional advice and formal
clarifications from appropriate authorities.1191
In Methanex the tribunal, analysing foreseeability of future regulation that allegedly
indirectly expropriated the investment, looked for specific stabilising representations.
In passages that became important under the FET standard1192, it observed that the
investor could have expected regulatory stability only if he had been induced to
invest by the host State’s specific stabilisation commitments. No such commitments
were found and the specific environment of the relevant economic activity increased
risk of regulatory changes in the future.1193
When compared with the analysis in the next chapter, the above examples show that
ITA tribunals understand the concept of legitimate, or investment-backed,
expectations under the indirect expropriation standard no differently than under the
FET standard.1194 They investigate interactions between investors and the host State
1187 Fireman’s Fund, paras. 176, 207.
1188 ibid, paras. 193-199.
1189 ibid, paras. 179-180, 218.
1190 ibid, para. 199.
1191 Feldman, paras. 114, 132, 134, 149.
1192 See Chapter 7. Section D.1. Fietta ((n 2) 391-392) argues that the tribunal’s
comments belong under FET standard and not expropriation analysis.
1193 Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, paras. 7, 9-10.
1194 See Chapter 7. Section D.1.
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for existence of host State’s conduct placing the investor in a situation legally
relevant for the finding of indirect expropriation. The Fireman’s Fund and Feldman
awards show that also with regard to indirect expropriation tribunals referring to
legitimate expectations investigated business risk taken by the investor.1195 In RDC,
CME, Metalclad and Tecmed tribunals found existence of such expectations. In the
latter three cases the economic impact on the investment of the host State’s
subsequent frustration of expectations amounted to its total destruction and
consequently to a finding of expropriation.
The type of legitimate expectations most relevant to indirect expropriation may be
related to a retrospective invalidation of contractual or quasi contractual
arrangements in an on-going relationship with the host State, if such invalidation
causes substantial deprivation. This would be consistent with pre-ITA international
arbitration, as illustrated by the cases of SPP1196 or Shufeldt.1197 In both cases,
investors had legitimate expectations of legality of their contractual or quasi-
contractual arrangements with the host State. Those expectations were later dashed
when the host State retrospectively invalidated the legal arrangements that were the
foundations of the investment, totally annihilating it. In cases when the matter of
legitimate expectations was incidental no such wholesale retrospective invalidation
occurred.
There appears to be a consensus that indirect expropriation protects investor’s
legitimate expectations engendered by specific representations. 1198 Such
expectations arise from specific stabilising undertakings concerning regulatory status
quo procured by the investor, who relies on those undertakings to invest.1199They are
also extended to expectations related to investor’s reliance on ‘representations and
undertakings’ 1200 or to abrogation, annulment or invalidation of contractual
commitments or authorisations by the host State.1201
1195 See also Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 350.
1196 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/84/3, Award on the Merits of 20 May 1992 [SPP].
1197 Shufeldt claim (Guatemala, USA), Decision of the arbitrator H.K.M. Sisnett of 24 July
1930, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, pp. 1079-1102.
1198 Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 157; Lowe (n 14) 462; Muchlinski (n 11) 592; Newcombe
& Paradell (n 1) 363; Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7; Newcombe (n 14) 49.
1199 Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 157-158; Lowe (n 14) 462; Muchlinski (n 11) 592;
Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7; Verhoosel (n 13) 456.
1200 Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 158.
1201 Newcombe (n 14) 46, 49.
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The above cases support the proposition that if the investment’s continuation
depends on a legal structure endorsed by the host State through representations,
contractual or quasi-contractual arrangements with the investor, the subsequent
abrogation of such structure leading to ‘substantial deprivation’ constitutes indirect
expropriation. Legitimate expectations arise here from the State conduct creating the
legal situation on which the investor relied. These are expectations of non-abrogation
of the investment or of its legality, not expectations of a successful investment
project. If the effect of State measures does not constitute a substantial deprivation,
legitimate expectations are merely a ‘useful guiding principle’ 1202 in assessing
specific circumstances of the case. RDC award shows that expectations are
protected only if deprivation of investment is substantial, which is rarely the case.1203
As a result, arguments based on frustration of legitimate expectations receive more
sympathetic reception under the FET standard, where there is no deprivation
threshold.1204
To assess whether there has been an indirect expropriation, tribunals investigate
whether the host State’s measures were justified in light of investor’s legitimate
expectations. This requires balancing of the private interest behind the expectations
and the public interest behind the expropriatory measures.1205 Such weighing is rare
in practice for at least three reasons. First, no such balancing is required when there
is no ‘substantial deprivation’. Secondly, balancing is viewed as unnecessary if
expropriation results from breach of specific commitments.1206 Such commitments
are understood narrowly as either stabilisation representations or contractual or
quasi-contractual commitments the abrogation of which leads to a destruction of
investment. In cases associated with legitimate expectations where tribunals found
expropriation, namely in CME, Metalclad and Tecmed, only the latter involved such
balancing. The tribunal weighed investor’s expectations of long-term operation of his
investment with public’s environmental and health concerns behind the measures
1202 Paulsson & Douglas (n 13) 157.
1203 Fietta (n 2) 384. 385, 399.
1204 ibid 385, 399; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 351.
1205 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 364.
1206 ibid 363. But see Wälde & Kolo (n 13) 843-844), who argue that breach of
commitments by the host State (either by their abrogation, breach by use of sovereign
powers or by enactment of new regulation) should be a factor in the assessment whether
there was indirect expropriation and be balanced with host State’s regulatory powers.
See also Verhoosel ((n 13) 463) who argued that, absent stabilisation commitments, the
impact of regulatory changes on other types of commitments could be assessed on a
reasonableness basis.
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that led to the investment’s permanent closure. It used for this purpose the
proportionality standard.1207 The third reason for general avoidance of balancing may
be the tribunals’ reluctance to view themselves as a proper forum to scrutinise
sensitive decisions about limits of governmental powers, thus shunning weighing of
private and public interests and preferring less politically sensitive solutions.1208
E. Conclusions
The role of references to legitimate expectations under indirect expropriation is not
as prominent as under the FET standard. However, their history clarifies two
important points. First, legitimate expectations are not economic expectations of
investors. Secondly, the references to legitimate expectations were inspired by
developed legal systems during a search for established concepts that could help
discipline an overly broad application of IIA standards by ITA tribunals.
Understanding legitimate or investment-backed expectations under indirect
expropriation is in line with the developments under the FET standard, discussed in
the next chapter. The process of resorting to ‘legitimate expectations’ and
‘investment-backed expectations’ represents a single trend and occurred
simultaneously under both standards. The critical reactions to the overbroad
application of the vague FET standard by ITA tribunals mirror the developments
described above. This was seen as reflecting a standard much broader than CIL
minimum standard1209 and the NAFTA States narrowed this practice by issuing an
interpretative statement.1210 Commentators turned to more developed legal systems
for help. 1211 This brought about references to ‘legitimate expectations’ 1212 and
‘investment-backed expectations’1213 inspired by EU law, English law and ECtHR
jurisprudence.1214 It was also accepted that the FET standard cannot be defined in
1207 Tecmed, paras. 122-150.
1208 Lowe (n 14) 464-465; Dolzer (n 13) 64-65.
1209 Lowe (n 14) 454.
1210 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions of 31 July 2001, Section 2.
1211 Wälde (n 14) 377, 385-386 and (n 199) 197-198.
1212 Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 103-104; Schreuer (n 12) 374; Vicuña (n 109)
353-356 and (n 1108) 193.
1213 Wälde (n 14) 377, 387 (‘investment-backed legitimate expectations’, ‘legitimate
investment-backed expectations’).
1214 Wälde (n 14) 377, 385-387 and (n 199) 197-198, 207-209; Vicuña (n 109) 355-356
and (n 1108) 193-194.
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abstracto, its application should to proceed on a case-by-case basis and that
investor’s legitimate expectations are one of the relevant factors in this enquiry.1215
Also here references to ‘investment-backed expectations’, ‘legitimate expectations’
or hybrids of the two terms were used interchangeably. They were treated by some
commentators1216 and tribunals1217 as a reflection of a single idea, underlying both
the FET and indirect expropriation standards. This approach was amplified by the
increased use of the FET standard as the main standard of investment protection.
The requirement of ‘substantial deprivation’ created a very high threshold for the
finding of indirect expropriation and tribunals were willing to consider investors’
claims under the vaguer FET standard. The FET therefore eclipsed the indirect
expropriation standard, prompting suggestions that it is applied in lieu of the
latter.1218 The details of this process will now be considered in the next chapter.
1215 Wäelde (n 14) 385; Lowe (n 213) 73; Jan Ole Voss, The Impact of Investment
Treaties on Contracts between Host States and Foreign Investors (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2011) 204; Tudor (n 1143) 164.
1216 Lowe (n 14) 257-262; Wäelde (n 16) 381 and (n 199) 202 (referring to
‘disappointment of legitimate investment-backed expectations build up by governmental
assurances: the reliance principle’); Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 968-
969; Vicuña (n 109) 353-356.
1217 Thunderbird, paras. 137-167; Cargill,para. 344; Glamis Gold, paras. 356, 542, 461;
Grand River, paras. 126-127.
1218 Fietta (n 2) 389, 397; Reed & Bray (n 13) 14; Reisman & Digón (n 1110) 28, 32-33;
Wäelde (n 16) 384; Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 37. This shift is compounded by approach
of some tribunals treating the FET standard as a fall-back in cases when the facts of the
case do not allow for a finding of expropriation. (Sempra, para. 297; PSEG, para. 393)
However, most commentators view FET as a standard separate and independent from
the expropriation standard (Lowe (n 213) 73; Kläger (n 12) 297; Weiler & Laird (n 317)
267-268; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 203).
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Chapter 7 The Origins and Development of Legitimate
Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Legitimate
Expectations and the FET Standard
A. Introduction
This chapter shows how investor’s legitimate expectations are referred to in the
context of the FET standard. It commences with an introduction of the theoretical
underpinnings of these references. It then analyses the types of the host State’s
conduct that may give rise to foreign investor’s reasonable reliance and thus to
legitimate expectations.1219 The term ‘conduct’ can be interpreted to mean various
factual situations, referred here as ‘sources’. This chapter recognises four types of
such sources. At the most general legitimate expectations of FET arise directly from
an IIA. This is an abstract concept of legitimate expectations, discussed in Section
C.1 below. Further, expectations can arise from the state of the host State’s law and
other circumstances existing at the time the investment is made, from specific
representations of the host State vis-à-vis the foreign investor, or from ‘commitments’
undertaken by the State towards the investor in very specific circumstances. The
latter three sources focus on the specific circumstances of a particular case as a root
of legitimate expectations. They inform the remainder of this chapter, which focuses
on their legitimacy and protection and the balancing of the private and public
interests in their application. The last part of this chapter summarises its findings and
identifies issues requiring clarification.
B. Theoretical Underpinnings
The theoretical underpinnings of the concept of legitimate expectations in ITL are not
clear. The FET standard is itself elusive and controversial. It is viewed as a standard
of justice to be achieved in a fair and equitable (i.e. balancing) process. It requires
balancing of investment protection with the host State’s need to adapt to changing
conditions and to act in the public interest. It enquires into what is right in a given
situation by weighing all relevant circumstances. Such flexibility is crucial for the
accommodation of relevant economic, social, cultural and political differences
between communities, which can be reflected in perceptions of a foreign investor vis-
1219 Thunderbird, para. 147.
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à-vis those of a host State.1220 The standard is also viewed as a general principle of
due process which ‘encapsulates the minimum requirements of the rule of law’.1221
Commentators from the civil law tradition view it as equivalent to a general clause of
good faith, filling gaps left by more specific IIA standards.1222
These views about the FET standard are reflected, albeit rarely, in the references to
investor’s legitimate expectations. Legitimate expectations are associated with
investor’s reasonable reliance on the host State’s conduct and the legal
consequences of subsequent frustration of investor’s expectations arising from such
reliance.1223 This mechanism is linked with the good faith underpinning both the host
State’s conduct, its ‘receipt’ by the investor and his reliance on it.1224 It is sometimes
noted that investor’s reliance reflects his reasonable trust or confidence1225 that his
expectations will materialise1226 , or ‘reciprocal trust and good faith’ between the
investor and the host State. 1227 Others observe that it is the expectations-
engendering conduct of the host State that must be ‘trust-inspiring’.1228 Legitimate
expectations are also associated with stability and transparency of the legal
framework into which the investor invests.1229
1220 Muchlinski (n 11) 635-636; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 202, 204-206;
Kläger (n 12) 256. But see Wälde (n 14) 385 and (n 199) 207; Francisco Orrego Vicuña,
‘Regulatory Authority and Legitimate Expectations: Balancing the Rights of the State and
the Individual under International Law in a Global Society’ (2003) 5 International Law
FORUM du droit international, 188, 193-194193-194 and (n 109) 355-256) who associate
it with preventing abuse of law.
1221 McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 205; see also: Vandevelde (n 165); Stefan
Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the
Rule of Law’, IILJ Working Paper 2006/6 (Global Administrative Law Series)
<www.iilj.org> (accessed 16 April 2014); Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 123.
1222 Dolzer, ‘FET : A Key Standard’ (n 5) 91; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 122.
1223 Tribunals in Suez/Vivendi (para. 226) and Suez/InterAgua (para. 207) particularly
highlighted the element of reliance.
1224 El Paso, para. 348; Tecmed, paras. 160, 173; OKO, para. 276; Total, paras. 121,
128; Thunderbird /Wälde, para. 25; Weiler & Laird (n 317) 275.
1225 Tecmed, para. 160; OKO, para. 70; Schill (n 1221) 18.
1226 Tecmed, para. 160; OKO, para. 70.
1227 Total, para. 121.
1228 Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 21.
1229 Schreuer (n 12) 374; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 133-134.
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C. Sources of Legitimate Expectations
1. Legitimate Expectations Based on Investor’s Reliance on an IIA: Legitimate
Expectations of FET
According to one view, legitimate expectations can be engendered by investor’s
reliance on the FET standard in an IIA clause. This is expressed as investor’s
legitimate expectations of FET.1230 This may be just another way of expressing the
host State’s IIA obligation to treat investors fairly and equitably. 1231 Such
understanding dovetails with the general international law use of the concept of
legitimate expectations as equivalent to pacta sunt servanda1232, albeit extended
beyond the treaty parties to treaty beneficiaries.1233
The FET standard, however, has no defined normative meaning. It is not possible to
say in abstracto what treatment is an unfair and inequitable in violation of an IIA. This
is particularly problematic when the standard is treated as ‘autonomous’. In such
case it is independent from the CIL minimum standard of treatment and its scope
and content can be determined only based on other investment awards.1234
The concept of legitimate expectations was suggested as a way of supplying the
FET standard with normative content. It is used to ‘define’1235 the FET standard in
abstracto or to apply it to the circumstances of a particular case. It expresses the
standard in terms of investor’s expectations of a particular treatment. These
expectations are formulated in a norm-like way, e.g. as expectations of transparency,
consistency, freedom from ambiguity, non-arbitrariness or non-discrimination. They
are ‘presumed legitimate’1236 because their source is not identified beyond investor’s
expectations. This approach was first applied in Tecmed, where the tribunal ‘defined’
the FET standard through a long list of State conduct generally expected by a foreign
investor.1237 The tribunal observed, among others, that the host State’s treatment
1230 Saluka, para. 301; Metalclad, para. 99.
1231 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 280.
1232 Brown (n 5) 1; Byers (n 4) 125.
1233 Weiler & Laird (n 317) 276.
1234 Fietta (n 2) 396-397.
1235 Attempting to define a vague treaty standard of indirect expropriation the Metalclad
tribunal referred to ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property’. This term
should not be equated with ‘legitimate expectations’ (see chapter 6).
1236 Tudor (n 1143) 168.
1237 See the full text of the ‘definition’ in Chapter 2, Section D.
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cannot affect ‘the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign
investor to make the investment’1238 and that foreign investors expect consistency,
total transparency as well as absence of ambiguity and arbitrariness.1239
Tecmed tribunal’s approach was replicated in other awards. 1240 They are also
reflected in claims of legitimate expectations of stability and predictability of the
regulatory framework in which they made their investment.1241 The main criticism of
this approach is that such expectations, and thus the content of the FET standard, is
not derived from the facts of a particular case. The contents of the definition are
either unrelated to the tribunal’s findings 1242 or reverse-engineered to fit its
decision.1243 Such approach allows tribunals ‘add new legitimate expectations at any
time’1244, making the concept infinitely expandable.1245
The Saluka tribunal suggested that such legitimate expectations, i.e. expectations of
transparency, good faith, non-discrimination etc., are a ‘dominant element’ of the
FET standard.1246 On this basis Weiler & Laird argued that there is a single standard
of ‘regulatory fairness’ the content of which should be established by reference to
investor’s legitimate expectations. 1247 The content of this ‘single, comprehensive
international tort of regulatory misconduct’1248 is established through asking ‘what
kind of treatment a reasonable investor was entitled to expect from the state’.1249
1238 This approach may have been inspired from the first monograph on the FET
standard which ‘defined’ it as an indication that investors ‘will be subject to treatment
compatible with some of the main expectations of foreign investors.’ (UNCTAD, Fair and
Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements
(United Nations 1999) Sales No. E.99.II.D.15, p. 3; Vasciannie (n 12) 99).
1239 Tecmed, para. 154. This approach has been criticised. See Douglas (n 289) 28;
Alireza Falsafi, ‘The International Minimum Standard of Treatment of Foreign Investors’
Property: A Contingent Standard’ (2007) 30 Suffolk Transnat’l L.Rev. 317, 340-341; MTD
Annulment, paras. 66-71; El Paso, para. 342.
1240 E.g. Saluka, para. 307; Lemire paras, 267-268; Rompetrol, para. 278; Arif, para. 537.
1241 Here, the claim is derived from findings of some tribunals that such stability is an
essential element of the FET standard, or even of the CIL minimum standard. See
Section C.2.
1242 Douglas (n 289) 27.
1243 Vandevelde (n 165) 68.
1244 ibid 68.
1245 Tudor (n 1143) 165.
1246 Saluka, paras. 302-303 (referring to Tecmed, CME, Waste Management and
Occidental).
1247 Weiler & Laird (n 317) 269, 299.
1248 Wäelde & Kolo (n 13) 848.
1249 Weiler & Laird (n 317) 271-272.
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Such expectations cover ‘the entirety of [investor’s] regulatory experience’1250 and
are reflected in a ‘basket of legal concepts, or regulatory indicators’, such as
transparency or non-discrimination.1251 The standard should safeguard ‘regulatory
fairness’ and investor’s expectation to be treated in accordance with it.1252
This brings the FET standard close to a standard of good governance.1253 Investors
have legitimate expectations of good governance and IIAs define disciplines of such
good governance, the breach of which triggers an obligation to compensate.1254
However, a ‘common, universally shared core of good-governance expectations’1255
was never expressly agreed among States and its specific sources were never
authoritatively identified. 1256 Weiler & Laird’s proposition gives the concept of
legitimate expectations the central role in specifying the content of good governance.
They argue that such expectations should be protected because investors rely on
IIAs and expect that the treaties will be complied with. Reliance on treaty provisions
should be treated as reliance on the host State’s specific representations. They
argue that every IIA includes the host State’s promise of ‘regulatory fairness’,
specifically of a ‘transparent and predictable regulatory environment’.1257 This implicit
and general promise is directed at foreign investors at large. However, it is treated as
a specific promise because regulatory fairness is ‘a foundational element’ of an
individual investor’s decision to invest.1258 Unfortunately, Weiler & Laird provide no
convincing explanation of how the specific content of this general promise should be
1250 ibid 282.
1251 ibid 300.
1252 ibid 260.
1253 Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 972; Suez/Vivendi/Nikken and
Suez/InterAgua/Nikken, paras. 20, 26.
1254 Thomas Wälde, ‘The Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines, Rules and
Treaties in Reducing the Political and Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure
Investment in Developing Countries’ (2000) 5-5 CEPMLP Journal (internet printout on file
with author).
1255 Also referred to as ‘expectations of fair and equitable governance’ or ‘the minimum
expectation in the 21st century’ as equivalent to contemporary minimum standard of
treatment (see Wälde (n 14) 385-386 and (n 199) 207).
1256 Commentators identified such potential sources: the IIA practice, other international
instruments, including human rights treaties and UN General Assembly resolutions as
well as treaties in force between two specific home- and host-States relevant to a given
dispute, WTO law and EU law. (Wälde (n 14) 286 and (n 199) 207) or standards of good
governance developed by World Bank and IMF (Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’
(n 5) 972).
1257 Weiler & Laird (n 317) 277. See also Thunderbird/Wälde (paras. 4-6).
1258 Weiler & Laird (n 317) 277 (emphasis added). Criticised by Yost (n 2) 43.
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identified. 1259 Another commentator explained that this content is derived from
investors’ perceptions and expectations1260, thus making the argument circular. The
argument resembles the approach taken under GATT that its provisions should be
interpreted in accordance with assumptions and subjective beliefs of one treaty
party.1261
The approach represented by Weiler & Laird has been criticised as subjective and
circular. It suggests that investor expectations are a source of the host State’s
obligations1262 and that their scope depends on how the foreign investor understood
them. Critics point out that the content of the FET standard should be derived from
what a host State has consented to in an IIA and not from ‘any set of expectations
investors may have or claim to have’. 1263 Accepting that investors have some
inherent expectations shaping the content of the FET standard overextends the
concept of legitimate expectations.1264 The concept of legitimate expectations should
operate within the confines of the FET standard.1265 Critics argue that legitimate
expectations should only arise from investor’s reasonable reliance on the host
State’s assurances or representations. 1266 Absent such representations or
assurances, references to legitimate expectations offer no criteria and no supporting
theory to establish their existence and content objectively. 1267 In essence, the
presumed legitimate expectations are either derived from investor’s legitimate
expectations1268 or from the tribunal’s arbitrary declaration that State is expected to
1259 Weiler & Laird ((n 317) 277, 300) refer to good faith and expectations arising from a
particular legal order.
1260 Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Recent Developments’ in
Reinisch A (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008) 124
and ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in Yannaca-Small K (ed), Arbitration under
International Investment Agreements. A Guide to Key Issues (Oxford University Press
2010) 398. See also Schill (n 120) 163 and (n 1354) 15.
1261 See Chapter 5, Section 2.
1262 MTD Annulment, para. 67; OKO, para. 246; Andrés Rigo Sureda, Investment Treaty
Arbitration, Judging Under Uncertainty (Cambridge University Press 2012) 77; Schill (n
1221) 17.
1263 MTD Annulment, para. 67.
1264 Fietta (n 2) 396.
1265 ibid 397.
1266 Vandevelde (n 165) 67; Fietta (n 2) 396; Pandya & Moody (n 2) 3.
1267 Vandevelde (n 165) 67-68.
1268 Sanja Ðajić, ‘Mapping the Good Faith Principle in International Investment
Arbitration: Assessment of Its Substantive and Procedural Value’ (2012) 46 Zb Rad Prav
Fak Novy Sad 207, 214.
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behave in certain way.1269 This approach eliminates the need to actually interpret the
treaty.1270 Moreover, the open-ended catalogue of what State conduct investors can
legitimately expect means that the FET standard or ‘regulatory fairness’ is potentially
unlimited and could be used to eliminate all risks to foreign investors.1271
Such abstract and inherent legitimate expectations of FET should be distinguished
from the three sources of legitimate expectations discussed in the remainder of this
chapter.
2. Legitimate Expectations Based on the State of the Law at the Time of
Investment
The second type of the host State ‘conduct’ giving rise to investor’s legitimate
expectations are the circumstances in which the investment is made. The central
element of these circumstances is the legal framework of the host State at the time
of investment.1272 It influences investor’s legitimate expectations about the way in
which his investment will be treated.12731274 Three elements inform the analysis of
investor’s legitimate expectations here: the host State’s legal framework at the time
of investment, giving rise to expectations; the time at which investor’s expectations
are assessed; and the investor’s reliance on this general legal framework when he
invests.1275
Few FET claims rest on the proposition that investor’s legitimate expectations were
engendered only by the state of the law at the time of investment.1276 It is said that
expectations may arise from host State’s ‘laws, regulations, declared policies, and
1269 Vandevelde (n 165) 67-68. See also McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 243; MTD
Annulment, para. 71.
1270 Ðajić (n 1268) 214-215.
1271 Pandya & Moody (n 2) 1; Vandevelde (n 165) 68; MTD Annulment, para. 71.
1272 McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 234; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134; Dolzer,
‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 968; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 100;
Kriebaum & Schreuer (n 872) 273; Muchlinski (n 40) 535; Potestà (n 2) 89, 110; Felipe
Mutis Téllez, ‘Conditions and Criteria for the Protection of Legitimate Expectations under
International Investment Law’ (2012) 27 ICSID Rev. 432, 437; Kläger (n 12) 186.
1273 McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 234; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134-135;
Muchlinski (n 40) 535.
1274
1275 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134; Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 968;
Potestà (n 2) 111.
1276 Grand River, para. 141.
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statements’1277 or, broader still, ‘from all the circumstances of the case’.1278 This is
reflected in the Tecmed proposition of respect for investors’ ‘basic expectations …
taken into account … to make the investment’.1279 Potential sources of legitimate
expectations are therefore viewed broadly. The key moment for their assessment is
the time when investor makes his investment.1280 However, it is also pointed out that
legitimacy of expectations must be assessed at each decisive step of investment’s
‘creation, expansion, development, or reorganisation’.1281
This type of legitimate expectations gives rise to two types of claims. First, investors
argue that the laws gave rise to their specific expectations of treatment. Secondly,
and more often, investors argue that they legitimately expected stability and
predictability of that initial legal framework throughout the duration of their
investment.1282
This latter claim reflects a general consensus that the legal framework for foreign
investment, which is often a long-term and capital-intensive project, requires some
basic stability and predictability.1283 An investor relies on this framework to plan and
make his investment, and needs stability to realise these plans.1284 This need is also
expressed in terms of ‘legitimate expectations’, e.g. as legitimate expectations of
stability and predictability.
1277 Suez/InterAgua, para. 230; Suez/Vivendi, para. 222. Similarly National Grid, para.
173, Enron, para. 262; El Paso, para. 378 and Continental, para. 261.
1278 EDF v Romania, para. 219; El Paso, para. 358.
1279 Tecmed, para. 154.
1280 Ulysseas, para. 250; Oostergetel, paras. 232-233; Electrabel, para. 7.76; Frontier
Petroleum, para. 287; AES Summit, para. 9.3.8; Plama, para. 176; Jan de Nul, para.
265; Biwater, para. 602; Duke, para. 340.
1281 Ursula Kriebaum, Christoph Schreuer, ‘At What Time Must Legitimate Expectations
Exist?’ in Werner J, Ali AH (eds), A Liber Amicorum: Thomas Wälde, Law Beyond
Conventional Thought (Cameron May 2009) 276; Frontier Petroleum, para. 287; see also
Téllez (n 1272) 435.
1282 Potestà (n 2) 88.
1283 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 285; Peter Muchlinski, ‘Regulating Multinationals:
Foreign Investment, Development, and the Balance of Corporate and Home Rights and
Responsibilities in a Globalizing World’ in Alvarez JE and others (eds), The Evolving
International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (Oxford University
Press 2011) 41; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134; Parkerings, para. 333; Tudor (n 1143)
169; Mairal (n 5); UNCTAD (n 12) 63-64; Voss (n 1215) 206.
1284 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134; Saluka, para. 301; Suez/InterAgua, para. 230;
Suez/Vivendi, para. 222; Téllez (n 1272) 433.
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However, there is less of a consensus about the legal implications of such
expectations. Some commentators and tribunals suggested that the FET standard
provides high protection from subsequent regulatory changes. Dolzer argued that:
The pre-investment legal order forms the framework for the positive
reach of the expectation which will be protected and also the scope
of considerations upon which the host state is entitled to rely when
it defends against subsequent claims of the foreign investor.1285
In his view, protection of expectations is informed solely by the law existing at the
time of investment. The State must at all times be aware of such expectations
harboured by foreign investors and it must take these expectations into account
when it subsequently changes that law.1286 As long as an investor could rely on the
law at the time of investment, he is protected from its subsequent changes.1287 The
Tecmed tribunal also insisted that investor’s basic expectations cannot be affected
by host State’s conduct. 1288 The Occidental tribunal pronounced that under
international law ‘there is certainly an obligation not to alter the legal and business
environment in which the investment has been made’ and the host State is obliged to
‘ensure both the stability and predictability of the governing legal framework.’1289
Such approach of strong protection against regulatory change was reinforced by
findings of other tribunals that stability is an essential element of the FET
standard.1290 This prompted claims that the host State, by changing its regulations,
abrogated investor’s rights arising from those regulations and breached the FET
standard.1291
On the other hand a growing number of investment awards and scholarly writings
indicate that protection of expectations of stability and predictability is not
1285 Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 103 (emphasis added); see also Téllez (n 1272)
434, 435.
1286 Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 969; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5)
103; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134-135.
1287 Dolzer (n 238) 72.
1288 Tecmed, para. 154.
1289 Occidental, paras. 191-192 (emphasis added). See also Frontier Petroleum, para.
285 (expectations based on the legal framework ‘will be protected’).
1290 Occidental, para. 183; CMS, para. 274; LG&E, para. 124; BG Group, para. 307;
Enron, para. 260; Duke, paras. 339-340; Sempra, para. 300. See also Christoph
Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions with other Standards’ in
Coop G, Ribeiro C (eds), Investment Protection and the Energy Charter Treaty (JurisNet,
2008) 89.
1291 El Paso, para. 353; Total, para. 113; Ulysseas, para. 240; Unglaube, para. 248; AES
Summit, para. 9.3.15; Bayindir, para. 184; Parkerings, para. 329.
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absolute.1292 The essentially presumed expectations1293 of stability were criticised for
turning the FET standard into a de facto stabilisation clause, for extending the
standard beyond what was agreed in the IIAs and beyond the CIL minimum standard
of treatment.1294 Recent awards are clear that investors cannot expect that the host
State’s law in force at the time of investing will remain completely unchanged ad
infinitum.1295 Change and evolution of laws and economic circumstances over time is
a normal feature of investment climate.1296 Every investor should be aware of this
fact.1297 Those changes may even need to be far-reaching and impose significant
burdens on investors1298, especially in a severe economic crisis.1299
It is by now well recognised that the standard language of IIAs does not guarantee
stability and immutability of the regulatory framework within which the investment is
made.1300 The IIAs limit host State’s sovereign powers but do not eliminate its right to
regulate domestic matters in public interest.1301 This applies to IIAs that do not refer
to stability; that expressly refer to stable conditions for investment as an element of
host State’s substantive obligations 1302 ; and that mention stability in their
preambles.1303
Investors therefore have no inherent legitimate expectations of stability and
predictability. Their expectations of total immutability of the legal and business
1292 Saluka, para. 305; El Paso, para. 350; Schreuer (n 12) 374; Newcombe & Paradell
(n 1) 282, 288; Potestà (n 2) 111-113; Voss (n 1215) 212; Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 30.
1293 See previous Section.
1294 Sornarajah (n 8) 355; Lowe (n 14) 455; Zeyl (n 48) 221-223; EDF v Romania, para.
218; Suez/Vivendi/Nikken and Suez/InterAgua/Nikken, paras. 2-3, 26-28; UNCTAD (n
12) 67.
1295 Saluka, para. 305; El Paso, paras. 350, 379; Oostergetel, para. 224.
1296 EDF v Romania, paras. 217-218; Parkerings, para. 332; Paushok, paras. 299, 270;
Mobil, para. 153; El Paso, para. 352.
1297 AES Summit, para. 9.3.34; Saluka, para. 305; Parkerings, para. 332; Muchlinski (n
40) 550-551.
1298 Mobil, para. 153; El Paso, para. 363; Paushok, para. 305.
1299 El Paso, para. 374; Impregilo, para. 291; Total, para. 162.
1300 Mobil, para. 153; BG Group, para. 298; Total, paras. 117, 120; El Paso, paras. 365-
367; Impregilo, para. 290; Plama, para. 219.
1301 Saluka, para. 305; Parkerings, para. 332; Plama, para. 177; EDF v Romania, para.
217 (‘normal regulatory power’). Enron, para. 261; CMS, para. 277; McLachlan, Shore &
Weiniger (n 12) 239, 261.
1302 AES Summit, paras. 9.3.28-29 (ECT Article 10(1)’s reference to stability of
investment conditions is not a stability clause).
1303 Continental, para. 258; Total, paras. 115-116; El Paso, paras. 369-372.
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framework and total immunity from State regulation based solely on a standard IIA
wording are neither reasonable nor legitimate. 1304 Such expectations may be
reasonable only if the host State made specific stabilising representations. 1305
3. Legitimate Expectations Arising from ‘Commitments’: Argentina’s
Privatisation Programme
Investor’s legitimate expectations can arise from ‘commitments’ undertaken by the
host State in a regulatory framework introduced to attract foreign investment.1306 This
type of legitimate expectations developed in very specific circumstances.1307 The
relevant disputes arose from Argentina’s large-scale privatisation of public utilities
(water, gas and electricity), designed to attract substantial foreign capital to improve
their infrastructure and quality.
A broad range of Argentina’s conduct gave rise to investors’ legitimate expectations.
First, it was the new national regulatory framework introduced for the purpose of
privatisations. It included: IIAs, general and specific sectoral laws, licenses and
concessions granted to investors who purchased shares in the privatised enterprises
and regulatory instruments containing terms and conditions of those licenses and
concession. Secondly, it was the international marketing campaign promoting the
privatisations to foreign investors, and, thirdly, the bidding process and interactions
between investors and the authorities during that process. Declarations by
Argentina’s President in connection with the ratification of IIAs were also relevant for
assessing investors’ legitimate expectations.1308
This regulatory framework included certain safeguards forming specific guarantees
or ‘commitments’. They applied to the long-term licenses and concessions
underlying operation of the privatised utilities1309 and included mechanisms aiming to
protect foreign investors against changes in the parity of the local currency and large
1304 El Paso, paras. 352, 372; Continental, para. 258; EDF v Romania, para. 217.
1305 See Section D.1. But see Total (para. 122) suggesting that some stability can be
inherent in the prospective nature of regulation applying to long-term investment projects.
1306 Téllez (n 1272) 436; Pandya & Moody (n 2) 11.
1307 CMS, LG&E, BG Group, Sempra, Enron, El Paso, Suez/Vivendi, Suez/InterAgua,
National Grid.
1308 CMS, paras. 53-56, 133-135; LG&E, paras. 35-51; Enron, paras. 41-43, 101, 103,
128; Sempra, paras. 82-84; National Grid, paras. 51-55, 176-177; BG Group, paras. 300,
305.
1309 CMS, para. 197; Enron, para. 44; BG Group, para. 173; Suez/Vivendi, para. 34;
Suez/InterAgua, paras. 92, 101-102.
206
increases of costs.1310 They secured returns allowing investors to cover reasonable
costs and earn reasonable return on investment.1311 They concerned protections
against devaluation of the local currency1312 and, in the gas sector, prohibitions of
unilateral changes to the licenses without investor’s prior consent1313 and of freezing
of tariffs under pain of compensation.1314
Three elements were important for the findings that this regulatory framework and
commitments it included gave rise to investors’ legitimate expectations. First, they
existed when the investment was made1315; secondly, investors relied on them to
make their investments1316 and, thirdly, expectations were engendered not only by
the framework and the ‘commitments’ but also by the motives behind their
introduction.
Not all tribunals explained what expectations were created.1317 However, all of them
found that the ‘commitments’ created mechanisms allowing for stability of the
economic regime of the concessions and licenses throughout their duration,
especially in case of changed circumstances. 1318 They gave rise to investor’s
expectations that Argentina will exercise its regulatory discretion within the limits
defined in that regulatory framework.1319In case of changed economic circumstances
investors could expect that the regulatory framework will be adjusted or renegotiated
1310 CMS, paras. 133, 144; LG&E, paras. 49, 119, 133; Sempra, paras. 85, 110, 114,
151, 168; Enron, paras. 101-103; BG Group, paras. 162, 165, 167-169, 172, 305;
Suez/Vivendi, paras. 38, 79, 82-83, 106-111, 126, 231, 234; Suez/InterAgua, paras. 78,
92, 115.
1311 CMS, para. 179; LG&E, paras. 119, 133; Sempra, para. 168; Enron, para. 44; BG
Group, para. 162; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 80, 126, 231; Suez/InterAgua, para. 112.
1312 CMS, para. 133; LG&E, paras. 49, 119, 133; Sempra, paras. 85, 141, 148, 158, 160;
Enron, paras. 127, 129, 134; El Paso, paras. 511-514; BG Group, paras. 164, 166, 171,
305.
1313 LG&E, para. 49; Sempra, para. 85; Enron, para. 44; BG Group, paras. 170, 305.
1314 LG&E, paras. 119, 133; Sempra, para. 85; Enron, para. 44; BG Group, para. 305.
1315 CMS, para. 275; LG&E, paras. 127, 130; BG Group, para. 298; Enron, para. 262;
Sempra, para. 303; Suez/InterAgua, paras. 203, 205; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 222, 224;
National Grid, para. 173.
1316 CMS, para. 275; LG&E, para. 133; Enron, paras. 262, 264-265; Sempra, para. 299;
Suez/InterAgua, para. 207; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 226, 231; National Grid, para. 178.
1317 LG&E, para. 133; National Grid, paras. 173-179.
1318 El Paso, para. 515; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 38, 83; Suez/InterAgua, paras. 112, 216;
Enron, para. 155.
1319 Suez/Vivendi, para. 237; Sempra, paras. 168-169; Enron, paras. 103-104, 144, 154;
Suez/InterAgua, paras. 216-217.
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‘in an orderly manner’, in accordance with mechanisms provided therein.1320 The
‘commitments’ engendered investor’s expectations that the regulatory framework will
not be entirely transformed or totally dismantled during the concession or license
period.1321
The above findings were based on the overall circumstances of the cases and in
light of the recognised minimum level of stability inherent in foreign investment
protection. 1322 Three elements influenced the tribunals’ findings of investor’s
expectations of stability, namely: the regulatory framework, the ‘commitments’ and
the stability obligation inherent in the FET standard.1323 It is difficult to ascertain from
awards the weight attributed by tribunals to each of these elements. However, some
tribunals were clear that investors were not generally immune from regulatory
changes subsequent to their making of the investment. 1324 The ‘commitments’
immunised investors from a complete change of the regulatory framework and
created expectations concerning the process through which such change should
occur.1325
However, subsequent tribunals confronted with claims based on ‘commitments’
shunned the above approach1326 and were careful to distinguish the disputes before
them due to ‘significant factual and contextual differences’. 1327 Methodology
employed by them differed from the one employed by the ‘commitments’ tribunals. In
particular, the former assessed each alleged source of expectations on its own
1320 CMS, paras. 161, 183; Sempra, para. 168; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 241-242; Enron,
paras. 104, 129, 137, 143, 186; BG Group, para. 310; Suez/InterAgua, para. 222; it can
be inferred from National Grid, para. 179.
1321 CMS, paras. 275, 277, 284; Sempra, para. 303; Enron, paras. 261-262, 264, 267;
BG Group, para. 307; El Paso, para. 517. Such conclusion can be also implied from
LG&E, paras. 133-139 and National Grid, para. 179. Suez/Vivendi (para. 231) and
Suez/InterAgua (para. 212) formulated them in a more general way as expectations that
the host State will respect the concession throughout its lifetime.
1322 That minimum was either (controversially) linked with recognition of stability as a
necessary element of the FET standard (see Section C.2.) or with inherent nature of
regulatory frameworks underlying long-term investment. (Total, para. 122).
1323 Potestà (n 2) 111-112.
1324 El Paso, paras. 87, 365-374, 390; Impregilo, paras. 290-291.
1325 Some tribunals did not use legitimate expectations and viewed the issue of
commitments as contractual. In Impregilo (paras. 292-296) the tribunal saw them as
outside its mandate while in EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León
Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award of 11
June 2012 [EDF v Argentina] (para. 1022) it analysed them under an umbrella clause.
1326 Continental, para. 260; Metalpar, paras. 186-187; Total, paras. 147-148, 177-180.
1327 Continental, para. 260; Total, paras. 177-178.
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terms, not as part of an attractive framework deliberately designed to induce the
investment.1328 This approach developed to address legitimate expectations arising
from ‘representations’, to which we now turn.
4. Legitimate Expectations Arising from Representations
Investor’s legitimate expectations can arise from ‘representations’ of the host State
on which the investor had reasonably relied.1329 Some tribunals and commentators
associate legitimate expectations only with representations or with a contractual or
quasi-contractual relationship between an investor and a host State.1330 By contrast
with ‘commitments’, the ‘representations’ approach concentrates on the specific
conduct of the host State vis-à-vis the investor and analyses it in more detail.1331
There is no definition of what representations give rise to legitimate expectations.1332
They may arise from various conduct of the host State and need to be analysed in
the circumstances of each case.1333 Representations may consist of oral statements,
either recorded in minutes or reconstructed in witness testimonies; of
correspondence; of negotiations evidenced by various materials1334; or of some other
pattern of behaviour.1335 They can take a form of a conduct or a declaration.1336
Usually, representations are reflected in a pattern of behaviour 1337 in dealings
between investor and the host State.1338
1328 Continental, para. 261; El Paso, paras. 390-396; Total, paras. 145-146, 149-150.
1329 E.g. CME, paras. 157, 611; Waste Management, para. 98 (these two early awards
did not associate this mechanism explicitly with ‘legitimate expectations’ but were later
subsumed under it), see e.g. Wälde (n 14) 387, Schreuer (n 12) 375-377); Plama, para.
176; Glamis Gold, para. 621; Merrill, para. 150; Grand River, para. 140; Mobil, paras.
152, 156; Total, para. 121; Potestà (n 2) 89; Kriebaum & Scheuer (n 1281) 274;
Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 279; Pandya & Moody (n 2) 11.
1330 EDF v Romania, para. 216; PSEG, para. 241 (but see paras. 255, 275); Metalpar,
paras. 186-187; Glamis Gold, paras. 22, 622,766; Merrill, paras. 150, 242 (the tribunal
was split on the issue); Wälde (n 14) 387 and (n 199) 208-209; UNCTAD (n 12) 68;
Vandevelde (n 165) 68.
1331 Potestà (n 2) 107.
1332 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 280.
1333 El Paso, para. 375; Arif, para. 539.
1334 Kardassopoulos, paras. 445-449; Potestà (n 2) 103.
1335 Mobil, para. 156; Mairal (n 5) 434-435; Voss (n 1215) 205; Thunderbird/Wälde,
paras. 13, 32; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 280.
1336 Total, para. 118.
1337 Mobil, para. 156.
1338 MTD Annulment, para. 69.
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The host State conduct giving rise to legitimate expectations is characterised as
‘clear’, ‘explicit’ 1339 , ‘precise’, ‘unambiguous’, ‘definitive’, ‘unequivocal’; and
‘specific’.1340 Representations must be specific as to the addressee1341 and as to their
subject-matter.1342 They need to be addressed directly to the investor1343 or to an
identifiable group of investors.1344 The more specific the State conduct, the more
likely the tribunal will find that its addressee was entitled to rely on the
representations. 1345 Representations cannot be conditional or qualified. 1346 Best
efforts undertakings are usually not regarded as specific representations giving rise
to legitimate expectations.1347
Representations need not be formally legally binding.1348 It is unclear, however, to
what extent an ultra vires conduct can give rise to investor’s legitimate expectations.
The answer may depend on the circumstances of a particular case. Expectations
can arise from host State’s conduct inconsistent with local law, provided that the
investor had ‘clean hands’.1349 On the other hand, due diligence requires the investor
to know that he is dealing with the competent authorities1350 and that representations
1339 Some commentators and tribunals refer to ‘implicit’ representations (e.g. Grand
River, para. 141; Frontier Petroleum, para. 285; Total, para. 120; Dolzer & Schreuer (n
13) 134; Schreuer (n 12) 374; Kläger (n 12) 164-165). However, this term has never
been fully explained and is confusing (see e.g. El Paso, para. 217).
1340 Total, paras. 117, 121; Continental, para. 261; El Paso, para. 375; Unglaube, paras.
250, 270; Feldman, para. 148; Glamis Gold, paras. 24, 800; Grand River, para. 141;
Mobil, para. 152; OKO, paras. 247-248; Duke, para. 351; Mairal (n 5) 429; McLachlan,
Shore & Weniger (n 14) 237; McLachlan (n 165) 377; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 281.
1341 Total, para. 119; El Paso, para. 375.
1342 El Paso, para. 375.
1343 El Paso, para. 376; Grand River, para. 141; UNCTAD (n 12) 69.
1344 Unglaube, para. 270. Reference to a ‘group of investors’ may have been drawn from
the ‘commitments’ approach and needs to be treated with caution.
1345 Total, para. 121.
1346 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 286; GEA, para. 291; Frontier Petroleum, para. 465 (a
letter from the State expressly saying that it had no possibility to intervene on behalf of
investor). But see different approaches of tribunals to disclaimers in information
memoranda presented by Argentina. The Total tribunal (para. 146) observed that the
memorandum warned investors of potential risks; the LG&E (para. 150) the tribunal drew
no consequences from the disclaimers, while the National Grid tribunal (para. 177) found
that it was disingenuous for the host State to invoke such disclaimers.
1347 GEA, para. 291.
1348 El Paso, para. 376; OKO, para. 262; Mairal (n 5) 414, 434 (observing that the
conduct may be informal, i.e. not constituting a contract, a regulation or a formalized
administrative act).
1349 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 282.
1350 MTD Annulment, para. 69.
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are made ‘by government officials in an official way’ 1351 , even if they are not
formalized e.g. in a decision. Abrogation of an on-going investment due to illegality
may occur from a legitimate judicial process or from an abuse of national law
procedures.1352
In appropriate circumstances representations may consist of ‘a reiteration of the
same type of commitment in different types of general statements’.1353 Host State’s
conduct giving rise to ‘representations’ needs to be coherent and intended to
engender expectations of the investor.1354 Some tribunals add that the conduct must
have been undertaken to induce the investor to invest.1355
Some tribunals introduced a ‘hierarchy’ of potential sources of investor’s
expectations. Political statements are treated as having the least legal value.1356
General legislative statements do not give rise to expectations of stability, because
by nature they are subject to modification, withdrawal or cancellation. 1357
Unsurprisingly, the ‘commitment’ approach, discussed in the previous section,
encouraged claims alleging either existence of legitimate expectations of stability
inherent in the legal framework in force at the time of investment1358 or existence of
‘commitments’ protecting investors’ position from future regulatory changes. 1359
However, tribunals generally required existence of stabilising representations and
observed that such representations need to comply with the requirements of
specificity.1360
1351 Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 21.
1352 RDC, para. 235 (abuse of lesivo process); Arif, paras.  398, 547(b)-(c)
(controversially criticising invalidation of transactions by host State’s judiciary despite not
finding denial of justice).
1353 El Paso, para. 377; see also Unglaube, para. 270.
1354 El Paso, para. 379; Total, para. 119.
1355 Glamis Gold, paras. 22, 621, 800-801; Mobil, para. 152; McLachlan, Shore &
Weniger (n 14) 237; Mairal (n 5) 438 (less categorically).
1356 Continental, para. 261; El Paso, paras. 378, 392-395.
1357 Continental, para. 261; Total, paras. 100, 309, 312; El Paso, paras. 376, 394, 397-
400; Mobil, para. 153. But see Total (para. 122), where the tribunal noted that stability
expectations may be engendered by inherently prospective nature of laws aimed at
regulating long-term investment projects.
1358 El Paso, para. 353; Total, para. 113; Ulysseas, para. 240; Unglaube, para. 248; AES
Summit, para. 9.3.15; Bayindir, para. 184; Parkerings, para. 329.
1359 Ulysseas, para. 216; AES Summit, para. 9.3.15; Total, para. 143.
1360 El Paso, para. 375; Ulysseas, para. 249; Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v
Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award of 7 June 2012 [Toto], para.
244; Plama, para. 219.
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As a result, broad ‘catalogues’ of host State’s conduct that may give rise to legitimate
expectations need to be treated with caution.1361 Moreover, tribunals who shunned
the ‘commitments’ approach in the circumstances of Argentina’s privatisation
programme saw its promotional activities merely as ‘political and commercial
incitements’ and not as conduct capable of engendering expectations of legislative
stability. 1362 In this context the El Paso tribunal rejected 1363 the argument that
Argentina’s commercial and political statements vis-à-vis potential foreign investors
can be analogous to the public international law doctrine of unilateral
declarations.1364
Investment tribunals acknowledge that representations giving rise to legitimate
expectations, specifically when they concern stabilisation of the legal framework
underlying the investment, can be contained in agreements, contracts, quasi-
contractual obligations or stabilisation clauses. 1365 Contractual undertakings set
within a complex regulatory framework need to be scrutinised in the context of all
circumstances of a given case, including reasons and effects of such undertakings.
Some tribunals noted that contractual or quasi-contractual ‘representations’ give rise
to expectations of host State’s compliance with them. 1366 Others found that
engagement of high ranking State officials in contractual negotiations with the
investor gives rise to legitimate expectations that the contract complies with the host
State’s law.1367 Moreover, an investor may have assumed legitimate expectations
that his contractual relationship with a private entity will not be interfered with by the
State.1368
Tribunals require that representations are made at the time of investment1369 and
investors rely upon them to invest.1370 Some tribunals treat the timing requirement as
1361 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134.
1362 El Paso, paras. 392-395.
1363 ibid, para. 392.
1364 See Chapter 5, Section D.1.
1365 Total, para. 117; Unglaube, para. 250; Kriebaum & Scheuer (n 1281) 274;
Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 280.
1366 Continental, para. 261; El Paso, para. 278. But see Thunderbird/Wälde (para. 13),
who associated legitimate expectations with ‘commitments … of a less formal character’.
1367 Kardassopoulos, para. 317; Kardassopoulos v Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18,
Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 July 2007 [Kardassopoulos/Jurisdiction], paras. 191-192.
1368 Alpha, para. 422.
1369 Continental, para. 260; Unglaube, para. 269.
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strict, finding that any purported representations made after the investment is made
cannot give rise to legitimate expectations.1371 Other tribunals observe that reliance
on representations may be linked with incurring costs after the investment was
made.1372 As a result, investor’s reliance on representations after the investment was
made can also be reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances1373, especially
when linked with ‘expansion, development or reorganisation of the investment’.1374
The host State’s conduct often does not meet the threshold set by the tribunals to
engender legitimate expectations. The standard of proof in this regard rose over the
years.1375 Alleged representations are often too vague and general.1376 There is often
no evidence that the alleged representations were made during meetings or such
evidence is contested. 1377 However, witness evidence of such assurances is
acceptable if it is unchallenged by the other party.1378 Written evidence, either as
minutes of meetings or as correspondence, is often inadequate to prove existence of
specific representations.1379
D. Legitimacy and Reasonableness of Investor’s Expectations
1. General Considerations: Caveat Investor
Legitimate expectations are not static and tribunals assess their legitimacy and
reasonableness in light of all relevant circumstances of a particular case.1380 This
1370 Continental, para. 260; El Paso, para. 376; Total, para. 118; Unglaube, para. 269;
Mobil, para. 152; OKO, para. 247; McLachlan, Shore & Weniger (n 14) 237.
1371 Frontier Petroleum, para. 468; Jan de Nul, para. 265; Duke, para. 365; Thunderbird,
para. 167.
1372 Total, para. 118.
1373 OKO, para. 247; Kardassopoulos, paras. 439, 441; UNCTAD (n 12) 71.
1374 Kriebaum & Scheuer (n 1281) 276; AES Summit, paras. 9.2.8-14; OKO, para. 270.
1375 Compare approaches by Metalclad and Thunderbird tribunals to evidence of relevant
‘representations’. The latter does not give any factual details of representations on which
the investor was found to have reasonably relied. The latter engages in a detailed factual
analysis of the available material.
1376 White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India, Final Award of 30
November 2011 [White Industries], para. 10.3.17; Frontier Petroleum, para. 468.
1377 Oostergetel, paras. 249-250; Jan de Nul, para. 262; MTD, paras. 149-158.
1378 Kardassopoulos, para. 445.
1379 GEA, paras. 277-283, 287-291; Frontier Petroleum, paras. 465-466; AES Summit,
paras. 9.3.19-20; EDF v Romania, paras. 243-245; Plama, paras. 212-213; Feldman,
para. 132.
1380 Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 286; Fietta (n 2) 389; Tudor (n 1143) 167.
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applies to legitimate expectations engendered by circumstances existing at the time
of investment1381, by ‘representations’1382 and by ‘commitments’.1383 All of these
sources require contextual assessment.1384 Such enquiry may supply investors with
a wide range of facts in support of legitimacy or reasonableness of their
expectations. However, tribunals highlight that not all circumstances can be used for
this purpose.1385 This assessment is guided by a number of factors and is directed at
assessing the level of investment risk the investor took upon himself in a particular
case.1386
Circumstances of each case may also give rise to requirements on investor’s part,
which is referred to as ‘caveat investor’.1387 With regard to the state of the law at the
time of investment this rule means that investor ‘must take foreign law as he finds
it’1388, cannot complain that it is applied to him1389 and has to comply with it.1390
Another aspect of this rule is an assumption that investors are prudent and
experienced.1391 Before they invest, they are required to conduct due diligence of the
law of the host State and other relevant circumstances. 1392 This may require
1381 El Paso, paras. 358, 359, 364; Saluka, para. 304; Oostergetel, para. 114; Biwater,
para. 602; EDF v Romania, para. 219; Potestà (n 2) 113, 119-120.
1382 Total, para. 121; OKO, para. 247.
1383 Suez/Vivendi, para. 229; El Paso, para. 355.
1384 Total, paras. 121, 123, 155-156.
1385 El Paso, para. 355. See also Arif, para. 536; Parkerings, para. 344.
1386 Muchlinski (n 40) 534; LG&E, para. 130; Newcombe (n 14) 45; Franck (n 27) 440.
1387 Muchlinski (n 40) includes three requirements here: that investor refrains from
unconscionable conduct, adequately assesses investment risk and conducts his
business in a reasonable manner.
1388 McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 236-237, 261; White Industries, para. 10.3.15;
Potestà (n 2) 110; Kläger (n 12) 186.
1389 McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger (n 12) 237; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 102
and (n 266) 72; MTD, para. 205; Potestà (n 2) 110.
1390 Muchlinski (n 40) 552.
1391 Mobil, para. 158; Unglaube, para. 258; Plama, paras. 220, 222, 268, 270, 300; EDF
v Romania, para. 313; Grand River, para. 144; Oostergetel, para. 254. Tribunals do not
apply a lower threshold if the investor is inexperienced (see e.g. Plama). Thus, they are
not sympathetic to complains that the requirement of due diligence may put too heavy
burden on investors. (see e.g. Thunderbird/Wälde, paras. 4-6, 12, 47; Dolzer, ‘Impact of
Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 968) Tribunals require investors ‘to take the rough with the
smooth’ before they can claim treaty protection (Sureda (n 1393) 81-82).
1392 Parkerings, para. 333; EDF v Romania, para. 219; Electrabel, para. 7.78; Plama,
para. 268; Biwater, para. 601; MTD, para. 164; Muchlinski (n 40) 534-535, 550;
McLachlan (n 165) 246-247; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 104; Téllez (n 1272)
434; UNCTAD (n 12) 78; Mairal ((n 5) 442-443) treats it as a factual requirement.
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obtaining professional advice.1393 The assumption of investor’s knowledge of the
environment in which he invests includes the state of the host State’s law1394 and,
depending on the circumstances, the operation of its judiciary and administration.1395
If the investor ignores the factual context important for his investment decision, he
bears the consequences of such omission.1396
Legitimacy of investor’s expectations concerning regulatory changes is influenced by
the ‘regulatory climate’ of a given industry.1397 Risk of regulatory changes is higher
when the area has been traditionally subject to intense regulation and intense public
interest. 1398 This lowers investor’s expectations that he will not be subject to
regulation or that the existing regulation will not change. For example, an investor
investing in production and marketing of tobacco products must be aware that they
have historically been subject to extensive regulation.1399 A similar conclusion was
reached with regard to the market for gasoline additives in California:
Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known,
if not notorious, that governmental environmental and health
protection institutions at the federal and state level, operating under
the vigilant eyes of the media, interested corporations, non-
governmental organizations and a politically active electorate,
continuously monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds
and commonly prohibited or restricted the use of some of those
compounds for environmental and/or health reasons.1400
As a result, the investor could not have expected immunity from the host State’s
regulatory environment of that particular market.
1393 Muchlinski (n 40) 553; Feldman, para. 132; Parkerings, para. 342; Plama, para. 221;
MTD, para. 164.
1394 Oostergetel, para. 254; Mobil, para. 158; Plama, para. 222; Thunderbird, para. 164;
Total, paras. 124, 149; Dolzer, ‘Impact of Investment Treaties’ (n 5) 968-969; Dolzer,
‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 103.
1395 White Industries, paras. 10.3.11, 10.3.14-15; Unglaube, para. 258.
1396 Total, paras. 155-158 (if investor treated policy developments affecting future
existence of the underlying regulatory framework as irrelevant he cannot later complain
that the framework has changed).
1397 LG&E, para. 130; Glamis Gold, paras. 800-801; Mairal (n 5) 444; Potestà (n 2) 119;
UNCTAD (n 12) 71.
1398 Grand River, para. 144; Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 9; Ulysseas, paras.
253-256; Glamis Gold, para. 767.
1399 Grand River, para. 145.
1400 Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 9.
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Investors can mitigate the risk of regulatory changes by obtaining specific
commitments from the host State addressing his particular concerns.1401 However, if
relevant local laws are unclear and/or subject to diverse administrative and judicial
practice, investors cannot use ITA to resolve such uncertainties and should request
clarifications and assurances from the host State.1402 Investor’s expectations of
stability are lower if he cannot show that he tried to procure such specific
representations 1403 or when he could have procured a stabilisation clause but failed
to do so.1404
Legitimacy of investor’s expectations may be influenced by the ‘overall investment
climate of the host country’. 1405 The relevant circumstances may include social,
economic or historical context that should have impacted the investor’s decision to
invest1406 (referred also as the host State’s level of development1407) and the relevant
business risk.1408 The investor should maintain reduced trust in measures introduced
by the State at the time of a worsening economic crisis.1409 In Metalpar the investor,
who had business experience in the host State and awareness that the relevant
industry was struggling, had no legitimate expectations of immunity from the
impending economic crisis and from the regulatory changes required in such
crisis.1410 An economy in transition generally involives higher risk of subsequent
regulatory changes, as well as a promise of higher returns.1411 An investor investing
1401 Ulysseas, para. 254; Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7-9; Glamis Gold, para.
767; Potestà (n 2) 113, 114; Voss (n 1215) 212; Fietta (n 2) 389; Newcombe & Paradell
(n 1) 296.
1402 See Section E.1.
1403 Mobil, para. 169.
1404 Paushok, paras. 302, 370.
1405 Muchlinski (n 40) 545. See also Potestà (n 2) 113; UNCTAD (n 12) 14; Tudor (n
1143) 164.
1406 Impregilo, para. 290; Suez/InterAgua, paras. 209-210; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 228,
230; El Paso, paras. 358-364; National Grid, para. 174; Parkerings, paras. 335-336;
Duke,para. 340; Metalpar, paras. 187, 201-202; Bayindir, para. 192; Paushok, para. 302.
Kriebaum observes that such elements are not systematically considered (Ursula
Kriebaum, ‘The Relevance of Economic and Political Conditions for Protection under
Investment Treaties’ (2011) 10 L.P.I.C.T. 383, 385).
1407 Potestà (n 2) 118; Kriebaum (ibid) 404; UNCTAD (n 12) 71; Tudor (n 1143) 165; Nick
Gallus, ‘The Influence of the Host State’s Level of Development on International
Investment Treaty Standards of Protection’ (2005) 6 JWIT 711.
1408 National Grid, para. 175; Total, paras. 157-158.
1409 Continental, para. 262.
1410 Metalpar, para. 187.
1411 Generation Ukraine, para. 20.37; Muchlinski (n 40) 534, 545.
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in a transitional or post-war economy is assumed to know that the law is likely to
change more frequently than in a stable developed State. 1412 Similarly, it is
unreasonable for an investor to rely on politicians’ declarations and continue with his
investment project when he knows that its existence depends on which political
faction is in power and the political climate is volatile.1413
2. Objective Assessment of Legitimacy and Reasonableness of Investor’s
Expectations
Legitimacy of investor’s expectations must be assessed objectively.1414 The overall
‘investment climate’ cannot automatically excuse maladministration or inability to
implement and enforce laws and policies.1415 The assumption of investor’s prudence
should also not automatically excuse the host State’s obligation to act
transparently.1416 Objectivity of assessment is influenced by the tribunal’s approach
to transparency.1417 According to an older approach, obligation to provide investors
with transparent legal framework is broad and inherent in the FET standard.1418 This
transparent legal framework gives rise to investor’s legitimate expectations.1419 More
recent approaches show more restraint.1420 Generally, the outcome of the objective
assessment of legitimacy of investor’s expectations is difficult to predict from existing
investment treaty jurisprudence.1421 Muchlinski suggests that this assessment could
1412 Parkerings, para. 335; Toto, para. 245; Paushok, 302.
1413 Bayindir, paras. 190-195.
1414 Glamis Gold, para. 22; Mobil, para. 152; El Paso, paras. 356, 364; Toto, paras. 165-
166; Electrabel, para. 7.76; EDF v Romania, para. 219; Muchlinski (n 40) 535; Téllez (n
1272) 433.
1415 Muchlinski (n 40) 546; GAMI Investments, Inc. v The Government of the United
Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 15 November 2004 [GAMI], para. 94. But
see Gallus ((n 1407) 714) who suggests that the level of development of the host State
could lead to a finding that investor had no protection.
1416 Muchlinski (n 40) 553.
1417 UNCTAD, Transparency: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment
Agreements II: A sequel (United Nations 2012) Sales No. E.11.II.D.16, pp. 52-55; Fietta
(n 2) 389.
1418 UNCTAD (n 1204) 51; Wälde (n 14) 387 and (n 199) 209; Thunderbird/Wälde, paras.
4-6 (ambiguous governmental communications should endanger expectations as the risk
of lack of clarity burdens the host State); Tecmed tribunal (para. 154) suggested very
broad obligation of transparency which was criticised (see e.g. UNCTAD (n 12) 52;
Douglas (n 289) 28).
1419 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 133-134; Schreuer (n 12) 374.
1420 UNCTAD (n 12) 63, 72.
1421 Muchlinski (n 40) 546.
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involve balancing of benefits the investor can gain from his investment with the risk
he voluntarily undertakes when making the investment.1422 The risk allocation will be
influenced here by whether the host State induced the investor to invest.
3. Specific Considerations: Legitimacy of Expectations Arising from
‘Commitments’
Reasonableness and legitimacy of investor’s expectations arising from
‘commitments’ was influenced by the specific circumstances of the cases in which
they were referred to. Tribunals found that the regulatory framework that included
‘commitments’ was designed and introduced with the specific purpose of inducing
foreign investors to invest in Argentina. 1423 Argentina actively pursued potential
investors1424 and deliberately sought to create expectations of a stable regulatory
framework capable of dealing with future economic crises.1425 This framework was
necessary because Argentina needed substantial capital, technology and know-how
to upgrade its public utilities.1426 To attract investors, due to its history of economic
instability, Argentina needed to convince them that their investments are safe from
such risks in the future.1427 Moreover, the tribunals treated this regulatory framework
as (re)presented1428 or offered to the investors by the host State, rather than mutually
negotiated.1429
As a result the ‘commitment’ approach did not require detailed assessment of
legitimacy and reasonableness of investor’s expectations. In the circumstances it
was found reasonable for the investor to attach great importance to the host State’s
1422 ibid 546-547, referring to the Barcelona Traction case, para. 99.
1423 Suez/Vivendi, para. 227.
1424 CMS, para. 134; Enron, para. 264; Suez/Vivendi, para. 30; El Paso, para. 84;
National Grid, para. 177; BG Group, para. 175; LG&E, para. 49.
1425 Enron, para. 264; Suez/Vivendi, para. 124, 227; Suez/InterAgua, paras. 112, 208;
EDF v Argentina, para. 1008; BG Group, para. 304; CMS, para. 134; LG&E, para. 49;
but see El Paso (paras. 392-404, 511-515, 517) where the tribunal found that Argentina’s
actions to attract investors were of political and commercial character and did not create
expectations of immutability but, somewhat contradictorily, found the regulatory
framework to constitute a commitment that the regulatory framework will not be totally
altered by the host State.
1426 Suez/Vivendi, paras. 30, 227; Suez/InterAgua, paras. 112, 208.
1427 Enron, para. 264; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 124, 234; Suez/InterAgua, paras. 112, 214;
El Paso, para. 82; National Grid, para. 176; BG Group, para. 304; LG&E, para. 133.
1428 Sempra, para. 103; BG Group, para. 298.
1429 CMS, para. 183; LG&E, paras. 52, 130; Enron, para. 262; Suez/InterAgua, para.
210; Suez/Vivendi, para. 231; National Grid, para. 174.
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commitments and rely on them to make the investment.1430 This reasonableness was
justified by ‘care and attention’ Argentina took to establish the legal framework1431
and by the statutory enshrinement of the ‘commitments’. 1432 Moreover, tribunals
assumed that without reliability of the ‘commitments’ no investor would have invested
substantive funds in Argentina.1433
Therefore, the context of the ‘commitments’ cases was exceptional. They neutralised
investors’ risk of economic instability arising from historical experience of Argentina’s
economic crises. They ‘created strong expectations of a long-term investment
subject only to de minimis political or regulatory risk.’1434 This meant that investors’
due diligence obligations were low and tribunals refused to engage in their
analysis.1435
4. Specific Considerations: Legitimacy of Expectations Arising from
‘Representations’
When investor’s expectations arise from representations, their legitimacy is
influenced by that investor’s unconscionable conduct vis-à-vis the host State.1436
Legal relevance of unconscionability is not limited to the concept of legitimate
expectations.1437 An investor seeking representations from the host State is obliged,
as a moving party, to disclose all relevant information. The scope of disclosure
follows from his due diligence of the applicable law and the surrounding
circumstances. If the information provided is incomplete and/or inaccurate and ‘puts
the reader on the wrong track’, the host State’s representations based on such
1430 Enron, para. 265; Suez/Vivendi, para. 231; Suez/InterAgua, para. 212; National Grid,
para. 178; LG&E, para. 133.
1431 Suez/Vivendi, para. 231; Suez/InterAgua, para. 212.
1432 Enron, para. 265; BG Group, para. 306.
1433 Suez/Vivendi, para. 231; Suez/InterAgua, para. 212; Sempra, para. 148; Enron,
para. 136. Pandya & Moody ((n 2) 18-19) criticise this approach as ‘vague’.
1434 EDF v Argentina, para. 1008.
1435 ibid, para. 1009; Suez/Vivendi, para. 234; Suez/InterAgua, para. 214; LG&E, paras.
133, 139.
1436 Muchlinski (n 40) 532) links this requirement of ‘clean hands’ with equitable character
of the FET protection. See also Potestà (n 2) 120-121; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 282
and Section D.1.
1437 Plama, paras. 133-146 (investor denied access to treaty protection due to
misrepresentation of its investment capacity); Azinian, Davitian, & Baca v The United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award of 1 November 1999 (for the
same reasons host State’s conduct not found to be in breach of IIA). See further
Muchlinski (n 40) 536-542; Mairal (n 5) 441-442.
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information are not procured in good faith and reliance on them is not reasonable.1438
Investor’s subjective interpretation of an agreement reached with the host State
cannot give rise to legitimate expectations, if he behaved disingenuously during
negotiations. Such investor cannot rely on his covert understanding of the agreement
when he officially agreed with all the negotiating parties about the meaning of the
relevant provision.1439
Repeated host State’s conduct showing leniency vis-à-vis the investor may not
create expectations of indefinite benevolence. When leniency in enforcement of tax
law was based on investor’s repeated but unfulfilled promises, the host State’s
repeated conduct does not create legitimate expectations of continued exemptions.
Therefore, reversal of State conduct once the authorities’ patience runs out does not
frustrate any legitimate expectations. 1440 Aninvestor will also struggle to prove
legitimacy of his expectations if the host State opposed his business activity ‘every
step of the way’.1441
Assessment of existence, reasonableness and legitimacy of expectations arising
from ‘representations’ often forms part of the same analysis. The type of factors
taken into account by tribunals to find whether investors’ expectations were
legitimate is illustrated by three examples.
In Duke, expectations of operational payment guarantees of a US investor and his
subsidiary arose from letters issued by the relevant ministry of Ecuador. The
guarantees were attached to power purchase agreements between the investor, his
subsidiary and a State-owned power distribution company. The ministry undertook to
pay for electricity in case the State-owned company defaulted on its payments. The
guaranteed payments were to be secured by a trust-based mechanism. The
ministry’s representation was not merely contractual. It engaged the State’s
responsibility and the ministry, not being the investor’s contractual partner,
intervened for the sole purpose of providing the guarantees. The expectations were
reasonable because the representations were a condition precedent of the
1438 Thunderbird, paras. 151-159 (especially if it concerns activity that may be illegal
under the host State’s law).
1439 Chemtura, para. 179.
1440 Oostergetel, paras. 243-244, 248, 269-270.
1441 Feldman, para. 149.
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investment, requested by the investor because he knew of the previous problems
with payment. The guarantees were also express and formulated in clear terms.1442
In OKO the tribunal found that investors’ expectations of loan repayment arose from
a letter from the relevant ministry in Estonia. The letter guaranteed the loan
repayment and was attached to a loan restructuring agreement between the
investors (commercial banks) and a state-controlled company. The expectations
were reasonable even though the letter did not constitute a guarantee under
Estonian law. The tribunal analysed in great detail circumstances justifying
legitimacy of investor’s expectations. They included: active participation of the
ministry in long-term loan restructuring negotiations, its good faith willingness to
secure payment of the loans, an analogous guarantee previously provided by the
ministry and its de facto control over the debtor.1443
In MTD the tribunal found that a preliminary approval of a foreign investment gave
rise to investor’s legitimate expectations of feasibility of that investment’s location.
The case concerned construction of a city in Chile. The project was approved by the
commission responsible for allowing foreign investments into the State. Investor’s
expectations did not arise from the facial reading of the approval but from two
elements inherent in the approval process. First, the commission coordinated inflow
of foreign investment at the highest ministerial levels. This implied ‘minimum of
diligence internally and externally’ before it granted the approval. Secondly the
approval process required the investor to specify location of the project which could
only be changed by a renewed approval.1444 Investor’s expectation was limited to the
feasibility of the investment’s location and did not extend to its successful
commencement or completion.1445
E. Protection of Investor’s Legitimate Expectations
1. Expectations Arising from the State of the Law at the Time of Investment
As shown above 1446 although it was suggested that frustration of legitimate
expectations based on the state of the law at the time of investment automatically
1442 Duke, paras. 359-363.
1443 OKO, paras. 39-40, 261-269.
1444 MTD, paras. 162-163.
1445 MTD, para. 163.
1446 See section C.1.
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breaches the FET standard, recent tribunals do not share this view, finding that
investors are not immune from regulatory change.
Does the FET standard nevertheless protect certain expectations arising from the
state of the law at the time of investment? Investors can expect that that law will
apply to them.1447 As a result, the regulatory framework at a given time creates
expectations of treatment, either favourable or unfavourable to the investor. These
law-based expectations must arise from law that is clear and not subject to
controversy. When this is not the case investor’s reliance on such law is not
legitimate. 1448 In Grand River the relevant law was unclear and ambiguous. Its
interpretation proposed by the investor was unsupported by judicial precedents and
practice 1449 and therefore could not engender a reasonable expectation’ of the
alleged treatment under the law.1450 In such cases investors should seek appropriate
clarifications from the host State.1451 Absent such clarifications, disputes concerning
unclear and ambiguous law belong to the jurisdiction of the host State’s courts.1452
To what extent are investors’ expectations that the law will apply to them protected
under the FET standard? Failure of the host State to apply it may, but does not have
to, constitute a breach of the standard.1453 This has to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. It is relevant whether the host State made good faith attempts to achieve
the objectives of its laws and regulations1454 or if, after discovering a misapplication
of its own law, took no further action affecting the investor.1455 Non-implementation of
a policy does not frustrate investor’s expectations if the failure to do so cannot be
attributed exclusively to the State.1456 However, the host State cannot excuse its
failure to apply the law by a ‘dearth of able administrators or a deficient compliance
1447 See Section D.1.
1448 See Section D.1.
1449 Grand River, paras. 139-143.
1450 ibid, para. 144.
1451 Unglaube, para. 253; Plama, paras. 219-220, 270; Metalclad, paras. 80, 85, 88;
Grand River, paras. 142-143; Mobil, para. 169. See also Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 26.
1452 EnCana, para. 200; Unglaube, para. 253; Grand River, para. 142; Feldman, para.
134. But see Metalclad (paras. 81-86) and Occidental (paras. 117-143) where tribunals
applied local law despite surrounding controversies.
1453 GAMI, paras. 91, 97.
1454 ibid para. 97.
1455 Unglaube, para. 254.
1456 GAMI, paras. 91, 110.
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culture.’1457 Most importantly, the assessment whether non-compliance with its own
law breaches the FET standard is not guided by ‘protection of legitimate
expectations’ but by an enquiry whether the host State’s conduct is ‘arbitrary,
discriminatory or otherwise shocking to the conscience.’ 1458 As a result, asking
whether an investor had legitimate expectations in this context adds nothing to such
enquiry.
The same applies to subsequent regulatory change. Protection against unfavourable
regulatory changes is limited to situations when an investor obtained specific
stabilization commitments to that effect.1459 Absent such commitments, an investor is
protected from regulatory changes it they are ‘unfair and inequitable’ 1460 ,
‘unreasonable’ 1461 , ‘arbitrary, grossly unfair or discriminatory, or otherwise
inconsistent with the customary international law standard’.1462 The host State enjoys
here an ‘acceptable margin of change’. 1463 If the investment is based on a
contractual or quasi-contractual relationship between the investor and the host State,
subsequent regulatory changes ‘should be made fairly, consistently and predictably’
and ‘[take] into account the circumstances of the investment.’1464 In practice, such
regulatory misconduct may be hard to prove.1465 If the changes fall within such
‘acceptable margin of change’, they may even create ‘unstable legal and business
framework’. 1466 Tribunals may require the host States to provide them with an
economic, social or other justification for the change.1467 All in all, absent specific
1457 ibid para. 94.
1458 Unglaube, paras. 253, 258; Toto, para. 244.
1459 Mobil, para. 169.
1460 Muchlinski (n 40) 551-552.
1461 El Paso, paras. 364, 370-371.
1462 Mobil, para. 153. See also: Parkerings, para. 332; Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D,
paras. 7, 15; Glamis Gold, paras. 761-762; Suez/InterAgua/Nikken and
Suez/Vivendi/Nikken, para. 36; Schreuer (n 12) 374-275.
1463 El Paso, para. 402.
1464 Electrabel, para. 7.77. Muchlinski ((n 43) 552) suggests that the host State may
breach this obligation by making ‘significant, unforeseeable and unannounced changes
in the law with the aim of ‘trapping’ an investor into giving up their investment as a result
of non-compliance.’
1465 Muchlinski (n 40) 552.
1466 Mobil, para. 153 (but see PSEG, para. 254). See also Glamis Gold, paras. 761-762,
809-811 (any regulatory changes not covered by specific assurances were outside the
tribunal’s mandate).
1467 El Paso, para. 372.
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stabilisation commitments, ‘expectations of stability’, are also not ‘protected
legitimate expectations’ engendered by the host State conduct.1468
Tribunals also found that the FET standard is breached when the legal framework
under which the investment was made had been totally altered.1469 This observation
refers to expectations arising from ‘commitments’ or expectations inherent in the
nature of long-term capital-intensive investments, whose profitability depends on
fees and prices regulated by the host State. 1470 In the latter case ‘legitimate
expectations’ of stability do not arise from the host State’s conduct but are inherent
in the investment’s character.1471
Legitimate expectations based on general conditions in which an investment was
made are merely an analytical tool, a starting point for the tribunal’s assessment of
facts, not a self-standing standard of review. 1472 Tribunals investigate the
circumstances in which the investment was made, enquiring whether they reflect
investor’s alleged expectations.1473 This methodology leads either to a finding of
expectations arising from specific undertakings, i.e. representations or
‘commitments’, and to a subsequent analysis of their protection.1474 Alternatively, it
leads to a finding that investor’s alleged expectations of stability, predictability or
other specific treatment are not supported by the circumstances of the case.1475 In
the latter situation an assessment whether the host State’s conduct was within the
‘acceptable margin of change’ is beyond the scope of the concept of legitimate
1468 It may be based on normative ‘legitimate expectations of fair and equitable treatment’
but such approach only creates confusion.
1469 El Paso, para. 374.
1470 Total, para. 122.
1471 This signals that to qualify for protection under the FET standard such total alteration
must fall outside the ‘acceptable margin of change’. This requires case-by-case
assessment and has not been tested in practice. Even tribunals referring to such
inherent normative expectation found that the host State’s conduct gave rise to
stabilising ‘commitments’. (Total, paras. 167-168, 175; El Paso, para. 517).
1472 Newcombe’s observation in relation to expropriation is also relevant here: ‘[a]
reference to the amorphous concept of legitimate expectation is the beginning of the
expropriation analysis, not its conclusion’.  (Newcombe (n 14) 48)
1473 Oostergetel, paras. 235-236.
1474 See sections b and c below.
1475 Oostergetel, paras. 233-236; Electrabel, para. 7.140; AES Summit, paras. 9.3.17-18;
EDF v Romania, para. 245; Parkerings, paras. 333-337; Methanex, Part IV, Chapter D,
para. 10; Mobil, paras. 158-171. But see El Paso (paras. 397-400, 517), where absent
specific representations the tribunal took the view that a number of provisions taken
together constituted a specific stabilising commitment.
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expectations. References to legitimate expectations in this context add nothing to the
tribunals’ methodology.1476
2. Expectations Arising from ‘Commitments’1477
Some tribunals observe in abstracto that frustration of expectations arising from
‘commitments’ by the host State’s non-compliance with its ‘commitments’ breaches
the FET standard.1478 However, their actual findings were more confined. They found
that Argentina frustrated investor’s expectations and breached the FET standard
when it completely dismantled the regulatory framework, including the ‘commitments’
specifically designed to guarantee investment’s stability and failed to offer viable
alternative arrangements. 1479 Paparinskis argues that this is one of only two
situations that shoud be regarded as covered by the concept of legitimate
expectations.1480
3. Expectations Arising from ‘Representations’
Some tribunals and commentators observe in abstracto that frustration of legitimate
expectations based on representations will or should be protected.1481 However,
other tribunals point out that in assessing whether investor’s expectations of stability
have been frustrated, one needs to take into account if the measures were
introduced in good faith, in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory fashion, and
whether they were of general application.1482 Moreover, it is important if the host
State frustrated investor’s expectations in pursuance of a public interest and
1476 See Section B.1.
1477 The specific conditions of the Argentinean economic crisis and the issue whether it
could have relied on the doctrine of necessity are outside the scope of our analysis.
1478 LG&E, para. 130; Sempra, para. 299; Suez/InterAgua, para. 204; Suez/Vivendi,
para. 223; EDF v Argentina, paras. 999, 1001; Potestà (n 2) 103.
1479 CMS, para. 277; LG&E, paras. 134-139; Enron, paras. 264, 266; BG Group, paras.
307, 309-310; El Paso, para. 517; National Grid, para. 179; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1)
289. Suez/InterAgua (para. 227) and Suez/Vivendi (para. 247) found that expectations
were frustrated by refusal to apply the framework, when it had not been dismantled.
1480 Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable
Treatment (Oxford University Press 2013) 240 (the other are State contracts); see also
Mairal (n 5) 439.
1481 Schreuer (n 12) 374; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134; Fietta (n 2) 389; Glamis Gold,
para. 22 (however, the tribunal added that the conclusion will depend on ‘the type or
nature of repudiation measures’ frustrating expectations); Snodgrass (n 2) 56; Téllez (n
1272) 436; Voss (n 1215) 204; Tudor (n 1143) 168.
1482 Continental, para. 261; Frontier Petroleum, para. 285.
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employed ‘measures to reduce the negative impact’ of its conduct on the
investment.1483 Others still observe that frustration of legitimate expectations based
on the host State’s ‘conduct’ may be relevant for the finding of a breach of the FET
standard1484, or ‘could’ give rise to the host State’s obligation to compensate the
investor1485, but does not mandate protection.
Finding of a breach of the FET standard based on representations is not frequent.1486
Tribunals that found such a breach took various approaches to the consequences of
that frustration. In OKO a claim for invalidation of the loan restructuring agreement
filed by the State-controlled company was ‘an act of gross bad faith’. Its
encouragement by the State constituted inconsistent, unfair and not even-handed
conduct, frustrating investors’ expectations and breaching the FET standard.1487 In
MTD the approval of investment location inconsistent with the host State’s own
policy was unfair and inequitable. However, the investor was partly to blame for his
investment’s failure as he did not perform due diligence of applicable law.1488 In
Metalclad the conduct in violation of host State’s representation contributed to the
breach the FET standard, resulting in expropriation of the investment.1489
Some commentators support the view that legitimate expectations based on the host
State’s conduct relied upon by the investor represent a ‘self-standing subcategory
and an independent basis for a claim.’1490 This approach was followed in awards
where legitimate expectations were found to arise from ‘commitments’. However,
these cases do not represent a general trend, since their circumstances were
unique. Tribunals using a more general category of ‘representations’ do not always
use legitimate expectations as a self-standing standard, and require that the host
1483 Continental, para. 261.
1484 Waste Management, para. 98; Newcombe & Paradell (n 1) 283.
1485 Thunderbird, para. 147.
1486 Duke, OKO, MTD, RDC. Earlier awards in which tribunals found a breach of the FET
standard in relation to investor’s reliance on representations but which did not refer to
legitimate expectations (CME, Tecmed and Metalclad) are also regarded as belonging to
this group. (Wälde (n 14) 387; Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 135-137).
1487 OKO, paras. 282-283.
1488 MTD, paras. 166, 242-243 (for this reason the tribunal decreased the damages by
50%).
1489 Metalclad, para. 99.
1490 Thunderbird/Wälde, para. 37; Snodgrass (n 2) 2; Fietta (n 2) 385.
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State’s conduct frustrating expectations is also arbitrary, inconsistent or results in an
expropriation.1491
F. Balancing Private and Public Interest
Recognition that investment tribunals must balance investor’s legitimate expectations
and the host State’s right to regulate in the public interest applies universally to
expectations arising from all three sources of legitimate expectations1492, namely the
state of the law at the time of investment 1493 , ‘commitments’ 1494 and
‘representations’.1495
If the host State did not make any specific stabilising representations, investor’s
expectations arising from the state of the law at the time of investment do not
outweigh the host State’s right to regulate in the public interest. The host State’s right
to regulate has to be exercised within the ‘acceptable margin of change’, which may
involve weighing of the public and private interests. Recent awards and commentary
point in particular to proportionality and margin of appreciation in relation to such
balancing.1496 However, such standard of review is outside the concept of legitimate
expectations.
Tribunals referring to legitimate expectations arising from ‘commitments’ were careful
to stress that their mandate was limited to assessing whether the host State violated
1491 Duke is an exception.
1492 UNCTAD (n 12) 72-77; McLachlan, Shore & Weniger (n 14) 239.
1493 El Paso, para. 358; Saluka, para. 305; Ulysseas, para. 249; Electrabel, para. 7.77;
AES Summit, para. 9.3.30; Plama, para. 177; Parkerings, para. 332.
1494 CMS, para. 277; BG Group, para. 298; Enron, paras. 104, 143, 261; Sempra, para.
168; Suez/InterAgua, para. 216; Suez/Vivendi, para. 236; EDF v Argentina, para. 1005;
El Paso, para. 358.
1495 Total, para. 123.
1496 e.g. Benedict Kingsbury, Stephan W Schill, ‘Investor-State Arbitration as
Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global
Administrative Law’ (2009) 14 ICCA Congress Series: 50 Years of the New York
Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference (Kluwer Law International 2009)
and ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in
the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality in Schill SW (ed), International
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010); William W
Burke-White, Andreas von Staden, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in
Investor-State Arbitrations’ in Schill SW (ed), International Investment Law and
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) and ‘Private Litigation in a
Public Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ (2010) 35 Yale J.
Int'l L. 283; Stefan Schill, ‘Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing
the Standard of Review’ (2012) 3 JIDS 577; Henckels (n 13); Zeyl (n 48).
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its legally binding commitments vis-à-vis the investor 1497 and did not cover the
general economic policy measures adopted by Argentina during the crisis.1498 The
tribunals found that through the ‘commitments’ Argentina limited its right to regulate
and it could only exercise it within the confines of the regulatory framework
underlying the concessions and licenses.1499 When it acted outside this framework, it
either frustrated investor’s expectations about the process applicable to the solving
of the relevant problems1500, or committed abuse of its regulatory discretion.1501 For
some tribunals the requirement to balance the public and private interests was
eliminated by their narrow understanding of their mandate, the existence of
‘commitments’ and by deliberate inducement of investments by Argentina.1502 In
finding a breach of the FET standard the tribunals did not find that these measures
were arbitrary or discriminatory. 1503 One tribunal even found that the measures
resulted from host State’s reasoned judgement, due consideration, a consultation
process and a justified need to avoid ‘full economic collapse’.1504 The award does not
reveal whether these findings were balanced with investor’s legitimate expectations
arising from ‘commitments’. The tribunal found that protection of expectations was
almost absolute, subject only to conditions of state of necessity.1505
1497 CMS, para. 124; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003
[CMS/Jurisdiction], paras. 27-29, 33; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 January 2004, para.
30; National Grid, paras. 138-139.
1498 CMS, para. 124; CMS/Jurisdiction, para. 33; LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital
Corp., LG&E International Inc. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 30 April 2004, para. 67.
1499 Suez/InterAgua, para. 217; Suez/Vivendi, para. 237; EDF v Argentina, para. 1005.
1500 Suez/InterAgua, paras. 222, 227; Suez/Vivendi, paras. 242, 247.
1501 Suez/InterAgua, para. 217; Suez/Vivendi, para. 237.
1502 Mairal (n 5) 445; National Grid, para. 179.
1503 CMS, para. 295; Enron, para. 281; Sempra, paras. 318-319 (tribunals found that
conduct was neither discriminatory nor arbitrary); LG&E, paras. 148, 162 (found
discrimination but not arbitrariness); BG Group, paras. 346, 360 (found that measures
unreasonable but not discriminatory).
1504 LG&E, para. 162. See also Enron, para. 268 and Sempra, para. 318 (recognising
that the measures were ‘guided by best of intentions’ but not enquiring into whether there
were any ‘good reasons’ for those measures which could justify frustration of
expectations).
1505 LG&E, para. 130.
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The need for such balancing was highlighted in recent awards concerning
‘commitments’.1506 It was important that the host State made reasonable attempts to
respect its commitments vis-à-vis the investor, e.g. by cooperating with him and by
restoring the contractual arrangements within a reasonable time after the crisis.1507
Tribunals also observed that the measures adopted by Argentina were too rigid and
restrictive. Less restrictive measures protecting the public and the private interests
were proposed but rejected and the host State showed uncooperative attitude
towards such proposals.1508
Some commentators suggest that protection of legitimate expectations arising from
‘representations’ should be weighed against the public interest represented by the
host State’s measures.1509 However, tribunals dealing with this type of expectations
do not engage in such balancing. 1510 In Duke, the non-implementation of the
payment guarantees breached the FET standard, even though it was not arbitrary
and the investor’s invoices ‘were paid, albeit late.’1511 Of the tribunals who found a
breach of legitimate expectations based on representations only the Tecmed tribunal
balanced investor’s expectation of continuation of his investment with the host
State’s measures that caused its permanent closure. It observed that the State
conduct was not justified by public health or environmental concerns and, in case
such concerns existed, the investor was not given an opportunity to address
them.1512
Absence of such balancing may be explained similarly to the analogous problem
under indirect expropriation. Tribunals might be unwilling to engage in politically
sensitive delimitation of the host State’s regulatory powers.1513 They may also view
‘representations’ or ‘commitments’ as analogous to contractual commitments and
their frustration akin to a breach of contract, and thus not requiring them to balance
public and private interests. Moreover, the additional requirement that the host State
1506 EDF v Argentina, para. 1005; Suez/Vivendi, para. 236; Suez/InterAgua, para. 216.
1507 EDF v Argentina, para. 1001-1002.
1508 Suez/InterAgua, para. 215; Suez/Vivendi, para. 235.
1509 Montt (n 44) 264; Snodgrass (n 2) 48; Téllez (n 1272) 441-442; Thunderbird/Wälde,
para. 30.
1510 Montt (n 44) 365.
1511 Duke, paras. 361, 364, 381, 448-449. However, no damages were awarded for this
breach due to lack of evidence.
1512 Tecmed, paras. 162, 173.
1513 Mairal (n 5) 445.
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conduct frustrating expectations cannot be arbitrary, inconsistent or otherwise unfair
and inequitable or expropriatory, may be viewed as eliminating the need for
additional balancing.
G. Conclusions
Legitimate expectations are perceived to be at the centre of the FET standard. As a
result, the concept had been tried and tested in multiple ways, many of them
controversial. A general rule emerging from these various applications is that the
more specific the conduct identified as a source of legitimate expectations, the more
acceptable it is that that subsequent frustration of such expectations may be worthy
of protection.
The concept is most problematic when used in the abstract. The idea of ‘legitimate
expectations of FET’ crosses the limit of the tribunals’ mandate to interpret vague IIA
provisions. It is based on a subjective and/or arbitrary identification of sub-standards
of State conduct that should be legitimately expected by investors as part of ITL.
This does not mean that the FET standard should not be understood as a standard
of good governance. However, the development of its constituent standards would
be less controversial if advanced on a case-by-case basis, allowing it to merge over
time into a more abstract rule. In such case the references to legitimate expectations
also would not add anything to such process.
The concept of legitimate expectations is less problematic when expectations arise
from specific representations and commitments, including contractual and quasi-
contractual ones. However, including formal State conduct such as licenses, permits
and contracts as a source of legitimate expectations that can give rise to protection
that differentiates ITL from the other legal systems analysed here. The latter do not
subsume a formal State conduct under the concept of legitimate expectations. Apart
from comparative questions, this broad catalogue of specific conduct giving rise to
legitimate expectations also raises questions about overlaps between the FET
standard and an umbrella clause, which is a standard designed for protecting State’s
compliance with its formal commitments.
By contrast, expectations arising from the state of the law at the time of investment
are a different type of legitimate expectations. They give rise neither to investor’s
immunity from subsequent regulatory change nor to specific promises vis-à-vis such
investor. They assist in identifying investor’s legal and factual position based on the
relevant circumstances. But this is only a starting point for a further analysis whether,
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against this factual and legal background, the host State conduct was unfair and
inequitable. Such breach of the FET standard would not be a frustration of legitimate
expectations but e.g. an arbitrary treatment.
Such analytical function of legitimate expectations closely resembles the US concept
of RIBE, where investor’s proprietary expectations are established by looking at the
factual and legal circumstances at the time the property was acquired. Both concepts
attracted criticisms for supporting regulatory freezes and favouring interests of
investors. This parallel reveals the conceptual door between indirect expropriation
and the FET standard. Should the FET standard be used as an extension of the
expropriation standard? Should the methodology used in an expropriation standard
be available under the FET standard? Should legitimate expectations under the FET
standard encompass expectations of property rather than, or in addition to,
expectations of treatment? These questions will be addressed in the next chapter.
The question of balancing between private and public interests constitutes a grey
area in investment treaty law. In theory, it is recognised that investors’ legitimate
expectations need to be balanced with the host States’ exercise of their sovereign
powers in the public interest. Such balancing, however, rarely happens in practice,
although the tribunals’ approach may be changing in this respect. The approach to
balancing differs from the approach taken by other legal systems analysed in
previous chapters. This disparity, as well as other comparative questions highlighted
above, will be addressed in chapter 8, to which we now turn.
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Chapter 8 The Legal Character of the Concept of Legitimate
Expectations in Investment Treaty Law – A Comparative
Analysis
A. Introduction
This chapter summarises the findings of chapters 3-7 and presents the comparative
contribution of the concepts of reasonable investment-backed expectations and
legitimate expectations to the development of the concept of legitimate expectations
in ITL. It attempts a typology of approaches to legitimate expectations, identifying
among them European and US approaches, legitimate expectations concerning
legislative changes, expectations arising from representations and expectations
arising in the context of invalidity of final administrative decisions. It further focuses
on the the common elements of the concept of legitimate expectations, among
others its rationale, protection, equitable character, legitimacy and balancing. The
chapter concludes by answering the question whether, in the light of this discussion,
the legal character of the concept of legitimate expectations is that of a general
principle of law, a rule of investment treaty law, an analytical tool, or merely a
relevant consideration in the tribunal’s reasoning.
B. Summary of the Survey
Chapters 3 to 7 of this thesis presented a number of major legal systems that use
the concept of legitimate expectations or RIBE. Viewed collectively, they do not
present a single coherent principle or a doctrine. Each approaches the concept to
reflect its own needs and purposes. Although the concept does not lend itself to
generalisations1514, this section highlights the specific aspects of the concept in these
legal systems.
US law 1515 uses RIBE as one of the crucial factors in determining regulatory
expropriation claims. RIBE represent owner’s expectations of his property in the light
of existing laws, regulations, usages and factual circumstances, and in the light of
the socially acceptable and constantly changing dimension of property. RIBE reflect
the tension between the property owner’s expectations of stable property rights and
the State’s right to regulate. They are always balanced against other factors
1514 Deuka/Trabucchi (n 725) 777.
1515 See Chapter 3, Section B.
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identified by the USSC on an ad hoc basis. They do not always feature in the Court’s
analysis and are usually not dispositive of the case result.
English law and Australian law1516 use the concept of legitimate expectations as a
manifestation of procedural fairness. Legitimate expectations give an individual
procedural protection, i.e. the ability to present his case before the authorities take a
decision that may negatively affect him. English law extends the concept to
substantive protection, requiring fulfilment of expectations of a substantive benefit.
Expectations can arise from specific as well as general conduct of the authorities, or
even from the very nature of the individual’s legal situation. However, substantive
protection of expectations is limited to representations.
In EU law1517 legitimate expectations are associated with three distinct areas of
enquiry, namely expectations of immunity from regulatory or legislative changes;
expectations as to the stability and legality of final administrative decisions; and
expectations engendered by representations of the authorities. The first two types of
expectations are attached to the very nature of the situation of change, namely a
regulatory change or retroactive invalidation of final administrative decisions.
Legitimate expectations arising from representations are similar to substantive
protection of expectations under English law.
The ECtHR1518 uses legitimate expectations in the context of deprivation of property
to elucidate the concept of ‘possessions’. Expectations arise here from situations
which, were it not for the actions of the State, would have constituted an enforceable
right or claim. Detrimental State actions consist of a retrospective invalidation of final
formal decisions or a retrospective legislative change.
In general international law1519 legitimate expectations support the scholarly analysis
of the binding nature of rules of international law, including estoppel, unilateral
declarations and Article 18 of the VCLT. It is also used in treaty interpretation, e.g. as
a tool safeguarding benefits agreed under a treaty from being undermined by
conduct consistent with the treaty’s letter but not its spirit.
Against this background, the concept of legitimate expectations in ITL1520 constitutes
a patchwork of ideas that can be linked to the legal systems mentioned above. It
1516 Chapter 3, Section C.
1517 Chapter 4, Section B.
1518 Chapter 4, Section C.
1519 Chapter 5.
1520 Chapters 6-7.
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links legitimate expectations with the state of the law at the time of investment and
with investor’s expectations of his investment’s stability. Further, it associates
legitimate expectations with the host State’s ‘representations’ and more vaguely
understood ‘commitments’. The concept operates predominantly under the FET
standard but also plays a subsidiary role under indirect expropriation.
C. Concepts Based on Legitimate Expectations: Typology
The legal systems analysed in chapters 3-7 do not represent a single uniform
concept of legitimate expectations. Based on this survey this section proposes a
typology of approaches informing further sections of this chapter.
1. European and US Approaches
The legal systems analysed in the preceding chapters are dominated by two
approaches that can be referred to as European and US. The European approach
looks at the conduct of the State as a source of expectations. It recognises that the
State does not operate in a vacuum and its conduct can create expectations in
others, be it other States, the State’s citizens, traders or foreign investors.
Expectations arise from reliance on that conduct, which needs to be specific.1521
Such reliance may have legal consequences when the State behaves inconsistently
with what was expected and expectations are found to be worthy of legal protection.
Protection may be justified because confidence manifested by reliance on the State
conduct is necessary to safeguard conditions conducive to co-operation.
Against this background, the US law concept of RIBE represents another major
approach to the concept of expectations. It roots them in the concept of property.
Expectations are inherent in a proprietary title and represent the scope of that title
vis-à-vis subsequent legislative and regulatory conduct of the State. These inherent
expectations of property are derived from a broad range of sources, including
legislation, administrative conduct and the factual background of a specific
investment.
The European and the US approaches represent different directions of analysis. The
former looks at a specific conduct of State authorities vis-à-vis an individual (or a
State) or a group of individuals (or States). It focuses on State conduct creating and
then frustrating legitimate expectations. The analysis under the US approach starts
1521 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b; Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter 5, Section C.1; Chapter
5, Section C.2.
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from an existing proprietary situation of an individual and tests his alleged proprietary
expectations against a broad legislative, regulatory and factual background. It
focuses on a proprietary situation of that individual and the social dimension of this
situation in light of subsequent legislative conduct of the State.
Due to these differences the two approaches need to be clearly distinguished.1522
Unfortunately, ITL conflates them, robbing the concept of legitimate expectations of
clarity and persuasiveness.1523 The concept of representations is narrow in the EU,
England and Australia. ITL extended it to a broad spectrum of State ‘conduct’. This
‘conduct’ may consist of any activity of the host State, from legislation, through
regulation, formal administrative acts, contractual undertakings, to informal
representations. This expansion is facilitated in at least three ways.
First, is the word ‘conduct’ can be interpreted broadly. In the narrow sense it
encompasses specific State behaviour vis-à-vis a specific person or persons. In a
broad sense it includes legislative or regulatory conduct vis-à-vis a broad or
unlimited group of persons.
Secondly, the ‘Tecmed test’, almost universally referred to by investment tribunals,
facilitates such expansion by its broad formula of ‘basic expectations that were taken
into account by the foreign investor to make the investment’.1524 No explanation was
ever offered as to its meaning, making it one of the ‘house-of-cards’-like
developments in ITL.1525 Tecmed’s approach to expectations is similar to the US
approach (RIBE). It therefore potentially puts investment tribunals on the wrong
track. It may direct them to engage in essentially proprietary analysis while applying
the FET standard, which is generally associated with due process.1526 The generally
understood ‘basic expectations’ should not be linked with the stronger legal
consequences attaching to expectations engendered by specific representations.
Lastly, the popular commentary by Dolzer & Schreuer merges the European and the
US approaches into one. Schreuer is inspired by EU law, specifically by the
requirement of legal certainty (transparency), traditionally linked with the concept of
1522 Fietta (n 2) 378.
1523 Chapter 7, Section C.2.
1524 Tecmed, para. 154; Chapter 7, Section C.2; Chapter 2, Section D.
1525 Chapter 2, Section D.
1526 Such misconceived approach facilitates arguments that the FET standard is a
standard of property protection protecting ‘vested rights’ (Chapter 6, Section D).
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legitimate expectations.1527 By contrast, Dolzer’s view is rooted in the RIBE-related
expectations arising from investor’s reliance on the legal framework existing at the
time of investment.1528 By putting these two distinct ideas together they created a
hybrid where expectations arise from the ‘legal framework’ consisting of ‘legislation
and treaties, of assurances contained in decrees, licenses and similar executive
assurances as well as in contractual undertakings’. 1529 This catalogue is clearly
reminiscent of the proprietary approach to expectations. Yet the commentators add
that a ‘reversal of assurances by the host state that have led to legitimate
expectations will violate the principle of [FET].’1530 Again, no explanation is offered as
to how these two distinct concepts should work, risking confusion in practice.
Tribunals recognise the confused nature of this approach and try to remedy it by
creating hierarchies of State conduct that can engender legitimate expectations.1531
However, the comparative perspective emerging from this thesis shows that the
differences are deeper than the type of conduct of the host State. They rest in the
different aims and directions of the underlying analyses. As a result, expectations
related to general legislative, regulatory or policy measures belong to a concept
distinct from the one linking expectations with specific representations.
This does not mean that the two approaches are clinically isolated. In Australia and
England legitimate expectations may arise ‘from the very nature’ of the individual’s
legal situation. In the EU and England protection of legitimate expectations covers
substantive legal situation of an individual. These circumstances may not be easily
distinguishable from the US proprietary analysis, except that the first offers only
procedural protection while the latter is limited to expectations arising from specific
representations. Similarly, sources of proprietary expectations in RIBE are not limited
to general laws, regulations or surrounding factual circumstances. They can also be
informed by specific formal and informal administrative actions. This creates
potential for confusion because specific conduct can be mistaken for a specific
representation, misdirecting the analysis from the US approach to the European
approach. Such high potential for confusion further justifies the making of a clear
distinction between the two approaches.
1527 Chapter 4, Section B.1; Schreuer (n 12) 374-379.
1528 Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 100-104; Chapter 7, Section C.2.
1529 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13) 134.
1530 ibid 134.
1531 Chapter 7, Section C.4.
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2. Legitimate Expectations and Representations
Legitimate expectations arising from representations are sometimes seen as the
equivalent of the concept of legitimate expectations.1532 It is also the most attractive
type of expectations because of the attached strong (substantive) protection and
thus its resemblance of a rule of law. This type can be found in the laws of the EU,
England and Australia, and in ITL.
In all these legal systems the general understanding of the concept of
representations is similar. They have no pre-defined form and there are no hard and
fast rules defining what State conduct will be treated as engendering legitimate
expectations.1533 Although virtually any official conduct of the authorities can have
such effect, certain hierarchy of conduct exists, reflecting the fact that unrecorded
oral representations are harder to prove (easy to deny).1534 Representations have to
be clear, precise and specific 1535 and thus cannot be conditional, qualified or
general. 1536 They also need to be directed to an individual or a group of
recipients.1537 ITL formulates analogous requirements.1538
The threshold of clarity and specificity is hard to pass and many cases fail on this
basis.1539 This is the case in ITL, too.1540 The English law observation that the more
specific the representation, the easier it is to find a legitimate expectation1541 was
echoed by investment tribunals.1542
An important feature of a representation is that it arises from informal, if official,
conduct of State administration. ITL demonstrates a clear tendency to expand
beyond this limitation. It primarily seeks to include contractual commitments among
expectations-engendering representations.1543 General legislative statements were
1532 E.g. Snodgrass (n 2); Pandya & Moody (n 2) 3; Fietta (n 2) 397.
1533 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter 3, Section C.2.b.
1534 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c.
1535 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter 3, Section C.2.b.
1536 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter 3, Section C.2.b.
1537 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b.
1538 Chapter 7, Section C.d.
1539 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b.
1540 Chapter 7, Section C.4.
1541 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b.
1542 Total, para. 121; Chapter 7, Section C.d.
1543 Chapter 7, Section C.d.
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also viewed earlier as equivalent to representations.1544 Additionally, claimants and
commentators attempted to subsume public international law concepts of estoppel
and unilateral declarations under the strong protection of legitimate expectations.1545
This trend of extending the strong legal protections to as broad a spectrum of State
conduct as possible goes beyond what is accepted in other legal systems. Since no
explanation is offered, it can result in the concept’s abuse. Alternatively, this
approach may be viewed as an attempt to utilise an existing public law concept in
the specific legal circumstances of a foreign investment, where there are no clearly
defined international law mechanisms of protection. An investment project usually
consists of intertwined contractual, administrative, regulatory and legislative
arrangements, i.e. of different types of host State conduct.1546 It is a complex legal
structure usually governed by the host State’s law. The concept of legitimate
expectations may provide legal meaning under IIAs to situations when some State
conduct upsets the bargain between the investor and the State reflected in this
complex legal structure.
Legislative arrangements as well as the international law estoppel and unilateral
declarations are distinguishable from the public law legitimate expectations based on
representations.1547 Although international law estoppel and unilateral declarations
cover State conduct corresponding to public law representations, they have their
own mechanism of application. Unilateral declarations refer to legitimate
expectations only as one of the factors that need to be balanced with State intent
and approach State conduct restrictively. 1548 Estoppel is generally reserved to
relationships between equals1549, while in a relationship between the State and an
individual the court needs to weigh the public and private interests when assessing
State conduct.1550
Thus, the key difference between ITL and other legal systems lies in including
contractual commitments among (informal administrative) representations. One
1544 Chapter 7, Section C.b, Chapter 7, Section C.d.
1545 Chapter 7, Section C.d; Mahnoush H Arsanjani, W Michael Reisman, ‘The Question
of Unilateral Governmental Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes’,
(2004) 19 ICSID Rev. 328.
1546 Wälde & Kolo (n 13).
1547 Section C.3.
1548 Chapter 5, Section C.1.
1549 Chapter 5, Section C.2; Chapter 3, Section C.3; Brown (n 5) 9-10.
1550 Chapter 3, Section C.3.
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approach to this purported expansion is not to apply the public law concept of
legitimate expectations to contractual obligations.1551 An alternative approach is to
apply it, respecting the general conditions of application of the public law concept of
legitimate expectations.1552 Tribunals would therefore need to consider and balance
all relevant circumstances of a particular case on an equitable basis, including
existence of an overriding public interest justifying frustration of expectations. The
contractual context is an important circumstance of this assessment. It means that
tribunals cannot use legitimate expectations ‘as a substitute for the actual
arrangements agreed between the parties, or as a supervening and overriding
source of the applicable law.’1553
This last comment ties with the Australian criticism of substantive protection of
legitimate expectations. Commentators pointed out that a court or tribunal cannot
usurp executive powers and has to act with restraint when assessing the substance
of representations.1554 An investment tribunal needs to consider this criticism when
applying the public law concept of legitimate expectations. In the contractual context
it highlights a prohibition of re-vising and re-writing of the bargain between the
investor and the State. This caution echoes the restraint towards the concept of
legitimate expectations by the WTO AB. It criticised the WTO panels for their
readiness to protect expectations of one party to a treaty arising from its subjective
reading of the treaty or its revisiting of treaty negotiations.1555
The expanded concept of representations triggers the question of potential conflicts
and overlaps within an IIA. First, an umbrella clause provides for observance of
commitments, including contractual ones, the State has entered into with the
investor.1556 Traditionally, contract-based legitimate expectations were linked with
such clauses, not with the FET standard.1557 If a tribunal uses legitimate expectations
1551 Montt (n 44) 363.
1552 See Section D.
1553 James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ (2008) 24 Arb. Int’l
351, 374.
1554 See Chapter 3, Section C.4.b; Chapter 3, Section C.5.
1555 See Chapter 5, Section B.2.
1556 On umbrella clauses see e.g. Hege Elisabeth Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor-State
Arbitration. The Interplay between National and International Law (Oxford University
Press 2013) 247-253; Anthony C Sinclair, ‘The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the
International Law of Investment Protection’ (2004) 20 Arb. Int’l 411.
1557 See e.g. Verhoosel (n 13) 463; Thomas Wälde, George Ndi, ‘Stabilizing International
Investment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation’ (1996) 31
Tex.Int’l L.J. 215, 247 et seq; Wälde & Kolo (n 13) 843.
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extending an FET standard to overlap with an umbrella clause, it creates uncertainty
that could affect the legitimacy of the tribunal’s interpretative exercise. 1558 The
question is equally valid if an umbrella clause of this type is absent from the relevant
IIA. Any decision has to be persuasively explained.1559 Secondly, the tribunal needs
to consider on what terms such an extension should subsume contractual analysis
under its treaty-based mandate. Caution is required not to allow legitimate
expectations to form a covert method of importing contractual claims under the
mechanism reserved for treaty-circumscribed claims. So far there is no clear method
of distinguishing whether a contract-related claim falls in or outside the tribunal’s
mandate.1560
3. Legitimate Expectations and Legislative Change
Another type of legitimate expectations concerns legislative measures. This type of
expectations is addressed in the US1561, the EU1562, the ECHR regime1563, and in
ITL.1564
As a rule, individuals do not have an expectation that the law in force at a given time
will not change, but rather an expectation that the law will change. It is generally not
unfair for a State to change its laws, and arguments based on reliance on existing
law represent only one side of the argument about change.1565 Certain stability of law
is embedded in the very idea of a legal system and the rule of law.1566 As a result,
expectations of some stability of law need to be balanced with the State’s need to
change it. This rule had not been obvious to the early investment tribunals, but the
current state of ITL is in agreement with the other legal systems on this point.1567
1558 Franck (n 193) Chapter 4.
1559 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 196.
1560 For a cautious approach see e.g. Parkerings, para. 344 and Impregilo, para. 294.
1561 Chapter 3, Section B.
1562 Chapter 4, Section 2.a.
1563 Chapter 4, Section C.2.b.
1564 Chapter 7, Section C.b, E.a.
1565 Chapter 4, Section B.2; Chapter 4, Section B.3.c; Chapter 4, Section B.2.a; Chapter
7, Section C.2; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard’ (n 5) 100-104.
1566 Chapter 3, Section C.1; Chapter 4, B.1, p.2; Chapter 5, Section A; Chapter 7,
Section B.
1567 Chapter 7, Section C.2.
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Legitimate expectations tied to legislative changes concern prospective and
retrospective changes, including those that are immediate, sudden and
unexpected.1568
The comparative perspective shows general acceptance that law can always change
prospectively, including to the detriment of an individual. Such expectations are
particularly inherent in the business environment.1569 Legislation enables existence of
a complex market, at a national1570 and an international level.1571 Access to that
market is a benefit granted by the authorities in return for which an entrepreneur
accepts that the underlying laws 1572 and policies1573 may change in response to
economic, scientific, social, political or other developments. 1574 Courts give
deference here to the discretionary powers of the regulators to choose appropriate
solutions to address changing circumstances.1575 Entrepreneurs are expected to be
aware of this context and thus capable of foreseeing some legislative changes.1576
In certain cases prospective legislative change may frustrate expectations worthy of
protection. This may happen when a State expressly shields the individual’s
beneficial position from such change. Such protection may be derived from formal
decisions, specific assurances and formal approvals1577, as well as from specific
shielding legislation 1578 or special regulation-based arrangements with the
authorities.1579 To determine whether such protection should be granted, courts need
to take into account all relevant circumstances. In the EU such expectations can be
overridden by public interest.1580 US law will determine protection by balancing of a
1568 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a.
1569 Chapter 3, Section B.4.a.
1570 Chapter 3, Section B.4.a; Section Chapter 3, B.4.b.
1571 Chapter 4, Section B.1.
1572 Chapter 3, Section B.4.b; Chapter 4, Section B.2.a.
1573 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b.
1574 Analogies with RIBE must be treated with caution here, since gros concern real
property which is not subject to this access-to-market benefit assumption. (Chapter 3,
Section B.4.a)
1575 Section D.5.
1576 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a; Chapter 3, Section B.4.b.
1577 Chapter 3, Section B.3.b.
1578 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a.
1579 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a.
1580 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a.
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number of different factors as part of the Penn Central test.1581 Such shielding is
never absolute.
Investment tribunals demand specific stabilising commitments as a protection from
legislative or policy changes.1582 The comparative exercise shows that tribunals need
to make clear that such commitments are not the same as ‘representations’1583, as
these two concepts are distinct. Stabilising commitments usually take a form of
contractual stabilisation clauses, a phenomenon the other legal systems do not
address. In ITL the question is whether stabilisation commitments should be
analysed under an umbrella clause or under the FET standard. So far investment
tribunals have been finding that it is unfair and inequitable to completely renege on
stabilisation commitments by dismantling entirely the contractual structure of
investment.1584
Recent ITA practice shows acceptance of a greater deference towards host
States.1585 Such developments are strongly supported by commentators.1586 A clear
approach is particularly needed when the tribunals’ decision would endorse a result
effecting a regulatory freeze. US law shows that such clarity is required to avoid
suspicion of judicial activism or imposing personal ideological predilections about the
role of the State in shaping the market.1587
The comparative perspective also shows that it is generally unfair to change laws
retrospectively, unexpectedly and with immediate effect.1588 EU law stresses that a
legislative change is generally not unfair if it provides for transitional measures. To
excuse retroactivity changes must be necessary for achieving the public policy goal
sought by the regulator. However, the requirement to employ transitional measures
may be overridden by public policy concerns.1589 The practice of ECtHR also shows
that retroactive laws cannot be used by the State to extinguish established claims
1581 Chapter 3, Section B.4.a.
1582 Chapter 7, Section E.1.
1583 Chapter 7, Section C.2.
1584 Chapter 7, Section E.1.
1585 Chapter 7, Section E.1.
1586 See e.g. Zeyl (n 48), Pandya & Moody (n 2).
1587 Chapter 3, Section B.1.b; Chapter 3, Section B.5.b.
1588 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a.
1589 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a.
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pending against it. Only in such situations claimants have legitimate expectations
based on reliance of the law existing at the time when their claim arose.1590
Investment tribunals often refer to legitimate expectations as arising from the law in
force at a given point of time.1591 Absent special shielding arrangements, these are
‘expectations-weak sense’1592 – a mere delineation of the factual and legal scope of
the investment. They resemble the static concept of legal certainty rather than
dynamic expectations. Such references are superfluous1593 and may be misleading
by suggesting existence of a factual situation worthy of some special protection.1594
They create a ground for manufacturing ‘vested rights’ deserving such protection1595,
while in fact no special legal consequences are attached to them.1596 If ITL aims at
developing clear and persuasive concept of legitimate expectations, the use of the
term in these circumstances may be incorrect. In case of frustration of such
‘expectations’ the standard applicable should be that of arbitrariness and
discrimination.1597
4. Legitimate Expectations and Ultra Vires
Protection of expectations arising from informal representations made ultra vires or
from formal administrative acts that are subsequently invalidated represents another
type of legitimate expectations spanning a number of jurisdictions. 1598 These
expectations are not connected with the content of a specific act, but rather with its
legality. They concern formal administrative decisions and informal representations.
With regard to revocation of final administrative decisions EU law refers to legitimate
expectations of legality and stability of a situation created when such decision is
made.1599 This reveals that legitimate expectations do not arise from any particular
source but are inherent in this type of situation.
1590 Chapter 4, Section C.2.b.
1591 Chapter 7, Section C.2.
1592 Montt (n 44) 222.
1593 Snodgrass (n 2) 56.
1594 Chapter 7, Section C.2.
1595 Chapter 6, Section D.
1596 Montt (n 44) 222, 362; Schill (n 1221) 28.
1597 Chapter 7, Section E.1.
1598 Chapter 3, Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.2.b; Chapter 4, Section B.2.c.
1599 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b.
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Invalidity of a formal administrative decision or an informal representation can occur
when the State authorities exceed their powers. The policy reason for not upholding
expectations in such a situation is to prevent the authorities from extending their
statutory powers through their own actions.1600 This approach is the expression of
the rule of law.1601 It corresponds with the requirement that representations must be
made by an authorised person properly applying applicable law.1602
Informal representations that are ultra vires cannot give rise to legitimate
expectations.1603 Formal administrative decisions that are ultra vires may engender
legitimate expectations. This is illustrated by the rules applying to revocation of final
administrative decisions in EU law 1604 and the ECtHR jurisprudence concerning
situations tainted with nullity, voidness or illegality.1605 Foreseeability and reliance are
the key components of the test here.
Formal acts that are subsequently invalidated can give rise to legitimate expectations
if its addressee did not contribute to their illegality and could not have foreseen it at
the time when these acts took place.1606 The assessment is made on a case-by-case
basis considering a number of factors.1607 The EU Courts observe that individuals
are generally not best placed to foresee the invalidity. However, the ‘prudent trader’
standard does not exempt the courts from scrutinising whether the individual was
aware of the illegality.1608
The conduct of State authorities after issuing and before the invalidation of the
formal act may be relevant for the finding that the act gave rise to legitimate
expectations worthy of protection. Detrimental reliance is an important element
here1609 and the analysis is similar to estoppel. It may therefore be relevant that
between the formal act’s issuance and its invalidation the individual exercised his
1600 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b; Chapter 3, Section C.3.
1601 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b; Chapter 3, Section C.3. English law refers here to ‘illegal
legitimate expectations’ preferring to view protection through the prism of fairness rather
than legal certainty.
1602 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter 3, Section C.3.
1603 Chapter 3, Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.2.c.
1604 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b.
1605 Chapter 4, Section C.2.a.
1606 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b; Chapter 4, Section C.2.a.
1607 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b.
1608 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b.
1609 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter 4, C.2.a.
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rights and obligations arising from that formal act, and that the State authorities
benefited from that exercise e.g. by way of rents or taxes. In other words, it is
relevant that the individual relied on the formal act to his detriment and/or to the
benefit of the State. Moreover, it is relevant if both of the parties were entitled to
assume that the formal act is legally binding.1610 This approach is well established in
international law.1611
The question of ultra vires is problematic in ITL. It spans expropriation and FET
claims, although it originates in the former.1612 Tribunals are not clear about the
extent to which the requirement of investor’s due diligence should contribute to the
assessment of whether he could have foreseen the future invalidation of the formal
act. 1613 The concept of legitimate expectations places strong emphasis on the
expectations existing at the time of investment and requires diligent analysis of that
law.1614 However, tribunals facing the question of retrospective invalidations rarely
analyse these elements. They rely on Article 32 of the Articles on State
Responsibility1615 and Article 27 of the VCLT1616 that prohibit the State from relying
on its own law to excuse violation of its international law obligations.1617 They also
refer to SPP v Egypt, where the tribunal stated that actions ‘cloaked with the mantle
of Governmental authority’ give rise to legitimate expectations. These expectations
are protected under international law and relevant when the underlying actions are
later retrospectively invalidated.1618 These references do not explain why the national
law context and the investor’s presumed awareness of it should be completely
ignored in such cases. National law forms part of the State’s international obligation
1610 Chapter 4, Section C.3.
1611 Shufeldt claim, pp. 1079-1102. Chapter 6, Section D.
1612 Chapter 6, Section D.
1613 Chapter 7, Section C.4.
1614 Chapter 7, Section D.
1615 ‘The responsible State may not rely on the provision of its internal law as a
justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this part.’ (Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Act, Draft Articles adopted by the International Law
Commission in 2001, 2001 U.N.Y.B.I.L.C. Vol. II.2).
1616 ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty.’
1617 Compare e.g. Kardassopoulos/Jurisdiction, paras. 195-194; RDC, paras 116-123,
222-236 and Arif, paras. 539-549.
1618 SPP, paras. 82-85. The tribunal did not clarify whether the protected expectations
concern legality of the State acts or success of the investment.
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under IIAs and therefore its role goes beyond being a source of excuses of
international liability.
The comparative exercise shows that the responsibility for the invalidity of a formal
administrative act does not rest entirely on the shoulders of the State authorities.
Considering this approach investment tribunals should therefore ask whether the
investor should have foreseen the invalidity of the formal act at the time when it was
issued and whether such invalidation, if pronounced by a competent State organ,
was not arbitrary, abusive or in denial of justice. Such an approach is in line with the
view that the FET standard reflects the standard of good governance1619 or the rule
of law.1620 An approach de facto exempting investors from any responsibility for the
host State’s acts that are ultra vires, regardless of the circumstances that gave rise
to such illegality, could legitimise negligent, abusive or corrupt conduct by foreign
investors.1621 This would contradict the equitable nature of legitimate expectations.
The comparative exercise shows that tribunals should be wary to attach legal
consequences to illegal informal representations. Their assessment of legitimate
expectations in ultra vires situations must consider investor’s due diligence, his
contribution to the situation of illegality and his ability to foresee it. If the competent
State organs found a State act to be invalid, investment tribunals should investigate
whether the actions leading to the invalidation were arbitrary, abusive or in denial of
justice.1622
D. Common Elements
1. General Observations
The differences discussed in the preceding section do not mean that the concepts of
RIBE and legitimate expectations do not share any characteristics. This section
identifies three common elements, while sections 2-5 concentrate on those meriting
broader analysis, namely: rationale, equitable character, legitimacy and balancing.
1619 Muchlinski (n 164) 48; Suez/InterAgua/Nikken and Suez/Vivendi/Nikken, para. 20;
Wälde (n 14) 385-386.
1620 Schill (n 1221); Vandevelde (n 165).
1621 Jan Paulsson, ‘The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to Foreigners’
(2010) 1 JIDS 341, 351. Montt (n 44) 364.
1622 The approach of the RDC tribunal should be preferred here over the one’s applied by
the Arif tribunal.
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First, in all of the legal systems the expectations-related concepts are judge-made.
Although in general international law the concept of legitimate expectations was
mainly developed by scholars 1623 , courts and tribunals also play a role in its
development.1624
Secondly, all approaches highlight expectations of the expectations-holder. They do
not concentrate, sometimes deliberately, on the intention of the State undertaking
the conduct that is being relied upon. This poses a risk of an undue concentration on
one side of the legal relationship. In practice, as shown below, the courts approach
the alleged expectations in an objective way.
Thirdly, the concepts are related to the question of risk allocation. Courts and
tribunals applying RIBE and legitimate expectations face a challenge of deciding how
the regulatory risk is allocated between the individual and the State in particular
circumstances.1625 Relevant considerations may include how much risk was inherent
in a given context1626, whether the State interfered in the entrepreneur’s decision-
making process to induce him to take greater risk, or whether the risk was voluntarily
undertaken.1627
2. Rationale
The rationale for the protection of legitimate expectations results largely from
scholarly elaboration.
In explaining the rationale of extending legal protection to legitimate expectations,
the European approach focuses on the protection of trust or confidence of members
of a given society or community in the consistency, certainty or predictability of State
conduct.1628
There are at least three dimensions to this rationale. First, that interactions giving
rise to expectations worthy of protection occur in a context of a given society or
1623 Chapter 5, Sections A-B.1.
1624 Chapter 5, Section B.2; Chapter 5, Section C.1.
1625 Chapter 3, Section B.2.
1626 Chapter 3, Section B.4.a; Chapter 4, Section B.2.a; Chapter 4, Section C.3; Chapter
7, Section D.1.
1627 Chapter 3, Section B.4.b; Chapter 4, B.2.a; Chapter 4, Section B.5.2.c; Chapter 6,
Section D; Chapter 7, Section D.2.
1628 Chapter 3, Section C.1; Chapter 4, Section B.1.
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community bound by the law giving protection to expectations, be it international,
supranational or national law.1629
Secondly, the protection of expectations aims at facilitating cooperation between the
members of that community, be it a community of equals 1630 or a relationship
between citizens and public administration.1631 That protection preserves conditions
of good administration or good governance, enabling operation of the law in a
cooperative, non-abusive and non-coercive manner.1632
Thirdly, the European approach ties protection of expectations with legal certainty by
highlighting consistency and predictability of State conduct. However, while legal
certainty is a static concept, addressing the clarity of law at a given point of time, it
does not address the question of State conduct over time, which is inherent to the
concept of expectations. As a result, although the concept of legitimate expectations
acknowledges the need for legal certainty, predictability and stability of law, it
requires them to be balanced with the inevitable changes over time, related to the
operation of the State.1633
The concepts related to deprivation of property are less useful here because they
subsume the concept of legitimate expectations within the broader rationale of
property protection. However, they also take into account the social context of
property rights, ability of the citizens to rely with confidence on specific State
conduct, and the need for balancing of expectations with the State’s right to
regulate.1634
ITL recognises the protection of trust and confidence as a broad rationale for
protection.1635 However, tribunals prefer to tie legitimate expectations to good faith,
an aspect discussed in the next section. The comparative exercise shows the
potential for exploration of the social dimension of investment protection. It poses the
question of what ‘community’ or ‘society’ should be taken into account as the scope
1629 See e.g. Chapter 5, Section A.
1630 Chapter 5.
1631 Chapter 4, Section B.1; Chapter 3, Section C.1.
1632 Chapter 3, Section C.1; Chapter 4, B.1, Chapter 4, Section B.2.a; Chapter 5, Section
C.1.
1633 Chapter 3, Section C.1, p. 25; Chapter 4, Section B.1; Chapter 5, Section A; Chapter
5, Section B.
1634 Chapter 3, Section B.3.b; Chapter 3, Sections B.4.a-b; Chapter 3, Sections C.1-
C.2.b.
1635 Chapter 7, Section B.
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of this protection: the ‘community’ of a host State and all foreign investors it admitted
and regulates; the society governed by the State, which includes foreign investors, or
the international community of States and foreign investors? The answer to this
background question will influence the persuasiveness of the specific protection
granted by tribunals on a case-by-case basis.
The rationale for protecting expectations does not go as far as to provide a test of
application of the concept of legitimate expectations.1636 The way in which it should
be applied can be glimpsed from the concepts’ essentially equitable character, to
which we now turn.
3. Equitable Character
The concept of legitimate expectations is equitable in character. Equity refers to
fairness1637 in judicial decision-making and concerns application of principles that
allow for achieving justice where existing rules and principles are inadequate.1638
Equity in international law may be understood as the application of general principles
of justice1639 or principles representing the values of the system.1640
A number of features reflect the equitable character of legitimate expectations. First,
the concept answers to the calls for fairness and justice. In England and Australia it
developed as a concept of fairness in public administration.1641 The substantive
protection in English law targets situations where frustration of expectations ‘is so
unfair as to be a misuse of the authority’s power’.1642 EU law associates it with the
principles of fairness and justice1643 and its Courts use legitimate expectations when
‘going one way in a particular case would be inequitable, or economically
unsound’. 1644 RIBE apply when the change of the law affecting proprietary
expectations is unfair1645, and its role is to serve fairness and justice in the relations
1636 Chapter 3, Section C.1; Chapter 5, Section A.
1637 The Law Dictionary (Anderson Publishing 2002).
1638 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (Lexis Nexis 2010) (online edn).
1639 As distinct from application of law (Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Role of Equity in
International Law’ (1988-1989) 12 Aust YBIL 54, 54)
1640 Shaw (n 1089)106.
1641 Chapter 3, Section C.1.
1642 Couglan, p. 251; Chapter 3, Section C.4.b.
1643 Chapter 4, Section B.1.
1644 Sharpston (n 728) 160 and (n 853) 103.
1645 Chapter 3, Section B.3.c.
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between the State and property owners. 1646 In ITL the concept of legitimate
expectations operates within the broader concept of the FET standard, perceived as
a general standard of justice.1647 Its application is subsumed under the general
requirement of fairness in international law.1648
Secondly, the concept is applied to situations not recognised by law as clearly
established rights1649, formal administrative acts1650 or obligations1651, to which there
is a remedy under law. It applies where the existing law or doctrine is too rigid,
uncertain or unclear.1652 In the Anglo-Saxon legal systems the concepts developed in
response to overly rigid doctrinal divisions that left some situations worthy of
protection without remedies in law.1653
Thirdly, application of the concepts does not follow any prescribed tests and
depends on the circumstances of a particular case. As a result, it is often referred to
as an approach based on common sense, pragmatism and logic.1654 It gives courts
and tribunals broad discretion.
Fourthly, use of the concept of legitimate expectations requires that the individual
acts fairly and in good faith vis-à-vis the authorities. He must fully disclose any
information relevant for an informed and valid representation1655 and cannot act in a
misleading, fraudulent or deceptive way.1656 Legitimate expectations cannot arise if
the individual contributed to illegality of the formal act.1657 In ITL the requirement of
investor’s good faith is included in the ‘caveat investor’ rule.1658 The requirement of
good faith and conscionable conduct applies also to the State.1659 It is relevant that it
tries in a reasonable time and in good faith to remedy the situation caused by
1646 Chapter 3, Section B.4.c and Section B.5.b.
1647 Chapter 7, Section B.
1648 Chapter 7. Section F.
1649 Chapter 3, Section C.1; Chapter 4, Section B.1; Chapter 4, Section C.2.a.
1650 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c.
1651 Chapter 5, Section B.2.
1652 Chapter 4, Section C.1.
1653 Chapter 3, Section C.1; Chapter 3, B.1.b.
1654 Chapter 3, Section B.5.b; Chapter 3, B.5.c; Chapter 4, B.5.
1655 Chapter 3, Section C.3.
1656 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b; Chapter 4, Section B.3.
1657 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b; Section C.4 of this Chapter.
1658 Chapter 8, Section D.a; Chapter 8, Section D.4.
1659 Chapter 4, Section C.2.b.
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frustration of expectations e.g. by offering alternative arrangements or correcting
illegality.1660 ITL follows a similar path.1661
Application of this equitable concept brings problems with its predictability and
vagueness.1662 The Anglo-Saxon commentators complain that it is too uncertain and
may encourage arbitrariness, judicial activism or ideological bias.1663 Because there
is no authoritative indication of the point of balance, the concept can easily veer into
circularities, favouring either the expectations-holder or the State. 1664 For these
reasons some see it as superfluous1665 and meriting abandonment.1666
However, because the concepts are inherently flexible and prone to controversy
courts apply them with caution. They strive to weigh and balance all relevant
circumstances and interests and assess expectations in an objective way. Thus,
although many claims are based on the concept of legitimate expectations, not many
succeed.1667
Commentators also monitor the borders of the concept. They criticise the uses that
add nothing to the established rules and that compromise the concepts’ own clarity
and integrity. 1668 A second instance of judicial scrutiny also adds to such
monitoring. 1669 It can correct developments that corrupt the concepts’ equitable
nature, veer into judicial activism and overly favour one of the sides of the
expectations-related relationship. Absence of such a mechanism in ITA1670 places a
great burden on investment tribunals to self-monitor their use of legitimate
1660 Chapter 4, Section B.2.b.
1661 Chapter 7, Sections E.1 and E.2-3.
1662 e.g. Chapter 4, Section B.4; Chapter 5, Section A.
1663 Chapter 3, Section B.1.b; Chapter 3, Section B.5.b and Section B.5.c; Chapter 3,
Sections C.1 and C.4.b; Chapter 5, Section B.2.
1664 Chapter 3, Sections B.3.c and B.4.c.
1665 Chapter 5, Section A.
1666 Chapter 3, Section B.5.c.
1667 Chapter. 3, Section B.5.c; Chapter 3, Section C.1, Chapter 3, Section C.4; Chapter
4, Section B.4.
1668 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b; Chapter 4, Section C.2.b.
1669 Chapter 3, Section B.4.c; Chapter 5, Section B.2.
1670 Use of the concept of legitimate expectations will not be a reason for annulment. The
ad hoc Committee can offer critique ‘for posterity’ (Christoph Schreuer et al, The ICSID
Convention. A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2009) 1040) and thus has
moral rather than factual power in the control of the concept’s use. See e.g. MTD
Annulment (paras. 67-71).
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expectations. Failure to do so may cause tensions among system participants and
may take longer to correct.
The equitable character of the concept of legitimate expectations indicates that
tribunals should use it cautiously, in particular in situations where there is a clearer
alternative. Marking clear boundaries of the concept would contribute to its
persuasive development. This is particularly desirable because ITL is developing in
many directions which often overlap, creating inconsistencies, uncertainty,
unpredictability and a risk for abuse.
4. Legitimacy of Expectations
Legitimacy of expectations concerns the question whether expectations are
legitimate and/or reasonable and therefore possibly worthy of protection. There is no
general test for the assessment of legitimacy or reasonableness but certain factors
are commonly taken into account.
Legitimacy of expectations depends the context and all relevant circumstances
surrounding the State conduct allegedly giving rise to expectations, as well as the
State conduct that allegedly frustrates them. 1671 In the business context, these
circumstances concern regulatory, political, economic and social conditions of doing
business and of dealing with the authorities.1672 As a rule, legitimate expectation can
only arise from conduct of an authorised person acting in accordance with relevant
law.1673
A court assesses legitimacy of expectations through an objective interpretation of the
State’s conduct that allegedly gave rise to those expectations. It analyses it in light of
all relevant circumstances.1674 The courts stress that legitimate expectations must be
well-founded1675 and must be something more than a ‘unilateral hope’ or an ‘abstract
need or belief’.1676
To assess the ways in which an individual could have reasonably understood the
conduct allegedly giving rise to his expectations, the courts consider the level of
1671 Chapter 3, Section C.3.
1672 Chapter 4, Section B.1; Chapter 4, Section B.2.a; Chapter 5, Section B.2.c.
1673 Chapter 3, Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; But see Section C.4 of this
Chapter.
1674 Chapter 3, Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.2.c.
1675 Chapter 4, Section B.2.c.
1676 Chapter 3, Section B.3.a.
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knowledge, prudence or sophistication expected of a person of a given kind. With
regard to professional entities, such as traders or business people, the courts usually
set a relatively high standard of awareness of their area of operation.1677 The EU law
‘prudent trader’ standard sets a particularly high bar for traders.1678
Seen through this prism, the courts assess whether the expectations-holder was
able to realise that the conduct allegedly giving rise to expectations was not so
intended or illegal; whether he could foresee the subsequent conduct frustrating his
expectations1679; or whether he could obtain relevant assurances or clarifications
from the authorities1680 or legal advice. It is relevant that the individual acted fairly
and in good faith vis-à-vis the authorities1681, and that he relied on the conduct
engendering his legitimate expectations.1682
Investment tribunals generally follow this course in assessing legitimacy of investors’
expectations.1683 There is no mechanical test allowing for taking these factors into
account in a consistent manner. Investment treaties mix and match factors from
various legal systems, as attested by the US-law inspired argument concerning
regulatory environment introduced in Methanex.1684 The main problem appears to be
the formulation of a standard of knowledge (standard of reasonableness) required
from foreign investors. The existence of such a standard, akin to, but not necessarily
as high as EU law ‘prudent trader’ standard, would allow for a more predictable
assessment of how IIAs allocate risk between foreign investors and host States. The
extreme side of this problem is shown by some of the Argentinean ‘commitments’
awards, where the question of investors’ due diligence in entering and negotiating
the investment projects was essentially dismissed.1685 On the other hand, investment
tribunals to not deal with a single investment area and the conditions of investing
differ from case-to-case. The tribunals seem to be left with a case-by-case
construction of the standard of prudence or reasonableness required from a foreign
investor, based on the conditions in which that investor invested and his specific
1677 Chapter 3. Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter 4, Section B.3.
1678 Chapter 4, Section B.3.
1679 Chapter 3, Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.2.b.
1680 Chapter 3, Section C.3.
1681 Chapter 3, Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.3.
1682 Chapter 3, Section C.3; Chapter 4, Section B.2.b.
1683 Chapter 6, Section D; Chapter 7, Section D.a.
1684 Chapter 3, Section B.4.b; Chapter 7, Section D.1.
1685 Chapter 7, Section D.3.
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relations with the host State giving rise to the alleged expectations and their alleged
frustration. That assessment must be clearly and persuasively presented in the
award.
Assessment of legitimacy or reasonableness of expectations is linked with the
balancing of the individual’s interest with the public interest that is at stake in the
circumstances. To this issue we turn now.
5. Balancing
Balancing is an important element of the operation of the concept of legitimate
expectations. Legitimate expectations limit flexibility of the exercise of sovereign
powers but do not eliminate it. The two interests cannot be fully satisfied at the same
time and their relation is a matter of degree influenced by the circumstances of a
particular case.
Public interest underlying the State conduct frustrating legitimate expectations can
override or outweigh the private interest behind legitimate expectations. A concern
with such overriding public interest is an inherent element of the concept of
legitimate expectations as well as RIBE. Existence of this factor is a permanent
feature of analysis in the expropriatory and non-expropriatory contexts and it applies
to all types of expectations in public law.1686
In balancing the two interests, courts at a national, supranational and international
level leave a broad margin of discretion to the authorities.1687 They admit to not being
best suited to second-guess the substantive administrative decision-making based
on broader policy considerations. The authorities need to retain flexibility in
exercising their discretion.1688 Concerns with discretion may follow from constitutional
constrains of a separation of powers1689, from the character and the organisation of
the regional market1690 or from the general policy of the court.1691 The less ‘dense’
and more general the regulation, the less willing the courts are to interfere with
State’s discretion. This may be the result of greater willingness to avoid judicial
1686 Chapter 3, Section C.5; Chapter 4, B.2.a; Chapter 4, Section B.2.b; Chapter 4,
Section B.4; Chapter 4, Section C.3.
1687 Chapter 4, Section B.4; Chapter 4, Section C.3.
1688 Chapter 3, Section C.4.b; Chapter 3, Section C.5; Chapter 5, Section B.4; Chapter 4,
Section C.3.
1689 Chapter 3, Section C.4.b, Chapter 3, Section C.5.
1690 Chapter 4, Section B.4.
1691 Chapter 4, Section C.3.
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activism at an international level, resulting in a more reserved approach.1692 Courts
essentially limit their role to monitoring whether the authorities acted legally, did not
act abusively or arbitrarily or did not manifestly exceed their discretion.1693
As aptly observed by Australian commentators, there is probably no objective
balancing test to reconcile the protection of legitimate expectations and the
protection of the public interest underlying State conduct frustrating those
expectations.1694 Courts and tribunals are therefore exposed to the suspicion of
arbitrariness, unpredictability or judicial activism.1695 Except for the ECHR regime,
none of the courts use a single balancing test and often uses no identifiable
consistent mechanism, preferring instead an ad hoc balancing of relevant factors
and values.1696 The absence of such a single standard leaves the courts with broad
discretion as to how to balance these interests in a particular case. Scholarly
proposals of various standards of review, in particular proportionality, have not been
followed in practice.1697 The ad hoc case-by-case approach reflects the flexible and
amorphous nature of legitimate expectations and an equitable and pragmatic
approach of the courts. The courts’ cautious approach allays fears that concentration
on expectations tilts the balance towards the interests of an individual.1698 Although
the ECtHR employs the proportionality test, it does it in a lenient way, without
requiring the least restrictive method to balance individual and public interests.1699
The mechanism of the concept of legitimate expectations sets a low jurisdictional
threshold. This gives the courts broad jurisdiction over claims based on legitimate
expectations. In the course of their review the authorities are required to explain and
justify the conduct that frustrated legitimate expectations. However, the justification
provided is usually sufficient to show that the authorities acted within the margin of
their discretion.1700
1692 Chapter 4, Section C.3; Chapter 5, Section B.2.
1693 Chapter 4, Section B.4; Chapter 3, Section C.4.b (Coughlan (n 564)); Chapter 4,
Section C.2.b (Kopecký (n 885)); Chapter 4, Section C.3.
1694 Chapter 3, Section C.4.b.
1695 Chapter 3, Section B.5.c; Chapter 3, Section C.4.b; Chapter 4, Section B.4.
1696 Chapter 3, Section B.1.a; Chapter 3, Section B.5.b; Chapter 3, Section C.5; Chapter
4, Section B.4.
1697 Chapter 3, Section B.5.b; Chapter 3, Section C.5; Chapter 4, Section B.4.
1698 See Section C.3 of this Chapter.
1699 Chapter 4, Section C.3; Pine Valley (n 880).
1700 Chapter 3, Section C.5; Chapter 4, Section B.4; Chapter 4, Section C.3.
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This contrasts with ITL, where the dominant view is that frustration of legitimate
expectations arising from ‘representations’ and ‘commitments’ constitutes a breach
of the FET standard.1701 This approach makes no reference to the overriding public
interest or balancing. It leaves little or no space for the assessment of the host
State’s conduct affecting legitimate expectations and thus no margin for deference
and no need for a standard of review. Such an approach is out of line with the other
legal systems analysed here.
However, some recognition that investigation of the public interest behind the
measures frustrating legitimate expectations needs to be included appears to be
slowly emerging in ITL. 1702 The standards proposed by scholars are those of
proportionality, margin of appreciation, fairness and reasonableness.1703 Snodgrass
argues that they should involve an enquiry whether the State could have adopted
measures less impinging on investor’s legitimate expectations, at the same time also
accommodating the public interest.1704 Such investigation may be more intrusive than
the approaches taken in the other legal systems. As illustrated by Coughlan,
tribunals should avoid the illusion of easy alternatives. 1705 Taking the course
suggested by Snodgrass requires tribunals to establish alternatives available to and
feasible for the host State from the financial, policy and other relevant points of view
and to analyse the substantive and policy issues underlying their application.
Other legal systems suggest alternative factors for this balancing process, for
example: whether the measure frustrating legitimate expectations was a misuse of
power, was arbitrary or in excess of discretion1706; whether the authorities took good
faith measures to mitigate the effects of the frustration of expectations by way of
‘practical means eliminating unfairness’ 1707 ; whether there was an ‘average
reciprocity of advantage’ in constraining public and private interests.1708 Moreover,
tribunals could tap into the intensifying discussion on the appropriate level of scrutiny
1701 Chapter 7, Sections E.2-3.
1702 Chapter 7, Section F.
1703 Snodgrass (n 2) 48, 57; Montt (n 44) 366; Total, para. 120. See Chapter 7, Section
F.
1704 Snodgrass (n 2) 48.
1705 Chapter 3, Section C.4.b and Section C.5.
1706 Chapter 4, Section B.4. Tribunals must avoid here the circularity of equating
frustration of expectations with arbitrariness. (Montt (n 44) 222-223).
1707 Chapter 3, Section C.5.
1708 Chapter 4, Section B.5.b.
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to be applied in ITA.1709 The experience of other legal systems shows that this
balancing process is rather opaque, based on a low threshold of scrutiny and a low
level of interference with the decisions by the authorities. ITL commentators propose
that tribunals should employ the balancing process in a way not overly deferential to
national authorities.1710 There is no explanation for such modelling of the balancing
approach. Tribunals would have to be clear why they prefer the interest of investor
over that of the host State and vice versa. However, in the current situation the key
step for the tribunals is to cement the recognition of the need for balancing. The test
applied to it will probably be an ad hoc one and will develop on a case-by-case
basis. This will affect the persuasiveness and predictability of the concept.
The reluctance of investment tribunals to recognise the need for balancing exposes
yet another frontier of resistance to the public dimension of ITA, that was prominent
at the early stages of its development.1711 The reasons for such resistance may also
reflect a commercial rather than public law approach to ITL/ITA. 1712 Such a
commercial approach sees legitimate expectations as ‘transactional’ or contractual in
nature.1713 This context of assessment is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it
shows that an analysis of a contractual context of protection of legitimate
expectations would be useful to complete the comparative picture. If undertaken, it
should concentrate on economic relations between entrepreneurs and States in
public law, i.e. not in purely commercial, context.
E. The Loose Ends: Expropriation, Public International Law and Commitments
This section concerns three ‘loose ends’ remaining from the comparative
assessment of chapters 3-7. These are legitimate expectations associated with
expropriation, commitments and public international law.
In the context of expropriation legitimate expectations cover factual situations at a
‘property rights’ periphery’ 1714 that are considered worthy of protection from a
regulatory taking1715 or a deprivation of possession.1716 Proprietary expectations arise
1709. Chapter 7, Section F.
1710 Snodgrass (n 2) 57.
1711 Chapter 6, Section C; Chapter 6, Section E.
1712 Schill (n 1499) 587-588.
1713 Alvik (n 2) 160; Schreuer (n 1290) 89; Wälde & Kolo (n 13) 844.
1714 Montt (n 44) 222.
1715 Chapter 3, Section B.
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from existing laws, regulations or formal administrative acts and are protected ether
from too great, unfair and unjust constraint1717 or from unfair and disproportionate
extinguishing or invalidation.1718 The assessment whether such expectations should
be protected from impending State measures requires taking into account public
interest as well as other relevant factors.1719
ITL takes an entirely different approach to such ‘lesser’ expropriations. It does not
allow for partial takings or deprivations of individual components of an investment,
which it approaches as a whole.1720 It recognises that expropriation can be indirect,
but not partial. Legitimate expectations feature in the application of the standard of
indirect expropriation. However, they do not follow the path of RIBE. Tribunals set
the standard of indirect expropriation very high, leaving no space there for the
concept of legitimate expectations as understood in the expropriation contexts of US
law.
These developments in ITL cannot mean that less acute deprivations of property
should shift under the FET standard. At least, this should not be facilitated though
the incorrect use of the concept of legitimate expectations. The attempt to follow
such a path combines strong legal consequences attached to substantive protection
of legitimate expectations under EU law and English law with the legal sources of
proprietary expectations, namely laws, regulations and formal decisions.1721 This
approach is incorrect because substantive protection attaches only to specific
informal representations and does so on an exceptional basis.1722
Tribunals should be wary of endorsing such intellectual hybrids. Such caution follows
from the need for the concept of legitimate expectations to be predictable and
persuasive. The legitimacy of ITL would increase if treaty interpretation differentiated
between the treaty standards, here between expropriation and FET, to make them
clearer to the addressees.1723
1716 Chapter 4, Section C.
1717 Chapter 3, Section B.5.b.
1718 Chapter 4, Section C.2.a-b.
1719 Chapter 3, Section B.5; Chapter 4, Section C.3.
1720 Chapter 5, Section D.
1721 See Section C.1 of this Chapter.
1722 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b; Chapter 3, Section C.4; Chapter 4, Section B.2.c; Chapter
4, Section B.2.a.
1723 Franck (n 193).
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By contrast, the practice of investment tribunals to derive legitimate expectations
from commitments 1724 has no equivalent in the legal systems analysed in this
comparative exercise. From the comparative perspective ‘commitments’ purport to
use the protection mechanism attached to legitimate expectations reserved to
representations to a cluster of different and not clearly distinguishable sources. The
comments made above on the extension of the concept of representations beyond
informal, if official, conduct of State administration are equally applicable to
‘commitments’.1725
The last ‘loose end’ in this analysis of the comparative contributions concerns
legitimate expectations and public international law.1726 At first glance the concepts of
legitimate expectations in ITL and general international law are different. The former
uses the concept to elucidate the meaning of indeterminate treaty standard, while
the latter refers to legitimate expectations in its attempts to explain the binding nature
of international law rules. They therefore address two different questions: existence,
as opposed to content, of binding international law rules.
However, as shown above, public international law also helps to elucidate the
elements common to the concept of legitimate expectations and to distinguish
specific representations from similar specific conduct of States on an international
plane.
Its independent contribution to this comparative exercise concerns treaty
interpretation. Application of the concept of legitimate expectations in the WTO
shows clearly the perils of endorsing treaty interpretations based on subjective
‘legitimate expectations’ of one treaty party.1727 This supports the critics of Weiler &
Laird’s approach to interpreting IIAs through the prism of investor’s ‘legitimate
expectations’ arising from his reliance on the treaty.1728 It is an example of judicial
activism and risks abusing the concept of legitimate expectations. As a result,
tribunals should be cautious when endorsing interpretations arising from ‘legitimate
expectations of fair and equitable treatment’.
1724 Chapter 7, Section C.3.
1725 See Section C.2 of this Chapter.
1726 Chapter 5.
1727 Chapter 5, Section B.2.
1728 Chapter 7, Section C.1.
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F. Conclusions
How, in the light of the comparative exercise presented in this chapter, can we
answer the question posed in the introduction? Is the concept of legitimate
expectations a general principle of law, a rule of ITL, an analytical tool or merely a
relevant factor?
As mentioned in Chapter 1 1729 some commentators argue that the principle of
protection of legitimate expectations is a general principle of law. However, the
comparative exercise shows that such a narrow approach does not allow for an
understanding of the various other uses of the concept of legitimate expectations
and its potential interactions with a proposed general principle. If any general
principle of law of legitimate expectations exists, it is not a principle of ‘protection’.
Rather, it is a principle that
if an individual or a State relies on the conduct of a State in certain
circumstances, expectations arising from such reliance may be protected
by law in case a subsequent State conduct frustrates these expectations,
if refusing such protection would be unfair or unjust.
Specific factors will attach to the assessment of the factual circumstances underlying
such a scenario. These factors do not lend themselves to a formulaic summary and
can be derived from the legal systems analysed in the preceding chapters.
Legitimate expectations do not constitute a rule of ITL. References to legitimate
expectations are certainly ubiquitous, as is their application by the tribunals.
However, from the comparative perspective, the concept of legitimate expectations
in ITL is still in formation. Many questions still need to be answered to delineate a
predictable and persuasively constructed concept. It is also not certain whether that
concept will be a rule in the sense of a rule of law. Investment tribunals clearly
endorse arguments to this effect, accepting that frustration of expectations based on
broadly understood State conduct, in particular commitments and undertakings, is a
breach of the FET standard. However, such an unqualified approach is not in line
with the public law concept of legitimate expectations, which requires taking into
account public policy concerns in assessing whether expectations were frustrated
unfairly. Moreover, such a rule is dangerously close to a contractual clause, which
may take the concept outside the intended scope of a specific IIA.
1729 Section D.
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Can the concept of legitimate expectations be characterised as an analytical tool? It
certainly has some characteristics of this kind in relation to expectations arising from
the laws and regulations existing at the time of investment. These expectations are
not ‘protected’ in the sense ascribed by commentators to the general principle of law.
They merely help to establish a status quo. However, tribunals must be careful not to
attach any specific legal consequences to it merely because they refer to ‘legitimate
expectations’. Moreover, using legitimate expectations as an analytical tool cannot
lead to ascribing proprietary rights as protected under FET standard in the same
sense as they would have been protected from expropriation. The FET standard is a
standard of due process and such an approach would create confusion.
Lastly, legitimate expectations are often merely a factor in the process of applying
investment treaties. They may indicate situations when the investor’s position might
merit greater consideration but will not be dispositive of the question whether there
had been a breach of an IIA.1730
Thus, the short answer to the above question is that in some senses the concept of
legitimate expectations is all of the above because it is still a work in progress. The
comparative approach can shape its development in the future. How this may occur
is the subject of the next, and last, chapter of this thesis.
1730 See e.g. Patrick Dumberry, ‘The Protection of Investors’ Legitimate Expectations and
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard under NAFTA Article 1105’ (2014) 31 J.Int’l
Arb. 47.
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and recommendations
A. Introduction
This chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis by way of conclusions on how to
address and apply the concept of legitimate expectations. It identifies the
fundamental concerns about which tribunals need to be clear when referring to
legitimate expectations. It also identifies themes meriting further research and
comments on an express reference to the concept of legitimate expectations in a
recent draft IIA.
B. How to Apply the Concept of Legitimate Expectations in Practice
1. Three Types of Legitimate Expectations
One can identify three main types of legitimate expectations:
 type 1: general expectations related to the legal and factual situation of the
investor at the time he makes the investment;
 type 2: legitimate expectations arising from specific representations of the
host State;
 type 3: legitimate expectations related to the invalidation of State acts.
Investment tribunals need to distinguish between these different types.1731 Treating
them as a single concept diminishes the persuasiveness and coherence of ITL.
Accordingly, tribunals should first identify which of the three types is being argued
before them and adjust their methodology accordingly.
These types of legitimate expectations should not be confused with two others. First,
the concept of legitimate expectations should not be used as a tool of treaty
interpretation. The idea of ‘legitimate expectations of fair and equitable treatment’
misdirects the tribunal into enforcing investors’ subjective expectations about the
content the FET standard. 1732 Secondly, the concept of legitimate expectations
should not be used as an expression of acquired rights. Such argument has no place
in the analysis under the FET standard. It concerns proprietary protection while the
FET standard focuses on the treatment accorded to investors.1733 Impact on the
1731 Arif, para. 534.
1732 Chapter 5, Section B.2; Chapter 7. Section C.1.
1733 See Section C below.
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investment is of secondary importance for the finding of a breach, although it is
relevant for the assessment of damages. Such proprietary expectations also have no
place under the indirect expropriation standard due to the high threshold for the
finding of indirect expropriation.
2. Considerations Applicable to All Three Types of Expectations
Considering any type of legitimate expectations an investment tribunal needs to be
mindful of the general considerations applicable to all three types of expectations.1734
It should apply the concept in accordance with its equitable character and respect its
focus on safeguarding the trust in the State authorities and the conditions for non-
coercive governance. The tribunal needs to treat the concept according to its risk-
allocating function. It must analyse legitimacy of investor’s reliance on the alleged
sources of expectations. Further, it should balance the investor’s interest in fulfilment
of those expectations with the public interest justifying the measures that frustrate
them. The role, content and scope of each of these elements will depend on the type
of expectations and the circumstances of a particular case. However, the tribunal
should remember of its responsibility to self-monitor and prevent an abusive
application of the concept.1735
3. Type 1: General Expectations Related to Legal and Factual Circumstances
Legitimate expectations type 1 embody Tecmed’s ‘basic expectations’. They should
be used to analyse the relevant facts of the case to establish the situation of the
investor at the time when he made the investment.1736 They do not require the
tribunal to attach any specific legal consequences to the situation of the foreign
investor.
Type 1 expectations are not ‘frustrated’. Unfavourable administrative or legislative
changes should not be associated with such ‘frustration’. These changes can breach
the FET standard, but such breach will not constitute a frustration of this type of
expectations. In such case the tribunal will be asked to assess if the host State
applied its laws fairly and equitably. Nothing is gained by re-labelling it as a
‘frustration of legitimate expectations’.
1734 See Chapter 8, Section D.
1735 Chapter 8, Section D.3.
1736 Chapter 7, Section C.2; Chapter 8, Section C.3.
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An exception from this rule is a specific arrangement between the investor and the
host State, shielding the former from subsequent administrative or legislative
changes. This will usually be a stabilisation clause, i.e. arrangements whereby the
host State undertakes to stabilise certain aspects of its investment relationship with
the foreign investor. It is unclear to what extent stabilisation clauses shield investors
from future changes in ITL. The comparative approach shows that they are
interpreted restrictively and may be outweighed by an overriding public interest.1737 It
is also unclear whether such arrangements should be classified as expectations type
1 or type 2. Further research may help to clarify these questions.
Another exception is provided by retroactive legislative changes that need to protect
legitimate expectations by way of transitional measures. EU law provides useful
safeguards in relation to both exceptions.
When applying this type of legitimate expectations the tribunal should reject express
or implicit arguments that frustration of expectations is per se an arbitrary conduct of
the host State and thus a breach of the FET standard. Such arguments are circular
and expand the FET standard to any State conduct inconsistent with investor’s
subjective perceptions about the host State’s legal, administrative or judicial system.
4. Type 2: Legitimate Expectations Arising from Representations
Legitimate expectations type 2 are engendered by specific representations of the
host State vis-à-vis a foreign investor. Frustration of those expectations can merit
legal protection if the expectations are legitimate and there is no overriding public
interest behind the State measures that frustrate them.1738 They analysis here can
benefit greatly from analogies with EU law and English law.1739 These analogies may
help in the identification of State conduct that could give rise to legitimate
expectations; in elucidation of the circumstances in which State conduct frustrates
these expectations; and identification of situations when such frustration is not
justified by any overriding public interest and thus gives rise to an obligation to
remedy the situation.
An aspect immediately apparent from the comparative analysis is the subsumption
by investment tribunals of contractual and other formal State conduct within the
meaning and the legal consequences of specific representations. In public law, this
1737 Chapter 4, Section B.2.a; Chapter 4, Section B.4.
1738 Chapter 7, Section C.d; Chapter 8, Section C.2.
1739 Chapter 3, Section C.2.b, C.3; Chapter 4, Sections B.2.c and B.3.
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category of State conduct is outside the scope of this type of expectations.1740 An
investment tribunal extending this type of legitimate expectations beyond the scope
firmly established in national laws is likely to meet with criticism. As a result, it needs
to explain this extension. Moreover, such extension should be subject to same
methodology as the other types of conduct constituting representations. This means,
first, an objective assessment of the contractual context. Legitimate expectations
cannot be used as a substitute for the actual contractual arrangements.1741 Secondly,
the general requirement of balancing will also be applied to the extended
representations.1742
As mentioned above, stabilisation clauses will pose an additional challenge for the
tribunal. Such clauses can be treated as specific representations giving rise to
legitimate expectations type 2 1743 or as special shielding arrangements under
expectations type 1. 1744 A stabilisation clause treated as engendering type 2
expectations will trigger the question of overlap between the FET standard and the
umbrella clause, discussed in Section E.2.
Moving to the assessment of the State conduct that frustrates type 2 legitimate
expectations, the tribunal needs to consider the public interest behind such
conduct.1745 Existence of an overriding public interest will influence the tribunal’s
decision whether investor’s legitimate expectations are worthy of protection. The
tribunal will engage in weighing the private interests of the investor related to his
investment project with the public interest underlying the measures that negatively
impacted on investor’s expectations.
This element of type 2 legitimate expectations may be disappointing to those who
regard IIAs as excluding any detrimental impact by the State’s sovereign powers on
an investment project agreed between that State and the foreign investor.1746 Further
research into approach of national laws to contracts between States and individuals
could be of assistance here. However, a more realistic course is to find an
acceptable formula for the balancing of both interests.
1740 Chapter 8, Section C.2.
1741 Crawford (n 1553) 374.
1742 Chapter 8, Section D.5.
1743 Chapter 7, Section C.d; Chapter 8, C.2.
1744 Chapter 7, Section C.b; Chapter 8, D.3.
1745 Chapter 8, Section D.5.
1746 See Section C below.
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The comparative perspective is of little assistance with regard to a specific test that
could be applied to the balancing between the interests of investors and host States.
There is no set balancing test, and the balancing is generally left to a case-by-case
determination.1747 Investment tribunals should be aided in such case-by-case ad hoc
assessment by the general characteristics of the concept of legitimate expectations.
They will be guided by the need to protect confidence and trust of foreign investors
vis-à-vis host States in order to facilitate cooperation between them and to secure
non-coercive economic governance. 1748 They should also bear in mind that the
concept is equitable, i.e. demanding good faith and fair dealings from both parties,
and is employed on an exceptional basis. Tribunals need to be guided here by
common sense, pragmatism and logic and be mindful not to abuse the broad
discretion that the concept affords them.
5. Type 3: Legitimate Expectations and Ultra Vires
Legitimate expectations type 3 concern the retrospective invalidation of formal
administrative acts. The tribunal is faced with a question whether a retrospective
invalidation of a legal instrument underlying a foreign investment that had a negative
impact on that investment is a breach of an IIA and should be compensated. The
expectations here are expectations that the final administrative act will not be
invalidated rather than expectations of a successful investment project.
This type of expectations may be particularly relevant in the context of indirect
expropriation, if the invalidation neutralises the foreign investment. It also raises
certain fundamental questions discussed in Sections C.2-3.
An assessment of this type of claims involves two major sets of questions. First, the
tribunal needs to consider the interactions between the State and the investor from
the time when the relevant legal instrument was issued to when it was invalidated.
The relevant factors include: the duration of the ‘illegal’ situation, the State’s
awareness of, lack of reaction to and/or benefit from that situation. Secondly, the
tribunal needs to consider whether the investor should have been aware of the
illegality, whether he relied on the measure in good faith, and whether he contributed
1747 Chapter 7, Section F; Chapter 8, Section D.5.
1748 The crucial question here concerns the scope of social interactions in which this co-
operation will be assessed. (Chapter 8, Section D.2).
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to the illegality. 1749 The experience of ECtHR, English and EU law may be of
assistance here, as well as the CIL Shufeldt case.
C. Fundamental Questions Underlying Application of Legitimate Expectations
To be persuasive, the application of the concept of legitimate expectations has to be
‘objectively justifiable and explainable’. 1750 The decision whether legitimate
expectations are worthy of protection depends on the tribunal’s perceptions of how
the investment treaty system operates. Therefore, when giving reasons to its
decision, the tribunal needs to be clear about the following four fundamental issues
underlying application of the concept of legitimate expectations.1751
1. The Character of Protection Offered by IIAs
First, the tribunal needs to be clear about the character of protection offered by the
IIAs, in particular whether they favour the protection of investments over the host
State’s right to regulate.
Public law shows that the private interests rarely prevail over the public interest. The
State’s frustration of legitimate expectations triggers the need for remedies only
exceptionally.1752
The tribunal does not need follow this course. Its approach should reflect the nature
of protection offered by the IIA in question, and ITL as a whole. Some commentators
called for tipping the scales here in favour of investors.1753 To prevent suspicion of
abusing their mandate, investment tribunals should adopt solutions that do not
unduly favour the investor or the host State.
Whichever way it proceeds, the tribunal will have to explain the way in which it
balanced the interests of the investor with the interests of the host State.
1749 Chapter 8, Section C.4.
1750 Orakhelashvili (n 24) 196.
1751 Chapter 2, Section B.
1752 Chapter 8, Section D.4.
1753 Snodgrass (n 2) 57; Mairal (n 5) 451.
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2. The Character of the FET Standard
Secondly, the tribunal needs to be clear about the character of the FET standard. Is
it a standard of treatment, commensurate with the standard of due process and fair
procedure, or is it also a standard of proprietary protection?
Although most commentators appear to associate the FET standard with the former,
there is no clear and unambiguous answer here. Two more approaches are possible.
The tribunal may view the FET standard as a gap-filling device applicable to
situations requiring protection that the other standards do not address.1754 This gives
the tribunal an almost unlimited power to expand the scope of an IIA. It also thwarts
the development of other treaty standards, facilitating the decision-maker’s ‘escape’
into a more general and unstructured FET standard. Adopting this approach, the
tribunal will have to consider potential overlaps of the concept of legitimate
expectations with an umbrella clause and/or the indirect expropriation standard.
Moreover, the tribunal may view the FET standard as a standard of property
protection, protecting rights acquired as a result of making the investment. Any
diminution of these rights would constitute unfair and inequitable treatment. This
approach also raises the question of an overlap with the standard of indirect
expropriation.
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, in our view there is no place for this type
of expectations in ITL at its current level of development. The tribunal’s use the
concept of legitimate expectations in a proprietary sense would require elaboration of
the concept of indirect expropriation, e.g. through the Penn Central test. Recognising
that legitimate expectations could be expropriated would also require acceptance of
partial expropriation, a step the tribunals have been unwilling to take so far.1755
Equating the FET standard with the standard of due process does not mean that,
unlike in England and Australia, it should only allow for procedural remedies.1756
Investment tribunals have a limited ability to order such remedies1757 and the main
available ones are damages. However, given the equitable character of the concept
1754 FA Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’ (1981)
52 BYIL 241, 243; Dolzer, ‘FET: A Key Standard (n 5) 90; Sempra, para. 297.
1755 Chapter 6, Section B..
1756 Chapter 3, Section C.4.a.
1757 OECD, Investor-State Disputes Settlement. A Scoping Paper for the Investment
Policy Community (prepared by Gaukrodger D, Gordon K), OECD Working Papers on
International Investment 2012/2013, pp. 24-29.
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of legitimate expectations, tribunals may order a non-pecuniary remedy as an
option.1758
3. A Standard of Prudent or Reasonable Investor
Thirdly, the tribunal needs to reveal its approach to the relationship between the
standard of due diligence required from the investor and the assessment of host
State’s conduct. This question goes to the heart of the possible future development
of the ITL’s standard of reasonable or prudent investor.
This is of particular importance for the assessment of legitimacy of investor’s
expectations and with regard to type 3 expectations (retroactive invalidation of formal
State acts).1759
In the latter case the tribunal should ask whether the investor could have foreseen
the subsequent invalidation of the act. Such enquiry balances two important values.
First, it considers the host State’s obligation to act fairly and equitably towards the
investor by not invalidating final formal acts, especially if the investor relied on them
in good faith to its detriment and/or to the benefit of the host State. Secondly, it takes
into account that investors are required to conduct due diligence in making the
investment and act in good faith when relying on such formal State conduct.1760 In
particular, an investor cannot legitimately expect that an illegal measure is not going
to be invalidated if he was aware of its illegality or, in an extreme situation, when he
contributed its illegality. Detaching assessment of invalidation from such concerns1761
could undermine the rule of law in the host State by  giving investors a license to put
pressure, including undue pressure, on host State’s officials to illegally extend their
statutory powers. An important factor in this assessment is a question of time: the
longer the State knowingly overlooks the illegality and fails to correct it, the more it is
estopped from raising violation of its own law as a defence.1762
4. Does the Concept of Legitimate Expectations Apply to Contracts?
Fourthly, the tribunal needs to be clear about its approach to the question whether
expectations type 3 apply to contractual commitments.
1758 But see e.g. Arif, para. 573.
1759 Chapter 8, Section C.4.
1760 RDC, para. 116.
1761 Arif, para. 539.
1762 RDC, para. 234; Kardassopoulos/Jurisdiction, para. 194.
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This question is closely connected to an umbrella clause. The tribunal may decide
that contractual commitments should be subsumed under an umbrella clause rather
than evaluated through the concept of legitimate expectations type 2 under the FET
standard. This would limit the application of the concept of legitimate expectations to
expectations engendered by specific informal representations, bringing it to line with
other legal systems, notably EU law and English law.1763 Alternatively, the tribunal
can expand the concept of legitimate expectations to cover contractual
commitments. Implications of this approach are discussed in Section B.4.
Extending the concept of legitimate expectations type 2 to contractual commitments
could hamper the development of an umbrella clause as an independent element of
IIAs. It would expand the meaning of the FET standard to blur the boundaries
between these two types of provisions, to potentially expand the intended scope of
an IIA and diminish the legitimacy of the tribunal’s interpretative exercise.
One unarticulated assumption underlying the concept of legitimate expectations
concerns the perennial problem of foreign investment, namely that of credible State
commitments. It is sometimes assumed that IIAs support investor-State contracts
that are ‘binding under international law’ and eliminate the host State’s ability to
change its laws in a way detrimentally affecting such a contract. This view arises
from the disappointment with the internationalisation of investment contracts that
failed to produce such result. The disappointment was in the fact the host State as
party to such internationalised contracts retained its sovereign ability to change the
law and thus was thought unable ‘to make its commitment fully credible’.1764
The approach ascribing a more powerful effect to an IIA stems from the reading of its
definition of ‘investment’ as providing that ‘any breach of an agreement between the
host country and the investor [is] a violation of an international treaty’. 1765 This
conclusion is clearly erroneous since a definition of ‘investment’ per se says nothing
about what State could constitute a breach of an IIA. However, in a more generalised
version, this assumption underpins the approach to treaty obligations of some
commentators.1766
1763 Chapter 8, Section C.2.
1764 Guzman (n 39) 660.
1765 ibid 655-656, 658-660.
1766 Daniel J Blake, ‘Thinking Ahead: Government Time Horizons and the Legalization of
International Investment Agreements’ (2013) 67 International Organization 797;
Paulsson (n 1622).
270
IIAs do not support such an assumption, which is a policy-like belief of some
arbitrators and commentators as to how ITL should operate. The comparative
analysis also shows that the need for credible commitments should be corrected by
the consideration of the host State’s need for flexibility to regulate in the public
interest. This requires balancing of all relevant factors, rather than focusing on
finding ways to justify the view that investment commitments are entirely
unconstrained by the host State’s sovereign regulatory powers.
As mentioned above, a comparative research into the question of contractual State
commitments could help in developing an alternative methodology. However, this
disappointment may also be an indication of an unsolvable clash of interests that
pre-dates ITA. It is embedded in the very foundation of the system of investment
protection and was not remedied by the tailor-made structure of ICSID arbitration.1767
D. Considerations for Treaty Drafters
How can the treaty drafters benefit from this comparative analysis? The analysis
shows that the concept of legitimate expectations is flexible and as yet unsettled. Its
regulation in an IIA at this stage would be premature for at least three reasons:
First, the concept cannot be succinctly presented and thus it is difficult to regulate
without the risk of creating unintended consequences.
Secondly, once regulated, it may create inconsistency in ITA/ITL, if such regulation is
introduced only by one or a limited number of States, or if the States introduce
diverging formulations of the concept in their respective IIAs.
Thirdly, as illustrated by the Penn Central test and the concept of ‘investment-backed
expectations’, such regulation does not mean that the concept will be applied or that
such application will follow the intentions of the treaty drafters.1768
Regardless of these general comments, one needs to confront the reality of treaty-
making. The recent CETA is the first IIA with an express provision attempting to
influence the existing practice on legitimate expectations. The European
Commission described it as limiting the breach of legitimate expectations ‘to
situations where the investment took place only because of a promise made by the
1767 M Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts
(Longman 1990) 99-101.
1768 Chapter 6, Section D.
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State that was subsequently not honoured’.1769 According to unofficial information
(the text is not yet publicly available) CETA provides that a tribunal, when applying
the FET standard, may take into account
whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to
induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation,
and upon which the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain
the covered investment, but that the Party subsequently
frustrated.1770
How would a tribunal apply this provision in light of our comparative analysis? The
reference to a ‘specific representation’ points to legitimate expectations type 2. The
IIA does not clarify the scope of such ‘specific representation’, in particular whether it
includes conduct that is formal or informal, contractual, administrative, legislative or
otherwise. It may also cover formal acts that induced the investor to invest but were
subsequently invalidated, i.e. legitimate expectations type 3. The clause potentially
covers contractual commitments as well as other specific statements. It is not clear
whether the Commission’s reference to a ‘promise’ could narrow the scope of
potential State acts that could give rise to legitimate expectations.
In applying this provision a tribunal will have to establish whether the particular
representation interfered with the investor’s decision to make, or maintain, the
investment. It appears to allude to situations similar to Embassy Limousines, CNTA
or Mulder. In these cases the EU institutions caused traders to take upon themselves
greater risk than they would otherwise have and the consequences of that reliance
were later frustrated.1771
The provision gives the tribunal broad discretion to apply it. This may lead to
problems similar those caused by the concept of ‘commitments’, when tribunals de
facto exempted investors from any due diligence obligations by assuming that
investors were induced to invest .1772
To summarise, CETA limits the scope of State conduct that could give rise to
legitimate expectations to specific conduct that was instrumental in inducing the
investor to make or maintain his investment. It does not include legitimate
expectations type 1 within the scope of the concept. It requires tribunals to enquire
1769 ‘Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada free trade agreement (CETA)’, European
Commission <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf>
(accessed 16 April 2014).
1770 CETA, Section 4, Article X.9.5.
1771 Chapter 4, Sections B.2.a and B.2.c.
1772 Chapter 7, Section D.c.
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whether, but for the inducement, the investor would not have invested in the host
State. However, it does not elucidate the mechanism of assessing such inducement.
E. Suggestions for Further Research
The comparative analysis identifies at least three areas meriting additional research.
Such research could benefit further elucidation and consolidation of the concept of
legitimate expectations and its peripheries.
1. The Contractual Dimension of Legitimate Expectations
The first such area concerns interactions between the host State’s exercise of its
sovereign powers and their negative impact on the investment contract between the
investor and the State.
The comparative analysis shows that extension of the concept of legitimate
expectations type 2 to contractual commitments must involve balancing of private
and public interests. However, the answer to the question about the limits of State
sovereign powers with regard to its contractual relations with a private business party
does not need to be informed by the public law concept of legitimate expectations.
The comparative approach of this thesis does not pretend to be the only possible
solution to the problem of credible (contractual) commitments.
The old research did not bring conclusions satisfactory to the interests of foreign
investors on the perennial problem of reinforcement contractual commitments of a
host State vis-à-vis a foreign investor.1773 It is possible that a renewed research into
this area could arrive at different conclusions. The law might have changed over the
last decades. Such research would also contribute to further elucidation of the
concept of legitimate expectations. An alternative solution is to accept that exercise
of sovereign powers of a host State impacting negatively on an investment contract
cannot be entirely eliminated by an IIA. This could allow the system participants to
focus on developing rules applying to the interaction and balancing of the two
interests, private and public.
2. The Role of Stabilisation Clauses
The second area that would benefit from further research concerns stabilisation
clauses. The classic function of a stabilisation clause is to freeze specific legislation
from subsequent unfavourable change, usually for the duration of an investment
1773 Chapter 1, Section B.
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project. Another type of a stabilisation clause, an economic equilibrium clause, aims
to maintain the economic equilibrium of such a project. It does not freeze the
applicable law but obliges the parties to negotiate in good faith to restore the
project’s equilibrium.1774
Stabilisation clauses raise a number of important questions. Should they be
subsumed under legitimate expectations type 1 (as shielding arrangements) or type
2 (as contractual commitments)? They are contractual in nature and therefore raise
concerns whether they should be subsumed under the FET standard (and the
concept of legitimate expectations) or an umbrella clause. Given their repeated use
in investment projects, a set of guidelines concerning stabilisation clauses in the
context of IIAs would be a welcome assistance to the development of ITL. So far the
approach of investment tribunals to these clauses has been inconsistent. They
sometimes treat them as contractual and thereby outside the scope of their
mandate1775 and sometimes as commitments protected under the FET standard.1776
Economic equilibrium clauses signed by Argentina gave rise to the rule according to
which an investor can legitimately expect that his contractual arrangements with the
host State will not be completely dismantled.1777 The question whether this rule is
universal or is confined to stabilisation clauses has not yet been tested in practice.
3. The Standards of Review/Balancing
The third area inviting further research concerns the standard according to which
States and tribunals should balance the private interests of investors and the public
interest represented by the State. The comparative analysis shows a general
absence of a set balancing test in the more developed legal systems.1778 As a result,
any detailed research of this issue will not be coming from the research on legitimate
expectations.
1774 See generally: Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and
Sustainable Development’, OECD Global Forum on International Investment VII, 27-28
March 2008 <http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf>; Andrea
Schemberg, ‘Stabilisation Clauses and Human Rights’, OECD Global Forum on
International Investment VII, 27-28 March 2008
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+
sustainability/publications/publications_loe_stabilization__wci__1319577941106> (both
accessed 16 April 2014).
1775 Parkerings, paras. 344-345; Impregilo, para. 305.
1776 E.g. Total, para. 175.
1777 See e.g. EDF v Argentina, para. 999; El Paso, paras. 513-515.
1778 Chapter 8, Section D.5.
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However, the need for and interest in the standard of review appears to be growing
in ITL in general. 1779 An investment tribunal applying the concept of legitimate
expectations should tap onto an on-going research and discussion about such
standard.
An investment tribunal applying the results of such research to legitimate
expectations should be mindful of the level of intrusion into the host State’s
administrative decision-making allowed by such test. Australian law comments are
instructive here. They remind us that one should generally not allow a tribunal to
interfere with the policy-making of the host State. Tribunals do not have the capacity
or means to make such assessments. It is also instructive that other international or
supranational legal regimes, namely the EU and ECHR, do not apply intrusive
balancing tests and leave the State authorities with a broad margin of discretion.
F. Final Remarks
This thesis explored the concept of legitimate expectations by way of a comparative
analysis. The comparative perspective proved to be an effective way to elucidate the
incoherent concept of legitimate expectations in ITL. Its conclusions can be
instantaneously applied in practice and can contribute to a more coherent and
persuasive development of the concept of legitimate expectations in this nascent
legal regime.
The foregoing analysis greatly assists in understanding the practice of investment
tribunals so far. It clearly shows where ITL is developing in the same direction as the
other legal systems; where it combines distinct elements of the concept from
different legal systems to expand the reach of investment protection; where it ignores
universally established elements of the concept; and where it develops it in an
entirely distinct way.
The comparative perspective identifies a general approach to the concept of
legitimate expectations that goes beyond individual needs of a specific legal system.
As a result, it creates an important point of reference for justification of approaches
taken by investment tribunals. Using this point of reference in future disputes will
contribute to the development of the legal argument in ITL.
The points of convergence can help to discipline the concept’s development. It is
applied in three core areas, which are: situations of changes to existing factual and
1779 Chapter 7, Section F.
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legal situation of a person; situations created by specific representations of a State;
and situations of invalidity of State action. The concept’s application by investment
tribunals can be made more coherent at once if they use this typology to classify
arguments made before them by the parties. They can further strengthen the
persuasiveness of their reasoning by borrowing from methodologies and factors
applied in these areas by the other legal systems where the concept is more
established.
The comparative perspective is also a good point of reference where the tribunals
apply the concept inconsistently with other legal systems. Explaining their
methodology used for the concept of legitimate expectations investment tribunals
can justify their position by reference the boundaries of the concept set by other legal
systems. This will add to the system’s credibility and provide a foundation for an in-
depth doctrinal engagement with the concept by all participants of the validation
process.
The comparative analysis identifies two urgent points to address. First, the question
of using the concept of legitimate expectations to contractual commitments and,
secondly, incorporation of public interest into the concept of legitimate expectations.
It also shows that the comparative perspective cannot be of assistance with regard
to basic values that should inform the concept’s application. However, it highlights
that those values have a crucial role in the tribunals’ equitable determination whether
legitimate expectations are worthy of protection in the circumstances of a particular
case.
Other legal regimes could also benefit from a similar comparative perspective. It is
an important tool of development of any international law regime that applies to
individuals and has an independent enforcement mechanism.
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